TABLE 4
LEADING CASES IDENTIFIED BY MODERN HISTORIANS, 1600–1872

	Baker		Ibbetson		Epstein		All	
	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N
1600–1798	76%	192	64%	138	58%	19	69%	302
1800–1824	70%	20	50%	35	33%	6	56%	57
1826–1872	56%	36	62%	103	38%	28	57%	143
1800–1872	61%	58	60%	140	39%	35	57%	203
Difference between 1600–1798 and 1800–1824	-6%		-14%		-25%		-13%*	
Difference between 1800–1824 and 1826–1872	-14%		12%		5%		1%	
Difference between 1600–1798 and 1800–1872	-15%**		-4%		-19%		-12%**	

* denotes that the one-tailed *p*-value was between 0.025 and 0.05, and thus that the two-tailed *p*-value was between 0.05 and 0.10.
** denotes that the one-tailed *p*-value was less than 0.025, and thus that the two-tailed *p*-value was less than 0.05.

In Vikas K. Didwania, Comment, *The Defense of Laches in Copyright Infringement Claims*, 75 U Chi L Rev 1227 (2008), footnote 149 should read:

The other possibility is that the second user will find a creator's threat to sue as highly credible because the second user knows that the creator is worried about losing his ability to sue in the future due to delay. Therefore, the second user may be more willing to settle initially. Aside from the fact that examples exist of negotiations leading to delay under laches, as in *Danjaq*, there are other reasons to doubt this line of analysis. First, the creator would need to assume that the second user would find his threat credible in order to avoid filing suit early. Second, the creator would worry that the second user may agree to negotiate in good faith and avoid suit but then simply drag on the negotiations. Third, even if the parties do negotiate in good faith, the creator will likely need to lower licensing fees to immunize the second user, as explained in note 141. A lower licensing fee would lead to reduced incentives to create for the creator and reduced ability to exploit for the second user.