Volume 33, Number 1 (1990)
Front Matter
Editorial Staff
The Fable of the Keys
S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis
How Efficient Is the Voting Market?
Sam Peltzman
Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed"
Pablo T. Spiller
The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions
Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan
The Rationality of U. S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum
Thomas W. Hazlett
The Race for Property Rights
Terry Anderson and Peter J. Hill
Detection Controlled Estimation
Jonathan S. Feinstein
An Empirical Study of the Effect of Rule 19c-3
Kalman J. Cohen and Robert M. Conroy
Back Matter
Editorial Staff