Arizona State Law Journal
The editors have kindly invited Professor Sunstein and me to comment on Ronald Dworkin's article In Praise of Theory.' The article is critical of what Dworkin calls the "Chicago School" of "anti-theorists," 2 to which he has consigned both Sunstein and me despite the palpable differences between our views. I do not want to paper over those differences, but I do want to point out that Dworkin has committed the identical error in his criticisms of both of us, as well as mischaracterizing our views. That error is to announce a parochial definition of "theory," then define anyone who does not subscribe to it as an "anti-theorist." I shall explain this error and argue that it deforms Dworkin's analysis of my own conception of theory and that his own conception is inadequate as a guide for judges or others engaged in practical legal tasks.
Richard A. Posner, Response, "Conceptions of Legal Theory: A Response to Ronald Dworkin", 29 Arizona State Law Journal 377 (1997).