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Chicago Journal of International Law

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477

Abstract

The lack of resources that afflicts Ghanian and Ivorian enforcement of child labor prohibitions has allowed for the continued use of child labor in the cocoa industry. The current enforcement bodies not only suffer from serious coordination problems, but also fall victim to the harsh reality of cocoa farming, which pays pitiful daily wages to farmers. Child labor serves as a cheap, and perhaps even cost-free, option that allows farmers to maximize their profits. Many cocoa plantations are family-run, and thus the inclusion of children in the workforce is often a natural step, even where educational opportunities are available. To sacrifice productivity is to sacrifice one’s livelihood. This Comment first analyzes Ghana’s and Côte d’Ivoire’s child labor statutory regimes along with their enforcement apparatuses. This entails a deep dive into the efforts being taken by government and non-government actors along with a discussion of contributing factors relating to the use of child labor. Finally, the Comment proposes a novel solution to establish an intergovernmental organization, or commodity cartel, between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire to better regulate and coordinate cocoa export and growth, modeled after existing commodity cartels. This Comment focuses on the organizational feasibility of such an organization and the potential ramifications, both advantageous and detrimental, such consolidation would cause.

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