Publication Date
2001
Publication Title
Public Law & Legal Theory
Abstract
Can computers, or artificial intelligence, reason by analogy? This essay urges that they cannot, because they are unable to engage in the crucial task of identifying the normative principle that links or separates cases. Current claims, about the ability of artificial intelligence to reason analogically, rest on an inadequate picture of what legal reasoning actually is. For the most part, artificial intelligence now operates as a kind of advanced version of LEXIS, offering research assistance rather than analogical reasoning. But this is a claim about current technology, not about inevitable limitations of artificial intelligence; things might change in the future.
Number
18
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Of Artifical Intelligence and Legal Reasoning" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 18, 2001).
Additional Information
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