Good Cop, Bad Cop:Delegating Interrogations
Start Page
151
Abstract
A decision- maker who aims to find the truth from a suspect delegates to an interrogator with possibly misaligned preferences. The ideal interrogator is always misaligned: sometimes nicer, sometimes tougher. The decision-maker can further improve by conditioning the delegation on the evidence, which is her private information, appointing a nice interrogator when the evidence is weak and a tougher interrogator when the evidence is strong. Dynamic, endogenous,conditional delegation can credibly convey information about the strength of the evidence and implement the overall optimum with full commitment. More-over, the decision-maker can then retain authority over decisions by relying on the interrogator’s recommendations.
Recommended Citation
Ispano, Alessandro and Vida, Péter
(2026)
"Good Cop, Bad Cop:Delegating Interrogations,"
Journal of Law and Economics: Vol. 69:
No.
1, Article 6.
Available at:
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jle/vol69/iss1/6
