The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred-Position Debate, 1941-1946

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While the Supreme Court grappled with questions arising out of the Second World War, ordinary life went on. In a large number of decisions more remote from the emotions and uncertainties of war, the Court cemented the gains of the New Deal revolution and made further progress in defining the contours of civil rights and liberties that it had begun to draw under the leadership of Chief Justice Hughes.

In addressing the familiar economic issues that had dominated the docket before that revolution, the Justices largely confirmed the Washington Post’s sunny prediction that “‘for years to come there would be virtual unanimity on the tribunal.’” None of the Brethren objected when, in Wickard v. Filburn, a congressional limitation of the wheat a farmer could plant for his own use was upheld under the commerce clause, even though the transaction was neither interstate nor commerce. None complained when in

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4. G. Dunne, Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution 204 (1977) (citation to original source not provided).

5. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

6. “[I]f we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.” Id. at 128 (Jackson, J., for a unanimous Court); see also A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., over a dissent by Roberts, J.) (holding Fair Labor Standards Act’s wage and hour regulations applied, i.e., to elevator operators in building whose tenants manufactured goods for interstate shipment); Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 324-34 (1946); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pt. 2), 59 Harv. L. Rev. 883, 901-09 (1946) (applauding the decision).

The Court also unanimously held that Congress could regulate insurance despite three-quarters of a century of unpersuasive precedent that it was not commerce even if interstate.
Carolene Products Co. v. United States,\(^7\) the second Carolene Products decision, due process objections to a ban on interstate transportation of "filled" milk, after the addition of vitamins had eliminated any legitimate health concern, were rejected on the ground that it was "disputable" whether mere regulation could remove the danger of confusing it with "the natural product." The methods employed in the exercise of congressional powers, wrote Justice Reed in the latter case, "are beyond attack without a clear and convincing showing that there is no rational basis for the legislation."\(^8\)

However, in the first Carolene Products decision, United States v. Carolene Products Co.,\(^9\) Justice Stone had suggested that the Court might more strictly scrutinize measures falling "within a specific prohibition . . . such as those of the first ten amendments," or "restrict[ing] those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or directed against "discrete and insular minorities." The civil rights and civil liberties decisions of the 1930's seemed to bear out this suggestion.\(^10\) In grappling with cases in Stone's preferred categories, however, great differences of opinion developed among Justices who had been unani-

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See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), discussed in D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 352 (1985). In a companion case, four Justices insisted, however, that Congress could do so only because insurance affected interstate commerce, thereby avoiding a disruption of established schemes of state regulation. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944) (Black, J., writing for four of the seven participating Justices) (holding Sherman Act applied to insurance). But see id. at 562-83 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); id. at 583-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 584-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.) (applying the theory of the South-Eastern dissenters to uphold application of the National Labor Relations Act to an insurer); Powell, Insurance As Commerce in Constitution and Statute, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1944) (agreeing with the dissenters in South-Eastern).

When Congress in the McCarran Act intervened to restore any state authority taken away by the South-Eastern decision, the Court predictably upheld the statute, see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946) (Rutledge, J., noting that to hold otherwise "would invert the constitutional grant into a limitation upon the very power it confers"), as it had upheld similar statutes removing commerce clause barriers to state regulation since the 1890's, see, e.g., Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 324, 361-62 (1985) [hereinafter Fuller I] (discussing In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891)), despite indefensible contrary decisions respecting the analogous limitation found implicit in article III's grant of admiralty jurisdiction, see, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), discussed in Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 Duke L.J. 1111, 1144 [hereinafter White].


8. Id. at 31-32. Justices Black and Douglas concurred only in the result, presumably because they thought economic due process should have been disowned altogether. Id. at 32. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (Douglas, J., enunciating an even more hands-off approach).

9. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), discussed in Hughes I, supra note 3, at 546.

10. See Hughes II, supra note 2, passim.
mous in upholding ordinary economic legislation.\textsuperscript{11}

\section*{I. The Opening of the Rift}

\subsection*{A. Obstructing Justice}

Soon after Stone became Chief Justice, differences of opinion among the Justices erupted in \textit{Bridges v. California},\textsuperscript{12} where the Court split five to four over the constitutionality of contempt convictions for statements allegedly interfering with the administration of justice in pending cases. Justice Black wrote for the majority to set aside the convictions on freedom of expression grounds.\textsuperscript{13} Justice Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices Roberts and Byrnes, wrote for the dissenters.\textsuperscript{14} It was a battle of giants and a preview of things to come.

In part, the difference between the opinions of Black and Frankfurter lay in their varying assessments of the facts. The President of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union had published a telegram warning of a crippling strike if a court order was enforced. The Los Angeles Times had published an editorial urging a judge not to place named offenders on probation.\textsuperscript{15} To Frankfurter, both publications were "attempt[s] to overawe a judge in a matter immediately pending before him."\textsuperscript{16} To Black they were essentially harmless since the Times editorial "did no more than threaten future adverse criticism which was reasonably to be expected anyway in the event of a lenient disposition of the pending case" and Bridges' telegram had told the judge nothing he could not be assumed to have known before.\textsuperscript{17}

Yet the differences between the majority and dissenting Justices ran deeper. They quarreled, to begin with, over the weight to be given to history in interpreting the speech and press guarantees. Justice Frankfurter insisted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} For statistical demonstration of this fractiousness, see C. Pritchett, \textit{The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values} 1937-1947 (1948).
\item \textsuperscript{12} 314 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1941).
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.} at 258-78.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.} at 279-305 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{Id.} at 298-302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} at 279 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter noted: "A powerful newspaper brought its full coercive power to bear [on a judge, whose continuance in office was dependent upon securing popular approval within a year], in demanding a particular sentence." \textit{Id.} at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He continued that it would be "inadmissible dogmatism" to say that publication of the telegram (which the state supreme court regarded "as 'a threat that if an attempt was made to enforce the decision, the ports of the entire Pacific Coast would be tied up'") could not have "dominated the mind" of the state court judge. \textit{Id.} at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.} at 273, 278.
\end{itemize}
that "the power to punish for contempt for intrusions into the living process of adjudication ha[d] been an unquestioned characteristic of English courts and of the courts of this country" for over 200 years; Black retorted that the first amendment had been adopted in order to disavow "oppressive English restrictions" and that "untested state decisions" were not determinative.

The Justices also differed as to the substantive standard by which the state's action was to be judged. Noting that the contempt citations in *Bridges* rested not upon a legislative determination entitled to deference under *Gitlow v. New York*, but on the common law, Justice Black took the occasion to enshrine the famous "clear and present danger" test, which had begun to crop up again in the late 1930's, in its most protective form: "the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished." Justice Frankfurter, who thought it enough, as the state court had held, that the publications had a "reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice," commented that "[t]he phrase 'clear and present danger' is merely a justification for curbing utterance where that is warranted by the substantive evil to be prevented . . . and the literary difference between it and 'reasonable tendency' is not of constitutional dimension."

The majority and the dissenters also differed in the relative importance they accorded to the competing values of free speech and fair trial. Justice Black emphasized that punishment of the utterances in question would preclude discussion of matters of great public importance at a crucial time.

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18. *Id.* at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); *see also id.* at 290 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (invoking Justice Holmes' decision upholding a similar conviction in *Patterson v. Colorado*, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)), discussed in Currie, *The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1890-1910*, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 871-72 (1985) [hereinafter Fuller II].

19. 314 U.S. at 265, 268 & n.13 (dismissing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), on the ground—which Holmes had refused to take—that the Court had not yet held first amendment limitations applicable to the states); *see Patterson*, 205 U.S. at 462 (expressly assuming that state was forbidden to abridge freedom of expression).


22. *Bridges*, 314 U.S. at 295-96 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Holmes had said much the same thing in *Patterson*: "If a court regards, as it may, a publication concerning a matter of law pending before it, as tending toward such an interference, it may punish it . . . ." 205 U.S. at 463; *see also Hanson, The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publication*, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 165 (1942) (highlighting this disagreement and applauding Justice Black).

while Justice Frankfurter noted that "[the] administration of justice by an impartial judiciary" was "basic to our conception of freedom." Finally, while there was no hint of either judicial restraint or federalism in Justice Black's opinion, Justice Frankfurter invoked both "the presumption of validity" and the "duty to give due regard . . . to the state's power to deal with what may be essentially local situations." In short, some of the New Deal Justices seemed much more willing than others to set aside measures affecting freedom of expression, and among the more reluctant in Bridges was Chief Justice Stone.

B. Picketing

In a final burst of unanimity that closed the Hughes era, Justice Murphy's maiden opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, assimilating freedom of speech to Carolene Products' preferred category of devices for the democratic correction of error, had struck down as overbroad a state statute read essentially to forbid all labor picketing. Less than one year later, however, that unanimity had vanished as Justices Black, Douglas, and Reed dissented in Milk.
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., a decision that upheld an injunction against peaceful picketing that Justice Frankfurter said could justifiably be found coercive because of "the momentum of fear generated by past violence." As in Bridges, the disagreement in Milk Wagon turned in part upon differing assessments of the facts. Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter once again emphasized deference to the state courts while Justice Black continued to insist on the need to find a "clear and present danger" of harm. Justice Reed, moreover, went further by noting that "[i]f the fear engendered by past misconduct coerces storekeepers during peaceful picketing, the remedy lies in the maintenance of order, not in denial of free speech."

This basic disagreement between the Justices flared up again in two picketing cases decided soon after Stone became Chief Justice. In the first, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, the Court, in another Frankfurter opinion, upheld an injunction against picketing a restaurant in violation of a state antitrust law over dissents by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Reed. The picketers' only quarrel with the restaurant owner was that he had hired a contractor who employed nonunion labor to construct another building less than two miles away. To hold this picketing constitutionally protected, wrote Frankfurter, "would compel the states to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose."

However, in the second case, Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, which was decided the same day as Ritter's Cafe, the Court unanimously set aside an injunction against the picketing of bakeries because of a

29. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
30. Id. at 293, 294 (adding that "utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal reason and become part of an instrument of force").
31. See id. at 313-16 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is going a long way to say that because of the acts of these few men, six thousand other members of their union can be denied the right to express their opinion . . . ."); cf. id. at 294-95 (Frankfurter, J.) (terming the acts of violence "neither episodic nor isolated," quoting the state court's conclusion that "'in connection with or following a series of assaults or destruction of property, [picketing] could not help but have the effect of intimidating the persons in front of whose premises such picketing occurred,'" and adding that "[w]e can reject such a determination only if we can say that it is so without warrant as to be a palpable evasion of the constitutional guarantee." (citation omitted)).
32. See id. at 313 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 319 (Reed, J., dissenting).
34. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
35. Id. at 728.
36. 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
dispute with "independent jobbers" who purchased their products, delivered them to retailers in their own trucks, and resold them. Effectively distinguishing *Ritter's Cafe* without referring to it, Justice Jackson explained that the jobbers' "mobility and their insulation from the public as middlemen made it practically impossible for [the union] to make known [its] legitimate grievances to the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system" without picketing the bakers, and that the picketing was "such as to have slight, if any, repercussions upon the interests of strangers to the issue."\(^3\)

The reference to the impact upon "strangers" seemed to suggest that the bakers, unlike the owner of *Ritter's Cafe*, were not "neutrals" at all since the "independent jobbers" were their former deliverymen. In a real sense the dispute was over the bakers' own decision to stop employing union labor.\(^3\)

The argument respecting the drivers' mobility, however, was more fundamental. *Thornhill* had established that picketing was an indispensable means for bringing "the facts of a labor dispute" to the attention of the public; the risk that it might "persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into advantageous relationships with the business establishment which is the scene of the dispute" did not justify forbidding it altogether.\(^3\)

Similarly, when the mobility of those with whom the picketers dispute makes it impracticable to convey the message by picketing them directly, as in *Wohl*, even "repercussions upon the interests of strangers" may have to be accepted if the message is to be effectively conveyed.\(^4\) The state had a legitimate interest, however, in protecting innocent persons from group boycotts designed to force them to take sides in other people's disputes. Furthermore, the state was entitled to effectuate this interest so long as it left the parties, as in *Ritter's Cafe*, a reasonable opportunity to get their information across at the site of the actual dispute.

Thus, there was a strong argument that, unlike the blanket prohibition on

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\(^3\) *Id.* at 775. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Murphy, added a separate concurring opinion. *Id.* at 775-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).

\(^3\) See *id.* at 770-71 (showing that drivers had been made "independent" to reduce social security and unemployment-insurance costs); cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132 (1944) (holding "independent" newsboys newspaper "employees" within National Labor Relations Act).

\(^3\) See *Thornhill*, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 104 (1940) ("The safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an informed and educated public opinion . . . ."); cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding risk of littering did not justify total ban on distribution of hand bills on sidewalks and streets), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2.

\(^4\) Thus, for example, picketing the site of the new building in *Ritter's Cafe* might well have been constitutionally protected, although it too might have had some tendency to "conscript neutrals," because that was the most logical place to publicize a dispute with the building contractor. Picketing at the building site, Justice Frankfurter noted, had not been enjoined. *Ritter's Cafe*, 315 U.S. at 724.
picketing in *Thornhill*, the injunction upheld in *Ritter's Cafe* was a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of communicating information. Moreover, the fact that the picketers chose to convey their message at the premises of a person with whom they had no direct dispute strongly suggests that their purpose was in large part to persuade others not to do business with him. If the state can forbid a concerted refusal to deal under these circumstances, it should be able to forbid speech inciting to the commission of the offense—by picketing or otherwise. The decision underlined the growing split on matters of free expression between Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, Byrnes, and Stone on one side and Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Reed on the other, with Justice Jackson holding the balance of power between them.

II. JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES—AGAIN

In the 1930's, Jehovah's Witnesses had won significant first amendment victories, from freedom from overbroad or discretionary permit requirements to the right to distribute handbills and protection against abusive enforcement of laws against breaches of the peace. At the end of the Hughes period, however, the Witnesses had been rebuffed in seeking special exemption from a generally applicable flag salute requirement and in attacking a

41. Congress soon wrote similar distinctions into § 8(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (1982)). *Ritter's Cafe* may indeed have been easier to defend than the limitations in Taft-Hartley, which forbade picketing only by labor organizations and only for certain goals, since it was based upon a general antitrust statute that seemed neutrally to forbid all speakers to induce third parties to take sides in other people's disputes.

42. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 469 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., without dissent) (upholding injunction against picketing to induce unlawful racial discrimination in hiring); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (Black, J., writing for a unanimous Court) (upholding injunction against picketing to induce wholesaler to join illegal group boycott of nonunion ice peddlers: "It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) ("We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech."); Dodd, *Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent*, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 524 (1943). It is noteworthy that the remedy in all the picketing cases was an injunction, which the Court in *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), had condemned as a prior restraint even when the expression enjoined was constitutionally punishable. See Hughes II, * supra* note 2. Nobody explained why illegal picketing should be an exception to this rule. See Teller, *Picketing and Free Speech*, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 195-200 (1942) (arguing that *Ritter* and *Wohl* substantially weakened *Thornhill*'s equation of picketing with speech).

parade permit provision carefully limited to traffic control purposes. Continued reversals during the early days of Chief Justice Stone came to an abrupt halt after Justice Rutledge replaced Justice Byrnes in 1943.

A. Fighting Words

In *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, none of the Justices had any difficulty in concluding that a state could punish a Jehovah's Witness or anyone else for calling a city marshal a "'God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist.'" It was the libertarian Justice Murphy who wrote to emphasize that "the right of free speech [wa]s not absolute" and that "insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"—were among "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" that were not protected—both for historical reasons and because of their "slight social value" when compared with "the social interest in order and morality." While Justice Black rejected history in *Bridges*, Justice Murphy embraced it in *Chaplinsky*. Posternity was to have difficulty with Murphy's gratuitous assimilation of "the lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous" to the unprotected categories, as well as with the Court's contemporaneous and wholly conclusory holding that "commercial advertising" was not protected either. Regardless of history, it is always troublesome in terms of first


45. 315 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1942) (quoting the complaint in *Chaplinsky*).

46. Id. at 571-72 (adding that the punishment of speech in such categories had "never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem"); see also id. at 574 ("The appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."). Justice Murphy's biographer, who carefully documented his increasing zeal for protection of civil liberties, termed the *Chaplinsky* opinion "early Murphy." See J. Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy 256 (1968).


48. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (Roberts, J.). This debatable decision had been foreshadowed by equally conclusory dictum in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2, and it derived support from repeated arguments that the purpose of the first amendment was to permit free discussion of political issues as an instrument of self-government. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relations to Self-Government 15-16, 24-27, 39 (1948); see also Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 524 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting), ("Such men as Thomas Paine, John Milton and Thomas Jefferson were not fighting for the right to peddle commercial advertising.") rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Resnick, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation. 30
amendment policy to limit the content of speech.\textsuperscript{49} A neutral ban on fighting words, in contrast, can be defended as a reasonable restriction of the \textit{manner} of expression, since it leaves the speaker free to convey whatever message he likes in less inflammatory terms.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{B. License Taxes}

Two months after \textit{Chaplinsky}, however, differences of opinion boiled up again when the Court, by a five to four vote in \textit{Jones v. Opelika},\textsuperscript{51} held that the Constitution granted Jehovah's Witnesses no exemption from taxes on the sale of religious literature. The lineup of Justices was the same as in the picketing case of \textit{Ritter's Cafe}, with two interesting exceptions—this time it was Justice Reed who wrote to reject the constitutional claim, while Chief Justice Stone joined the predictable Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy in dissent.\textsuperscript{52}

Discriminatory taxes on newspapers had been struck down in \textit{Grosjean v. American Press Co.}\textsuperscript{53} in 1936, but the taxes upheld in \textit{Jones} applied impartially to purveyors of other goods as well.\textsuperscript{54} In \textit{Grosjean}, the Court made clear that it did not mean "to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for the support of the government."\textsuperscript{55} A later decision would explain why: "We need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency."\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 242-44 (discussing the related issue of profanity); cf. Hughes II, supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{51} 316 U.S. 584 (1942).

\textsuperscript{52} See id. at 600-24.

\textsuperscript{53} 297 U.S. 233 (1936), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{54} Jones, 316 U.S. at 586-92.


\textsuperscript{56} Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
Justice Reed thought this conclusion determinative in *Jones*: “The First Amendment does not require a subsidy in the form of fiscal exemption” for either religion or the press.\(^{57}\)

The Witnesses’ setback was temporary, however, for within a year Justice Rutledge had replaced Justice Byrnes, voted with the *Jones* dissenters to grant a rehearing,\(^{58}\) and joined Justice Douglas’ opinion in *Murdock v. Pennsylvania*\(^{59}\) for a new five to four majority reaching the opposite conclusion.\(^{60}\) Echoing Stone’s dissent in the earlier case, Douglas argued it was not enough that similar taxes had been laid upon commercial enterprises operated for profit—the Constitution had placed freedom of speech, press, and religion “in a preferred position.”\(^{61}\)

Decisions limiting the use of injunctions and permits that could have been employed against other activities did indeed suggest that speech and press, although not religion, were entitled to some special constitutional privileges.\(^{62}\) There were, moreover, strong arguments to support this distinction. The virtual representation assured by forbidding discrimination may well be sufficient to protect “discrete and insular minorities,” which seems to have been the purpose of the free exercise clause. It may nevertheless be inadequate to assure the integrity of the political process, which Justice Stone had rightly suggested was one of the functions of free expression in *Carolene Products*.\(^{63}\) Justice Murphy seemed to be going very far, however, in suggesting in a second *Jones* dissent that those exercising first amendment freedoms bore no responsibility whatever for helping to defray the common costs of government.\(^{64}\) Justice Douglas, in *Murdock*, pulled back from this

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\(^{57}\) 316 U.S. at 599.

\(^{58}\) Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam).

\(^{59}\) 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

\(^{60}\) See Mendelson, *Clear and Present Danger—From Schenck to Dennis*, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 320 (1952) (“The tenure of Mr. Justice Rutledge marks the era *par excellence* of civil liberties . . . in American jurisprudence.”).

\(^{61}\) Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115; Jones, 316 U.S. at 608. Stone had also argued in *Jones* that the discretionary power of city officials to revoke a permit for the sale of literature created the same potential for discrimination that had condemned a permit requirement in *Lovell v. Griffin*, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2. *Jones*, 316 U.S. at 600-03. Justice Reed reaffirmed Lovell in Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943); in *Jones*, he appropriately responded that the revocation provision was not at issue. 316 U.S. at 599-600.


\(^{63}\) 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

\(^{64}\) Except for fees “commensurate with any expenses entailed by the presence of the
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extreme position: “It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.”65

Justice Douglas’ hackneyed argument that “[t]he power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment” applied equally to the income and property taxes he professed to distinguish.66 Additionally, there was no contention that the amounts demanded were oppressive or prohibitive.67 Nevertheless there were aspects of the privilege tax that arguably justified Douglas’ distinction.

First, the taxes in question were “fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners or to their realized revenues.”68 Accordingly, as Chief Justice Stone had said in analogizing to state taxes on persons engaged in interstate commerce, by its form alone “[t]he tax imposed . . . [was] more burdensome and destructive of the activity taxed than any gross receipts tax.”69 Payment of the tax, moreover, was made a condition of the right to sell literature because the sanction for nonpayment was denial of the

Witnesses,” Murphy argued, “no tax whatever can be levied on petitioners’ activities in distributing their literature or disseminating their ideas.” Jones, 316 U.S. at 620 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941), for the acceptability of fees to cover expenses caused by a parade); see Hughes II, supra note 2. But see Murdock, 319 U.S. at 131 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“The distributors of religious literature, possibly of all informational publications, become today privileged to carry on their occupations without contributing their share to the support of the government which provides the opportunity for the exercise of their liberties.”); id. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Murphy also suggested that the tax had been discriminatorily applied. “[N]o attempt was . . . made to apply the ordinance to ministers functioning in a more orthodox manner than petitioner.” Jones, 316 U.S. at 617 (Murphy, J., dissenting). A showing of discrimination would of course have condemned the tax, but the Court did not find discrimination in Murdock, and Justice Frankfurter insisted that no claim of discrimination had been made. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

65. 319 U.S. at 112.
66. Id. at 112; see also id. at 137 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes’ aphorism in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928), that “[t]he power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”). Justice Jackson added an embarrassing dissent of his own in which Justice Frankfurter joined, fulminating in what seemed a rather injudicious manner against the Witnesses’ aggressive methods of spreading their message. Id. at 166-82 (Jackson, J., dissenting); cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy.”).
67. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 130 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No claim is made that the effect of these taxes, either separately or cumulatively, has been, or is likely to be, to restrict the petitioners’ religious propaganda activities in any degree. Counsel expressly disclaim any such contention.”).
68. Id. at 113 (Douglas, J.).
69. Jones, 316 U.S. at 609 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 55-57 (1940) (dictum)); cf. Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 45 n.2. (taxes of a kind that two or more states might impose upon the same transaction were forbidden without regard to their amount because they placed interstate trade at a competitive disadvantage).
right itself. As Justice Douglas also suggested, commerce clause precedents had long insisted that the payment of a tax not unduly burdensome in itself could not be made a condition of exercising the federal right to engage in interstate commerce. While interstate commerce could be required to pay its own way, it could not be prohibited. Finally, the requirement that the speaker obtain a license to speak conjured up visions of the censorship that had been at the heart of the historic opposition to limitations on free expression. Though the requirement left the licensing authority no discretion to deny a permit to anyone tendering payment of the tax, it bore more than a little resemblance to the classic "previous restraint." Jones and Murdock were anything but easy cases, yet they did not hold that speech, press, or religion must be exempted from paying their share of the cost of governing.

C. Doorbells and Flags

In Martin v. City of Struthers, decided the same day as Murdock and by the same vote, the Jehovah's Witnesses won another great victory as Justice Black wrote to strike down an ordinance forbidding door-to-door distribution of handbills, circulars, and other forms of advertisements. Conceding that "the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution" and that the homeowner's privacy was a legitimate state concern, Black convincingly argued that the means selected to assuage it went too far. Black emphasized that "door to door distribution of circulars [was] essential to the poorly financed causes of little people" and that the city had substituted its judgment for that of the householders, some of whom might wish to receive the message. The interest in privacy, he concluded, could be adequately

70. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106, 114 ("It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment.").

71. See id. at 113; cf., e.g., Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 698 (1895) (Fuller, C.J.) (dictum).


73. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

74. Id. at 142; see also id. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 154 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 157, 166, 181-82 (Jackson, J., dissenting). That the ordinance discriminated against speakers and in favor of salesmen made it immediately suspect, but the Court chose a broader ground of decision.

75. Id. at 143.

76. Id. at 146.
protected by making it an offense "to ring the bell of a householder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed."77 Like the handbilling and picketing decisions, Martin seemed to strike an admirable balance between competing interests.78

One of the oddest aspects of the license-tax litigation was a separate dissent by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy in Jones signaling their repentence for having voted in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,79 over Stone's lone dissent, to sustain the requirement that Jehovah's Witnesses salute the flag.80 Justices Hughes and McReynolds, who also had joined the majority in Gobitis, had since given way to Justices Jackson and Rutledge, both of whom joined in a six-to-three opinion by the former in the famous case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,81 where the Court reversed itself on this issue too.82

Justice Stone's earlier dissent had suggested that those with religious objections were entitled to a special exemption from what he seemed to assume was an otherwise valid requirement, and so had the brief statement of the three converts in Jones.83 Jackson's magnificent "opinion of the Court" in Barnette, however, took a broader tack by proclaiming that no one could be compelled to salute the flag. Freedom of speech included the freedom not to speak; no state interest in inculcating patriotism justified such an infringement upon individual autonomy.84

77.  Id. at 148.
78.  See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text (discussing the picketing cases); cf. Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
79.  310 U.S. 586 (1940).
80.  Id., discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2; id. at 601-07 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, Douglas, & Murphy, JJ., dissenting) (describing both cases as sanctioning "device[s] which . . . suppress[ ] or tend[ ] to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group"). Gobitis was met with virtually unanimous scholarly criticism. See Heller, A Turning Point for Religious Liberty, 29 VA. L. REV. 440, 450-53 (1943) (collecting the authorities).
81.  319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
82.  Id. at 642; see also id. at 642-43 (Roberts & Reed, JJ., dissenting); id. at 646-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83.  See supra note 80.
84.  See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35 ("Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views . . . . It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty."); id. at 633 n.13 (citing William Tell's legendary refusal to salute a bailiff's hat and William Penn's refusal to uncover his head in deference to civil authority); id. at 634 ("To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."); id. at 641 ("Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson or every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as
In announcing this eminently appropriate assessment of the competing interests, Justice Jackson went out of his way to endorse Justice Stone's suggestion in *Carolene Products* that measures affecting first amendment freedoms were subject to much stricter scrutiny than those in which the due process clause was "applied for its own sake." According to Jackson, the test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect.

Justice Frankfurter's famous dissent left no doubt that he rejected this distinction in toto:

The admonition that judicial self-restraint alone limits arbitrary exercise of our authority is relevant every time we are asked to nullify legislation. The Constitution does not give us greater veto power...
when dealing with one phase of 'liberty' than with another . . . .

Our power does not vary according to the particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked . . . . [W]hen legislation is sought to be nullified on any ground, . . . responsibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerable as they are directly to the people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is to determine whether within the broad grant of authority vested in legislatures they have exercised a judgment for which reasonable justification can be offered. 87

In so saying, Justice Frankfurter laid bare the fundamental cause of the unbridgeable abyss that separated New Deal Justices who had all agreed in burying economic due process. Justices Stone, Black, and Jackson were no less adamantly than Frankfurter that the catastrophe of *Lochner v. New York* 88 must not be repeated, but they disagreed sharply as to the means of preventing it. The majority of the Justices had a narrow conception of substantive due process; Justice Frankfurter had a narrow conception of judicial review.

The majority had yet to give a satisfactory answer to Justice Frankfurter's question of how measures impinging on different "liberties" could be given different levels of scrutiny in applying the due process clause to evaluate state action. 89 His reference to the Bill of Rights and his further insistence that the question was the same as if an act of Congress had been involved, 90 however, made clear that his disagreement with the majority was broader. He seemed to have concluded that the only way to protect against further abuses like *Lochner* was to minimize judicial authority to enforce any constitutional provisions. 91

87. *Id.* at 648-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
88. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
89. See *Stone I*, supra note 1, at 13-15.
90. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 666 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The uncontrollable power wielded by this Court brings it very close to the most sensitive areas of public affairs. As appeal from legislation to adjudication becomes more frequent, and its consequences more far-reaching, judicial self-restraint becomes more and not less important, lest we unwarrantably enter social and political domains wholly outside our concern.

*Id.* (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For his Spartan view of the judicial function, Justice Frankfurter invoked Justice Holmes, whose pungent dissent in *Lochner* had served more than anything else to call attention to the problem. *See id.* at 649 (quoting Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)); *Lochner*, 198 U.S. at 75, *discussed in Fuller I*, supra note 6, at 378-82. Significantly, however, despite suggestions in his earlier opinions, Holmes himself had abandoned the position for which Frankfurter cited him. *See White*, supra note 6, at 1143-52. Several of his most illustrious opinions attest that his standards for reviewing claims both of free expression and of uncompensated takings were far stricter than those he applied in ordinary substantive due process cases. *See, e.g.*, *Gitlow* v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925)
Justice Jackson recognized in *Barnette* that it was not necessary to stop enforcing limitations that were in the Constitution in order to avoid imposing others that were not. In his sincere concern to keep judges from exceeding their constitutional authority, Justice Frankfurter came perilously close to repudiating that authority itself.\(^9\)

### III. Criminal Procedure

The basic dispute over the intrusiveness of judicial review that characterized the Stone Court's encounters with the "specific prohibitions" of the first amendment emerged in other fields as well. In *Powell v. Alabama*,\(^9\) for example, where "ignorant" defendants had been sentenced to death for rape, the Court broke new ground in a noble 1932 opinion by Justice Sutherland by holding that the due process clause required a state to provide lawyers to defendants unable to employ their own: "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."\(^9\) Ten years later, in *Betts v. Brady*,\(^9\) a divided Court nevertheless upheld a state robbery conviction although the defendant's request for an assigned attorney had been denied.

In concluding in *Betts* that the right to assigned counsel in such cases was not "fundamental," Justice Roberts relied largely on the absence of such a right in the colonies and in many state constitutions.\(^9\) If practice was to be a guide, however, Justice Black furnished food for thought in noting that thirty-five states provided for appointing counsel in noncapital cases by either constitution, statute, or judicial custom.\(^9\) More important, neither history nor practice had been the basis of *Powell*, and it was equally true in noncapital cases that a trial without counsel was no trial at all.\(^9\)

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\(^{92}\) See Kalven, Book Review, 37 Ind. L.J. 572, 577 (1962) (reviewing W. Mendelson, *Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court* (1961)) ("[W]hy should any one have preferred the setting up of this anemic check to the simplicity of not having judicial review at all?").

\(^{93}\) 287 U.S. 45, 173 (1932).

\(^{94}\) Id. at 69, Hughes II, *supra* note 2.

\(^{95}\) 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (Roberts, J.).

\(^{96}\) Id. at 465-72.

\(^{97}\) See id. at 477 & n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).

\(^{98}\) In reliance on *Powell*, the Court had declared that the sixth amendment entitled every
The Court displayed neither judicial restraint nor concern for state autonomy in *Powell* or in its other criminal procedure decisions of the early 1930's.\(^9\) In 1937, however, in *Palko v. Connecticut*,\(^10\) Justice Cardozo employed language reminiscent of the hands-off attitude that characterized economic cases of the later Hughes period in arguing that right-minded men could reasonably believe that permitting the state to appeal an acquittal was not "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."\(^11\) In echoing this language, *Betts* showed how miserly such an attitude could be by largely abandoning a right that even the Justices of the early 1930's had rightly deemed fundamental. In order to find that convicting a defendant with no lawyer to defend him was not "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right"\(^12\) the Justices needed, as Justice Black protested, a very thick skin.\(^13\)

Only Justices Douglas and Murphy joined Justice Black in his dissent in *Betts*. Justice Rutledge had not yet been appointed. It was interesting that Chief Justice Stone voted with the majority after his suggestion in *Carolene Products* of more aggressive review in cases involving "specific prohibition[s]... such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."\(^14\) Apparently, while freedom of speech was made "specific[ally]" applicable to the states because it was so fundamental, the right to assigned counsel was not because it was fundamental only in certain cases.\(^15\)

In rejecting this subtle distinction, Justice Black, who had joined the *Palko* majority, first suggested the sweeping doctrine for which his dissent in *Adamson v. California*\(^16\) would soon make him famous. Legislative history showed, Black argued in *Betts*, that the purpose of the fourteenth amend-

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\(^9\) For a discussion of the decisions, see Hughes II, *supra* note 2.

\(^10\) 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

\(^11\) *Id.* at 323.

\(^12\) *Betts* v. *Brady*, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).

\(^13\) *Id.* at 475-76 (Black, J., dissenting).


\(^15\) See *Betts*, 316 U.S. at 461-62. The Court stated:

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may... operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law... .

*Id.*

\(^16\) 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
ment was "to make secure against invasion by the states the fundamental liberties and safeguards set out in the Bill of Rights," including the right to counsel.\footnote{107} "I believe that the fourteenth amendment made the sixth amendment applicable to the states."\footnote{108} This position had been rejected before, and there were troublesome arguments against it.\footnote{109} However, if the Senate spokesman for the amendment was correct in saying that it made all the protections of the Bill of Rights "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" binding the states as well,\footnote{110} then it was not inconsistent after all to enforce these rights aggressively against the states while essentially abandoning substantive due process; for in this view, their applicability to the states did not depend on that discredited doctrine at all.

IV. INSULAR MINORITIES AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

A. Blacks

Carolene Products hinted at strict enforcement not only of "specific" constitutional prohibitions—which should have included the equal protection clause and the fifteenth amendment's ban on racial denial of the vote—but also of provisions protecting "those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or the rights of "discrete and insular minorities."\footnote{111} These two categories coalesced in \textit{Smith v. Allwright},\footnote{112} a case involving a white primary, where the Court delivered one of its greatest blows both for the equality of blacks and for the integrity of our political system.

Although the Court struck down the exclusion of blacks from primary elections whenever it could find the state responsible, it had felt stymied in \textit{Grovey v. Townsend},\footnote{113} where the discriminatory decision had been made by a party convention.\footnote{114} Nine years after \textit{Grovey}, in \textit{Smith}, the Court changed its mind. On second thought, the discrimination could be pinned on the state.\footnote{115}

\footnotetext[107]{316 U.S. at 474 \& n.1 (Black, J., dissenting); \textit{cf.} \textit{Adamson}, 332 U.S. at 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting).}
\footnotetext[108]{316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).}
\footnotetext[109]{See \textit{D. CURRIE}, supra note 6, at 342-51, 363-68 (discussing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).}
\footnotetext[110]{\textit{CONG. GLOBE}, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-66 (1866) (remarks of Senator Howard).}
\footnotetext[111]{See \textit{United States v. Carolene Products}, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).}
\footnotetext[114]{See Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing \textit{Grovey}. 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).}
\footnotetext[115]{Only Justice Roberts, author of \textit{Grovey} and one of the two remaining Justices who had then been on the Court, dissented. \textit{Smith}, 321 U.S. at 666-70 (Roberts, J., dissenting). There was irony in his protest against the Court's willingness to overrule precedents, since Roberts
Justice Reed’s opinion relied in substantial part on state regulation of the party, which the Grovey Court had found insufficient. Justice Reed noted that state law provided for the election of party officers and delegates to the party convention and that state statutes set the fees to be paid by candidates to defray costs of the primary elections. Additionally, state courts had jurisdiction “to compel party officers to perform their statutory duties.” Thus, according to Reed, “[p]rimary elections [were] conducted by the party under state statutory authority” and “[t]he party [took] its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes.”

All of this was pretty flimsy, and none of it seemed to distinguish political parties from other associations or individuals whose activities were regulated by state law. Such arguments, if taken at face value, could have largely obliterated the constitutional distinction between public and private action.

Not only was the Court, in conformity with Stone’s dictum, showing precious little restraint in protecting minorities and the political process, it also seemed to be stretching the Constitution in order to do so.

After Stone’s death, the Justices had to find a new rationale for their decision in Terry v. Adams that the “Jaybird Democratic Association’s” lily-white preprimary must be struck down. As Justice Minton protested in a lone dissent, the preprimary was not regulated by the state at all. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton, seemed to argue that the state
was responsible for private discrimination because it had not prohibited it. Black's thesis would wholly eliminate the requirement of state action. Justice Frankfurter, in arguing that state officers had "participated in" the discriminatory scheme "by voting in the Jaybird primary," ignored the distinction between public and private acts of state officials on which he himself had most zealously insisted in other cases. Justice Clark, writing for the remaining four members of the Court, seemed to put his finger on a more promising argument:

[T]he Jaybird Democratic Association is the decisive power in the county's recognized electoral process. . . . [W]hen a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play.

This argument takes on meaning from Justice Black's opinion in *Marsh v. Alabama*, one of the Court's last pronouncements before Stone's death in 1946. That case followed *Lovell v. City of Griffin* and other precedents in forbidding a municipality to bar the sidewalk distribution of literature or to condition it on a permit that could be denied at will. There was just one difference between *Marsh* and the earlier cases: the municipality in *Marsh* was a company town.

Chickasaw, Alabama, where the case arose, was owned and governed by

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122. Id. at 469 (opinion of Black, J.) ("For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment."); see also id. at 485 (Minton, J., dissenting) ("As I understand Mr. Justice Black's opinion, he would have this Court redress the wrong even if it was individual action alone.").

123. See id. at 473-77 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); id. at 485 (Minton, J., dissenting) (adding that the record contained no evidence that officials had participated in the primary); cf. *Monroe v. Pape*, 365 U.S. 167, 202-59 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (taking a similar view of the "under color of" state law requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)); *Snowden v. Hughes*, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("I am unable to grasp the principle on which the State can here be said to deny the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws of the State when the foundation of his claim is that the Board had disobeyed the authentic command of the State.").

124. *Terry*, 345 U.S. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring); cf. id. at 469 (opinion of Black, J.) ("The only election that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years has been that held by the Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded. . . . The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county.").


126. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justice Burton, objected that Marsh was "the first case to extend by law the privilege of religious exercises . . . to private places without the assent of the owner." Justice Black demurred, arguing that the corporation's right to control the residents of Chickasaw was not "coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests." "[A] company-owned town," as Frankfurter succinctly stated in a concurring opinion, "is a town." Except for the question of title, Black added, there was "nothing to distinguish Chickasaw from any other town," and the public interest in open channels of communication was the same.

Those who govern, in other words, are the "state" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The purposes of the amendment are applicable to all who perform the functions of government, whether they are elected, appointed, or otherwise private persons. That seems to be what Justice Clark was suggesting when he noted in Terry that the Jaybird organization had "take[n] on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play." Justice Reed, despite his Marsh dissent and his stress on ephemeral traces of state regulation, intimated the same thing in Smith when he commented that "recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the State."

Like governing itself, the election of those who govern is such a central state function that whoever controls it is the "state" within the meaning of constitutional limitations. That test, like most, would present nasty line-drawing problems. Yet it seemed much more faithful to the purposes of the framers than any of the more sweeping theories that had been offered in an

128. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502-03; id. at 513 (Reed, J., dissenting) (Company towns "may be essential to furnish proper and convenient living conditions for employees on isolated operations in lumbering, mining, production of high explosives and large-scale farming."). "In the bituminous coal industry alone," Justice Black noted, "approximately one-half of the miners in the United States lived in company-owned houses in the period from 1922-23." Id. at 508 n.5.
129. Id. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 506.
131. Id. at 510 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 503.
133. Id. at 507.
135. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944); see also id. at 664 ("When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national, . . . the same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election."). For an approving view, see Cushman, The Texas "White Primary" Case—Smith v. Allwright, 30 Cornell L.Q. 66 (1944).
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effort to make the fifteenth amendment more than an empty formality. Moreover, it certainly suggested very little in the way of judicial restraint.

B. Other Outsiders

Because state regulations affecting interstate commerce often imposed burdens "principally upon those without the state," Justice Stone noted in *South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers* in 1938, "legislative action [in such cases] is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation." In light of these observations, it was understandable that Stone cited *Barnwell* in *Carolene Products* along with cases of racial and religious discrimination as examples of the arguable need for "more searching judicial inquiry" in cases involving "discrete and insular minorities." 137

Since geographical outsiders have no vote, they are in special need of constitutional protection. An efficient way to provide this protection, with relatively modest displacement of the normal political process, is to tie the fate of those who are not represented to that of those who are by forbidding discrimination. 138 The framers utilized this approach in article IV by requiring one state to afford citizens of another all the privileges and immunities of its own citizens. The same method was employed in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth amendments to protect the interests of blacks and, later, of women. As Justice Stone explained in *Barnwell*, this approach also helps to explain the Court's longstanding insistence that interstate commerce may not be subjected to discriminatory burdens. 139

136. 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938).
139. See 303 U.S. at 185 (dictum) ("The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or method . . ."); see also, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (striking down state tax applicable only to out of state goods), *discussed in D. Currie, supra* note 6, at 404-05. Because local residents with normal political power may also engage in interstate transactions, the analogy to racial minorities is not perfect. Yet the presence of outside interests suggests that the concerns of interstate commerce may be underrepresented in the counsels of any one state.

Marshall's reasoning in the analogous field of intergovernmental immunity in *M'Culloch*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428, seemed to go further than this argument required. A ban limited to discriminatory taxes, such as that imposed in *M'Culloch* itself, would have given the national bank political protection by tying its fate to that of local institutions. Under Chief Justice Stone, recognizing that the United States could protect itself by legislation and that the states were adequately represented in Congress, the Court continued to chip away at intergovernmental immunities. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (Black, J.) (federal price
Edwards v. California,\textsuperscript{140} abandoning ancient dicta in denying the right of a state to exclude paupers in the most important opinion of the short-tenured Justice Byrnes, properly reflected these concerns with the observation that "the indigent non-residents who are the real victims of this statute are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy."\textsuperscript{141} Justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy, evidently gearing up for an assault on the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence, argued instead that the state's action abridged the mysterious right to travel originally recognized in Crandall v. Nevada,\textsuperscript{142} which the Slaughter-House Cases\textsuperscript{143} described as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship protected by the fourteenth amendment; Justice Jackson basically agreed.\textsuperscript{144} Although Justice Douglas mentioned it in passing, none of the Justices relied on the most obvious constitutional basis for the decision: clear discrimination against citizens of other states in violation of the...
privileges and immunities clause of article IV.145

In Barnwell, Justice Stone had come close to saying that the states could regulate commerce so long as they did not discriminate against it.146 Justice Douglas echoed this position in his dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,147 where the majority struck down a nondiscriminatory provision limiting the length of trains. Justice Black, in a separate dissent in Southern Pacific, seemed to question the entire notion that the commerce clause limited state power, suggesting that the Court should be "at least" as deferential to state legislatures in this field as it was in substantive due process cases.148 The Chief Justice, however, took the occasion to entrench for the majority his original position that the validity of nondiscriminatory state regulations affecting commerce turned on "accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved."149

The dubious safety advantages of the train length law sufficiently distinguish Southern Pacific from Barnwell, which had upheld an obviously reasonable limitation of the width of trucks.150 The tone of the two opinions,

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145. "[T]here are expressions in the cases that this right of free movement of persons is an incident of state citizenship protected against discriminatory state action by Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution.” Edwards, 314 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The Court consistently applied this provision according to its purpose of preventing one state from discriminating against citizens of another. See D. Currie, supra note 6, at 348 & n.137. In addition, the Articles of Confederation, from which the clause was taken, had expressly included the right of “free ingress and regress to and from any other State”—not qualified to except “paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice,” as was the basic provision itself at the time. Articles of Confederation, art. 4. It seems most unlikely that in omitting the explanatory clause respecting the right of entry, the framers of the present Constitution, which generally increased the restrictions on state authority, meant to empower one state to deny another’s citizens the most fundamental privilege of all.

146. Stone stated:

In each of these cases regulation involves a burden on interstate commerce. But so long as the state action does not discriminate, the burden is one which the Constitution permits because it is an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the Constitution, has been left to the states.

Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 189.

147. 325 U.S. 761, 795-96 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“My view has been that the courts should intervene only where the state legislation discriminated against interstate commerce or was out of harmony with laws which Congress had enacted.”).

148. Id. at 792 (Black, J., dissenting).

149. Id. at 769; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943) (Stone, C.J.) (applying same test to uphold state restrictions on marketing of raisins); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).

150. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 781-82 (The state’s “regulation of train lengths, admittedly obstructive to interstate train operation, . . . passes beyond what is plainly essential for safety since it does not appear that it will lessen rather than increase the danger of accident.”); Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 196 (noting that the use of 96-inch trucks on roads with 96-inch lanes “tends to force other traffic off the concrete surface”); see also id. at 191-96 (upholding a gross-weight limitation designed to prevent road damage over the objection that limitations on
however, was significantly different. While Barnwell had intimated that even severe burdens on commerce were permissible in the absence of discrimination, Southern Pacific declared that the states had wide scope for regulation of matters of local concern “provided it [did] not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines.” The contrast between the deferential tone of Barnwell and the unabashed activism of Southern Pacific suggests that Stone’s thinking about the commerce clause had undergone some evolution in the intervening years.

In aggressively applying a balancing test for determining the reasonableness of laws that imposed neither discriminatory nor cumulative burdens on interstate trade, Chief Justice Stone seemed to go beyond Barnwell’s explanation that relatively strict scrutiny was necessary to protect politically impotent outsiders from competitive disadvantage. In so doing, however, he merely made explicit what the Court had basically been doing for nearly a century. By stressing the distinct national interest in unimpeded interstate transportation, moreover, he seemed to assimilate the implicit limitation of the commerce clause on state power to those “specific prohibitions” which, like those of the Bill of Rights, were also candidates for less restrained judicial enforcement under Carolene Products. In short, like Justice Jackson in Barnette and Justice Black in Betts, the Chief Justice seemed to make clear in Southern Pacific that his objection to the economic activism of the days before 1937 was to substantive due process, not to aggressive judicial review.

C. Interstate Relations

Like the privileges and immunities clause of the same article, the full faith and credit clause of article IV was designed to protect unrepresented out of state interests in the name of interstate harmony—in this case the legitimate interests of other states in recognition of their governmental acts. In light of his heightened concern for the politically powerless in Carolene Products, it seems surprising that Stone’s signal contribution to this field was to replace the traditional strict scrutiny of state choice of law decisions with a deferential analysis that permitted any interested state to resolve conflicts in its own favor.

weight per axle would have sufficed). Chief Justice Stone’s explicit basis for distinguishing the two cases—the state’s ownership of its highways—seemed less compelling. Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 783; cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (striking down highway regulation that exposed interstate truckers to contradictory requirements in different states).

151. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 770; Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 189.
152. See Fuller I, supra note 6, at 366-69.
153. See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (Stone,
Unlike the equally deferential commerce clause views he had expressed in *Barnwell*, this interest analysis continued to determine interstate choice of law decisions after Stone's elevation to Chief Justice.154 Once the rights of the parties had been determined by litigation, however, Stone was faithful to his own aggressive prior position that the policy of finality embodied in the full faith clause required even an interested state to respect another state's judgment.155

J.; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (Stone, J.) (allowing either state of accident or of contract to apply its own workers' compensation law); Hughes I, supra note 3, at 548-50. It was understandable that Stone would reject the Procrustean notion that only the state where an event occurred had any legitimate concern in its regulation, but his theory of unrepresented interests might have led him to attempt to determine which state's interest was the greater. Cf Jackson, *Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution*, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945). But see Freund, *Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws*, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1235 (1946) ("[P]roblems of choice of law have not lent themselves to satisfactory solution as constitutional questions, and . . . in their nature they cannot be expected to.").

154. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 158, 160 (1945) (Douglas, J.) (state may determine amount of reserve out-of-state insurer must maintain to satisfy claims by insured residents); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1941) (Stone, C.J.) (state may apply own law to determine whether resident has become member of out of state corporation and thus liable for share of its debts); see also Freund, supra note 153, at 1232. Freund, noting the "notable latitude" left the states by the Pink decision, stated, "If choice of law in commercial transactions is to be subjected to some extent to the unifying force of the full faith and credit clause, there could scarcely be a more appropriate matter for such treatment than the relation of a policyholder to his company . . . ." Id.

155. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (one state's workers' compensation award bars second claim for same injury in second state). Chief Justice Stone distinguished between statutes and judgments and stressed "the clear purpose of the full faith and credit clause to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered." Id. at 436-39; see Freund, supra note 153, at 1225-30; see also Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (Stone, J.) (requiring state to respect sister-state judgment for taxes); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (forbidding state to grant child support beyond that provided by sister-state decree); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (requiring state to respect judgment on gambling contract contrary to its public policy), discussed in Fuller II, supra note 18, at 883-86; Cheatham, *Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt*, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330 (1944) (arguing that workers' compensation should be treated as an exceptional case). Stone had let sympathy draw him from this path in Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 213-27 (Stone, J., dissenting), but since then he had been the Court's leading spokesman for a strict interstate res judicata policy.

The award given binding effect in *Magnolia* was that of an administrative agency rather than of a court, but, as Stone said, the policy of the clause was unaffected by the label: Whether the proceeding was a "judicial" one or its award a "record," the clause required both to be equally respected. 320 U.S. at 443. Justice Black, writing for the four dissenters, made the more serious objection that the first state's tribunal had had no jurisdiction to decide claims under any other state's law: "The decision of this Court today, therefore, is tantamount to holding that Texas intended to extinguish a claim against the employer in a proceeding in which . . . liability under Louisiana law was not allowed to be raised." Id. at 453. Jurisdiction to decide
The critical assumption on which this clause subordinates the interest of one state to another state's interest in finality, however, is that the litigant have a reasonable opportunity to present his case in the forum whose judgment is sought to be enforced. This assumption fails when a judgment is pleaded against one who was not a party to the initial litigation and when the parties have every incentive to frustrate the nonparty's legitimate interest. Thus it was entirely appropriate for the Court in *Williams v. North Carolina* to hold that a foreign divorce decree did not preclude a state from prosecuting for bigamy two of its residents who had remarried after traveling to another state for the sole purpose of evading the strict divorce limitations of their home state.

The Court had shown less concern for the interest of the stay-at-home spouse whose partner had fled to Nevada by holding, in an earlier chapter of the same litigation, that a divorce was valid though the defendant never had any contact with the divorcing state. Thus, as Justice Jackson succinctly stated in his dissent, the Court held that "settled family relationships may be destroyed by a procedure that we would not recognize if the suit were one to collect on a grocery bill." Unless one concludes that the absent spouse was not substantially harmed because the marriages in question existed in name only, this decision seems hardly reconcilable with the modern standard of "minimum contacts, ... 'fair play and substantial justice'" that had always been a condition of full faith and credit. See *D'Arcy v. Ketchum*, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1851). Unless filing a claim under one state's law fairly can be held an election, there are due process difficulties in allowing a tribunal to destroy rights it has no jurisdiction to enforce. See *Hansberry v. Lee*, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (Stone, J.) (holding due process forbade enforcing judgment against nonparty).

A few years after *Magnolia*, in *Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin*, 330 U.S. 622, 627-28 (1947) (Murphy, J.), a unanimous Court sensibly permitted a second state to give further compensation after concluding that the first tribunal had intended to preclude further relief only under its own law. For the subsequent fate of these decisions, see *Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.*, 448 U.S. 261 (1980), in which six Justices voted to repudiate *McCartin* and four voted to overrule *Magnolia* as well.

157. 325 U.S. 226 (Frankfurter, J.), reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 898 (1945); *see also Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce—Williams v. North Carolina II*, 54 YALE L.J. 799, 801-02 (1945) ([A] divorce decree in such circumstances appears more like an interference by Nevada in the marital relations of North Carolinians . . . .
Chief Justice Stone would soon enunciate to determine whether a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was consistent with due process in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*.161

In *International Shoe*, decided only a few months before his death, Chief Justice Stone did for the law of personal jurisdiction what he had done ever since his appointment for full faith and credit, intergovernmental immunity, extraterritorial taxation, and state laws affecting interstate commerce.162 He brought order out of chaos, brought out of the closet the functional considerations that had often lain earlier decisions, and laid down sensible criteria that have governed ever since.163

D. Representation

The famous 1946 decision in *Colegrove v. Green*164 involved a suit by Illinois citizens attacking the apportionment of congressional seats among various districts within the state. One of the complainants lived in a district containing more than 900,000 people; other districts contained as few as 112,000.165 The complainant’s vote, as Justice Black observed in his dissent, was “only one-ninth as effective . . . as the votes of other citizens.”166

Joined as usual by Justices Douglas and Murphy, Justice Black argued that “[s]uch discriminatory legislation . . . [was] exactly the kind that the equal protection clause was intended to prohibit.”167 As an original matter this conclusion seems questionable, since the framers’ focus was on racial discrimination and they had expressly disclaimed any intention of affecting the right to vote.168 By 1946 it was a little late to raise either objection.169 Whether there might be justifications for the discrepancy, however, re-

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162. See Hughes I, supra note 3, passim.
163. See Cheatham, *Stone on Conflict of Laws*, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 729 (1945). In *International Shoe*, 326 U.S. at 322-26, Justice Black wrote a separate opinion agreeing that the court below had jurisdiction and protesting, as he did repeatedly in other contexts, that the Constitution gave the Court no warrant to determine whether a state’s exercise of power was “reasonable” or in accord with “fair play and substantial justice.” See supra text accompanying notes 106-08, 147-51 (discussing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 76 (1945) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)).
164. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
165. See id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
166. *Id.* (Black, J., dissenting).
167. *Id.* (Black, J., dissenting).
168. See D. Currie, *supra* note 6, at 342-51, 384 (discussing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
169. See id. at 390-92 (discussing the extension of equal protection to nonracial classifications); Taft, *supra* note 20, at 70-71 (discussing its application to voting in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)).
mained to be seen.\textsuperscript{170}

Although the substantive issues raised by the complaint were extremely challenging, the majority did not reach them. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Reed and Burton, concluded that the questions presented were “of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination.”\textsuperscript{171} Rutledge, the only other Justice participating, concluded that the complaint had been properly dismissed “for want of equity.”\textsuperscript{172} Hence, by a four-to-three vote, the judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed.

Earlier decisions had occasionally suggested that certain “political” questions were indeed beyond judicial ken.\textsuperscript{173} The whole course of constitutional decision, however, demonstrated that the mere fact that an issue was of political significance did not bring it within that category. Though some of the opinions were foggy, the Court seemed largely to have held that certain matters lay within the discretion of other governmental bodies\textsuperscript{174} and that the section of article IV by which the United States guaranteed to each state a republican form of government, as its text suggested, gave the citizen no enforceable rights.\textsuperscript{175}

Justice Frankfurter’s most concrete argument was that article I gave Congress authority to revise state regulations governing the time, place, and manner of congressional elections,\textsuperscript{176} but explicit congressional authority to enforce the Civil War amendments\textsuperscript{177} had never been held to oust courts of ordinary jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of state action under them. Furthermore, since it was Congress that was allegedly malapportioned, there was a particularly hollow ring to Justice Frankfurter’s conten-

\textsuperscript{170} Justice Black also invoked article I’s requirement that members of the House be “chosen . . . by the People of the several States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, which obviously required some interpretation before it could be said to outlaw the apportionment in question. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 570 (Black, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{171} Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.

\textsuperscript{172} Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{173} See D. Currie, supra note 6, at 67 & n.19, 252-57 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-71 (1803) and Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)); Hughes I, supra note 3, at 554 n.223 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).

\textsuperscript{174} E.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 421 (1839) (President’s authority to recognize foreign sovereignty), discussed in D. Currie, supra note 6, at 253 n.121; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. The foggiest decision of all, Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433, can be viewed as holding that the Constitution imposed no limit on the time for ratification of an amendment and did not forbid ratification after rejection, though the Court also spoke more vaguely about the lack of judicially manageable standards for decision. See id. at 453-55.

\textsuperscript{175} See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143-51 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).

\textsuperscript{176} Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).

\textsuperscript{177} See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
tion that "[t]he remedy for unfairness in districting" was "to invoke the ample powers of Congress." 178 In fact, Colegrove was a classic illustration of Chief Justice Stone's wisdom in suggesting a special need for judicial review to assure the proper functioning of "those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." 179

Chief Justice Stone died suddenly in April 1946, shortly before Colegrove was decided. Someone must have known how he would have voted in the case, since it had been argued before his death. One likes to think he would have voted with Justice Black to determine the case on its merits, since it was he who had pointed out in Carolene Products that the integrity of the democratic process was the crucial assumption on which deference to the political branches rested. 180

Nothing in Justice Frankfurter's brief opinion seems sufficient to justify a refusal to determine the impact of the equal protection clause in such a context. He would make a much more elaborate effort to do so some sixteen years later in Baker v. Carr. 181 For now let it suffice that, popular impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, Frankfurter lost on this issue in Colegrove. In providing the decisive vote for dismissal on the ground that it might be too late for the petitioners to obtain effective relief before the impending election, Justice Rutledge made clear that he thought precedent established that the questions raised were justiciable. 182

V. CONCLUSION

Stone's brief tenure as Chief Justice was a time of tall Justices—Stone himself, Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson, to name only the most illustrious. Seldom have so many gifted Justices graced the institution at the same time.

It was a time of great victories and of great disappointments. Great blows were struck for freedom in such inspiring opinions as Duncan v. Kanahamoku 183 and Ex parte Endo, 184 Cramer v. United States 185 and Es-

178. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. Justice Frankfurter also suggested that voters might "secure State legislatures that will apportion properly," id., but those legislatures were apportioned in the same way and therefore no more likely than Congress to give away the excessive power of their incumbents. See id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting).
180. Justice Murphy's biographer reports that "only one Justice" (not Black, Murphy, or Rutledge) voted to intervene when Colegrove was first discussed in conference, and that Justice Black initially had the "assignment" of writing to deny justiciability. See J. HOWARD, supra note 46, at 484 & n.C.
182. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 564-65 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
185. 325 U.S. 1 (1945), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 21-27.
tep v. United States, Martin v. City of Struthers and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, and Smith v. Allwright and Marsh v. Alabama. Entire fields of law were modernized and clarified by the Chief Justice's fine opinions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona and International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The Court did what it could to curb the excesses of war; but cases like Ex parte Quirin, In re Yamashita, Hirabayashi v. United States, and Korematsu v. United States were sobering reminders both of the limits of judicial review and of the responsibility of other branches for safeguarding fundamental liberties. Colegrove v. Green postponed for a generation the correction of the glaring anomaly of malapportionment, and Betts v. Brady prevented for the same period fulfillment of the promise of fair trial the Court had made ten years before.

It was a time of vigorous disagreement among the Justices, most notably over the question of heightened scrutiny of measures affecting "specific" constitutional prohibitions, political processes, and insular minorities that Stone had raised in his perceptive footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co. To a substantial extent Stone's view had already prevailed, though the battle was not to be fully won until Justice Frankfurter's retirement in 1962. As leading spokesmen for the two competing views, Justices Black and Frankfurter, like Justices Field and Miller three-quarters of a century before, squared off in 1946 for another decade and a half of intense controversy over the most fundamental questions of judicial authority.

It was a time, finally, to celebrate the career of a truly extraordinary member of the Court. In his twenty years on the Bench, Harlan F. Stone had done more perhaps than any other Justice to bring constitutional law into the twentieth century. We are indebted to him for one of the most effec-

186. 327 U.S. 114 (1946), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 33-37.
187. 319 U.S. 141 (1943); see also supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
188. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
189. 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
190. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see also supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
191. 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see also supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
192. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
193. 317 U.S. 1 (1942), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 4-5.
194. 327 U.S. 1 (1946), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 5-7.
197. See generally Stone I, supra note 1.
198. 328 U.S. 549 (1946); see also supra notes 164-82 and accompanying text.
199. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see also supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
200. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), discussed in Hughes I, supra note 3, at 546.
201. See D. Currie, supra note 6, at 537-58.
202. See A. Mason, supra note 144, at 777 ("In a logical, as well as a chronological, sense..."
tive protests against the old order, as well as the authoritative program of the new. He almost singlehandedly wrote the modern law of intergovernmental immunity, commerce clause preemption, full faith and credit, extraterritorial taxation, and personal jurisdiction. Next to Marshall and Holmes, Stone may well have been the most influential Justice yet to have presided on the Supreme Court.

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Stone was the one who, in both the old and the new Court, carried the Holmes-Brandeis tradition to its fruition.

203. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936), discussed in Hughes 1, supra note 3, at 530-36; see also Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 764, 777 (1945) ("In the battle that followed [the Butler dissent] was the standard of attack.").

204. See Cheatham, supra note 163, at 733 ("[S]ince Story wrote his great treatise over one hundred years ago no member of the court has contributed more than the late Chief Justice to conflict of laws."); Magill, Stone on Taxation, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 747, 752, 763 (1945) ("Mr. Justice Stone's operations in the field of state jurisdiction to tax intangibles . . . contributed much to the establishment of sensible rules. . . . He put intergovernmental tax relations on a sound basis.").