Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation
This paper builds on contributions to the Sloan conference Benefit-Cost Analysis of Financial Regulation, held at the University of Chicago, to show how benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of financial regulations should be conducted. Our major themes are that (1) on theoretical grounds, BCA should be easier for financial regulation than for other areas of regulation where it is already used, such as health and safety regulation; (2) while many needed valuations for BCA of financial regulation do not yet exist, those valuations are theoretically measurable; (3) once regulators commit to using BCA, economists will have incentives to work on supplying those valuations; (4) BCA will improve financial regulation and make it less vulnerable to judicial challenge; and (5) the specific protocols or paradigms of BCA will differ across different areas of financial regulation.
Posner, Eric A. and Weyl, E. Glen
"Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation,"
Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 43:
3, Article 1.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jls/vol43/iss3/1