Chicago Journal of International Law


Much has been written about how the end of the Cold War totally shifted the post World War II framework of foreign policy and national security assumptions for the United States, and for the rest of the world. Desert Storm underlined both that shift and the extraordinary military force that could be brought to bear by the United States. The Clinton Administration was obviously the first American administration forced to grapple with what that shift meant in terms of how to define our national interest; how and when to use the military; how to preserve or redefine our relationships with both traditional allies and traditional "enemies." This transitional period necessarily lacked the intense policy focus on terrorism that resulted from the terrible events of September 11th. And because, shortly after I arrived, both Houses of Congress shifted into Republican control, this transition almost by definition would feature classic struggles between the Congress and the Executive branch, as well as between the parties controlling each branch of government. All the same, I would argue that the Clinton Administration's efforts to deal with Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, North Korea, Kosovo, and East Timor, along with the newly effective power of non- governmental organizations on the international treaty scene (for example, landmines, the proposed International Criminal Court) offer some lessons to build upon now. [CONT]