Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond
Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.
Ramseyer, J. Mark and Rasmusen, Eric B.
"Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond,"
Journal of Law and Economics: Vol. 57
, Article 9.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jle/vol57/iss4/9
Full text not available in ChicagoUnbound.