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University of Chicago Legal Forum

Abstract

What is religion, and should immigration courts seek to define religion in the context of asylum claims? Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), individuals who have experienced past persecution or fear future persecution because of their religious beliefs can apply for asylum in the United States. Although individuals are afforded these protections under the statutory provisions of the INA, there is a fundamental problem in the way courts have treated religious asylum claims. Rather than holistically considering religion, courts have instead focused on religion’s fragmentary aspects. This fragmentary understanding of religion has contributed to another legal problem among the courts: the interpretation of the one central reason standard under the INA.

This Comment explores the current circuit split between the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. While the Fourth Circuit has found that religion can be one central reason for an individual’s religious persecution even if their persecutor’s ultimate goal was unrelated to religion, the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have narrowly construed the standard, finding that religion or another protected ground in itself must have been the ultimate motivation for the persecutor to target the applicant. To resolve this circuit split, this Comment argues that courts must first adopt an understanding of religion in the context of religious asylum claims in order to determine what it means to be persecuted on account of religion under the INA. To avoid inconsistent reasoning among immigration and federal courts as it relates to the one central reason standard, this Comment proposes a four-part definitional methodology of religion and argues that a but-for causation standard as used in Title VII claims is sufficient in adjudicating religious asylum claims.

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