Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics
Publication Date
2013
Publication Title
Law & Economics Working Papers
Abstract
This paper presents an overview of what economists can say about vertical constraints by multi-sided platforms at this stage in the development of our knowledge about the economics of these businesses. It describes the general procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of vertical restraints by multi-sided platforms. It then focuses on the role of critical mass for multi-sided platforms and how vertical restraints might be used on the one hand, anti-competitively to prevent rivals from achieving critical mass and long-term growth and, on the other hand, pro-competitively, to ensure the platform and its customers that the platform will remain viable.
Number
626
Recommended Citation
David S. Evans, "Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 626, 2013).
Additional Information
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