University of Chicago Law Review
In this Article we argue against imposing any additional burdens on investments by SWFs in the United States; at least at present. In our view, at this point a policy of watchful waiting is preferable to any immediate effort to impose special restrictions on SWFs On the one hand, the nightmare scenarios painted by SWF critics often involve activities that would be caught by existing laws; either as they relate to national security or to various forms of business regulation under the securities and antitrust law. On the other hand, we do not possess perfect foresight and cannot say that every possible permutation of SWF investment should escape a regulatory response in the future. What we do know, however, says that the burden of proof lies on those who think that further prophylactic regulation is in order at this juncture To date, SWFs have acted as model investors, and the risk that they may act strategically in the future is significantly mitigated by existing safeguard& A far greater danger to America's economy and security inheres in taking unnecessary action that would encourage SWFs to redirect their investments elsewhere; or to harbor resentment toward the United States that could express itself in a wide range of hostile action.
Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, "The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow," 76 University of Chicago Law Review 111 (2009).