

ERRATA

In Daniel Klerman, *Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law*, 74 U Chi L Rev 1179 (2007), the first two paragraphs of the text should be italicized as an abstract.

Additionally, the first full paragraph on page 1211 should read:

On the other hand, there is no evidence that the 1825 statute that took fees away from the Chief Judges of King's Bench and Common Pleas had any effect. The cases in Baker show a large, 14 percentage point drop in the percent pro-plaintiff, but Ibbetson and Epstein show smaller increases. Overall, there is a slight (1 percentage point) increase in the percent pro-plaintiff. None of these changes is statistically significant. Most probably, the 1825 statute had little impact because all cases in the examined reports were decided en banc by all four judges in the court. Since the chief was only one of the four, the change in his incentives had little effect. In addition, the 1825 statute had no effect on the Court of Exchequer because fees from all its judges were taken away in 1799.

Table 3 on page 1207 and Table 4 on page 1210 should read:

TABLE 3
REPORTED CASES, 1798, 1800, 1824, AND 1826

Year	King's Bench		Common Pleas		All	
	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N
1798	56%	100	54%	69	55%	169
1800	40%	76	60%	73	50%	149
1824	43%	28	53%	19	47%	47
1826	35%	37	67%	18	45%	55
Difference between						
1798 and 1800	-16%**		6%		-5%	
Difference between						
1824 and 1826	-8%		14%		-2%	

Source: The English Reports on CD-ROM (Jutastat, Ltd).

** denotes that the one-tailed *p*-value was less than 0.025, and thus that the two-tailed *p*-value was less than 0.05.

TABLE 4
LEADING CASES IDENTIFIED BY MODERN HISTORIANS, 1600–1872

	Baker		Ibbetson		Epstein		All	
	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N	% for plaintiff	N
1600–1798	76%	192	64%	138	58%	19	69%	302
1800–1824	70%	20	50%	35	33%	6	56%	57
1826–1872	56%	36	62%	103	38%	28	57%	143
1800–1872	61%	58	60%	140	39%	35	57%	203
Difference between 1600–1798 and 1800–1824	-6%		-14%		-25%		-13%*	
Difference between 1800–1824 and 1826–1872	-14%		12%		5%		1%	
Difference between 1600–1798 and 1800–1872	-15%**		-4%		-19%		-12%**	

* denotes that the one-tailed p -value was between 0.025 and 0.05, and thus that the two-tailed p -value was between 0.05 and 0.10.

** denotes that the one-tailed p -value was less than 0.025, and thus that the two-tailed p -value was less than 0.05.

In Vikas K. Didwania, Comment, *The Defense of Laches in Copyright Infringement Claims*, 75 U Chi L Rev 1227 (2008), footnote 149 should read:

The other possibility is that the second user will find a creator's threat to sue as highly credible because the second user knows that the creator is worried about losing his ability to sue in the future due to delay. Therefore, the second user may be more willing to settle initially. Aside from the fact that examples exist of negotiations leading to delay under laches, as in *Danjaq*, there are other reasons to doubt this line of analysis. First, the creator would need to assume that the second user would find his threat credible in order to avoid filing suit early. Second, the creator would worry that the second user may agree to negotiate in good faith and avoid suit but then simply drag on the negotiations. Third, even if the parties do negotiate in good faith, the creator will likely need to lower licensing fees to immunize the second user, as explained in note 141. A lower licensing fee would lead to reduced incentives to create for the creator and reduced ability to exploit for the second user.