Symposium Articles
[Introduction] Symposium: Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation
Law Review Editors
Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance
Frank H. Easterbrook
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker
Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options
Kevin J. Murphy
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies
Jennifer Arlen
The Best of All Possible Worlds (Or Pretty Darn Close)
Reinier Kraakman
Market Evidence in Corporate Law
Daniel R. Fischel
Commentary on Fischel
Isaac Corre
The Case against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux
Martin Lipton
The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, and Leo E. Strine Jr.
Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters
Robert H. Sitkoff
Commentary on Sitkoff
Omri Yadlin
Corporate Charitable Giving
Victor Brudney and Allen Ferrell
Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell
Richard W. Painter
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections
Jeffrey N. Gordon
Reviews
Comments
The Case against a Nondelegable Duty on Owners to Prevent Fair Housing Act Violations
Joshua W. Dixon
"Every Spouse's Evidence": Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege in Federal Civil Trials
Katherine O. Eldred
Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under the Equal Access to Justice Act
Macon Dandridge Miller
The Nature and Scope of the FCC's Regulatory Power in the Wake of the NextWave and GWI PCS Cases
Nicholas J. Patterson
Shifting the Burden of Production under Rule 4(k)(2): A Cost-Minimizing Approach
Julius Ness Richardson
Presidential Power to "Un-Sign" Treaties
David C. Scott