Volume 29, Number 1 (2000)
A Fine Is a Price
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini
Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict
Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat
Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions
George Triantis
An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law
David A. Weisbach
Have Changing Liability Rules Compensated Workers Twice for Occupational Hazards? Earnings Premiums and Cancer Risks
John Lott and Richard L. Manning
Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry
Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer
Incentives to Settle under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation
Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman
Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman
An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms
Hung-Jen Wang and Michelle J. White
Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension
Robert Innes
Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of Rights
Jeremy Waldron
Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights
Richard H. Pildes