Publication Date
2014
Publication Title
Public Law & Legal Theory
Abstract
The Constitution’s distribution of power among three branches of the federal government is valued because it aims to produce some bundle of valuable social or public goods such as democracy, rights, or welfare. This essay examines the interaction between constitutional structure and those goods a libertarian might pursue. Analyzing the options for both a constitutional designer and a constitutional interpreter, it suggests that first-order preferences over liberty fail to translate into structural design maxims in any mechanical or predictable way.
Number
464
Recommended Citation
Aziz Huq, "Libertarian Separation of Powers" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 464, 2014).
Additional Information
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