The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulations: Battleground States, State Regulators, and the Environmental Protection Agency

Authors

Huseyin GulenFollow
Brett W. MyersFollow

Start Page

225

Abstract

The Electoral College creates incentives for politicians and regulators to direct policy favors toward battleground or swing states. We examine whether this affects regulatory enforcement and find that facilities in battleground states are less likely to be found in violation of the Clean Water Act, partially because the permit limits for facilities in these states are less restrictive. Identification is obtained by analyzing violation rates of similar facilities located along the border between battleground and nonbattleground states.

Recommended Citation

Gulen, Huseyin and Myers, Brett W. (2024) "The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulations: Battleground States, State Regulators, and the Environmental Protection Agency," Journal of Law and Economics: Vol. 67: No. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jle/vol67/iss1/7