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United Nations Endorsement & Support for Human Rights: An Experiment on Women’s Rights in Pakistan*

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Abstract
The United Nations is the organization charged with developing and promoting international human rights law. Despite the importance of these efforts, a number of obstacles have made it difficult to empirically assess whether the United Nations’ efforts actually causes countries to improve their human rights practices. In order to study this topic, we conducted an experiment in Pakistan that tested whether respondents were more likely to support policies aimed at improving women’s rights when they learned that the reforms were proposed by the United Nations. Our results indicate that the respondents who were randomly informed of the United Nations endorsement not only expressed higher support for the policy reforms, but also were more likely to express willingness to “mobilize” in ways that would help the reforms be implemented. Our treatment did not have any effect, however, on respondents that did not already have confidence in the United Nations.

Word Count: 9,994

Keywords: Human Rights, United Nations, Women’s Rights, International Law, Experimental Research
I. INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the twentieth century, a large web of international agreements and institutions was developed to regulate the way that governments treat their citizens. This web forms the basis for one of the primary bodies of international law: human rights law. As the organization charged with developing and promoting human rights law, the United Nations has worked to create a series of major international treaties on the topic. Moreover, the United Nations has also formed a number of institutions that are responsible for encouraging countries to comply with the obligations contained in human rights treaties. These institutions do not, however, have the power to force countries to improve their human rights practices. Instead, these entities have primarily focused on regularly reviewing member states’ human rights practices and subsequently issuing reports with policy recommendations for a given member state outlining areas of suggested improvement. Although countries are not sanctioned for failing to adopt the recommendations contained in the United Nations reports, the hope is that the reports will produce new ideas and political pressure that will lead member states to improve their human rights practices.

Despite the considerable resources that are expended every year to administer this system, scholars still vigorously debate whether these efforts actually lead countries to improve their human rights practices. Critics of the system have argued that, because of a number of shortcomings, international human rights law has failed to achieve its objectives (e.g., Posner 2014; Hopgood 2013; Moyn 2010). For example, these scholars have argued that weak enforcement mechanisms, the proliferation of rights, and lack of consensus on what rights should be protected have all made the human rights regime ineffective. Defenders of the system have argued that, despite its flaws, international human rights law has produce dividends in at least some circumstances (e.g., Goodman and Jinks 2013; Sikkink 2011; Simmons 2009). For example, these scholars have argued that domestic political actors in countries that are at least partially democratic may have an easier time generating support for reforms when the international human rights system lends credibility to their efforts.
Although social scientists have used increasingly sophisticated quantitative methods to try and resolve this debate, the existing research has produced inconclusive results. While a number of prominent studies have suggested that the effect of international human rights law on repression to be either neutral or negative (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Keith 1999), other research has found that international human rights law can cause countries to improve their behavior (e.g., Fariss 2015; Lupu 2015; Conrad 2014; Dai 2014; Lupu 2013a; Hill 2010; Simmons 2009; Landman 2005). These inconclusive results remain a feature of even the most prominent and cutting edge empirical research on human rights: in 2014 the American Political Science Review published a paper providing new evidence to suggest that ratification of international human rights treaties is associated with increased rights protections (Fariss 2014), but in the next issue the same journal published a paper finding that ratification of international treaties did not improve estimates of state repression (Hill and Jones 2014).

One reason that these quantitative studies have produced mixed results is that there are a number of obstacles that make reliable causal inference in this field incredibly difficult. Most notably, international human rights treaties are written with the preferences of (at least some) countries in mind (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996), and, after the treaties are written, countries are not randomly assigned to be part of the treaty regimes (Lupu 2013b; von Stein 2005). In other words, there are a number of endogeneity problems that thwart efforts to study the effect of international human rights agreements. Additionally, most of the major international human rights agreements have been universally ratified (Chilton and Tingley 2013). This is a major obstacle to empirical researchers because variation is a basic requirement of causal inference. Finally, scholars have struggled to find unbiased sources of data to use as cross-country measures of human rights practices (Fariss 2014). The consequence is that researchers often do not have reliable dependent variables to assess the effectiveness of the international human rights regime.

In response to these obstacles, researchers have begun to use experimental methods to test whether information on international law increases support for improving human rights practices (e.g., Hafner-Burton, LeVeck, and Victor 2016;
Mcentire, Leiby, and Krain 2015; Ausderan 2014; Chilton 2014; Wallace 2013; Putnam and Shapiro 2009; Tomz 2008). One advantage of these methods is that they allow researchers to directly test the theories that have been developed to explain why countries may improve their human rights practices. Although experimental methods have their own limitations, the handful of studies that have been conducted to date have suggested that information on international law can produce modest increases in support for policies designed to improve the protection of human rights.

The experimental research studying human rights law that has been conducted to date, however, suffers from several limitations. First, these experiments have been almost conducted entirely on respondents in the United States. This is not only potentially problematic because respondents in the United States are likely to have idiosyncratic views on international law, but also because previous research has also suggested that the international human rights agreements are unlikely to effect all countries equally (Conrad 2014; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Neuymayer 2005). Instead, research has suggested that international human rights law is most likely to change the behavior of “partial” democracies—that is, states that are neither stable democracies or stable autocracies (Simmons 2009). The generalizability of existing research is thus severely limited because these studies have not been conducted in partially democratic countries where human rights agreements are (theoretically) most likely to have an effect.

Second, there have not yet been any studies designed to test the primary mechanism through which the United Nations tries to encourage countries to improve their human rights practices. As previously noted, the United Nations regularly issues country-specific reports that outline policies it recommends that a specific country should adopt. Experiments have not yet been used to whether the fact that the United Nations endorsed these proposals increases their support. Instead, the experiments that have been conducted to date have largely used vignettes to tests whether references to international human rights treaties changes support for actions that would violate human

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1 We are only aware of two exceptions. First, Hafner-Burton, LeVeck and Victor (2016) conducted a survey that included 132 international elites that work at human rights NGOs. Second, Ausderan (2014) recruited 205 respondents from India for his experiment (in addition to a sample from the United States).
If the expansive human rights apparatus that has been developed beyond the treaties themselves does not improve the likelihood of human rights being protected, however, it would call into question the value of a great deal of the efforts that define the current international human rights system. As a result, it is important to test whether the fact that the United Nations is the institution developing and recommending policy reforms increases the likelihood that the reforms will be adopted.

Third, these experiments have largely been conducted on respondents recruited online. In many countries, however, policies proposed by human rights reformers remain controversial. Since the leading theory for why international human rights law may help lead to improvements in domestic human rights is that it increases the likelihood that mobilization efforts will gain traction (Simmons 2009), simply testing whether respondents will express support for human rights reforms when completing an anonymous online survey may not accurately measure whether respondents would be willing to more publically express support. It is thus important to test whether human rights law may lead respondents to express greater support for reforms during an in person interaction.

Our study was designed to address these three problems, and in doing so, bring new evidence to the debate on the effectiveness of international human rights law. More specifically, we conducted an experiment during interviews in Pakistan that tested whether endorsement from the United Nations increases support for policy reforms aimed at improving women’s rights. We believe that Pakistan was an ideal country for our experiment both because it is a developing country that is partially democratic, and because there is a great deal of variance in views about human rights. As a result, Pakistan is exactly the kind of country in which previous research has suggested human rights law might be able to make a difference. We also believe that women’s rights was an ideal topic for our experiment because previous research using observational data has suggested that Convention for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) may have helped improve women’s rights (Richards and Haglund 2015; Cole 2013; Lupu 2013b; Hill 2010; Simmons 2009), but this assertion has not yet been the subject of any experimental research. Moreover, the United Nations recently issued a
report suggesting specific policy reforms to improve women’s rights in Pakistan that we were able to use as the basis of our study, and the status of women’s rights are currently a salient political topic in Pakistan.

To administer our experiment, a team of six researchers conducted interviews with 614 respondents in Pakistan in December 2014 and January 2015. The experiment used an “endorsement” design (Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro 2011) to test the effect that learning that the United Nations proposed a given policy had on a participant’s level of support for that policy. The respondents were all asked whether they agreed with four policy proposals aimed at improving the rights of women in Pakistan. These policy proposals were directly taken from a 2013 report produced by the United Nations’ CEDAW Committee on the status of Pakistan’s compliance with its commitments to the rights of women. Half of the respondents were asked whether they support the proposals without information on where the proposals came from, while the other half of the respondents were told that the policies were proposed by the United Nations.

Our experiment found that endorsement from the United Nations had a substantively large and statistically significant effect on support for all four proposals. Moreover, the results of the experiment suggest that respondents that were told of the United Nations’ endorsement for reforms also expressed greater willingness to “mobilize” to support human rights. That said, our treatment did not have any effect on respondents that did not already have confidence in the United Nations. In other words, respondents were only more supportive of proposals endorsed by the United Nations when they already trusted the organization. Although our experiment has clear limitations, it does provide some qualified evidence to support the argument that the international human rights regime can aid domestic activists hoping to mobilize support for reform, but only if there is already faith in those international institutions.
II. BACKGROUND

The International Human Rights System

The international human rights law system is based on a number of treaties and institutions that—at least on their face—are designed to protect citizens from having their rights violated. Although a number of treaties have been developed over the years, there are six core treaties on human rights: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). These treaties all contain a large number of different commitments—for example, one account suggests that the ICCPR contains protections for 58 different rights (Posner 2014, at 152-154).

In addition to promulgating international treaties, the United Nations has also created several institutions charged with improving human rights protections. Three are worth mentioning. First, the United Nations has an Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. This office promotes and coordinates the United Nations’ policies towards human rights. Second, there is a Human Rights Council—comprised of 47 member states—that investigates and reviews alleged human rights violations. Finally, the major international treaties all have their own committees comprised of subject matter experts. For example, the CEDAW committee has 23 “independent experts” that monitor member states’ implementation and compliance with the CEDAW agreement.

The primary way that the treaty committees monitor member states is through issuing regular reports. Member states are obligated to file periodic reports to the committees on their implementation of the relevant treaty (although this obligation is often ignored). The treaty committee can then file its own response in which it makes observations about the country’s report. These responses comment on positive developments within the member country, and also make recommendations on steps the country should take to implement the relevant human rights treaty. Often these
recommendations call for fairly vague actions like “improving women’s access to healthcare,” but in other cases the report will call for specific reforms like imposing a 33% quota on the number of seats reserved for women in the national parliament. Although these reports are the primary way that the treaty bodies try to promote the protection of human right, there is a great deal of variance in how seriously countries take their reporting obligations (Creamer and Simmons 2015).

**Difficulties with Observational Data**

Despite the considerable resources countries expend in promoting this system of international human rights law, whether or not these treaties and institutions actually change state behavior is still disputed by scholars (compare Posner 2014 with Simmons 2009). This debate remains unsettled, at least in part, because several problems have made empirically assessing the effectiveness of the international human rights regime incredibly difficult.

The problem that has received the most attention is the fact that international treaties generally—and human rights treaties specifically—are drafted with the preferences, and likely policies, of states in mind (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). The designs of international human rights treaties are thus often endogenous to the preferences of the states. Moreover, after the treaties are drafted, the decision whether (and, more realistically, when) to ratify a given treaty is not random (Lupu 2013b; von Stein 2005; Neumayer 2005). The consequence of these facts is that efforts to study the effects of treaty ratification on policies are plagued by selection bias. For example, the fact that countries improve their human rights practices after ratifying a relevant treaty does not necessarily suggest that the improvement was due to the new commitment; instead the same forces that led the state to ratify the treaty might also be responsible for the improved rights protections.

Beyond selection bias, another problem is that the major international human rights treaties have near universal ratification (Chilton and Tingley 2013). For example,
South Sudan became the 189th country to ratify CEDAW on April 30, 2015. To put this in perspective, South Sudan became the 193rd member of the United Nations on July 14, 2011. The fact that nearly every member of the United Nations is a party to the convention makes it nearly impossible to evaluate the effect of ratifying the treaty on policy because a basic requirement of causal inference is variance (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Although scholars have tried to address this problem by examining the variance that existed between when treaties opened for signature and when they received near universal ratification (Lupu 2015; Lupu 2013a; Lupu 2013b; Hill 2010; Simmons 2009; Hathaway 2002), this strategy has limitations because the windows before universal ratification are increasingly brief (Chilton and Tingley 2013).

Moreover, even if researchers were able to identify a research strategy that overcame the selection bias and lack of variance, the problem would remain that it is difficult to identify reliable sources of cross-country data on human rights practices. For example, recent research has suggested that the primary datasets used by human rights scholars are biased because coding standards are not consistent over time (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that international human rights treaties protect a wide range of rights (Posner 2014). As a result, even if it is possible to find data to use as a dependent variable for a handful of rights, it is difficult to know whether any empirical results would hold for the complete range of rights covered by international treaties.

In addition to these problems—which have all previously been identified as obstacles to empirically studying the effectiveness of international human rights law generally—there are also a number of obstacles to studying the effectiveness of reports produced by the United Nations specifically. First, the recommendations contained in the reports may heavily depend on the current climate for human rights reform within a country. If this were the case, evidence that a recommendation was adopted after a report would not necessarily mean that the report made a difference—it instead may mean that the report contained recommendations that were likely to pass. Second, it is

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2 A list of the countries that have ratified CEDAW is available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited June 14, 2015).
incredibly difficult to obtain cross-country coding on whether legal reforms have been adopted. This problem is dramatically exacerbated by the fact that reports may recommend dozens of potential reforms. Finally, since the reports produced by the United Nations bodies may contain dozens of recommendations, any efforts to study their effects would have to take into account the risks of multiple hypothesis testing. In short, evidence that countries adopted one type of recommendation does not necessarily demonstrate that on the whole reforms are more likely to be adopted because they are proposed by the United Nations.

**Mechanisms of Compliance & Public Opinion**

Given these limitations of using observational data, one approach that can be used to empirically test the effectiveness of the human rights regime is to design an experiment that tests the mechanisms that have been theorized to drive compliance with this body of international law. Since experiments certainly have limitations of their own, it is unlikely that experimental evidence could settle this debate. If an experiment suggested that a mechanism through which human rights law could change behavior is at least plausible, however, it would bring new evidence to the discussion.

Of course, a critical step in this method is identifying a mechanism through which human rights law might change state behavior. That said, there is considerable disagreement over which mechanisms are most likely to be effective. One thing that scholars that have both criticized and defended the human rights system have agreed on, however, are the mechanisms through which international human rights law is unlikely to cause states to improve their human rights practices. For example, scholars on both sides of the debate have argued that the United Nations human rights system does not place direct pressure on states to improve their rights practices (Posner 2014, at 95-104; Hafner-Burton 2013, at 44-66; Simmons 2009, at 121-125). Moreover, scholars on both sides of the debate have also argued that powerful states rarely place pressure on states to improve their human rights practices (Posner 2014, at 80-81; Simmons 2009, at 116).³

³ For empirical evidence suggesting that powerful states do not reward or punish countries for their human rights practices, see Nielsen and Simmons (2015) and Nielsen (2013).
Although there is agreement that direct pressure from human rights bodies or powerful countries is unlikely to drive compliance, some scholars have argued that the international system can make a difference by changing the domestic political climate in ways that may increase the probability that rights will be protected (e.g., Lupu 2015; Hillebrecht 2014; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Lupu 2013a; Simmons 2009; Dai 2002). One specific way international human rights law may alter domestic political climates is by making it easier to gain support for potential reforms (e.g., Hafner-Burton, LeVeck, and Victor 2016; Neumayer 2005). For example, in one prominent articulation of this theory, Simmons (2009) argues that international human rights law can change domestic political climates because appeals to international standards makes the public more sympathetic to demands for reforms. The theory, simply put, is that the statements of international organizations may be used to try and make public opinion more supportive of a particular form, and, in turn, those changes in “public opinion [create] some pressure towards compliance with international law” (Posner and Sykes 2013, at 27).

A number of studies have tested this mechanism using data from public opinion surveys (e.g., Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012; Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp 2009) and survey experiments (e.g., McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015; Chilton 2014; Wallace 2013). This line of research has consistently found that information on international law can increase support for the protection of human rights. To our knowledge, these studies have all focused on whether appeals to the obligations contained in international human rights treaties increase support for a particular policy. What these studies have not tested, however, is whether the existence and activities of the entire international architecture designed to enforce these treaties—that is, the United Nations human rights organizations—actually can change public opinion. In other words, prior research has suggested that appeals to an international treaty may increase support for protecting a particular right, but they have not tested whether the policies and proposals produced by

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4 The argument that international organizations can influence policy by changing the domestic political climate is not unique to human rights. See, e.g., Fang (2008) (use of force); Dai (2005) (international environmental agreements); Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2002) (international trade agreements).

5 For example, Wallace (2013) tested whether invocations of international treaty obligations reduced support for Torture in the United Nations.
the international human rights organizations are more likely to be supported than policies suggested without the authority of international human rights law.

The experiment we have developed is designed to test whether policy reforms proposed to improve human rights protections receive increased support when they are recommended by the United Nations. In doing so, we follow a body of research that has tested the effects of endorsement on support for public policy (e.g., Bush and Jamal 2015; Berinsky 2009; Arceneaux 2008; Druckman and Lupia 2000). This research has found that individuals change their views based on the endorsement of political parties, elites, and in some cases, even the United Nations. For example, while studying policy diffusion, Linos (2011, 2013) found that U.S. respondents were more likely to support health reforms and maternity leave policies when these reforms when they are informed that these policies are recommended by the United Nations. If United Nations endorsement were to similarly increase public support for the policies it recommends that countries adopt to improve their human rights, that would provide evidence for the theory that international human rights law may lead to improved rights practices because the international system makes it easier for advocates to gain domestic support for reforms.

III. Experimental Design

Case Selection

We believe that Pakistan was an ideal country to conduct our experiment in for two reasons. First, research has suggested that the international human rights system is unlikely to improve rights protections in stable democracies or stable autocracies, but may improve rights protection in countries that are neither completely democratic nor completely autocratic (Simmons 2009). To our knowledge, however, there has not yet been any experimental research on the effects of the international human rights regime conducted in one of these “transitional democracies.” Pakistan is one of these countries. Not only was Pakistan identified as a transitional democracy by the methodology
Simmons (2009) used to classify countries, but Pakistan was rated as “Partially Free” by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report in both 2014 and 2015. Second, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in public views towards human rights in Pakistan. If there were already widespread public support for human rights reforms within a country, it would be difficult to assess whether endorsement by the United Nations increases that support. Instead, an ideal country to study would have variance in public opinion on human rights issues. Pakistan is a country that is currently undergoing a great deal of public debate about human rights generally, and over the role of women in society specifically.

We decided to focus on women’s rights within Pakistan for several reasons. First, empirical research using observational data has found evidence suggesting that CEDAW has caused more improvements in human rights than other agreements have (Richards and Haglund 2015; Cole 2013; Lupu 2013b; Hill 2010). To date, however, the small amount of literature that has used experimental methods to study the effectiveness of human rights (Mcentire, Leiby, and Krain 2015; Ausderan 2014; Chilton 2014; Wallace 2014; Wallace 2013; Putnam and Shapiro 2009; Tomz 2008), has not yet examined women’s rights. Women’s rights thus provide an excellent topic because experimental research has not yet been used to test whether the mechanisms hypothesized as driving an increase in support for women’s rights are plausible. Second, the United Nations completed a review of Pakistan’s women’s rights record in 2013. Since many of the recommendations had not yet been adopted when we began our experiment in 2014, the report provided us with a number of timely, concrete proposals to evaluate. Third, the condition of women in many parts of the world—including Pakistan—remains deplorable. For example, in Pakistan the practice of families “honor killing” female family members for perceived slights remains widespread. Our decision to focus on

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6 Simmons identifies countries as stable democracies if they have received a score of 8 or higher on the polity scale in all years since WWII, and countries as stable autocracies if they never received a score higher than 5 in the twentieth century. All other countries are classified as transitional democracies. See Simmons (2009) at 396.

7 The Freedom House data is available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores#.VX32-GTBzGc (last visited June 14, 2015). Pakistan was also rated as a “7” on the widely used “polity scale” of -10 to 10 developed by the Polity IV project. A score of seven indicates that Pakistan is partially—but not fully—democratic. The polity data is available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (last visited June 14, 2015).
women’s rights was thus in large part because we believe that it is important to research the effectiveness of efforts to improve the rights of women so that more can be done to change these practices.

A final consideration in favor of studying Pakistan is that debates, discussions, and reporting on human rights within Pakistan often reference the position of the United Nations. To illustrate this, we conducted a content analysis of the relative frequency that United Nations was referenced in newspaper stories on human rights in Pakistan. We specifically used the Factiva archive series to search for Pakistani newspaper articles mentioning “human rights” or “women’s rights” in each year between 2004 and 2014. We then evaluated the percent of those articles that mentioned the United Nations. As a point of comparison, we also conducted the same exercise for the United States. The results of this analysis are reported in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Articles that References the United Nations (%)

8 For an example of similar research conducting a content analysis of newspaper stories, see Kreps and Wallace (2015).
As Figure 1 shows, there are comparable trends in the number of news stories in Pakistan and the United States that reference the United Nations. In Pakistan, 24% (19,744 of 84,835) of news stories on “human rights” mentioned the United Nations compared to 27% (60,124 of 221,516) of stories in the United States. Similarly, in Pakistan 23% (926 of 4,710) of stories on “women’s rights” mentioned the United Nations compared to 13% (26,347 of 4,193) of stories in the United States. These results support of claim that the United Nations is often part of public discourse on the human rights within Pakistan.

Subject Recruitment

We administered our experiment to 614 respondents in Pakistan in December 2014 and January 2015.\(^9\) The experiment was administered during one to one in-person interviews conducted by one of six academic researchers from Pakistan.\(^{10}\) The in-person interviews took about 35 minutes to complete, and each respondent was paid 400 Pakistani Rupees (roughly $4.00 USD) for their time. The interviews were all conducted in the national language of Pakistan: Urdu. In order to be consistent with local customs, male researchers interviewed male respondents and female researchers interviewed female respondents.

Although it required considerable effort and expense to conduct our experiment through in-person interviews, we decided that for our research question it would be superior to conducting an online or telephone survey. This is because we believe that the important question is whether United Nation endorsement could increase Pakistani’s willingness to publically support reform efforts. Since women’s rights is still a very sensitive topic within Pakistan, using an online experiment to reveal that United Nations endorsement influences private views may not be enough to show that the international human rights system improves the political climate for human rights reform.

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9 Part A of the Supplementary Materials has the English translation of our survey. The Urdu version is available upon request.

10 Part B of the Supplementary Materials provides brief biographies of the six researchers that administered our survey.
Furthermore, endorsing certain policy recommendations in an online survey may just be a form of cheap-talk. Thus, it was important to see if in real interactions with participants they endorse these recommendations by the United Nations.

There are, however, also shortcomings associated with conducting in-person interviews. Most notably, it is possible that the researchers conducting the interview could bias the results by changing their behavior to elicit the desired result. To guard against this concern, we did not inform the members of the field team—with the exception of the leader—that the goal of our research was not to study support for policies on women’s rights generally, but instead to study the influence of endorsement by the United Nations’ on support for those policies.

Our subjects were primarily university students and teachers in and around Islamabad. Doing so had several advantages. First, because Islamabad is the federal center of Pakistan, these respondents were drawn from all regions of the country. Second, the respondents are middle class and educated, and thus might be the kind of individuals that may have their views changed based on international pressure. Third, the respondents offered the practical advantages of likely being receptive to participating in an academic survey. Finally, and most importantly, given the violence that has been directed to women’s rights activists in Pakistan in recent years, we decided that administering the survey on the grounds of secure universities would provide the greatest safety for our team of researchers.\footnote{Unfortunately, violence against women’s rights activists is all too common in Pakistan. Recent high profile examples of activists being targeted include the shooting of Malala Yousafzai in 2012 (Yousafzai went on to be the youngest Nobel Laureate following the incident) and the 2015 shooting of Karachi based social activist Sabeen Mehmud. Given our topic, the safety of the researchers administering the survey was a major concern.}

Table 1 presents complete summary statistics of the respondents’ demographic characteristics. Although conducting our experiment at universities had a number of practical advantages, the drawback is obviously that our sample is not representative of the population of Pakistan. Most notably, our respondents were dramatically more educated, less conservative, and less religious than the overall population of Pakistan. This obviously reduces the generalizability of our results. That said, if the United Nations were to have any effect on public support for improved human rights protections, it
would be reasonable to think that it would only be by influencing exactly the kind of urban, educated, elites that made up our sample.

| Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|               | Mean  | Stand. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
| Male          | 0.51  | 0.50         | 0    | 1    |
| Age           | 29.85 | 9.04         | 18   | 58   |
| Household Size| 6.77  | 2.99         | 2    | 29   |
| Income (1 = low; 10 = high) | 5.01  | 1.40         | 1    | 10   |
| Education – High School | 0.00  | 0.07         | 0    | 1    |
| Education – College | 0.23  | 0.42         | 0    | 1    |
| Education – Graduate Level | 0.76  | 0.43         | 0    | 1    |
| Ideology – Conservative | 0.09  | 0.29         | 0    | 1    |
| Ideology - Moderate | 0.71  | 0.45         | 0    | 1    |
| Ideology – Liberal | 0.20  | 0.40         | 0    | 1    |
| Religious – Not Very | 0.07  | 0.26         | 0    | 1    |
| Religious – Moderate | 0.76  | 0.42         | 0    | 1    |
| Religious - Extreme | 0.16  | 0.37         | 0    | 1    |

Survey Design

The survey was divided into four sections. First, the subjects were asked a number of questions designed to establish their views on the rights of women, their views on the role of religion in government, and their knowledge of and confidence in the United Nations. Second, the subjects were asked if they supported four reforms aimed at improving the rights of women. The experimental treatment in our survey was that half of the subjects were randomly told that the four reforms were proposed by the United Nations. Third, the subjects were asked a number of questions designed to test whether the experimental treatment increased support for mechanisms that may increase the likelihood of reforms being implemented. Fourth, the respondents were asked a series of standard demographic questions.

12 These questions were based on questions developed by Bush and Jamal (2015) in their experiment on women’s rights in Jordan.

13 The demographic questions included in our survey were based on demographic questions used by the World Justice Project in their international surveys.
The second part of the survey contained our experiment. Our experiment was specifically designed to test the impact that endorsement from an international organization has on support for policies intended to improve women’s rights. To do so, we used an “endorsement experiment” design (Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro 2011). This method allows researchers to measure support for an endorser—in our case, the United Nations—without directly asking respondents their views on the endorser. The idea behind the design is to ask a control group how much they support a list of specific policy reforms, and then to tell a treatment group the reforms have been endorsed by a particular group/institution/individual before asking them how much they support the same policy reforms. This method has the advantage of being able to measure support over controversial or sensitive topics while reducing the likelihood that responses will be biased. Based on these advantages, this method has recently been used in several experiments in Afghanistan (Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014; Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2013) and Pakistan (Blair et al. 2013).

The four policies that we asked about in our experiment were all recommended by the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’s 2013 Review of Pakistan’s compliance with CEDAW. The advantage of drawing proposals from this report is that they are specific policy reforms that the United Nations has endorsed that were made in order to bring Pakistan into compliance with its obligations under the CEDAW. Although there are many recommendations in the 2013 report, our goal was to find four proposals that: (1) call for concrete reforms; (2) are easy for respondents to understand; (3) may generate differences in opinion; (4) will not generate too strong views in respondents before they can answer; (5) cover different policy areas; and (6) have not yet been implemented. The four policies that we asked about are listed in Table 2.

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Table 2: Policy Questions for the Endorsement Experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . increasing the quotas allocated for women in the National and Provincial Assemblies and in the Senate from 17 percent to a minimum of 33 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honor Crime Pardons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . repealing all laws that allow perpetrators of so called honor crimes to negotiate a pardon from the victims’ families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . raising the minimum age for marriage for girls from 16 to 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Re-Polling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . re-polling any location where women cast less than 10 percent of votes during an election.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the subjects that took our survey were asked how they feel about the four proposals listed in Table 2. The experimental part of our survey was how the treatment was introduced. We started our questions to the “Control Group” by saying that “A recent proposal calls for . . .”, but we started our questions to the “UN Group” by saying that “A recent proposal by the United Nations calls for . . .”. In other words, the only difference between the two groups is that, for each policy question, the UN Group was told that the policy was proposed by the United Nations.

After reading the respondents about each of the proposal, researchers asked: “How do you feel about this proposal?” We choose this language following Blair, Imai, and Lyall (2013) who use the same wording in an endorsement experiment conducted in Afghanistan. We also followed Blair, Imai, and Lyall (2013) by asking respondents to assess their level of support on a five-point scale. Specifically, we asked respondents whether they: (5) “strongly agree”, (4) “somewhat agree”, (3) “are indifferent”, (2) “somewhat disagree”, or (1) “strongly disagree”. Each respondent was asked for their level of support for all four proposals this way.
Sample Balance

Before analyzing the results of our experiment, we first checked to ensure that the subjects that received our experimental treatment were not skewed among the variables measured during our post-treatment demographic questions. Following Chaudoin (2014), we used the balance test from Hansen and Bowers (2008) to evaluate whether there was any evidence of imbalance in the post-treatment demographic variables reported in Table 1. Using this test, the overall $\chi^2$ statistic is 10.6 and the associated overall $p$-value is 0.48. As a result, there is not any evidence of demographic imbalance between the subjects in our Control Group and UN Group.

Figure 2: Mean Responses to Pre-Treatment Questions
In addition to testing for demographic balance, we also tested to make sure our control and treatment groups held similar views on the subject of our study. To do so, we asked all the respondents a series of pre-treatment questions designed to elicit their expressed views on four topics: support for pro-women policies, support for anti-women policies, belief that Islamic Law should be the basis for laws, and confidence in the United Nations. With the exception of the question on confidence in the United Nations, these questions were based on a survey developed by Bush and Jamal (2015) that examined women’s rights in Jordan. Figure 2 reports the mean responses to these sets of questions.

As Figure 2 shows, the views of the Control Group and UN Group are fairly evenly balanced. We also more formally evaluated the degree of balance among these measures by again using the Hansen and Bowers (2008) test. To do so, we first tested balance for the four measures in Figure 2. Using this test, the overall $\chi^2$ statistic is 6.06 and the associated overall p-value is 0.20. Additionally, we simultaneously tested for balance for the thirteen demographic variables in Table 1 along with the four measures in Figure 2. For this combined set of variables, the overall $\chi^2$ statistic is 19.3 and the associated overall p-value is 0.20. Taken together, these tests do not reveal any evidence of demographic or ideological imbalance between the subjects in our Control Group and UN Group.

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15 We asked respondents how strongly they agreed with two statements to evaluate pro-women views: (1) “Women should work outside the home if they want to”; (2) “There should be equal work opportunities for men and women.” Our measure of “pro-women” views is the respondents’ average agreement with both statements.

16 We asked respondents how strongly they agreed with three statements to evaluate anti-women views: (1) “In general, men are more fit than women to be political leaders”; (2) “University education is more important for men than for women;” (3) “Women should stop working outside the home after they get married and have children in order to take care of the home and family.” Our measure of “anti-women” views is the respondents’ average agreement with these statements.

17 We asked respondents how strongly they agreed with this statement to evaluate their views on Islamic law: “The government and parliament should implement only orthodox Islamic laws.”

18 We asked respondents “How much confidence do you have in the United Nations?” Before asking respondents about the United Nations, however, we first informed them that “[t]he United nations is an international organization that has over 190 countries as members, including Pakistan.”
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Primary Results

Figures 3 and 4 present the primary results from our endorsement experiment. Figure 3 presents the distribution of support for our four policy questions for both the Control Group and the group that was told of the United Nations endorsement of the policy. As Figure 3 shows, for all four questions, the respondents that received the United Nations treatment were more likely to express agreement with the policy. One crude measure of the effect of the United Nations endorsement is that, for all four questions, the Control Group had fewer respondents that strongly agreed with the reform proposal and more respondents that strongly disagreed with the reform proposal.

Figure 3: Distribution of Responses to Experimental Questions

Figure 4 presents the mean responses and 95% confidence intervals for each of the four policy questions. As Figure 4 shows, the UN Group not only expressed higher average levels of approval for each question, but the differences are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level or higher. These differences are also all statistically significant at the 0.01 level when controlling for the demographic covariates listed in Table 1.

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19 Part C of the Supplementary Materials reports the results from Figures 3-7 in tables.
Moreover, the treatment effects are also substantively large. The size of the differences range from 0.36 for the *Quotas for Legislators* question to 0.79 for the *Honor Crime Pardons* question. Overall, the average increase in support for the four policies was 0.56 on a scale of 1 to 5.

**Figure 4: Mean Responses to Experimental Questions**

![Figure 4: Mean Responses to Experimental Questions](chart)

**Mechanism Question Results**

Our primary results have suggested that learning that the United Nations endorsed a policy reform increased expressed agreement with the proposal. This naturally raises the question whether this increased support would translate into greater

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20 Since the treatment was randomly assigned and there is demographic balance across the Control Group and treatment group, the body of the paper simply analyzes the differences in means. Part D of the Supplementary Materials reports the results of an ordered logit regression that estimates the treatment effects while controlling for demographic variables. Those results are all consistent with the results reported in the body of the paper.
willingness to take actions that would increase the probability that those reforms would pass. Although directly testing the impact of endorsement on mobilization is beyond the scope of this project, we did include a number of post-treatment questions in our survey designed to test previously developed theories about how international endorsement of policy reforms translates into improve rights performance.

As previously noted, the most prominent theory for why international human rights law might improve human rights outcomes is centered on mobilization (Simmons 2009). The argument is that ratification of international agreements and participation in international institutions does not automatically translate into improved rights practices. After all, these agreements do not have any direct enforcement mechanisms, and domestic governments that wish to improve the protection of human rights are free to do so without prodding by the international community. Instead, the claim is that international agreements and institutions can make it easier for domestic interests to lobby for changes within their country. That said, the claim is not that the international agreements and institutions make it easier in one single way, but instead that there are a number of ways having the support of international organizations can make it easier to mobilize reform efforts.

In our survey, we attempted to measure whether receiving the United Nations treatment increased expressed willingness to mobilize in ways that could advance the reforms. We specifically asked respondents how likely they would be to take four steps that could potentially lead to increased respect for women’s rights. First, to measure expressed willingness to **Vote for Women** we asked all of the respondents: “If a woman runs for election to the National Assembly of Pakistan, how likely are you to consider voting for a woman in the election, all else equal?” Second, to measure expressed willingness to **Vote for Women-Friendly Parties** we asked all of the respondents: “If a political party were to make improving women’s rights one of its main goals, how likely would you be to vote for the party in an election, all else equal?” Third, to measure expressed willingness to **Sign a Petition** we asked all of the respondents: “If you were asked to sign a petition calling for the government to improve women’s rights in Pakistan, how likely would you be to sign it?” Fourth, to measure expressed willingness
to **Support Increased Funding** we asked all of the respondents: “Do you support the government providing funding to organizations aimed at improving women’s rights?”

After presenting the respondents with each of these four mechanism questions, we asked the respondents how likely they would be to support to proposal on a 5-point scale. The mean responses to those four questions are presented in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: Mean Responses to Mechanism Questions**

![Figure 5: Mean Responses to Mechanism Questions](image)

Figure 5 reveals that the UN Group was more likely to claim to be likely to engage in all four mobilization options that we asked about. For all four questions, the difference between the Control Group and the UN Group are substantively large and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The size of the differences was roughly 0.40 for all four questions, and the average increase was 0.42 on a scale of 1 to 5. This suggests that the respondents were more likely to express willingness to mobilize after previously hearing that the UN had proposed reforms to women’s rights. This is perhaps surprising given that the only difference between the Control Group and UN Group is that in a
prior set of questions, the UN Group was told that four policies were proposed by the United Nations.

**Results by Confidence in the United Nations**

Of course, it is possible that the treatment effects are not consistent across all of our respondents. Most importantly, it is possible that the treatment effects are conditional on whether the respondents support the United Nations. For example, Linos (2011, 2013) found that endorsement from the United Nations was more likely to change the views of respondents in the United States when the respondents already supported the United Nations. To test this, we subset our sample into respondents that were “Confident in the UN” and respondents that were “Not Confident in the UN” when asked during our pre-treatment questions.\(^{21}\) Figures 6 and 7 present our primary results and mechanism results for these two groups.

**Figure 6: Responses to Experimental Questions by Confidence in the UN**

Out of our sample of 614 respondents, 39% were Confidence in the UN and 59% of respondents were Not Confident in the UN (the remaining respondents choose not to answer the question).

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\(^{21}\) Out of our sample of 614 respondents, 39% were Confidence in the UN and 59% of respondents were Not Confident in the UN (the remaining respondents choose not to answer the question).
There are two things worth noting about the results in Figures 6 and 7. First, for both sets of results, the UN treatment had a large and statistically significant effect on respondents that previously expressed confidence in the UN, but the treatment did not have an effect on the respondents that did not previously express confidence in the UN. Across both figures, there was a statistically significant treatment effect for all eight questions when the respondents previously expressed confidence in the UN, but there was not a statistically significant treatment effect in a single one of the eight questions when the respondents did not.

Second, the respondents in the Control Group that expressed confidence in the UN were less likely to support the reforms and efforts to mobilize than the respondents in the Control Group that did not express confidence in the UN. This result is surprising, and further research is needed to explore the reasons why this is true. One

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22 Part D of the Supplementary Materials more rigorously demonstrate this result with regressions interacting the UN Treatment and Confidence in the UN.
possible explanation is that respondents that are Not Confident in the UN may have doubts in the institution, in part, because they believe that human right reforms are necessary and that the UN has not done enough to provide them. These respondents thus may be more likely to support any proposals aimed at improving the rights of women.

V. CONCLUSION

The United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and countries around the world expend a large amount of resources every year to operate the United Nations’ system of monitoring compliance with international human rights law. Our experiment was designed to study whether the policy recommendations that are produced through that process—as opposed to simply the prior ratification of treaties—actually lead to improved human rights outcomes. We found that endorsement from the United Nations increased support for all of the policy reforms that we evaluated, and that respondents who were previously informed that the United Nations had proposed the reforms were more likely to express willingness to “mobilize” in ways that would help improve the chance that those policies would be implemented.

We also found, however, that the UN endorsement only increased support for reforms for respondents that previously expressed confidence in the United Nations. This is an important caveat to our results for several reasons. First, it suggests that the United Nations ability to drive reform is limited to situations where the UN enjoys support. In many developing countries, however, a relatively small percent of the population is likely to be both aware of the UN and supportive of its efforts. For example, our sample was dramatically more educated and secular than the overall population of Pakistan, but only 39% of our sample expressed confidence in the UN.

Second, because UN endorsement did not change respondents’ views when they did not already have confidence in the institution, it suggests that the UN may not enjoy special legitimacy. As a result, although endorsement from the UN might increase support for reform in certain situations, more popular organizations or political actors may be able to generate as much support without the international human rights
apparatus. Moreover, we tested the effect of endorsement from the United Nations in isolation. It might be the case that endorsements from other groups opposed to reforms—say religious leaders—might have larger effects in the opposite direction.

Third, even in cases where the United Nations enjoys widespread support, it does not necessarily follow that reforms it supports will be adopted. The process through which changes in public opinion translate into policy reforms is extremely complicated, and increased support for reforms do not guarantee that a government will change its policies.

Of course, even though our experiment found that UN endorsement does not increase support of reforms across the board, it is still possible that the international human rights system is able to drive meaningful reform. For example, the United Nations’ process may help activists or sympathetic governments identify shortcomings in their existing policies and develop potential solutions. Moreover, our experiment tested one aspect of human rights in a single country. Without additional research, it is impossible to know whether studies on other topics or conducted in other countries would reveal a positive effect when the United Nations endorses a policy.

As a final note, we not only decided to conduct this experiment because of our academic interest in human rights, but also because of our desire to improve the rights of women in Pakistan. Although we did find some encouraging results, our field team faced hostility on a number of occasions, particularly the women on our team. Based on our experiences, we are convinced more than ever that, although United Nations endorsement might assist the process, improving women’s rights in Pakistan will be a slow and difficult process.
REFERENCES


United Nations Endorsement & Support for Human Rights:  
An Experiment on Women’s Rights in Pakistan

Supplementary Materials

These Supplementary Materials are divided into four parts. Part A provides the text of our survey instrument. Part B provides biographical sketches of the research team that conducted our experiment. Part C provides the results of our experiment in tables. Part D provides the results of order-logic regressions that were used to confirm that our results are robust to controlling for the demographic features of the respondents.
A. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Pre-Treatment Questions

I'm going to read several statements about the situation of women in Pakistan. For each one, please tell me to what extent do you agree with the statement. Do you strongly agree [1], agree [2], neither agree nor disagree [3], disagree [4], or strongly disagree [5]?

1. In general, men are more fit than women to be political leaders.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

2. University education is more important for men than for women.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

3. Women should work outside the home if they want to.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

4. There should be equal work opportunities for men and women.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

5. Women should stop working outside the home after they get married and have children in order to take care of the home and family.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree
I am going to read to you a list of principles that can serve as a guide for making the laws of our country. Please tell me whether you strongly agree [1], agree [2], neither agree nor disagree [3], disagree [4], or strongly disagree [5]?

6. The government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

7. The government and parliament should implement only orthodox Islamic laws.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

8. The government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people on some issues and implement orthodox Islamic laws on other issues.
   - Strongly Agree
   - Agree
   - Neither Agree Nor Disagree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

I'm now going to ask you a couple of questions about the United Nations. The United Nations is an international organization that has over 190 countries as members, including Pakistan.

9. What do you believe the United Nations’ position is on women’s rights in Pakistan?
   - Pakistan should improve respect for women’s rights
   - Pakistan has an excellent record on respect for women’s rights
   - Don’t know

10. How much confidence do you have in the United Nations?
    - A great deal of confidence
    - Quite a lot of confidence
    - Not very much confidence
    - None at all
Experimental Questions

I’m now going to tell you about some proposals to change laws in Pakistan and then ask whether you agree with them.

11. A recent proposal [by the United Nations] calls for increasing the quotas allocated for women in the National and Provincial Assemblies and in the Senate from 17 percent to a minimum of 33 percent. How do you feel about this proposal?

   - Strongly Agree
   - Somewhat Agree
   - Indifferent
   - Somewhat Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

12. A recent proposal [by the United Nations] calls for repealing all laws that allow perpetrators of so called honor crimes to negotiate a pardon from the victims’ families. How do you feel about this proposal?

   - Strongly Agree
   - Somewhat Agree
   - Indifferent
   - Somewhat Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

13. A recent proposal [by the United Nations] calls for raising the minimum age for marriage for girls from 16 to 18. How do you feel about this proposal?

   - Strongly Agree
   - Somewhat Agree
   - Indifferent
   - Somewhat Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree

14. A recent proposal [by the United Nations] calls for re-polling any location where women cast less that 10 percent of votes during an election. How do you feel about this proposal?

   - Strongly Agree
   - Somewhat Agree
   - Indifferent
   - Somewhat Disagree
   - Strongly Disagree
Post-Treatment Questions

I’m now going to ask you for your views on a few issues.

15. If a woman runs for election to the National Assembly of Pakistan, how likely are you to consider voting for a woman in the election, all else equal?

- Extremely unlikely
- Unlikely
- Neutral
- Likely
- Extremely likely

16. If a political party were to make improving women’s rights one of its main goals, how likely would you be to vote for the party in an election, all else equal?

- Extremely unlikely
- Unlikely
- Neutral
- Likely
- Extremely likely

17. If you were asked to sign a petition calling for the government to improve women’s rights in Pakistan, how likely would you be to sign it?

- Extremely unlikely
- Unlikely
- Neutral
- Likely
- Extremely likely

18. Do you support the government providing funding to organizations aimed at improving women’s rights?

- Strongly oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Neutral
- Somewhat favor
- Strongly favor
19. If a political party were to condemn honor killing in Pakistan, how likely would you be to vote for the party in an election, all else equal?

   Extremely unlikely
   Unlikely
   Neutral
   Likely
   Extremely likely

20. If you were asked to sign a petition calling for the government to condemn honor killing, how likely would you be to sign it?

   Extremely unlikely
   Unlikely
   Neutral
   Likely
   Extremely likely

21. Do you support the government providing funding to organizations aimed at condemning honor killing?

   Strongly oppose
   Somewhat oppose
   Neutral
   Somewhat favor
   Strongly favor

22. Are you aware of the Women’s Protection Act of 2006?

   Not at all aware
   Slightly aware
   Somewhat aware
   Moderately aware
   Extremely aware

23. Are you aware of an international agreement called the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women?

   Not at all aware
   Slightly aware
   Somewhat aware
   Moderately aware
   Extremely aware
Demographic Questions

Finally, I’d like to ask you some background questions.

24. Please indicate your gender:
   
   Male
   Female

25. What is your age as of today? Please write in years: ______________

26. Please indicate your city:
   
   Islamabad
   Rawalpindi

27. How many people live in your household? ________

28. Imagine a staircase with 10 steps, in which on the first step are located the poorest people in Pakistan and on the 10th step, the richest people in Pakistan. Where would you put yourself on this staircase?

29. What is the highest degree you received?
   
   High school diploma or equivalent
   Bachelor’s degree
   Graduate degree (MA, M.Phil, Ph.D.)

30. Would you describe your current position?
   
   Student / Researcher
   Teacher
   Other

31. How would you describe yourself in terms of political orientation?
   
   Conservative
   Moderate
   Liberal

32. How would you describe yourself in terms of religious orientation?
   
   Not very religious
   Moderately religious
   Extremely religious
B. The Field Team’s Biographies

Dr. Gulnaz Anjum is a research fellow at the International Max Planck Research School and a teaching fellow at Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Germany. She is a social scientist and a cross-cultural researcher. She has been qualitative and quantitative research executive for social research and was responsible for training other interviewers.

Dr. Mudassar Aziz is an assistant Professor at the National Institute of Psychology, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is an educational psychologist and a cross-cultural researcher. He took care of coordination with university links and conducted interviews with male participants.

Zahid Usman is an M.Phil research fellow at the department of Economics, Quaid-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He has a research experience in economics and cross-cultural research. He conducted interviews with male participants.

Amara Yousaf is a lecturer at the University of Punjab at the department of Economics, Gujranwala, Pakistan. She worked mainly with female participants.

Gulfam Ahmad is a Research Executive of social sector projects at Oasis Insights Pakistan- Private Limited, and is affiliated with Pakistan Institute of Economic Development, Islamabad, Pakistan. He works as social and marketing research executive. He conducted interviews with male participants.

Z. F. is a graduate student at the School of Art, Design and Architecture. She volunteered to interview female participants in this project.
C. The Results Reported in Part IV

Results Reported in Figure 3 – Distribution of Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quotas for Legislators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Agree</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Indifferent</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Honor Crime Pardons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Agree</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Indifferent</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Marriage Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Agree</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Indifferent</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Election Re-polling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Agree</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Indifferent</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results Reported in Figure 4 (Mean Responses & 95% Confidence Intervals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quotas for Legislators</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.84, 3.17)</td>
<td>(3.21, 3.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Honor Crime Pardons</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.04, 3.38)</td>
<td>(3.87, 4.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Marriage Age</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.22, 3.58)</td>
<td>(3.73, 4.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Election Re-polling</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.83, 3.14)</td>
<td>(3.40, 3.70)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Results Reported in Figure 5 (Mean Responses & 95% Confidence Intervals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Vote for Women</strong></td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.94, 3.22)</td>
<td>(3.40, 3.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Vote for Women Friendly Parties</strong></td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.06, 3.33)</td>
<td>(3.49, 3.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Sign a Petition</strong></td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.46, 3.73)</td>
<td>(3.89, 4.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Support Increased Funding</strong></td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.32, 3.58)</td>
<td>(3.78, 3.98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Results reported in Figure 6 (Mean Responses & 95% Confidence Intervals)

#### Confident in the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quotas for Legislators</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.53, 3.07)</td>
<td>(3.98, 4.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Honor Crime Pardons</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.43, 2.95)</td>
<td>(4.09, 4.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Marriage Age</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.73, 3.32)</td>
<td>(4.12, 4.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Election Re-polling</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38, 2.88)</td>
<td>(3.86, 4.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Not Confident in the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quotas for Legislators</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.96, 3.37)</td>
<td>(2.72, 3.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Honor Crime Pardons</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.37, 3.78)</td>
<td>(3.68, 4.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Marriage Age</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.46, 3.90)</td>
<td>(3.44, 3.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Election Re-polling</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.04, 3.42)</td>
<td>(3.07, 3.45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Results reported in Figure 7 (Mean Responses & 95% Confidence Intervals)

#### Confident in the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vote for Women</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.69, 3.15)</td>
<td>(3.53, 3.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vote for Women Friendly Parties</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.73, 3.20)</td>
<td>(3.64, 3.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sign a Petition</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.01, 3.49)</td>
<td>(3.87, 4.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Support Increased Funding</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.05, 3.49)</td>
<td>(3.73, 4.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Not Confident in the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>UN Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vote for Women</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.03, 3.37)</td>
<td>(3.27, 3.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vote for Women Friendly Parties</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.19, 3.51)</td>
<td>(3.35, 3.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sign a Petition</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.69, 3.99)</td>
<td>(3.86, 4.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Support Increased Funding</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.42, 3.73)</td>
<td>(3.76, 4.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## E. Ordered Logit Regression Results

### Primary Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Quotas for Legislators</th>
<th>(2) Honor Crime Pardons</th>
<th>(3) Marriage Age</th>
<th>(4) Election Re-Polling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Treatment</td>
<td>0.808***</td>
<td>1.257***</td>
<td>0.651***</td>
<td>0.837***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-1.755***</td>
<td>-1.033***</td>
<td>-1.411***</td>
<td>-0.905***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.155**</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education – High School</td>
<td>-0.722</td>
<td>-0.900</td>
<td>-1.025</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education - College</td>
<td>0.550***</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.507**</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology – Conservative</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>1.153***</td>
<td>0.693*</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology - Moderate</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.396*</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion – Not Very</td>
<td>-0.809**</td>
<td>-0.487</td>
<td>-0.658*</td>
<td>-0.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Moderate</td>
<td>-0.405*</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>499</td>
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<td>501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Standard errors in parentheses
- Omitted categories are Education – Graduate Level, Ideology- Liberal, and Religion – Extremely.
- Constant omitted.

- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
## Results Interacting UN Confidence and UN Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Quotas for Legislators</th>
<th>(2) Honor Crime Pardons</th>
<th>(3) Marriage Age</th>
<th>(4) Election Re-Polling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Treatment</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.551**</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Confidence</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>-1.155***</td>
<td>-0.785***</td>
<td>-0.889***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Confidence X UN Treatment</td>
<td>2.126***</td>
<td>1.818***</td>
<td>1.893***</td>
<td>1.907***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-1.536***</td>
<td>-0.945***</td>
<td>-1.243***</td>
<td>-0.738***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
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<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.153**</td>
<td>0.115*</td>
<td>0.093</td>
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<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education – High School</td>
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<td>-0.726</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.493)</td>
<td>(1.447)</td>
<td>(1.470)</td>
<td>(1.453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education - College</td>
<td>0.460**</td>
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<td>0.114</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology – Conservative</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>1.064**</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.149</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
<td>(0.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology - Moderate</td>
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<td>0.374</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion – Not Very</td>
<td>-0.847**</td>
<td>-0.493</td>
<td>-0.634*</td>
<td>-0.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Moderate</td>
<td>-0.366*</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
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</tbody>
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**Observations**: 496, 497, 498, 498

**Model**: O-Logit, O-Logit, O-Logit, O-Logit

- Standard errors in parentheses
- Omitted categories are Education – Graduate Level, Ideology- Liberal, and Religion – Extremely.
- Constant omitted.

- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1