In this article, I elaborate on the Anderson and GreweU recommendation by arguing for a test to identify which environmental problems can be handled internally and for a commitment to focus foreign policy on international, not local, environmental problems. I first illustrate how international environmental regulations can cause harm by exploring how the Basel Convention stopped the export of scrap ships to south Asia.2 I then review how federal environmental policies in the United States are imposed as solutions for all manner of local environmental problems and point out that a trend towards centralized environmental policymaking at the international level is likely because the causes of centralized decisionmaking within the United States also exist at an international level. I then outline an economically sound approach to identify environmental problems that can be handled internally and develop a practical definition of such problems. Finally, I make recommendations that might help focus international organizations' involvement in environmental policy development only where local solutions are inappropriate.
"Sovereignty, Federalism, and the Identification of Local Environmental Problems,"
Chicago Journal of International Law:
2, Article 16.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol2/iss2/16