Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics
Law & Economics Working Papers
The laws of war govern the weapons and tactics that belligerents may use against each other. This paper uses a model of conflict to explain and evaluate the laws of war. In the model a nation’s propensity to engage in conflict is a positive function of the effectiveness of military technology, and a negative function of the destructiveness of technology. Accordingly, in theory nations would want to agree to laws of war that permit destructive weapons and tactics but limit their effectiveness. However, nations with different endowments and resources will enjoy differential advantages, and this makes agreement on specific laws of war very difficult. The paper discusses empirical implications of the argument, and discusses whether the Hague Conventions are consistent with the model.
Eric Posner, "A Theory of the Laws of War" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 160, 2002).
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.