Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series
Publication Date
2025
Publication Title
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics
Abstract
Vertical restraints in labor markets are a neglected topic, but have taken on importance as the harms caused by labor market restraints have gained greater recognition. These restraints are typically a form of input foreclosure, which refers to action of a downstream buyer of inputs to hinder its competitors from accessing those inputs. But while labor markets are important input markets, there has been little discussion of how input foreclosure can be used to evaluate anticompetitive labor market transactions. This article fills that gap by providing a framework for analyzing input foreclosure in labor markets.
Number
25-34
Recommended Citation
Posner, Eric A., "Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Restraints in Labor Markets" (2025). Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series. 25-34.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/1127
