Chicago Journal of International Law

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Cybercrime’s transnational nature has rendered conventional methods of domestic policing ineffective. The international community must cooperate to combat cross-border cybercriminals. Law enforcement efforts to respond to the threat through cyber sting operations call into question the degree to which individuals are protected by the entrapment defense. There is disagreement in the international community about the validity of the defense. The lack of consensus threatens effective law enforcement cooperation in responding to cybercrime, posing a global security risk. Furthermore, if countries with dissimilar entrapment rights cooperate to share data and carry out cyber stings, there is a heightened risk of the rights of the private citizen being diluted. After summarizing existing international agreements that discuss transnational crime and cybercrime, this Comment proposes that the international community modify the Budapest Convention to establish a “minimum floor” of entrapment rights. This approach would require countries, at a minimum, to consider entrapment as grounds for mitigation at sentencing or discretionary exclusion of evidence. While countries have been hesitant to explicitly codify entrapment in legislation, there has been an observed acceptance of entrapment-based rights in practice.

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