Judicial Oversight of National Security Policy in Ontologically Contested Democracies
Publication Date
2024
Document Type
Dissertation
First Advisor
Tom Ginsburg
Second Advisor
Aziz Z. Huq
Third Advisor
Geoffrey R. Stone
Abstract
National security governance has predominantly been organized by the elected branches of government. The executive and legislative branches, many constitutional scholars contend, are institutionally more competent and democratically more legitimate in governing national security matters than courts. However, the conventional view that courts play limited roles in overseeing national security policies is not universally supported, and this is especially the case in ontologically contested democracies, where the boundary of the state or the core interests of national security are inherently contentious due to the prolonged geopolitical tensions these democracies experience. Owing to the distinct nature of ontologically contested democracies, national security governance involves the normalization of geopolitical tensions, uneven public support for the executive’s decisive national security measures, and high-profile national security disputes. These three factors present a particular political and constitutional environment that may encourage courts to oversee national security policies in a rigorous manner. In this dissertation, I examine the oversight of national security policy by constitutional courts in three ontologically contested democracies: South Korea, Taiwan, and Lithuania.
Recommended Citation
Wang, Shih-An, "Judicial Oversight of National Security Policy in Ontologically Contested Democracies" (2024). J.S.D. Dissertations. 74.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jsd_dissertations/74
https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.12719
