Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other Law

Saul Levmore

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles

Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
HARMONIZATION, PREFERENCES, AND THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT IN COMMERCIAL AND OTHER LAW

SAUL LEVMORE*

1. Introduction

All harmonization is not equal. When it comes to child labour, for example, members of an economic or political union, and even their external critics and competitors, generally agree that constituent States should harmonize their laws. Mere trading partners agree to harmonize their copyright laws. There is less agreement about securities law, and much less about other subjects of domestic regulation, including school curricula, State-supported religions, health care delivery, tort law, subsidy and taxation of the arts, and approval processes for pharmaceuticals. For these subjects, we find variety with respect to policies, statutory frameworks, rules, and enforcement even within unified legal systems. Across jurisdictions, only some of these laws seem to converge over time, though there is more harmonization within an economic union than among simple trading partners. One wonders whether the variety illuminates the optimal level of harmonization with respect to commercial law in the European Union.

For the most part, harmonization opportunities come at the expense of variety, in the form of respecting local preferences, or political outcomes. There are many potential gains from harmonization, but proponents of harmonization with respect to commercial law across the European Union are likely to stress the potential reduction in transaction costs.1 Sceptics are likely

* William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Gomez and Gauza, “An economic analysis of harmonization regimes: Full harmonization, minimum harmonization or optional instrument?”, 7 European Review of Contract Law (ERCL) (2011), 281. (“With social welfare in mind, it is very likely that the largest advantage of building and establishing harmonized legal standards of behaviour for contracting parties, in Europe as in other areas of the world, would be essentially to reduce the transaction costs in cross-border commercial activity, and thus to enlarge economic welfare arising from those increased economic interactions that cross the national borders.”). For projected reductions in transaction costs through the adoption of CESL, see Commission Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment on a Common European Sales Law, Ref, Ares (2011)893702-19/08/2011, p. 12; and “A European contract law for consumers and businesses: Publication of the results of the feasibility study carried out by the expert group on European contract law for stakeholders and legal practitioners feedback”, p. 4, available online at <ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/feasibility_study_final.pdf>. For arguments that CESL
to be anxious about the process of choosing the focal points around which to harmonize and then also to favour the ongoing competition among jurisdictions that harmonization suppresses. One form of compromise is not to harmonize but to offer an attractive alternative that might appeal to jurisdictions, or even to businesses and individuals, which can then opt in to this alternative set of legal rules – though it must be apparent that Member States could simply harmonize around one of the many existing commercial codes. The alternative might be limited to, or more attractive for, cross-border transactions. The Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL)\(^2\) fits this description, even as it incorporates many mandatory terms. It offers an opportunity to think specifically and generally about harmonization.

Section 2 begins quite generally with the relationship between local preferences and harmonization. Section 3 takes a brief detour to include the role of harmonization in promoting union-wide identity. Section 4 takes account of local preferences, and the role of the median voter, in order to understand what might be harmonized. Section 5 introduces the inefficient moves a majority might make because of its ability to impose “external costs.” These inefficiencies can illuminate the winners and losers from harmonization. Section 6 builds to a conclusion about the winners and losers from harmonization by developing the notion of an organized subgroup with similar preferences, and contrasting harmonization with spontaneous convergence.

2. Preferences as a source of harmonization or variety

It is instructive to begin with an example where harmonization is uncontroversial, as it reflects widely shared moral sentiments. There is such widespread agreement in the developed world with respect to child labour, for instance; local preferences are not celebrated, and harmonization is will fail to reduce transaction costs, see Pachl, *The Common European Sales Law – Have the Right Choices Been Made? A Consumer Policy Perspective*, Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2012/6 (2012) (arguing that the European Commission and other groups exaggerate the potential reduction of transaction costs through adopting CESL); and Posner, *The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition*, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 597 (2d Series) (2012) (arguing that the introduction of CESL as optional will likely *increase* transaction costs in cross-border exchanges because – among other reasons – parties will continue to invest in understanding the variety of national laws in addition to CESL in order to pick the most advantageous law for any exchange).

appealing. Harmonization might also be the product of cross-border moral outrage, followed by political and economic pressure, with respect to such issues as income inequality, genetically modified crops, consumption of horse meat, and immodest fashions, though these pressures are more difficult to develop as the moral component weakens or appears more culture-bound. With the possible exception of consumer protection, most of commercial law creates yet less excitement in foreign jurisdictions, so that it is likely that this explanation of harmonization has little bearing on our subject, except to remind us that it can come from preferences about other people’s well-being.

A second explanation is that one’s own moral sensibilities with respect to the behaviour of others are heightened when competitive advantage is in the air. If a jurisdiction prefers nicer parks, and raises taxes to finance these parks, it recognizes that some businesses may migrate to other jurisdictions. The parks do not serve the needs of the businesses, and residents must pay for the parks they prefer. In contrast, if a jurisdiction shelters the homeless, its citizens are apt to think that it is wrong for businesses to be able to move away and escape their share of this cost. The superior shelters represent an unselfish expenditure, or so it will be thought, and, if mobility is easy, there may be a race to the bottom in which no one can afford to help the homeless even though some prefer to do so in the first instance. If we combine the two explanations we can say that the objection to local preferences, and the moral case for harmonization, arises either where human rights are concerned or where mobile taxpayers are perceived as evading a responsibility and driving jurisdictions to a lowest common denominator where other-regarding preferences are at issue.

The domestic regulation of child labour or genetically modified crops might raise the cost of doing business, and this will encourage some businesses to expand or migrate to unregulated jurisdictions. Domestic interests will regard this as a race to the bottom. A jurisdiction might combat some part of this unpleasant competition by regulating consumption rather

3. Although there is disagreement over the degree to which local preferences for child labour should be tolerated, I refer here to official positions articulated by the governments of developed nations. For a discussion of these issues, see Myers, The Right Rights? Child Labour in a Globalizing World, (2001) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 575.

4. See e.g. ibid. (“One answer [to the issue of diverging tolerance for child labour] is that since one country’s acquiescence to lower labour standards gives it trading advantages in labour-intensive goods, there should be multilateral sanctions against such a country; and social clauses should be used to deter such ‘illegitimate advantages.’”) (citations omitted).

5. I recognize that a jurisdiction has no preferences, but rather that the people within it do so. The discussion refers to a jurisdiction’s sentiments as shorthand for its median voter, its politicians, its intensely concerned and organized constituents, or its constituents’ aggregated welfare, as the context requires.
than production. Its law might simply forbid the consumption of goods made in the manner it deems offensive or it might tax such goods to compensate for the advantage that the “inferior” regulatory system bestows on its producers. A mixed approach could bar domestic production and then ban offending imports. But this strategy suffers from high enforcement costs. The offended jurisdiction requires a good deal of information about production in other countries; in contrast, most domestic regulation succeeds by monitoring a very few manufacturing sites or accepting complaints from whistleblowers, of which there will be many when a popular cause is at issue. Moreover, even when foreign violations can be identified, one must have the ability to block or tax imports. It is not just that international trade agreements may stand in the way, but also that goods can be channelled through third countries or simply sold in other countries while non-offending goods are directed to the jurisdiction with the highest standards.

These initial examples will seem rather remote from most of commercial law, with regard to which the rhetoric is likely to be about transaction costs rather than morality. Still, preference protection may be more important than transaction costs in terms of motivating harmonization. The gambit is also somewhat misleading, because most strategies for satisfying preferences lead to respect for disparate practices, or variety in law or markets, if only to satisfy dissimilar predilections across jurisdictions. Most preferences can be satisfied

6. Harmonization in commercial law is unlikely to be justified on the basis of externalities, though it might be advanced with the claim that non-harmonized rules encourage some leakage and thus devalue a country’s unilateral laws. The claim seems weak for commercial law. Similarly, the usual fear of unfair competition from unregulated jurisdictions seems much more robust where preferences are concerned, as discussed in the text, than for commercial law. A claim regarding an economy of scale seems plausible but nothing stops a jurisdiction from allowing its commercial laws to converge with others. Harmonized laws might be a step towards political unification, which brings its own scale economies, but this seems minor in the case of the EU. These features of harmonization reflect the useful and insightful framework, as well as scepticism, advanced in Leebron, “Claims for harmonization: A theoretical framework”, 27 Canadian Business Law Journal (1996), 63–107. A respectable case could be made for the idea that local preferences have so little to do with commercial law (consumer protection aside), that the game must be entirely about principal-agent problems or other reasons why jurisdictions resist the “obvious” gains from harmonization. Carbonara and Parisi, “The paradox of legal harmonization”, 367 Public Choice (2007). The authors adopt this starting point, and then proceed with the interesting idea that local resistance might be a strategy to get others to absorb the “switching costs”. In other words, harmonization offers benefits, and the trick is to incur as little of the costs as possible. To the extent that this is the case, the discussion here adds fuel to the wrong fire.

7. Gomez and Ganuza, op. cit. supra note 1, sets out clearly the choice between transaction costs saving and local (country level) preferences, along with references to the ongoing debate regarding EU commercial law. The discussion below reflects some of the same thinking about the likely compromises that are made when two or more jurisdictions harmonize their laws.
without insisting that other jurisdictions’ practices advance the same preferences as one’s own.

An easy example of this sort of variety concerns public support for the arts. A citizen might feel strongly that her government should support ballet companies, rather than have those entities rely entirely on patrons, but it is rare to see political capital expended in order to encourage a foreign jurisdiction to support that art form. Few people object to diversity in arts spending, though they do not go so far as to appreciate the economist’s Tieboutian perspective, that they might relocate and sort themselves into jurisdictions that offer the bundle of taxes and goods they prefer. Sorting at this level is academic. Moving is costly and even prohibitive for many residents; governments are unable to promise the continued provision of particular goods; and there are too many goods alongside too few jurisdictions that will accept migrants. A modest amount of sorting is the best we can expect.

3. Harmonization and a “preference” for shared identity

Why then does a central government ever support something regarding which there are diverse preferences? First, there may be an interest group, or even a majority, that is well enough organized to defeat local interest groups. The interest group that wants to spread its desire for ballet may find it cheaper to push for central support than to influence ten local governments. Other interest groups can, of course, compete, and when the dust settles it will be impossible for us to judge whether interest-group activity helped reveal intense preferences and achieve a desirable result or, instead, encouraged wasteful rent-seeking or imposed external costs (a topic discussed in Section 5 below) and did not maximize social welfare. Similarly, we might intuit that some interest groups prefer the harmonization of commercial law and others do not, but we are enfeebled when it comes to expressing normative judgements about the results of such battles.

The second, more far-reaching reason for central support is that authorities, or elites, might see such a policy as a useful means of promoting group identity. Thus, the Chinese Government based in Beijing supported and pressed Mandarin on the provinces, even though we might guess that local preferences were overwhelmingly inclined to maintain local dialects and not

8. There are exceptions. Investment in durable goods, and even capital goods like schools, helps. Famously, the development of an industry with tax revenue implications, like the corporate law industry in Delaware, helps commit to a pattern of laws over the long term.
to bear the switching costs. Mandarin became mandatory for some things, and it was to be the language of the future if only because it was imposed on primary schools everywhere, but we can think of it as an “opt-in” choice for many enterprises. Note that most of economic theory conveniently assumes that preferences are given, and the usual paradigm leaves no room for something like “developing a national identity,” or otherwise investing in the development of new preferences. A central agency in control of arts funding might be expected to favour touring performers, works that draw on common historical experiences or myths, and other projects that promote a shared national identity. In the case of the European Union, elites may also favour projects and laws that promote a European identity, but they know to minimize coercion. Indeed, the centrally-planned commercial law now ascendant in the EU is full of choice at the enterprise rather than jurisdictional level, and this may be the best tool of national unity that is politically acceptable.

The fact that one interest group promotes harmonization in furtherance of a shared identity does not mean that other groups cannot join in the project but have different motives. Large commercial enterprises might favour the harmonization of commercial law either because of the potential for reducing transaction costs in their far-flung transactions or because they perceive a competitive advantage over modestly sized firms that are comfortable with local laws. An interesting possibility is that risk averse businesses might prefer variety because different laws favour different business strategies or (even) products. A business will more likely find a market in which to flourish if there are a variety of markets offering different legal environments, one of which may be distinctly advantageous to that business. Just as a given business

---

9. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language (Order of the President No.37) (31 Oct. 2000), available online at <english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/19/content_64906.htm> (stating as its purpose, the “normalization and standardization of the standard spoken and written Chinese language and its sound development, making it play a better role in public activities, and promoting economic and cultural exchange among all the Chinese nationalities and regions”).

10. Ibid. at Ch. II, Art. 10.

11. On the other hand, some small businesses may also favour CESL because it would enable them to make sales throughout Europe without having to pay for legal counsel to navigate each country’s commercial law. See Hesselink, “The case for a common European sales law in an age of rising nationalism”, 8 ERCL (2012), 342–366; see also “A European contract law for consumers and businesses: Publication of the results of the feasibility study carried out by the expert group on European contract law for stakeholders and legal practitioners feedback”, cited supra note 1; but see Kornet, The Common European Sales Law and the CISG – Complicating or Simplifying the Legal Environment? Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2012/4 (2012), p. 3–4 (arguing that the introduction of CESL may increase legal complexity because it adds another option to the variants of sales law available to businesses, which have already privately developed shared standards to harmonize business practice).
might like free trade, because it opens new markets even as it brings in competitors to the market it already inhabits, so it might like different environments, and thus non-harmonized laws, in these markets. This may be a modest factor compared to the cost of switching (for some businesses) and the cost of interfacing and dealing with several legal systems (for others), but these latter factors are already appreciated as part of the case for and against harmonization. European Union bureaucrats will prefer harmonization for very different reasons, and not only the evolution of a shared identity, including the fact they are likely to be the source of mandatory and other rules. But it bears repeating that wherever harmonization is found, it has the capacity to promote a shared identity.

4. Sorting versus median voters

The most significant cost of harmonization is the sacrifice of the welfare gains obtained when mobile citizens sort themselves in a non-harmonized, differentiated world. But sorting is not the only way to accommodate disparate preferences. When a decision is made in a constituent jurisdiction it will reflect the political process found there. If we simplify by setting authoritarian governments, powerful bureaucrats, interest groups, and even intense preferences aside, we can proceed with the approximation, or ideal, that a jurisdiction’s political decisions reflect the preferences of its median voter.

Thus, even if citizens are immobile, differentiation will improve welfare so long as the varied preferences of residents across different jurisdictions are reflected in disparate laws and policies. Legal systems are in this way like firms in a market, and variety provides benefits. We should expect (even) similar jurisdictions to have disparate traffic laws, arts subsidies, criminal laws, farm policies, school curricula, and environmental laws alongside their different cuisines and fashions. With respect to some of these topics, there are right answers, as opposed to mere preferences, and we might expect various processes to lead to convergence on those answers, or best practices. At the same time, many right answers depend at least in part on preferences. Any two populations are likely to have people with different preferences, and it is

---

12. Hesselink, ibid., 350 (noting that one of the common economic arguments against adoption of CESL is that “competition between legal systems is better than harmonization”).

13. Ibid., 353–366 (arguing that resistance to CESL is partly motivated out of nationalistic sentiment and that adoption of CESL would increase a sense of European identity without necessarily sacrificing one’s sense of national identity). For some scepticism regarding the power of contract law to promote European identity, see Posner, op. cit. supra note 1.

unlikely that two jurisdictions will have median voters with identical preferences on many issues. In all the areas just listed, there is only a modest inclination (or preference) for imposing preferences on other jurisdictions, and there is a benefit in not having foreign preferences imposed on oneself. In one example (traffic laws) there are modest transaction costs to be saved through harmonization and in another (environmental law) there are externalities to be dealt with, but in none of these cases would the argument for harmonization be made as strongly as it is with respect to commercial law.

When two jurisdictions harmonize their (traffic, environmental, or commercial) laws, it is likely that they compromise between the domestic compromises they have already made. We can conveniently imagine that the median voters in the two jurisdictions must meet and agree on a midpoint, or perhaps the “combined” jurisdiction reaches a result that reflects its median voter. As the number of jurisdictions increases, it is theoretically possible to imagine that the losers, which is to say those whose preferences are distant from the median voter’s, in many jurisdictions could locate one another and benefit from central decision making by overcoming their respective median voters at that level. Without direct elections for the centralized authorities, however, this is most unlikely.

To be sure, laws are not only about preferences. Many questions of law have right answers or codify best practices, as opposed to median preferences – unless the correct characterization is simply that the median voter prefers the best practice. For example, the speed limit on comparable bridges might be identical in different jurisdictions. But most laws will reflect a mix of superior policies and preferences. Thus, there is no single best set of criminal penalties, because preferences come into play where questions of experimentation, rehabilitation, and expenditures on improving prison conditions are concerned. To be sure, the median voter in a jurisdiction might also have a preference about the desirability of harmonization, and mixed into this preference calculation will be that voter’s own projections regarding transaction costs and experimentation, so we might expect some amount of harmonization, or simply convergence, rather than diversity, for this reason alone. It follows that if two jurisdictions have similar populations (in terms of

15. In other words, each country in the EU can be thought of as a jurisdiction in which the median voter prevails. When these countries combine and make a centralized decision it is barely possible that the result is not a compromise among the 27 median voters, or a majority of those idealized positions, but rather an aggregation of the losers in many countries who find enough like-minded partners at the federation level. This is, of course, vastly more likely in a federation like the United States where these non-median voters can combine to elect a president, or even more so in a federation with frequent plebiscites. A federation dominated and managed by elected representatives of constituent States seems far more likely to reflect an aggregation of the median voters in some of those States.
preferences), their respective median voters might not be so far apart in terms of their inclinations. In turn, when transaction costs associated with trade, enforcement, and other matters are added in, preferences regarding the content of laws might indeed converge across these jurisdictions. Even if we could set simply imitation aside, we would expect the laws of two countries in Western Europe to be more similar than a pair drawn from two distant continents.

Prior to enriching the analysis with the concept of external costs, it may be useful to pause and placate the reader who is impatient with this circuitous approach to harmonization of (EU) commercial law, both because commercial law seems especially removed from mere preferences and because the CESL is structured as optional — especially where business-to-business transactions are concerned, and even more so because the choice is at the enterprise rather than jurisdictional level. Even readers who are inclined to agree that a theoretical approach, situating one harmonization question within others, can be profitable, are likely to object that most of commercial law not only reflects right answers regarding transactional efficiency but also deals rather directly with trade among jurisdictions and, therefore, transaction costs more than preferences. The median voter surely wants these costs reduced, the argument goes, and has perhaps been thwarted by local interest groups, including lawyers who invested in learning local codes and who enjoy something of a monopoly if these disparate codes are retained. The benefits from harmonization — as well as the explanation for stasis — might be analogized to those at stake where the metric and imperial measurement systems are concerned.

There are a few responses to this objection. One is that commercial law, especially when mandatory, brings on more conflicts among interest groups, perhaps because some rules impose costs on parties that do not expect to engage in much cross-jurisdiction trade. A better response is that commercial law is not unmoored from voters’ preferences. To begin with, there is the question of consumer protection, where protecting careless or unsophisticated shoppers comes at a cost to all, and thus implicates preferences regarding wealth distribution, paternalism, and the like. It is unsurprising that this piece of European harmonization receives the most attention. A second, less significant trigger of preferences is the inevitable suppression of local history, language, and culture implicated in all harmonization. A population that

16. There are principal-agent problems affecting voters and their representatives and also between legislators and “their” regulators. Consumer protection law is likely the area within commercial law where these are most significant, and thus the role of harmonization is there most significant. Singer, “Capital rules: The domestic politics of international regulatory harmonization”, (2004) *International Organization*, 531–565, thinks of harmonization as a tool for satisfying domestic political pressures rather than the regulators own preferences.
values tradition will gain utility from commercial (or any) law that can be traced back to the rules used by its forebears. There is no reason to expect this taste to be similar across populations, especially because some nations prefer to distance themselves from their geographic or genetic ancestors, while others cling to them. Finally, and most significantly, many elements of commercial law mix preferences with right answers. Priorities in bankruptcy, for example, might pit the claims of employees against those of the debtor’s tort victims, and various preferences and values will generate an inclination to favour one group over the other. Even the details of a secured transactions regime will bring into play relative tolerance for forcible repossessions and garnished wages, while others will reflect judgements about how much risk consumers should bear in return for lower prices.

5. The calculus of consent and optimal legal areas

The more we think of law as reflecting the preferences of the median voter, the more we need to ask why something is decided by law rather than left to markets (or families or other institutions) in the first place. In median voter terms, we can begin by noting the tyranny of the median voter, and then move to the question of why we cannot increase welfare by creating many more lucky median voters – by making jurisdictions smaller and smaller, much as markets segment to serve a variety of consumer tastes. In the extreme case, if each individual opts in to his own consumer law or commercial law, then everyone’s preferences can be satisfied. Note that a jurisdiction can be large for one purpose, such as national defence or currency, and much smaller for another, as is true in some places for public schools and traffic management, and could be true for commercial law. Indeed, the optimal jurisdiction size for

17. The role played by culture in creating friction (or non-compliance) for harmonization is discussed in Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, *Complying with Europe: EU Harmonization and Soft Law in the Member States* (Cambridge, 2005).

18. Secured Transactions is a good topic with which to contemplate the pressure to harmonize even where the harmonized element begins in optional form. As firms elect the CESL for cross-border transactions, it is likely that countries, not to mention the authorities in Brussels, will try to make the law mandatory. Even if this is not the case, as some firms elect the law because it is attractive to them, other firms will find that parties resist transacting unless they too agree to opt in to the CESL. Consider by way of analogy the fact that credit cards have spread, though their use is optional at the enterprise level. Firms need not accept them, and consumers need not carry them, but as they become ubiquitous one is at a serious disadvantage without them. Universality does not prove desirability, and does not eliminate the costs imposed on the minority that was dragged in to the system. Another, more provocative, example is found in the evolution of smoking regulation, which has evolved from opt-in to mandates in many jurisdictions.
one question of commercial law may well be different from that appropriate for another. The thought experiment reminds us that each jurisdiction has already harmonized, or unified, laws covering those who live within its borders. There is no reason to think that it will maximize welfare by maximizing coercion through unification. The problem with too much individual choice, of course, is that scale brings advantages, most notably a reduction in various transaction costs. In area after area of law, individuals would trade away some autonomy in return for lower prices, coordination gains, and so forth. If we allow every individual to make his or her own laws, there will be substantial interaction costs and fewer exchanges. Among other things, this trade-off pushes large swaths of law into one package when it comes to the size of the jurisdiction in which it will prevail.

As the title of this Article (and Section) suggests, the framework is also meant to remind us to incorporate Buchanan and Tullock’s notion that a majority can be expected to impose “external costs.” Inasmuch as I intend to contrast commercial law with other government actions, it is useful to dwell on the external costs problem, which is in some tension with the median voter perspective. The analysis is first framed in terms of individuals within a jurisdiction, but it is the same for numerous jurisdictions within a union. There is a median voter at both levels, and at both levels there is the problem or temptation of external-cost imposition.

Consider three different cases. In the first, a simple majority votes to build a new road at the expense of all taxpayers. Buchanan and Tullock develop the idea that the majority might make an inefficient choice as to where to locate the road or whether to construct it at all because 49 percent of the cost of the road is borne by the minority. The majority can build a road the minority would oppose, perhaps simply by locating it where it is useful to the majority alone. If the decision makers enjoy 100 percent of the benefits but pay only 51 percent of the costs, they are likely to overbuild. The smaller the share of costs paid by the majority, the greater the inefficiency problem. In the second case, the assumption about uniform taxation is relaxed, so that the majority can draft not only the road plan but also the tax law, enabling it to burden the minority and not itself. The inefficiency problem is yet greater in this second case; the majority can gain all of the benefits and pay none of the costs. If it can externalize costs in this manner, it will build roads it barely wants, though these are costly to others. It goes without saying that the example is oversimplified; among other things, it ignores the ability of the minority to turn this into a “mere” wealth transfer problem, by paying the majority not to build the road.

In a third version of the external cost problem, the majority is constrained and able to force expenditures by simple majority vote only with respect to pure public goods. Things like roads are paid for with user fees, or by taxes that are unanimously approved, or they are not built at all. Still, public goods are not identically valued by all participants, and the majority might order an inefficiently high level of a public good because the majority values it more than the minority, though not enough to pay for it by itself. The problem of external costs is solved only if majorities are unstable, so that a minority with respect to one spending programme is in the majority in the next go around, and there is a possibility of open or subtle bargains so that all majorities refrain from imposing external costs. There is little evidence supporting such an optimistic resolution.

It is plausible that the external cost problem is greater in smaller jurisdictions than in larger ones. Two voters can impose external costs on one, and a small number of players is likely to be better at maintaining a stable majority, and exploiting the minority in repeat fashion, than is a large number. A smaller jurisdiction is also likely to have homogenous voters who will form a majority and be confident that they will have similar preferences across many issues. Workers living near a factory or farmers who grow the same crop in a suitable valley come to mind. On the other hand, in many cases it is easier for an exploited minority to exit from a smaller jurisdiction without severing employment and familial ties.

Fortunately, the external cost problem is largely limited to cases where expenditures are concerned, and does not extend to all law. A good deal of imagination and many assumptions are required before the most severe external cost problem can be brought about by government regulation rather than spending. By way of illustration, product liability law may be voted in by a majority and imposed on a minority, but the costs are spread across most purchasers and the presumed benefits will flow to some subset of these purchasers, and then some other parties as well. The match between burdens and benefits is imperfect, so there is room for the majority to externalize some costs, but the problem is modest compared to what is possible when a majority contemplates an excise tax to fund a new bridge. Other regulatory law is more suspect on these grounds. For example, environmental regulations may benefit the majority, while it imposes clean-up costs on a completely different, minority, group. With such a mismatch, the majority, or even a well-organized interest group, might easily pass inefficient regulations.

Readers will have disparate intuitions about where commercial law fits in this scheme, and that may depend on the level of coercion in an initial, harmonized code. Most of commercial law is surely more like product liability and less like environmental regulation; it is certainly not like bridge building
with an excise tax on an unrelated good or activity. It is tempting to say that commercial law resembles none of these because much of it allows parties to contract out; in the case of the CESL the default is reversed and enterprises opt in rather than out. Where opting out is the rule, contracts may be costly, and for many parties and transactions the default position is all that matters. Even when there is no formal coercion, as others opt in one suffers costs by not doing so. In any event, there is reason to think if a code like the CESL has relevance, it will quickly take the opt-out form or even be imposed by the majority on certain transactions; it is hard to resist the benefits associated with imposing external costs and competitive disadvantages on others. If so, then it is noteworthy that there are many areas of commercial law where courts are hostile to contractual provisions, like liquidated damages, that attempt to contract out of default terms provided by law.\(^\text{20}\) In other areas, like credit transactions, it is difficult to contract out because of third-party effects. It is, for example, difficult to contract around payment systems or the priority rules of most secured transactions regimes.

Law may rarely be a pure public good, but it is difficult to exclude those who wish to make use of it. Its benefits cannot normally be restricted to 60 percent of the population while the other 40 percent pays for it. It could be structured as more of a private good. One can imagine charging litigants for the use of courts and collecting substantial user fees from debtors for such things as the law of secured transactions. The typical legal system, however, charges modest fees for these benefits and provides a publicly supported system, albeit one that produces precedents, trade, and other positive externalities. Thus, legal institutions, though they may arise out of a desire to impose preferences through harmonization, are likely to reflect the first type of majoritarian advantage, with its attendant external costs. The majority will impose more law than is efficient, and certainly more than it would pay for on its own, because it can share costs with those who will not benefit. The situation in which the external costs problem is greatest, as illustrated by the case where the majority can build roads it alone enjoys while it succeeds in taxing the minority to pay the entire cost, is very hard to reproduce where law-making, rather than spending, is involved. The most important sorting, but also the greatest danger from sorting, is unlikely to apply where harmonization of enabling or regulatory law (as opposed to taxing and spending) is at issue.

This is hardly the place to generalize about optimal legal areas, for that is a matter complicated by the question of the gains and losses from harmonizing some things but not others. I have already noted that the optimal size is likely to be different with respect to every question, and this may be so even within commercial law. One might want a large jurisdiction for defence, a small one

\(^{20}\) See Uniform Commercial Code, para 2–718(1).
for consumer law, a bit larger for secured transactions, a different size still for road building, and so forth. But it is clear that these various optima make the question of effective political representation extremely difficult, and the relative power of interest groups even harder to assess.

6. Conclusion: Convergence and compacts

The United States hardly needed harmonized commercial law to promote a sense of national identity, and yet its commercial law is fairly well harmonized, both where merchant-to-merchant transactions are concerned and, increasingly, where consumer law is at issue. There is no obvious evidence of significant cost externalization in this commercial law system. In the American experience we find another clue about harmonization; it came about largely through convergence. By convergence I mean, first, that different jurisdictions converged on the same legal rule, without any authority pushing them to do so.21 In the most interesting cases, convergence evolves across legal systems, without borrowing and even without knowledge of the other legal system. In the United States there has been some coerced harmonization (because of federal law regulating some consumer law, securities law, and so forth) but also convergence by State legislatures and courts, though hardly without awareness of other jurisdictions. Most significantly, model codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, have been drafted, and States have been free to adopt these codes, often with minor local adjustments. A clever political or psychological aspect to these opt-in codes, is that States do not feel as if another State was triumphant.22 The “winner” is a code usually drafted by non-political actors, influenced greatly by organized interest groups but normally incorporating a drafting committee eager to draft the best possible law. These interests keep an eye on the politics of adoption by State legislatures but it would be a mistake to minimize their desire to find the best answers. Second, there is convergence at the enterprise level. For example, one insurance company develops a form, and then because its terms are litigated, it becomes advantageous for other firms to use the same form, and it eventually becomes standard. One landlord or printing company draws a lease, and then others copy it, perhaps because drafting one’s own lease signals potential bargaining partners that one is strategic. Convergence as to terms also makes price comparisons more straightforward. Convergence thus

22. In other words, everyone bears switching costs. See Carbonara and Parisi, op. cit. supra note 4.
occurs even, or especially, where – as in the world of the CESL – harmonization is completely optional.

A good argument for EU harmonization with respect to commercial law is that harmonization in the United States, and certainly in China, is further along than in the EU, and those countries do not appear to be suffering as a result. It is safe and perhaps wise to imitate one’s competitors. There is no evidence that American States or Chinese provinces try to diverge or to separate from harmonized commercial law. Smaller units do try to serve as experimental zones, and Hong Kong might be thought of as an example of diversity rather than harmonization, but inasmuch as most observers would say that it represents a step toward a harmonized result, I will not dwell on that exception. In any event, harmonization in the United States came not from central directives but from convergence. Nothing has stopped the Members of the EU from converging on one law. It might be said that in many cases members of the United States converge with respect to commercial law and many other kinds of law because they know that if they do not, there is a good chance that federal law will develop and will pre-empt State law, with no room for dissent or even minor variations. Convergence and soft harmonization is thus often in the shadow of the threat of strong harmonization – though there is no evidence for this in the case of business-to-business commercial law. Whatever the extent of this effect, it seems impossible to say whether welfare is maximized under current U.S. law. Local variation may reflect local preferences and may increase welfare, or it may reflect overachieving interest groups and may be unfortunate in its imposition of transaction costs. Nor is there much to learn from the relationship between local variation and national identity in the United States.

Imagine that fifteen of twenty-seven jurisdictions in a federation are relatively homogeneous in the sense that the majority coalition in each of these jurisdictions sees that its preferences are sufficiently similar to those of the majority coalition (or median voter) in the other fourteen jurisdictions that it would prefer to abide by the laws of its like-minded partners than it would to the (unknown) decisions of the future majority of the twenty-seven. Alternatively, some members of the fifteen have intense preferences about some matters, and the group of fifteen is like-minded on these matters. The case is ripe for the imposition of external costs. Imagine further that there are restrictions on expenditures or taxes, perhaps because members of the federation sought to protect themselves from the external costs problem. The subset of fifteen can, therefore, manoeuvre only with regulatory law. In such cases, the fifteen would be better off agreeing to agree in the future.23 This power of a pre-committed caucus, or subgroup, is familiar to students of

political parties. In the American constitutional system it is combated by a rule requiring congressional approval of State compacts; several States cannot simply form a binding alliance. But it is clear that if a coalition of members, or elected representatives, could oblige themselves to vote alike in the future, they would gain at the benefit of their disorganized allies. The reasoning behind this counterintuitive claim begins with the assumption or requirement that each voter (each jurisdiction in the compacting group, or each senator in the set of senators contemplating such a pact) expects more often than not to agree with the majority of the group. We began, after all, with the assumption that a subset had similar preferences. If so, it is beneficial to agree to vote with the majority of one’s subgroup on all matters, as the agreement leverages one’s own vote a majority of the time. A second step, or corollary, is that the compacting group will then prefer for more matters to be decided centrally rather than be left to local preferences and votes, because each member of the compacting group has more power than the non-members where central decision making is concerned. The analogy for a federation, or for the EU in particular, is that a like-minded subset will prefer for more things to be decided by directive, or in some other centralized manner. Federations have a way of combating this compacting, or subgroup, problem. They can hope to enforce a plain ban on subgroup precommitments to vote together in the future. Alternatively, they can require various matters to be decided by supermajority.

Note, however, that the federation should not be expected to combat the power of the organized subgroup by opposing harmonization. Harmonization can be expected to increase the influence of the central bureaucracy, though the details of harmonization are likely to reflect the preferences of the overachieving, organized subgroup.

It seems plain that a self-identified minority, not empowered by “membership” in a like-minded subgroup, should generally resist harmonization. In the context of the European Union this means that a jurisdiction that thinks it is more likely to be exploited than it is to exploit others should oppose harmonization with respect to something like commercial law. Nothing stops it from allowing its laws to converge on the majority’s, much as its citizens might over time dress in the fashions prevalent in other countries, without committing to do so through any law. Fashions at home and abroad can change, and it would seem strange to agree in advance to abide by conventions set by others in return for very modest gains in trade.

In contrast, jurisdictions (like individual voters or representatives) that see themselves as part of a stable, continuing majority with similar preferences should normally prefer more central decision making, including
harmonization.\textsuperscript{24} There is the danger that the ability to externalize costs will generate inefficient laws, as might the advantage of a kind of compact that dominates disorganized States, but that is of no concern to the majority. If the primary consequence of harmonization, whether intended or not, is the development of a single political and cultural identity, then there is the question of whose identity and values will dominate, and the most likely result is that harmonization will favour the stable majority. Perhaps those who most favour strong harmonization in the case of EU commercial law are those who expect to win this battle regarding European identity.

\textsuperscript{24} Multinational firms may benefit from harmonization because it reduces transactions costs, but I hazard no conjecture on the question of political influence. Some large firms might do better dividing and conquering at the local level, while others might be perceived as gaining power when they need only influence central decision making.