Georgetown Law Journal
Antitrust law has become a branch of industrial organization, itself a branch of economics. Today judges and the antitrust enforcement agencies search at every turn for economic arguments pro and con. This is a staple in academic thought as well-and it makes little difference what stripe. Those who could be called hawks employ economic argument, just as do those who see less scope for antitrust do. Most of the papers delivered at this symposium, like the merger guidelines issued by the National Association Attorneys General (NAAG),' are grounded in economic rather than political theories. More economics lies ahead. But what shall we do with economic argument, which all too often has no firm conclusion? I add a thought that is old in thinking about economic arrangements but novel in thinking about the application of law to industrial organization: comparative advantage.
Frank H. Easterbrook, "Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks," 76 Georgetown Law Journal 305 (1987).