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Abstract
When the government removes a noncitizen with a final deportation order to a third country—one they may never have visited and to which they have no ties—it currently does so based on diplomatic assurances that an immigration officer deems credible. Individuals receive no notice of their destination, no opportunity to present evidence of feared persecution or torture, and no explanation of the government’s safety determination. The Trump administration claims that these decisions are entirely unreviewable by courts, invoking broad executive authority over removal and foreign affairs.
This Comment argues that complete unreviewability cannot stand on two inde- pendent grounds. Section 1231(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act creates a categorical, mandatory prohibition on removal to danger—and settled statutory entitlement doctrine requires courts to have power to enforce mandatory congres- sional commands rather than construe them as nullities. The plenary power doctrine, however broad, does not eliminate that review. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test confirms that the constitutional floor lies above zero: The severity of potential harm, the near-total absence of documented process, and the minimal bur- den that documentation would impose all demand, at minimum, notice and a mean- ingful opportunity to present evidence.
Recommended Citation
Shrock, Caroline
(2026)
"Deporting to Danger: A Process-Based Framework for Reviewing Third-Country Removals,"
University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 93:
Iss.
6, Article 5.
Available at:
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol93/iss6/5
