The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure

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The federal Constitution contains a set of rules that I will describe as the constitutional law of congressional procedure. These are rules that directly regulate the internal decisionmaking procedures of Congress; absent specific constitutional provision, those internal procedures would be subject to the authority of each house to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." The constitutional law of congressional procedure thus encompasses the long catalogue of procedural provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of Article I, which includes rules for assembling the legislature, selecting its officers, and disciplining its members; voting and quorum rules; rules governing the transparency of deliberation and voting; and a range of other provisions. It also encompasses other important rules scattered elsewhere in Articles I and II, such as the Origination Clause, special quorum rules for supermajority voting, and the procedures for overriding a presidential veto. But

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1 The qualifier serves to exclude provisions that incidentally affect congressional procedure as a byproduct of other aims, as when the First Amendment right of free speech is interpreted to restrict the scope of congressional investigations. See, for example, Watkins v United States, 354 US 178, 196–97 (1957) (holding, in the context of a witness's refusal to testify before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, that "[t]he First Amendment may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or by lawmaking").

2 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 2.

3 US Const Art I, § 7, cl 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.").

4 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 3 (requiring that when the House is selecting a president because no candidate received a majority of ballots in the Electoral College, "a Member or Members
I shall exclude questions about the structure and composition of Congress—questions such as the choice between bicameralism and unicameralism, or the standing qualifications for federal legislative office. Drawing this boundary has both methodological and substantive justifications. Methodologically, it is impossible to talk fruitfully about the design of constitutional rules if everything is up for grabs all at once; there must be fixed points from which the analysis may proceed. Substantively, the composition and structure of Congress fall outside the houses’ internal rulemaking powers, so they do not bear directly on the Constitution’s choice to prescribe some procedural rules while leaving others to legislative discretion.

The constitutional law of congressional procedure has rarely been analyzed as an integrated body of rules, largely because of historical quirks in the relevant sectors of political science and constitutional law. Political scientists have made the crucial point that Congress’s internal procedures are at least as important a determinant of policy outcomes and of the quality of legislative deliberation as are electoral rules, substantive legislative powers, and other subjects studied exhaustively by constitutional lawyers. The central tendency in recent political science scholarship on Congress, however, has been to assume that all legislative procedure is endogenous, subject to alteration by sufficiently determined legislative majorities wielding internal rulemaking power. Against this picture, I will emphasize the rich and

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5. US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2–3 (requiring two-thirds of the members of both houses to override a presidential veto).

6. Specific topics discussed in the literature include voting rules, especially supermajority rules. See, for example, John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex L Rev 703 (2002). Another strain of public-law scholarship concerns the “due process of lawmaking.” See, for example, Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb L Rev 197 (1976). This work unfortunately tends to entangle itself in questions about how courts should conduct judicial review, and whether such review might be used to improve congressional performance. See, for example, William W. Buzbee and Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan L Rev 87 (2001). My project here is to move decisively away from this court-centered discourse, instead analyzing the subject from the standpoint of constitutional design.


8. See, for example, David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers 164 (Cambridge 1999) (treating legislative organization and “the types of procedures invoked in passing legislation” as a “collective choice process” that results in laws); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization 77–79 (Michigan 1991) (treating the legislature’s membership, including members’ varied interests and expertise, as exogenously fixed, but treating “organizational design,” including committee composition and distribution of legislative resources, as an endogenous product of legislative choice); Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J Pol Econ 132, 134
varied body of internal legislative rules that the Constitution imposes directly, rather than delegating to future legislatures to prescribe. The interaction between these rules and the endogenously chosen rules studied by political scientists makes the constitutional design of the legislative process an essential topic in politics. Legal scholarship, with honorable exceptions, has largely neglected internal legislative rules. Here the political scientists' emphasis on the importance of legislative procedure is a valuable corrective—one that I shall adopt and expand.

My project is to examine this body of rules as a unified topic that is central to the constitutional design of legislative institutions. The project is neither positive nor radically normative, but instead instrumental and prescriptive. I shall ask whether and how the Constitution's rules of congressional procedure might be structured to promote a congeries of widely shared aims: the relevant rules should, among other things, promote well-informed and cognitively undistorted congressional deliberation, should minimize the principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation, and should encourage technically efficient use of constrained legislative resources, especially time. As we shall see, these aims were in large part also the framers' aims, or at least their professed ones. But the means that the framers chose to attain these aims, and the tradeoffs they struck, however enlightened or technically impressive at the time, have in some respects aged poorly in light of the subsequent two centuries' worth of theoretical developments, experimentation, and innovation in other
jurisdictions. This is not to say, however, that the framers’ views are irrelevant to the instrumental project of constitutional design and reform; far from it. If we wish to evaluate and improve the constitutional design in this area or any other, the ideas, arguments, and pragmatic solutions that our own constitutional designers developed are a rich source of useful information, and one that I will draw upon throughout.

I shall also draw upon two bodies of material typically neglected in modern treatments. The first is a rich utilitarian tradition of theorizing about the optimal design of legislative procedures, especially Jeremy Bentham’s great monograph, *Political Tactics.*¹ The second is comparative constitutional law, including state and foreign constitutions that contain a wealth of design possibilities and ingenious rules for minimizing legislative pathologies. To be sure, these sources of information and instrumental analysis often do not generate sharp deductive arguments with confident conclusions. There are too many design possibilities, too many margins on which tradeoffs must be made, and the fog of empirical uncertainty is too thick. The payoff, rather, is a horizontal study that links related design problems, analyzes their interaction, and supports plausible recommendations for improvement.

Part I surveys the methodological problems that constitutional framers designing legislative procedures must confront. One key problem is whether rules on particular subjects should be promulgated in the constitution itself, or should instead be committed to the discretion of future legislatures through a general grant of rulemaking power. Constitutional framers may, and our framers did, make this decision on any of several different grounds, including the idea that a constitution should provide rules on subjects that a legislature is logically incapable of deciding for itself (such as the time of its first assembling); the more pragmatic idea that the framers should choose the rules on subjects as to which they possess a comparative advantage, cognitive or motivational, over later legislators; and, most pragmatic of all, the need to ensure that a proposed constitution would be politically acceptable to ratifiers and the people. Another problem is the following: given a decision to proceed through constitutional rules rather than by delegation to future legislatures, and given the constraints of severely limited time, information, and political capital under which constitutional framers operate, how should the framers

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¹ Jeremy Bentham, *Political Tactics* (Clarendon 1999) (M. James, C. Blamires, and C. Pease-Watkin, eds). I am indebted to Jon Elster for bringing this work to my attention through his ongoing work on constitutional conventions. A bibliographic note: *Political Tactics* is in fact a composite of text by Bentham and Etienne Dumont. See Jon Elster, *Don't Burn Your Bridge before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment,* 81 Tex L. Rev 1751, 1773 n 75 (2003). For brevity, I shall simply refer to the work’s implied author as “Bentham.”
choose the content of the rules? Here a major difficulty is whether framers should simply copy or adopt provisions from the constitutions of other jurisdictions, without independent inquiry into the provisions' underlying mechanisms or political rationales, or should instead attempt a thoroughly independent inquiry into optimal design. Both of these polar views, as well as intermediate views of greater or lesser coherence, were represented at the federal Constitutional Convention.

Part II turns from method to substance. After introducing the major analytic themes, I shall consider in turn the timing of congressional sessions, the admission and expulsion of legislators, the selection of legislative officers, voting and quorum rules, the publicity or transparency of legislative deliberation and voting, the rule barring the Senate from originating revenue bills, and the question whether Congress may enact binding statutes that prescribe internal rules for the two houses taken separately. I will also consider provisions that are surprisingly absent from the federal Constitution—rules of legislative procedure that appear in state and foreign constitutions, and whose absence from our own Constitution poses interesting puzzles. Examples include rules requiring three readings before a bill may be enacted, and rules that bar the introduction or enactment of bills at the close of the legislative session. Throughout Part II, my aim is to identify design defects, to evaluate valuable alternatives and innovations found in state and foreign constitutions, and to propose interpretive choices and constitutional reforms that might improve the constitutional law of congressional procedure.

I. DESIGNING CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES

In this Part, I will examine the design of constitutional rules of legislative procedure, with a view to the methodological problems that the framers encountered and debated. In Part I.A, the question is why any rules of congressional procedure should be constitutionalized; why not simply leave all internal procedures to the discretion of future legislatures? Part I.B poses the next question: given a decision to constitutionalize a rule or set of rules on a given subject, how should constitutional framers choose the content of those rules—by imitation of other constitutions, by independent ratiocination about optimal design, or by some mix of these strategies?

A. Why Constitutionalize Congressional Procedure?

Why should any rules of congressional procedure be constitutionalized? Constitutions almost invariably grant some measure of discretionary power over internal rules to the legislatures created by the constitution. The federal Constitution’s Rules of Proceedings
Clause, which gives each house separately the power to enact internal procedural rules, is, in effect, a delegation of rule-designing authority from constitutional framers in the initial period to legislators in subsequent periods. Given the baseline established by this constitutional delegation, the puzzle is why framers might want to select some rules to be elevated to a higher status in the legal hierarchy, and so made immune from alteration by ordinary legislative rulemaking.

At some risk of false precision, we can identify three (classes of) reasons to constitutionalize rules of legislative procedure. First, some procedural rules are logically impossible for a future legislature to create, at least as an initial matter; consider the question of where and when the legislature shall initially convene, a question that the legislature could not resolve without convening. Constitutionalizing such rules can eliminate the need for a future legislature to pull itself up by its own bootstraps and resolves coordination problems. Second, there are rules that a future legislature has the capacity to create, but as to which the framers have, or believe themselves to have, a comparative advantage over the future legislators who would otherwise choose the rule; the framers' (perceived) comparative advantage might stem from superior information, cognition, or motivation. Finally, constitutionalizing some rules of legislative procedure may, for political reasons, improve a new constitution's chances of ratification by accommodating the preferences of the ratifying legislatures or conventions. It is tempting to think that this reason is in a sense disreputable compared with the first two, but the question whether framers should consider or ignore the political acceptability of their proposals turns out to be complicated; it is not at all clear that downstream ratifiers of the framers' proposed constitution are better off if framers make no effort to anticipate the ratifiers' political preferences.

12 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.").

13 On the question whether a statute can override the internal rules of each house, see Part II.C.7.

14 This idea is Jon Elster's, developed from his analysis of constitutional conventions. Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia, 14 Cardozo L Rev 549, 549, 558–60 (1993) (defining "constitutional bootstrapping" as "the process by which a constituent assembly severs its ties with the authorities that have called it into being and arrogates some or all of their powers to itself" and noting that some decisions of a constitution-making body must flow from an external authority because the body cannot itself decide when to meet or how to select its members); Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U Pa J Const L 345, 358–59 (2000) (noting that a constitution-making assembly must be convoked and a process for selecting delegates must be adopted, but that both of those decisions must be taken from outside sources, which in the case of the Constitutional Convention was the Continental Congress). My argument is that legislatures created by constitutional convention face a parallel problem.
1. Bootstrapping and coordination problems.

Institutions are systems of rules. Where, as is often the case, an institution also possesses the second-order authority to make rules governing its own action, how will those second-order rules be chosen? If the initial question, for example, is whether the institution’s members will proceed by simple majority vote, an infinite regress threatens: is the first-order decision itself to be made by majority vote, or under some other voting rule? And what voting rule is to be used to make the second-order decision? Absent some higher source of law that blocks the regress, the conceptual problem is insoluble.

More precisely, the conceptual problem is insoluble in conceptual terms, but crudely pragmatic solutions exist. Faced with a regress problem, one expedient solution is for institutions simply to bootstrap themselves into existence. An example is the Philadelphia Convention itself: because no outside institution had specified the voting rules the delegates would use, the delegates simply decided to proceed by simple majority vote (of state delegations, not of individuals). In this example, bootstrapping succeeded because the underlying decision was largely uncontroversial. Although the Convention’s decision lacked coherent conceptual foundations, in fine pragmatic style the decision worked even without coherent foundations.

Bootstrapping of this sort, however, can rectify the infinite regress problem only when the members of the institution are already assembled. But a new institution may also face a separate coordination problem in convening at all. Consider the question of when the first Congress elected under the new federal Constitution should convene—a decision that the new Congress itself could not possibly make. A pragmatic solution to this sort of problem is for an institution under the previous, outgoing constitution to specify a focal point on which the new legislature can coordinate. Thus the outgoing Confederation Congress specified that the new Congress would meet on March 4, 1789—a decision of dubious legality, given that the Confederation Congress lacked any obvious authority to make it, but also a decision that went unquestioned in practice.

15 The Convention’s voting rule was derived from the practice under the Articles of Confederation, with no alternative rule receiving serious consideration. See Elster, 2 U Pa J Const L at 367-69 (cited in note 14) (“Voting in the Convention was by majority vote, each state having one vote. Although the Pennsylvanians wanted to refuse the smaller states an equal vote, their proposal was never put on the table.”).

The larger point is that internal rules for deliberative bodies (constitutional conventions or legislatures) are never chosen in a historical and institutional vacuum. They are always chosen against the background, not only of exogenous constraints (constitutional or political), but also of previous rules, traditions, and practices. For an argument to this effect in the congressional setting, see Sarah A. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress 13-15 (Cambridge 1997).
So infinite regress and coordination problems are not fatal in practical terms. This does not mean, however, that constitutional framers should ignore them. That an institution has bootstrapped itself into existence, either in whole or in part, may provide future opponents or critics with grounds to question the institution's legitimacy. Constitutional framers may therefore wish to provide rules that obviate the need for new legislatures, convened under the new constitution, to bootstrap rules into place. Likewise, constitutional framers may easily resolve coordination problems by supplying constitutionally established focal points, which the new legislature may alter once the machinery of lawmaking is up and running.

These concerns were much in evidence at the Philadelphia Convention; in particular, they animated the Convention's decision to adopt the provision that "[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." One obvious coordination problem solved by this provision is the timing of the first meeting of the new Congress. As John Randolph put it, "some precise time must be fixed, until the Legislature shall make provision." A second and distinct coordination problem involved the question whether Congress should meet at all in any given year. Unlike the first problem, this question applied not only to the initial meeting of the new Congress but to every subsequent meeting, because some of the Convention delegates suggested that the legislature could meet episodically, only when the public business required it. A political response to this argument was that regular meetings should be mandated to provide a check on the executive branch. A different, and devastating, response was given by Oliver Ellsworth: "The Legislature will not know till they are met whether the public interest required their meeting or not."

The Convention, however, failed to anticipate other bootstrapping and coordination problems that afflicted the first Congress. One example involved the initial formation of a legislative quorum.

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16 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 2. The date specified in this provision has been superseded by the Twentieth Amendment, which provides: "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day." US Const Amend XX, § 2.
17 Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 2 The Founders' Constitution 283 (Chicago 1987). The date supplied in Article I would have fallen in December 1789, thus contradicting the date (March 4, 1789) supplied by the Confederation Congress—another reason to question the legality of the latter provision.
18 One Convention delegate, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, "thought it necessary that there should be one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department"; another, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, described frequent legislative meetings as "an essential safeguard of liberty." Id.
Article I provides that "a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized [that is, by the rules of either house] to compel the Attendance of absent Members." The second part of the provision was inserted to ensure that the absence of a quorum would not prevent either house from compelling the attendance of absentees. But the framers failed to anticipate that the initial convening of Congress might fail for lack of a quorum, as in fact it did in both the House and Senate. In those circumstances the provision for compelling absentees could not be invoked, since neither house had ever met to provide compulsion authority to a number smaller than the required quorum. The House soon attained a quorum, but the Senate limped along, sending stern but toothless letters to absent members, until it finally convened on April 6, 1789, over a month after the assembly date.21

Another, far more consequential example is the one with which we began: the framers failed to fully specify the voting rules that would govern the new legislature. Although the framers specified supermajority rules to govern particular decisions, they failed to specify whether simple majority voting is a mandatory default rule in areas not governed by a supermajority provision, or instead whether the internal rules of each house may require supermajorities for particular decisions. In the latter case, the infinite regress problem reappears: why should the decision to institute a supermajority requirement in a particular area not itself be required to be made by supermajority? The Congress, however, like the Convention before it, has ignored the conceptual conundrum by assuming that simple majority voting is always the default setting, even for rules creating supermajority requirements.

2. Comparative advantage.

Another reason to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure is that constitutional framers have some form of comparative advantage over later legislators in designing those rules. The framers' comparative advantage might take any of several forms: informational, cognitive, or motivational. The framers might possess superior information relevant to the design problem, might enjoy freedom from various cognitive quirks or disabilities that afflict the work of

20 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 1.
21 Linda Grant De Pauw, Charlene Bangs Bickford, and LaVonne Marlene Siegel, eds. 1 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791 3–6 (Johns Hopkins 1972) (recounting the Senate’s actions pending a quorum and reprinting the letters sent to absent members).
later legislators, or might act from public-spirited reasons where later legislators would act on the basis of rational self-interest or irrational passions.

For two reasons, however, the possibility that framers will possess informational advantages over later legislators seems quite implausible. The first reason is Bentham's view that later generations always possess informational advantages over earlier ones, simply by virtue of knowing what has transpired since the earlier generation left the scene.22 Conversely, a stock theme of constitutional choice is that framers act behind a “veil of ignorance”—more precisely a veil of uncertainty—that forces them to act impartially.23 The cost of this relative impartiality, though, is that the framers act in ignorance of post-enactment developments that might provide useful information in the choice of legislative procedures.24 The second reason to doubt the framers’ purported informational advantage is the relatively larger size of later congresses as compared to the Convention. As James Madison argued, increasing the number of legislators increases the legislature’s stock of political information.25 This second reason is specific to the American experience; it does not hold where, as in some nations, the constituent assembly that designs the constitution also functions as an ordinary legislature under the constitution.

Perhaps for these reasons, no one at the Philadelphia Convention suggested that the framers’ information would be superior to that of later Congresses. At most they suggested that the framers’ information was equally good, and then only with respect to the sort of coordinating rules that can be settled equally well one way or the other, so long as they are settled. Thus Oliver Ellsworth argued that the Convention might as well fix the date on which the Congress should annu-

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23 See Adrian Vermeule, *Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law*, 111 Yale L J 399, 399 (2001) (“A veil of ignorance rule . . . is a rule that suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of decisionmakers . . . by subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision.”).

The representatives of each state will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts; but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members of the state legislature, where all the local information and interests of the state are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
ally convene, because “the Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.” In such cases, the content of the rule is secondary to the sheer coordination benefit of choosing a rule; the informational advantage of later legislators is therefore irrelevant to the design problem.

The framers did frequently suggest, however, that they possessed cognitive and motivational advantages over later legislators. In contemporary terminology, the framers assumed that future legislators would act on the basis of “interests” and “passions” that would skew their judgment of the public good or cause them knowingly to act against the public good for private benefit. And legislators’ tendency to clump into “factions” would exacerbate these cognitive and motivational deficiencies. An example involves the question whether future legislators should be allowed to expel by a simple majority or only by a supermajority. Madison argued for the latter position on the ground that “the right of expulsion was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused.”

Governor Morris opposed this, although with an argument that shared Madison’s premise: “This power [of expulsion] may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.” The disagreement here is over the expected frequency and gravity of false positives (expulsion of members who should not be expelled) and false negatives (the failure to expel members who should be expelled). Madison’s supermajority position seeks to minimize false positives, while Morris’s position in favor of a simple majority requirement seeks to minimize false negatives. Both views, however, share the assumption that the respective errors will occur because legislators act on private-regarding or factional motivations.

This example is typical of the debates in an important respect. The Convention participants rarely questioned the assumption of comparative cognitive and motivational advantage. Rather, the most frequently heard grounds for opposing the constitutionalization of legislative procedures were that the collateral costs of some proposed safeguard would outweigh the benefits, or that other institutional

26 Kurland and Lerner, eds., 2 Founders’ Constitution at 283 (cited in note 17). See also Farrand, ed., 2 Federal Convention at 200 (cited in note 19) (reporting Ellsworth’s insistence that the meeting date for Congress not be in the summer because “almost all of the probable members of the Legislature [are] more or less connected with agriculture”). While the Convention set a date, Edmund Randolph had the phrase “unless a different day shall be appointed by law” appended so that a constitutional amendment would not be necessary to change the date. Kurland and Lerner, eds., 2 Founders’ Constitution at 283.


28 Id.
structures and procedures that the framers had adopted rendered unnecessary the additional safeguard of constitutionalizing legislative procedures. Gouvernor Morris's argument about expulsion is an example of the former claim.

An important example of the latter claim involved the debates over the Journal Clause.\textsuperscript{9} Many participants desired to constitutionalize some version of a requirement that Congress publicize its deliberations and votes. Although the framers realized that transparency might distort deliberation—the Convention itself deliberated and voted secretly, partly in order to allow participants to change their minds without incurring a reputational penalty in the nation at large—many delegates believed that future legislators could not be trusted to weigh the costs and benefits of transparency in public-regarding fashion.\textsuperscript{31} As George Mason summarized the point (at the Virginia ratifying convention, although similar arguments were made at Philadelphia), "[the legislators] may conceal what they please. Instead of giving information, they will produce suspicion. You cannot discover the advocates of their iniquitous acts."

Against this view was the claim that regular elections would force legislators to publicize their actions. As Ellsworth put it, "[t]he Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to time—The people will call for it if it should be improperly omitted."\textsuperscript{32} The precise electoral mechanism that Ellsworth envisioned here is unclear. One possibility is that voters demand transparency because it reduces

\textsuperscript{9} US Const Art I. § 5, cl 3:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

\textsuperscript{30} Max Farrand, ed. 3 \textit{The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787} 479 (Yale 1966) (remarks of Madison):

Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.

The Convention sessions were secret, though a journal was kept. When the Convention adjourned, the secretary, William Jackson, destroyed loose scraps of paper, "which he evidently thought unimportant," and turned over the journals and other papers to George Washington, who subsequently gave the papers to the Department of State in 1796. Max Farrand, ed. 1 \textit{The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787} xi–xii (Yale 1966). Congress by joint resolution ordered them published in 1818. Id.

\textsuperscript{31} Kurland and Lerner, eds. 2 \textit{Founders' Constitution} at 290–91 (cited in note 17).

\textsuperscript{32} Id at 293. Mason preferred the Journal Clause in the Articles of Confederation, which read "that congress shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy." Id.

\textsuperscript{33} Farrand, ed. 2 \textit{Federal Convention} at 260 (cited in note 19).
the costs of monitoring their elected agents. Legislators competing against each other and against potential candidates for voters' confidence might be responsive to that demand even if each legislator would prefer less transparency than voters would. Here secrecy might be viewed, from the standpoint of the whole group of legislators, as an unattainable public good. If all legislative action were secret, no particular legislator could be blamed for the practice. But if each legislator has the option to disclose deliberations or votes, and if such disclosures are verifiable when made, then legislators may defect from the cooperative behavior of maintaining secrecy to better their position vis-à-vis other legislators or potential challengers, even if all legislators would be better off with secrecy.

To be sure, this mechanism assumes that voters care about transparency. Voters might simply use decision rules that are entirely insensitive to legislative procedures. Consider the possibility that voters vote retrospectively in a simpleminded fashion, asking only whether their personal economic position is better (in absolute or relative terms) at the time of election than it was at the time of the previous election. We will see below, however, that a principal-agent model, representing legislators as agents who offer ever-greater transparency to compete for the favor of voter-principals, captures useful truths about both the Journal Clause and subsequent developments in congressional procedure. Whatever the details of the implicit model, however, Ellsworth's argument supposes that constitutionalizing a transparency requirement is unnecessary, given that the institutional safeguard of regular elections is already in place.

3. Political acceptability.

A final ground for constitutionalizing procedural rules was often invoked in the Convention debates: the ratifiers—or the people generally—would not find the proposed Constitution politically acceptable without certain procedural rules. This theme was especially prominent in the debates over the Journal Clause and the Origination Clause. As to the former, James Wilson argued that, apart from the merits of the Clause, "as this is a clause in the existing [Articles of Confederation], the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds may be easily misled."34 As to the latter, Elbridge Gerry argued that the people

35 See Ferejohn, *Accountability and Authority* at 139 (cited in note 8) (noting, for example, that recorded teller voting increased attendance at roll call votes).
36 Farrand, ed., *Federal Convention* at 260 (cited in note 19). George Mason also "thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a conclave of their Legislature." Id.
people "will not agree that any but their immediate representatives [in the House of Representatives] shall meddle with their purses. In short the acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating Money bills." This external political constraint should be distinguished from a different political constraint internal to the Convention: the need to ensure that the proposed draft was politically acceptable to a majority of state delegations. Obviously there are close linkages between the two constraints, because delegates might, and frequently did, shape their internal positions by anticipating the reactions and preferences of downstream ratifiers.

A tempting reaction to the external constraint is that it is undesirable for constitutional framers to consider the political preferences of downstream ratifiers. After all, if the framers' politics-independent view of optimal design is correct, then to modify that design on political grounds is to propose a suboptimal constitution. Many framers saw their own political predictions in this light; they believed that the ratifiers' or, especially, the people's political preferences derived from irrational fears of aristocratic conspiracy, fears that opponents of the new Constitution could exploit. This is the thrust of Wilson's reference to "weak & suspicious minds [who] may be easily misled," and of John Dickinson's argument, in the debates over the Origination Clause, that

all the prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege to the [House of Representatives] and these prejudices [should] never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes forth, it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries."

Dickinson's argument, like Wilson's, assumes that the framers possess privileged insight into optimal constitutional design. The argument that the framers should ignore political considerations is not, however, dependent upon this assumption. Whether or not the framers' independent view of optimal design is correct, the ratifiers might believe that the best division of labor is for the framers to leave all political considerations to the ratifiers themselves, just as a legislator might desire staff technocrats to consider only matters of optimal policy design, leaving considerations of political acceptability to the expertise of professional politicians. Moreover, if ratifiers' political preferences can themselves be shaped, at least in part, by the framers' proposals, the framers need not attempt to anticipate the ratifiers' preferences.
preferences, for those preferences will be, in whole or in part, products of the framers' actions, rather than constraints on their actions.

Yet there are also public-spirited reasons for constitutional framers to consider politics, and even for ratifiers to consider themselves better off if framers do so. The circumstances under which constitution-making typically occurs entail that the framers' relationship to ratifiers is fundamentally unlike the relationship of policy analysts to decisionmakers. Constitutional framing typically occurs under conditions of perceived political crisis, given the breakdown of the old constitutional order, and under a constraint of urgency, given the need to coordinate upon a new constitutional order. If framing and ratification must be completed under severe time constraints, ratifiers will be better off if framers attempt to anticipate their political preferences. The option to reject an initial, politically insensitive proposal and to send the framers back to the drawing board will often be practically infeasible. In these circumstances ratifiers will be worse off if they are constrained to accept a proposal that is marginally better than total failure of the constitution-making process, yet worse than any alternative design that takes their preferences into account.

B. Reason or Experience?

Given a decision to constitutionalize rules of legislative procedure, another critical methodological question for constitutional designers is whether to adopt rules from other jurisdictions without independent inquiry into their institutional and political rationales, or instead to attempt a thoroughly independent assessment of optimal design, including sophisticated predictions about the interaction effects between provisions. In the framers' philosophical argot, this was the opposition between "reason" and "experience": the defining difference turns on whether the proponent who urges adoption of a particular rule conducts a full independent inquiry into the institutional and political mechanisms that cause the rule to produce the desired effects or instead eschews a full understanding of the relevant political forces. The latter approach amounts to a deliberate policy of adoption; the only question the adopter asks is whether the rule at issue has proven "workable," in some roughly pragmatic sense, in the polity from whose constitution the rule is to be adopted.

The Convention debates over the Origination Clause provide many examples of both approaches, because the principal argument for the Clause was that the delegates should imitate the firm rule of English law that money bills could only be originated in the House of
As for ambitiously rationalist constitutional design, an example is Madison’s initial sally against adopting the Clause:

[Madison] observed that the Commentators on the [British constitution] had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the [House of Lords] in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1st branch [the House of Representatives]. If they [should] have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed.

By contrast, a particularly pure example of the experiential, anti-rationalist stance is John Dickinson’s famous speech urging the Philadelphia delegates to adopt the Clause:

Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could have discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has give[n] a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect may have proceeded he could not say; whether from the respect with which this privilege inspired the other branches of [Government] to the H[ouse] of Commons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights, but the effect was visible & could not be doubted.

The choice between independent inquiry (“reason”) and adoption (“experience”) superficially resembles the standard distinction, in the literature on comparative constitutionalism, between interjurisdictional borrowing or copying, on the one hand, and innovation, on the other. The two approaches, however, are merely overlapping, not co-terminous. The rationalist and optimizing constitutional designer may “borrow” from other jurisdictions in the sense that he consults other jurisdictions’ constitutions to obtain ideas and possibilities; the designer then treats those ideas as options within the design space, to be assessed against other options in the optimizing calculus. Note also

40 Farrand, ed., 1 Federal Convention at 233 (cited in note 30).
41 Id (emphasis added). Madison went on to argue, “As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it [would] be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important.” Id.
that adoption may draw upon unwritten as well as written constitutions, so long as the content of unwritten practices is sufficiently clear. Many American framers urged adoption of the unwritten practices of English constitutionalism, as in Dickinson's argument. It was also true, contrary to a common assumption, that the framers had many written constitutions on which to draw. Circulating compilations of written state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and important treaties provided models on which the framers drew, as did the history of the classical and early modern European polities.

What then is the best strategy for constitutional framers? At first blush, the circumstances of constitution-making would seem to entail that framers should mix imitation and innovation in eclectic proportions, not susceptible to general theorizing or extreme solutions in either direction. Constitutions are typically designed under conditions of political crisis and urgency. To these dynamic conditions we may add two factors: that the large-scale and long-term consequences of the choice of constitutional rules are exceedingly difficult to predict, and that constitutional framers are properly risk-averse, designing institutions to minimize the risks of political and social disasters rather than to maximize the gain from political association. These factors militate in favor of imitation. Militating in favor of innovation, however, is the typical idea that provisions or rules adopted from other jurisdictions will prove maladapted to the local circumstances of the adopting jurisdiction. At the Convention, John Rutledge criticized the origination clauses in the state constitutions as "put in through a blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now, they would be omitted." A complementary claim is that adapted provisions will fail to take root; only constitutions or provisions that are in some sense organic or indigenous tend to prove stable in the long term.

The optimum, then, would seem to be the banality that constitutional framers should imitate where appropriate to local circumstances. We may add a modicum of content to this conclusion in two ways. First, where many jurisdictions have converged on similar constitutional design(s), imitation is more prudent and less costly than innovation. The consensus across jurisdictions suggests that different poli-

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44 See Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U Pa J Const L 640, 642 (1999) ("The American Constitution is, in many dimensions, not an effort designed to achieve the best that government can offer. It is, rather, an attempt to avoid the worst, an attempt keyed to the peculiar pathologies that have been shown to be likely to afflict American democracy.").

ties have converged on a real constitutional optimum, one dictated by real institutional forces. Although the consensus might also rest simply on an opinion cascade or herding effect, in which a suboptimal rule is widely adopted simply because jurisdictions lacking information imitate others whom they (erroneously) take to have better insight, the cascade may, of course, also produce convergence on the optimal rule. Thus, the risks of deviating from a widespread consensus generally exceed the risks of copying it. Second, framers should distinguish between rules whose principal virtue is settlement of a question that can be settled equally well one way or the other, on the one hand, and rules whose content is independently significant, on the other. The former are better candidates for adoption, since the bare inquiry into stability or workability answers the only question that needs to be asked about provisions whose content is of secondary importance.

Even with these supplemental points, it is very hard to say anything in the abstract about the optimal mix of rationalist design versus adoption. Despite this theoretically pessimistic conclusion, an important dynamic renders the mixed approach unstable, thereby pressing constitutional framers toward the extremes of global imitation or global innovation. An illustration of this dynamic appears in the debates over the Origination Clause. Gouvernor Morris argued that “We should either take the British Constitution altogether or make one for ourselves.” As a normative matter, as we have seen, Morris’s position seems questionable. Yet we may reinterpret Morris’s point as a positive claim about the choices available to constitutional designers: for two reasons, the intermediate position that mixes reason with experience, independent evaluation with adoption, may prove unstable. First, where the designers may draw upon the experience of multiple jurisdictions whose provisions on similar topics conflict with one another, the appeal to experience is indeterminate; some reason, other than workability, must be given for adopting one or the other approach. Second, to propose partial modifications of other jurisdictions’ rules on rationalist grounds is an incoherent stance: if the designer can de-


47 For an overview of information cascades and rational herding, see generally Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. Econ 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 992, 992–94 (1992) (arguing that “localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by information cascades,” which are defined as times “when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information”).

scribe and predict the political mechanisms that make the modification valuable, including the interaction effects of the modification with the unmodified rules and with other provisions, then the designer necessarily possesses the capacity to conduct an independent evaluation of the unmodified provisions as well.

An example of the instability of the mixed approach is the very setting in which Morris’s argument on the Origination Clause was made. The provocation was an important internal tension in Dickinson’s position. The English practice was that money bills could originate only in the House of Commons and could not be amended by the House of Lords. Of the eight states that adopted origination restrictions, however, most allowed the nonoriginating branch to amend bills.49 “This he [Dickinson] thought it would be proper for us to do.”50 The first problem here is that of indeterminacy: why should the modified state provisions on origination allowing amendments, rather than the unmodified package of English practices that barred amendment, provide the reference for the argument from experience? The second problem is the incoherence of partial modification: if the effects of conferring the power of amendment upon the upper branch can be assessed on nonexperiential grounds, why cannot the baseline origination provision be assessed on the same grounds? On this view, the normatively attractive approach is to mix reason and experience in a particularistic manner guided by the framers’ sense of the situation, yet the instability of that intermediate stance will tend to push constitutional framers to the extremes of wholesale redesign or wholesale imitation.

Furthermore, constitutional framing may lean heavily toward either wholesale adoption or redesign for an additional reason: any change to the baseline requested by a particular drafter would cause other drafters to suggest and push their preferred changes as well. Once any single provision is up for grabs, everything is up for grabs. It is unclear, in the abstract, how these opposing tendencies will net out in particular constitution-making episodes, but the federal Convention ultimately moved well toward the extreme of wholesale redesign. Compared to the existing models in England and the states, the federal Constitution is strikingly original in important respects, most famously in the division of powers between federal and state governments and in the complex rules that parcel lawmaking power between a bicameral legislature and an independently elected executive.

49 See Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 278 (cited in note 19). See also Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 878 at 610–11 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1858) (noting that in states that previously did not allow amendment by the senate, such as Virginia and South Carolina, “it was a constant source of difficulties and contentions”).

50 Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 278 (cited in note 19).
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE

Part I examined the methodological problems facing the framers in deciding whether to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure and in choosing the content of the relevant rules. This Part examines the substance of the rules that the framers adopted, as well as rules that they might have adopted but did not, where the failure to do so itself illuminates the constitutional-design questions. Part II.A outlines the scope and limits of the enterprise, while Part II.B introduces a few major substantive themes of the analysis. Part II.C examines, in turn, the rules that determine when and by whom the Congress may be convened or adjourned; issues of membership in the legislature, including the procedures for disqualifying or expelling a (purported) member; the legislature’s choice of officers; the quorum rules that accompany simple majority voting and supermajority voting; the transparency or secrecy of legislative deliberation and voting; the Origination Clause; and joint cameral rulemaking. Finally, I will supplement the analysis by considering missing provisions—rules of legislative procedure that might well have been constitutionalized, but were not. Examples include requirements that each bill address only a single subject, and that bills be brought up for reading or debate three times before a final vote can be taken; these and other rules are embodied in various state and foreign constitutions.

A. Preliminaries

My ambition in this Part is to examine the constitutional law of congressional procedure from the prescriptive standpoint of constitutional design. I will not ask positive questions about the genesis of the relevant constitutional rules in the hurly-burly bargaining of the Convention. Nor will I discuss their positive effects, except insofar as anticipation of those effects would be relevant to sound constitutional design. The prescriptive approach will, however, have useful implications for constitutional interpretation to the extent that the prevailing theory of interpretation licenses interpreters to fill gaps and ambiguities in the constitutional text with normatively sensible rules.

Constitutional design presupposes some first-order account that specifies what the aims of design are, and thereby what will count as an instrumentally successful design. Yet such accounts are the province of political theory, not of consequentialist analysis. Here I will simply stipulate to a set of widely shared criteria for evaluating congressional performance, criteria stated in rough form and at a relatively low level of abstraction. Congressional procedure should, among other aims, work to accomplish all of the following.
1. Minimize principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation.

Legislators are agents for their constituents. This need not imply that legislators should view themselves as mouthpieces for constituent preferences; should adopt the opposing, Burkean view that legislators are to exercise independent judgment about the common good; or should adopt some other view entirely. On any of these conceptions, legislator-agents are charged with tasks by citizen-principals, and the ever-present risk is that the agents will divert resources from public tasks to private gain. Time is a resource, so an important form of diversion is shirking, in which legislators consume leisure rather than attending to public business. An important aim of legislative procedure is to minimize the social costs of legislators' diversion and shirking, including the costs incurred to prevent those problems.\(^{51}\)

2. Contribute to well-informed and cognitively undistorted deliberation about policy.

Legislatures are multi-member policymaking bodies (where policymaking includes the decision to delegate policymaking to others). In general, the performance of such bodies is a function of the information they possess and the quality of their deliberations. Deliberation may, in turn, be distorted by a range of decisionmaking pathologies, including, for example, group polarization, rational and irrational herding behavior, and conformity and preference falsification.\(^{52}\) Legislative procedure should encourage representatives to reveal the private information they hold while dampening deliberative pathologies.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{51}\) See, for example, Dennis C. Mueller, *Constitutional Democracy* 148–49 (Oxford 1996) (analyzing one-party and two-party alternatives for representative democracy and the danger that the elitist representatives might "undertake actions different from what the citizens themselves would"), for a discussion of representative politics in agency cost terms, see, for example, Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, *Democratic Devices and Desires* 99–104, 156–84 (Cambridge 2000).

\(^{52}\) For information on group polarization, see Cass R. Sunstein, *The Law of Group Polarization*, 10 J Pol Phil 175, 176 (2002) (defining group polarization as the phenomenon that occurs when "members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies") (emphasis omitted). For information on herding, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 100 J Pol Econ at 992–94 (cited in note 47) (arguing that small amounts of information can lead to informational cascades, resulting in conformist behavior). For additional information on conformity and preference falsification, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, *Why Societies Need Dissent* 14–38 (Harvard 2003) (noting that "people are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others" and that group identity exacerbates this effect).

\(^{53}\) See, for example, Sunstein, *Why Societies Need Dissent* at 111–65 (cited in note 52) (evaluating legislative structure, particularly bicameralism, in these terms).
3. Make technically efficient use of legislative resources.

Congress, like other legislatures, operates under severe resource constraints. Perhaps the most important of these resources is time. The legislative agenda is extremely compressed, and no single legislator can spend enough time on policy analysis to comprehend more than a small fraction of the issues the legislature takes up. Modern legislatures have accordingly evolved committee systems, in part to promote a division of labor and specialization in the production of information and policies. In a similar vein, legislative procedure should, among its other aims, help to ensure that Congress uses scarce resources in the most efficient possible manner. Holding constant the quality and quantity of congressional output, attaining that output at unnecessarily high social cost is a pure loss.

Stipulating to a set of widely shared aims in this fashion is a common procedure in the institutional-design literature, and for good reason. First, the evaluative criteria I have posited are widely shared, in part, because they are the common denominator of the rival camps of political theory. Theoretical approaches may, from diverse starting points, converge to an "overlapping consensus" or "incompletely theorized agreement" on mid-level institutional ideas—for example the idea that legislative representatives should be deterred from shirking or from diverting public resources for private gain. Second—this point is merely the converse of the first—disagreements at the level of high theory often fail to cut between concrete institutional-design choices. To prefigure a later example, the decision whether to require a minimum quorum for legislative business does not turn critically on rival conceptions of democracy or good legislation. Third, institutional arrangements of one sort or another must be devised and evaluated even if political theory has not (yet) achieved consensus on the aims of constitutionalism, and perhaps will never do so. "[I]f we put off the questions of institutional design until the higher-order questions are settled, we will get to them at the time of Godot's arrival. In the meantime, however, life goes on and we need grounds for preferring some institutional arrangements over others." Finally, and most pragmatically...

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55 Cass R. Sunstein, *Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict* 35–61 (Oxford 1996) (arguing that, when people adhere to a general principle, they "need not agree what it entails in particular cases," and discussing how this often occurs in the drafting of constitutions and other laws).

56 For an argument applying this point to the nondelegation doctrine, see Dan M. Kahan, *Democracy Schmemocracy*, 20 Cardozo L. Rev 795, 797–800 (1999) (claiming that "the concept of democracy, by itself, doesn't uniquely determine the structure of government institutions").

57 Ian Shapiro, *Democracy's Place* 223 (Cornell 1996).
cally, discussing institutional design with only a rough picture of the underlying aims is a sensible division of academic labor. Theory specialists may usefully focus on principles, but that is not my project here.

As we will see, the difficult enterprise is not stating the aims to which well-designed legislative procedure should conduce, but rather negotiating the inevitable tradeoffs between and among them. Because those aims cannot simultaneously be maximized, the devil is in the details, and good constitutional design requires detailed institutional analysis.

B. Substantive Themes

Before shifting to details, a brief preview of the major substantive themes may help frame the analysis. Across a range of constitutional provisions and design problems, the constitutional law of congressional procedure displays important thematic regularities.

1. Congressional and cameral autonomy.

A major theme involves the question whether and in what respects Congress enjoys procedural autonomy—the legal authority to structure its procedures without the imprimatur of other officials or institutions. In general, the relevant constitutional rules might allow Congress to structure its internal procedures with greater or lesser independence from (1) constitutional framers, (2) the president, or (3) the electorate. Independence from constitutional framers turns on which rules of congressional procedure the framers desire to constitutionalize, and why. The question of procedural independence from the executive—whether and when the executive would possess the power to structure or participate in the internal proceedings of Congress—was among the most consequential decisions the framers faced, and remains a major constitutional-design quandary in new democratic regimes that opt for an independently elected executive. Examples under the federal Constitution include the president’s powers to convene and adjourn Congress and the constitutional mandate that the vice president, an executive officer, preside over the Senate (except in impeachment cases). The third kind of congressional autonomy, Congress’s procedural independence from the electorate, is implicated when the electorate’s choice of representatives is given constitutional significance in ways that override congressional choices. An example

of this last point involves provisions present in several state constitutions, but conspicuously absent from the federal Constitution, allowing legislatures to expel a member (usually by supermajority), but not twice for the same cause. The final proviso, seemingly a type of double-jeopardy guarantee, is better understood in structural terms: it allows the electorate to override a congressional expulsion decision by reelecting a given representative.

A related question involves not the independence of Congress, as a body, from other institutions, but the question of cameral autonomy—the authority of each house of Congress to make procedural decisions and to set procedural rules independent of the other house. Globally speaking, the Rules of Proceedings Clause enables "[e]ach House [to] determine the Rules of its proceedings," which suggests a high degree of (permitted or mandatory) cameral autonomy. In Part II.C.8 I shall examine whether the two houses acting jointly may enact a statute that binds the houses, when acting separately, to follow internal procedures specified in the statute itself. As we will see, similar issues arise in many other procedural settings.

2. The role of political parties.

Our constitutional framers were essentially ignorant about political parties in the modern sense. Although the framers thought deeply about the vices of "faction," the modern political party so greatly increases the formality and operative power of the eighteenth-century faction as to amount to a different kind of institution. So one of our principal tasks will be to reconsider the constitutional design of congressional procedure in light of the "party-in-government," meaning (for our purposes) the institutionalization of factions within the modern Congress. Methodologically, this development increases the informational value of constitutions designed after (and with knowledge of) the spread of political parties, such as state and foreign constitutions.
tions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Substantively, we need to consider how parties affect the eighteenth-century blueprint for congressional procedure. In Part II.C.4, to pick one example, we will see that optimal quorum rules may be quite different for a legislature composed of unaffiliated individuals than for a legislature dominated by two major parties.

We will also see that the relationship between political parties and congressional autonomy is ambiguous, and will cash out differently in different settings. The rise of parties can increase or decrease the relative power of the executive and of legislators over congressional procedure. In Part II.C.3 we will examine these issues in the setting of the vice presidency and its evolution (or devolution). On the other hand, to the extent that parties form cross-cutting links between their members in Congress, the executive, and other institutions, then institutional power per se becomes less important. Partisan competition will take place across institutions, and parties will use institutions simply as arenas in which to stage conflict.

3. The evolution of quasi-constitutional norms.

Another large theme involves the endogenous development, within Congress, of institutional norms that parallel, supplement, or undermine explicit constitutional rules. In Part II.C.6 we will examine both the Origination Clause, which grants the House exclusive authority to originate revenue-raising measures, and also a parallel, endogenous norm that grants the House origination authority over appropriations measures as well. In Part II.C.5 we will examine norms of transparency for committee voting that, although not constitutionally mandated, supplement various constitutional mandates (or triggers) that require roll call voting for the final passage of legislation.

Legislative norms raise important questions both for constitutional designers, who might anticipate their development, and for later constitutional reformers, who must reckon with their existence. Where a desirable norm exists, or might be predicted to develop, should it be explicitly constitutionalized? One intuition is no, because constitutionalization is unnecessary, and might disrupt the norm itself. Perhaps subtly nuanced norms are not easily captured in relatively crude constitutional language. The contrary intuition is yes: precisely because valuable norms are fragile and vulnerable to exogenous shocks, constitutional designers are imprudent to hope for their development or to rely on their persistence. Constitutionalization entrenches norms against future change. Where the norm already exists, that very fact provides evidence that a constitutional equivalent will not disrupt the legislature's functions.
4. Decision and error costs.

Last, and perhaps most obviously, constitutional rules of legislative procedure should be designed to minimize (the sum of) the costs of reaching decisions and the costs of errors or mistakes. Here mistakes are defined by reference to whatever normative criteria are entailed by the designer's high-level account of good legislative performance, or—as discussed above—by reference to the common denominator or overlapping consensus among competing accounts of good legislative performance. The ambition to minimize decision and error costs follows from the idea that legislatures should make efficient use of scarce resources. Reaching good decisions in unnecessarily costly ways and reaching erroneous decisions both produce deadweight losses. These ideas are pervasively useful, and are applied throughout.

C. Design Questions

With the scope of the project delineated and the major themes introduced, we will proceed seriatim through the major constitutional rules of congressional procedure, including rules that are (surprisingly) absent from the federal Constitution.

1. Convening and adjourning the Congress.

The Constitution structures the timing and location of congressional sessions in several ways. In addition to the mandate of Article I and of the Twentieth Amendment that "[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year," Article I also provides that "[n]either House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting." Article II gives certain scheduling powers to the president, who may "on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper." A residual provision exempts agreements between the houses on questions of adjournment from presentment to the president. In part these provisions address concerns arising from the high costs of travel and information in the founding era, and the fierce sectional loyalties

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64 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 2; US Const Amend XX, § 2.
66 US Const Art II, § 3.
67 US Const Art I, § 7, cl 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President.").
that hampered attempts to fix the seat of government. Those concerns are largely obsolete today. These provisions retain great significance, however, for they implicate and illustrate the central thematic issues of congressional independence and cameral independence.

As for the issue of congressional independence, the principal Convention debates centered upon the twin questions of whether rules about the timing and location of congressional sessions should be constitutionalized, and the extent to which the executive should be authorized to participate in the relevant decisions. The background of these debates was a set of chronic complaints about executive influence over legislative procedure generally, and over the timing and location of legislative sessions in particular. The English monarchs possessed traditional prerogatives to convene and to prorogue, or dissolve, both Parliament and colonial legislatures. The Declaration of Independence, however, complained of George III that:

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. — He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. — He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected. 66

As the second clause hints, a widespread view in the founding era depicted frequent legislative sessions as an important safeguard against executive encroachments on political liberty, and Article I’s provision mandating annual meetings of Congress was justified principally on the grounds that frequent assemblies were necessary “as a check on the Executive department.” 67 One theme in the debate involved the costs of travel; although some state constitutions required even more frequent sessions, Joseph Story argued that the geographic scale of the new republic made such a system excessively costly for federal representatives, given “the distance of their abodes.” 70 An even more important feature of the constitutional rules was the great extent to which they minimized executive authority over the timing of congressional sessions, as compared to the English baseline. The basic asymmetry in the relevant rules is that they push Congress toward remaining in session. Congress is required to convene annually, as a

66 United States Declaration of Independence (1776).
67 Kurland and Lerner, eds, 2 Founders’ Constitution at 283 (cited in note 17). See also note 18.
70 Story, 1 Commentaries §§ 827-28 at 574 (cited in note 49) (glossing the Clause as a pragmatic measure, and contrasting it with the British constitution, which grants the monarch the right to convene and dissolve Parliament).
check upon the freedom of executive action; the president may con-
vene the Congress (on extraordinary occasions), but has no power to
dissolve it against the joint wish of both houses. The only circumstance
in which the president may dissolve is when the two houses disagree
on the timing of adjournment; and the framers seem to have enacted
this proviso only from inability to imagine that any other institution
might be a plausible candidate to break deadlocks between the houses
(with respect to adjournment).

Taken as a package, these rules minimize the risk that the execu-
tive will aggrandize itself at Congress's expense by means of strategic
dissolution. Participants in the relevant debates, however, were largely
insensitive to the principal cost of maximizing congressional auton-
omy in this way. A major constitutional-design consideration, arising
in contexts ranging from congressional procedure to official compen-
sation to judicial review, is that minimizing interbranch encroachment
or aggrandizement by guaranteeing autonomy to threatened institu-
tions constantly trades off against an increased risk of self-dealing by
those (autonomous) institutions. The constitutional rules that enable
aggressor institutions to encroach upon competitors are the same
rules that keep the competitors' strategic self-dealing in check; the risk
of aggrandizement is a typical byproduct of a design choice to mini-
mize self-interested official action through institutional competition.
In the extreme scenario—a scenario that materialized at several
points in English history—we can imagine that a legislature granted
constitutional autonomy over the timing of its own dissolution might,
for self-interested reasons, choose never to dissolve at all. As William
Rawle observed,

71 As it turns out, the houses of Congress have never failed to agree on an adjournment
date, and no president has ever exercised the power to break disagreements over adjournment.
See Charles Tiefer, Congressional Practice and Procedure: A Reference, Research, and Legislative

72 For some earlier efforts to apply this point in various settings, see generally Adrian Ver-
meule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 Colum L Rev 501 (2002); Adrian

Daryl Levinson has emphasized, in conversation, an important methodological point. Institu-
tions have no desires, for power or anything else. Ideas about the risk that legislative or executive
institutions will seek to “aggrandize” power must in principle be capable of reduction to some
microfoundational account of the behavior of individual legislators or executive officials.
In my view, however, such a reduction is unproblematic in many cases. A range of mecha-
nisms may cause officials to wish to increase the power, broadly defined, of the institutions they
occupy. For a brief catalogue of possible mechanisms, see Jon Elster, The Role of Institutional In-
terest in East European Constitution-Making, 5 E Eur Const Rev 63 (Winter 1996) (arguing that
legislators might be motivated to favor a strong legislature out of personal interest, emotional
identification with the institution, socialization, or other mechanisms). In what follows I shall
elide the relevant explanations, using ideas like “aggrandizement” as a convenient shorthand for
the relevant microfoundational accounts of official behavior.
without a constitutional limit on its duration, it must be con-
ceded, that a power in the legislature to protract its own continu-
ance, would be dangerous. Blackstone attributes the misfortunes
of Charles I. to his having unadvisedly passed an act to continue
the parliament, then in being, till such time as it should please to
dissolve itself, and this is one of the many proofs that the much
praised constitution of that country wants the character of
certainty."

To be sure, as Rawle also observed, the constitutional provision
for limited congressional terms sets an outer bound on the size of this
danger: "No act of Congress could prolong the continuance of the leg-
islature beyond the term fixed by the Constitution." Yet within that
capacious limit Congress may manipulate adjournment with a view to
maximizing its members' chances of retaining office or to imposing
political costs on the president. In modern times, examples of strategic
uses of the adjournment power are thick on the ground."

Nor is it difficult to imagine institutional-design alternatives that
might attain the same degree of legislative independence from the ex-
ecutive while creating a reduced risk of strategic legislative behavior,
thus producing a design improvement on any view of the necessary
tradeoffs. Even if autonomy and self-dealing trade off against each
other beyond some specified point, institutional-design proposals
might produce gains along both margins if that point has not yet been
reached. One possibility would be to randomly select the date of ad-
journment at the beginning of the legislative session; under this rule
the adjournment date would be chosen for no reason at all, but at
least it would not be chosen for self-interested reasons held by either
legislators or the executive. Under this regime, legislators anticipating
the adjournment date might still engage in strategic behavior, using
the confusion of a session's close to push through projects that would
have failed earlier in that session. Here the intuition is that the sheer
volume of business that always marks the end of legislative sessions
increases the costs to other legislators and interest groups of detecting
and blocking such legislation. But the same behavior is possible in the

73 William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 34–35 (Nicklin
2d ed 1829).
74 Id.
75 See, for example, Andrew Taylor, Lawmakers Accept Adjournment Delays despite
Toughest Issues Being Left for Last: A Strange Calm on Capitol Hill as GOP Ops for Unrushed
Exit, CQ Weekly 2401–03 (Oct 14, 2000) (observing that the 2000 Congress was “limping to a
close” as legislators continued to negotiate on spending bills while its work was overshadowed
by the presidential campaign between then-Vice President Al Gore and then-Texas Governor
George W. Bush); Richard E. Cohen, Good Vibrations, 29 Natl J 1732, 1732–33 (Sept 6, 1997)
(reporting that Congress intended to adjourn early so members could tout legislative successes
at home).
current regime so long as the adjournment date is announced in advance; and we shall examine state constitutional provisions that check this sort of strategic action by providing that no bills may be enacted or, alternatively, introduced within a specified time of adjournment. The time between the constitutionally specified date and the date of adjournment is time in which public opprobrium may be brought to bear on legislators for their actions late in the session.

Alternatively, the randomly chosen date of adjournment need not be established and announced in advance. Another possibility is sequential randomization, in which the legislative session is subject to a specified chance of ending abruptly on any particular day. The resultant uncertainty would force legislators to set the volume and timing of legislative business behind a partial veil of ignorance. Both this possibility and the preceding one, however, have an impractical air about them, if only because constitutional rules rarely employ randomization, even where randomization would have obvious benefits.

Cameral autonomy—the reciprocal independence of each house from the other, rather than the independence of Congress from the executive—was also an important consideration in the debates over the timing and location of congressional sessions. Here the principal debates centered on the Article I provision that barred either house from adjourning without the other's consent. In the view of proponents, such as Madison, this provision minimized the chance that Congress would fail to be in session when "public exigencies" warranted legislative action. This rationale assumes that the false negative, the failure to be in session when the public interest so requires, is more damaging than the false positive, the occurrence of a legislative session when there is no real public business to conduct. By contrast, many state constitutions seek to minimize the false positive by providing, for example, that the legislature may convene only every other year. In the view of Madison's opponents, the vice of the Article I provision requiring the houses to agree on adjournment was to create an unacceptable risk that the Senate would dominate the House of Rep-

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76 See notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
77 The foregoing addresses the timing of congressional sessions. Similar arguments about the independence of congressional procedure from executive control also arose with respect to the location of congressional sessions. See Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 261-62 (cited in note 19). As these are of little importance today, I do not discuss them here.
78 See Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 424-26 (cited in note 23) (noting the infrequent use of randomization and suggesting that the framers' crabbed understanding of "reason" as "sup[plying] the measure of good constitutional design" explains their failure to employ randomization devices).
79 Farrand, ed, 3 Federal Convention at 312 (cited in note 30) (recording Madison's response to Monroe's concern that the adjournment provision would grant undue power to the Senate by allowing it to keep the House from adjourning).
representatives. As George Mason put it in the Virginia ratifying convention:

The house of representatives is the only check on the senate, with their enormous powers. But by that clause you give them the power of worrying the house of representatives into a compliance with any measure. The senators living at the spot will feel no inconvenience from long sessions, as they will vote themselves handsome pay, without incurring any additional expences. Your representatives are on a different ground, from their shorter continuance in office. The gentlemen from Georgia are six or seven hundred miles from home, and wish to go home. The senate taking advantage of this, by stopping the other house from adjourn- ing, may worry them into any thing.80

The argument of this confused passage seems to assume that federal legislative careers would always remain a part-time or even amateur pursuit. The greater the fraction of representatives' income that is obtained from local business or professional pursuits outside the legislative session, the more the joint-consent rule for adjournment increases the relative leverage of senators. Today, however, the sharply reduced costs of travel and the professionalization of federal legislative careers have made Mason's particular concern anachronistic.


Article I provides that “[e]ach House may ... punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”81 This short clause raises no less than three interpretive puzzles that we must clear away before addressing questions of optimal constitutional design. The first puzzle is whether the two-thirds supermajority vote requires two-thirds of the whole expelling house, or merely two-thirds of a quorum; this is a question about supermajority quorum requirements, examined below. A second and more fundamental puzzle involves the relationship between the Expulsion Clause and the power of each house to “be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.”82 On one view, the distinction between these powers is temporal: disqualification by a simple majority can occur only before a member is seated, while after a member is seated the only recourse is expulsion by supermajority. A different view, which I will adopt, is David Currie’s argument that the distinction between the powers turns solely on the

81 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 2.
82 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 1.
ground on which each may be exercised. "A simple majority may determine at any time that a member is not qualified; expulsion of a duly elected member for any other reason requires stronger support." The final puzzle is whether the "disorderly Behaviour" that the Expulsion Clause authorizes each house to punish refers only to behavior that disrupts legislative business, or whether expulsion instead lies for a broader category of conduct, including conduct occurring outside the legislature itself or during a legislative recess. Here both congressional and judicial precedent have taken an expansive view of the expulsion power: following Story's analysis of early expulsion cases in the Senate, the Supreme Court has said that "[t]he right to expel extends to all cases where the offence is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member."

The framers' decision to lodge the powers of disqualification and expulsion in each house separately, without the participation of any outside institution, embodies two decisions, one in favor of cameral autonomy and one in favor of congressional autonomy. As to the first, it is hardly unimaginable that the power to disqualify or expel a member of either house (briefly, the power to make "membership decisions") could have been lodged in the houses acting jointly. The obvious analogy is to the powers surrounding impeachment, which are partitioned between the two houses in complex ways: the House of Representatives possesses the "sole Power of Impeachment," while the Senate possesses the "sole Power to try all Impeachments" and may convict by a supermajority of two-thirds of "the Members present."

Impeachment lies only against "civil Officers of the United States," but it is hardly obvious that federal legislators do not count as such officers. Early Congresses struggled mightily with the issue before apparently concluding that legislators are "officers" for purposes of the presidential succession provisions of Article II, but not for purposes of the impeachment provisions.

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83 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801–1829 75 (Chicago 2001). The "qualifications" of which each house may judge are, the Court has held, limited to the minimum constitutional qualifications set out in Art I, § 2, cl 2 (representatives) and Art I, § 3, cl 3 (senators). See Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 550 (1969).

84 Story, 1 Commentaries § 838 at 579 (cited in note 49) (discussing the expulsion cases of William Blount, who was expelled for attempting to suborn an American agent among the Indians, and John Smith, who was nearly expelled for an alleged treasonable conspiracy).

85 In re Chapman, 166 US 661, 669–70 (1897).


87 US Const Art II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").

88 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801 139–44. 279–81 (Chicago 1997) (suggesting that the term "Officers of the United States" as used in the impeachment provisions was meant to exclude congressional officers, while the simple term "of-
Analogously, we might imagine a constitutional division of labor in which one house brings a proceeding for disqualification or expulsion of its own members, with the merits of the charge judged by the other house. The framers' choice in favor of cameral autonomy might, on this view, be condemned in the vocabulary of the common law on the ground that it makes each house the sole judge of its own cause in membership cases. The instinct here, a pervasive one in both the constitutional structure and in eighteenth-century legal theory, is to separate the power to prosecute from the power to adjudicate.\(^9\) The point must be qualified in light of the Supreme Court's quite recent assertion of power to review cameral disqualification decisions, discussed below, but of course that decision has not yet been extended to expulsion decisions; and in any event, the question here is simply cameral autonomy, not the involvement of noncongressional institutions.

The argument for cameral autonomy in membership decisions is that the houses are institutional competitors, so that cross-participation in membership decisions creates a risk of intercameral aggrandizement, with the reviewing house basing its decisions on partisan or institutional advantage rather than the constitutional merits. But here, as elsewhere, the basic cost of cameral autonomy is an enhanced risk of self-dealing by legislative factions, in the absence of any mechanism for external review. To be sure, the symmetry of the cross-participation alternative, in which each house reviews the other's decisions, might produce a possible ameliorating mechanism: each house might refrain from patently self-interested review for fear of retaliation by the other. Yet if membership cases are rare (and they are), and if retaliation on other margins (say, by refusing to enact bills sought by the offending house) is a highly imperfect substitute, then the fear of retaliation will prove at best a weak deterrent, subject to domination by the political gains that might flow to the aggrandizing house from self-interested review in particular cases.

The framers' second design choice—to lodge the powers of disqualification and expulsion in (the houses of) Congress alone, without the participation of other institutions—implies similar considerations. If it seems unimaginable to lodge review or approval of expulsion decisions in an outside institution, consider the many analogies elsewhere in the constitutional structure. Many of the stock founding-era arguments for subjecting legislative lawmaking to presidential re-

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\(^9\) See US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3 (depriving Congress of prosecutorial power by providing that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”). See also Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* 80–87 (Kansas 1985) (describing how Americans embraced apportioning powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches).
view, by means of the veto power, transpose comfortably to membership decisions; it is hard to see any a priori reason for thinking that those decisions are any less or more susceptible to the sort of factionalized decisionmaking and legislative herd behavior that caused the framers to provide for the presidential veto. It is irrelevant that the Article I lawmaking process contains a built-in status quo default (a successful veto prevents a change in the law), while membership decisions, especially qualification decisions, sometimes require a compulsory choice between alternative candidates, with no legal default position. Even in the latter case the president or other outside body might be given the power to review the grounds on which the choice is made, with a remand to the initiating house if those grounds are found to be illegitimate. Beyond the possibility of review by the president, we must also consider the possibility of review of membership decisions by the Supreme Court. The Court has already undertaken a limited version of such review in disqualification cases, albeit only as to the legal question of whether the asserted ground of disqualification is among those set out in Article I."

To set against the possibility of outside review by other federal institutions is the standard legislative-autonomy argument: authority over membership decisions should be vested solely in the legislature to minimize the risk of aggrandizement by competing institutions. Consider Story's argument for legislative autonomy in membership decisions:

> It is obvious, that a power must be lodged somewhere to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of each house composing the legislature; for otherwise there could be no certainty, as to who were legitimately chosen members. . . . The only possible question on such a subject is, as to the body, in which such a power shall be lodged. If lodged in any other, than the legislative body itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed, or put into imminent danger. No other body, but itself, can have the same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes."

The fallacy here is by now obvious. Story's argument, which implicitly compares a well-motivated legislature with an ill-motivated reviewing body, amounts to an incomplete cost-benefit analysis. It ignores the potential costs of legislative autonomy, if ill-motivated legislative factions use membership decisions for partisan ends, and the potential benefits of external review, if well-motivated executive or judi-

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90 See Powell, 395 US at 550 (holding that, in judging the qualifications of its members, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications enumerated in the Constitution).
91 Story, 1 Commentaries § 833 at 575–76 (cited in note 49).
cial officials provide an impartial assessment of qualifications, the disruptive effects of legislators’ behavior, and other relevant questions.

Given this structural tradeoff between legislative autonomy and legislative self-dealing, we may interpret the supermajority requirement for expulsion as an attempt to minimize the costs of the latter while maximizing the benefits of the former. Madison’s idea, anticipating modern work on the economics of voting rules, was to minimize factional abuse not by mandating outside review, but by raising the costs of assembling the necessary faction. Supermajority rules are close substitutes for bicameralism, so requiring the former in effect compromises cameral autonomy over expulsion decisions without involving outsiders.

There are, however, two serious objections to Madison’s design choice. First, as we have seen, the supermajority requirement creates costs on another margin, the one identified by Gouvernor Morris: the supermajority requirement minimizes false positives (unjustified decisions to expel), but increases false negatives (unjustified decisions not to expel). Second, and less obviously, the supermajority rule for expulsions does nothing to minimize abuse of the disqualification power, and that gap encourages legislative substitution from ill-motivated expulsion to ill-motivated disqualification; the attempted disqualification of Adam Clayton Powell may have been an example. To the extent that substitution from partisan expulsion to partisan disqualification occurs, it supports the Supreme Court’s decision to limit the grounds for disqualification to the narrow lists set out in Article I. This functionalist defense of the Court’s disqualification jurisprudence improves upon the exhausting and inconclusive originalist debates about the exclusivity of the Qualification Clauses that fractured the Court both in Powell v McCormack and in U.S. Term Limits, Inc v Thornton.

92 See generally James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 211 (Michigan 1962) (noting that requiring more than a simple majority for a decision increases decisionmaking costs).
93 See id at 235–36.
94 See note 28 and accompanying text.
95 We might support Madison’s view with the additional claim that error costs here are asymmetric, because erroneous expulsions are more costly than erroneous failures to expel. The probability that a single bad legislator will cast a decisive bad vote is small, while the loss of legitimacy from an erroneous expulsion is large. But this reasoning might be incomplete: perhaps the legislator who would have been justifiably expelled, under simple majority voting, will have a more disruptive influence on deliberation and the conduct of legislative business than his fractional voting share would suggest.
A promising alternative to the supermajority requirement is embodied in state constitutional provisions that bar legislatures from twice expelling a member for the same conduct.\(^99\) The effect of the state provisions is to create a mechanism for outside review by lodging in the electorate a power to override the legislature’s expulsion decision, so these provisions compromise legislative autonomy vis-à-vis the electorate. On the most extreme version of legislative autonomy, one actually articulated by legislators during early expulsion proceedings, “the voters should not be able to elect anyone repugnant to two thirds of the House.”\(^{100}\) The response to this view is not an abstract argument from democratic theory, that the legislature ought to be bound to respect the voters’ choice of representative; that argument would condemn any legislative power to expel a duly elected member in any circumstances. The right argument for this sort of provision is simply that this form of outside review is, as a matter of institutional design, superior to any of the alternatives, either the supermajority requirement or the hypothetical alternatives that would vest review of expulsion decisions in the other house or in the president. Unlike the supermajority requirement, the electoral-review mechanism carries no built-in skew in favor of false negatives; unlike outside review by other federal institutions, it does not place the reviewing function in the hands of a presumptively hostile institutional competitor.

The states’ rule barring a second expulsion for the same conduct might plausibly be interpolated into the existing constitutional text. I have already sketched the consequentialist case for that reading, but it might be justified on originalist grounds as well.\(^{101}\) In the founding era, famous precedents arising out of the British Parliament’s expulsion of John Wilkes were widely cited as establishing the bar on re-expulsion,\(^{102}\) and early legislators suggested that a similar rule might it-
self be implicit in Article I's expulsion provision." Under the current constitutional rules, however, an interpolated requirement barring re-expulsion would be cumulative with, rather than a substitute for, the supermajority requirement, so this is ultimately an argument for constitutional reform rather than simply a novel interpretation. Yet several state constitutions contain the same combination of supermajority rules with a ban on second expulsions. Given the usual fog of empirical uncertainty that hovers around questions of optimal constitutional design, interpreters of the federal Constitution might do well to mimic those jurisdictions, thereby assuming, until it is proven otherwise, that an interpolated ban on re-expulsion would produce a net improvement.

3. Legislative officers.

The Constitution grants the House of Representatives full authority to "chuse their Speaker and other Officers." Not so for the Senate; Article I specifies that "[t]he Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided." Although the senators are authorized to "chuse their other Officers," they must also choose "a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States."

Implicit in these provisions are a number of important design choices. Generally speaking, legislative officers may be chosen by the legislature itself or by some other body, such as constitutional framers or the executive; legislative officers may be members of the legislature in their own right, or else outsiders; and legislative officers may hold full voting rights, including the power to cast tiebreaking votes, may hold limited voting rights, such as the power to cast only tiebreaking votes, or may hold no voting rights at all. We will examine the framers'
choices along these dimensions and compare them with Bentham’s views about the optimal structure of legislative officeholding.

The Convention’s most important decision was the threshold choice to constitutionalize the Senate’s presiding officer. Why should not the Senate, like the House, have been given discretion to choose all of its officers? In Part I, we examined good normative reasons to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure. As a historical matter, such reasons do not seem to have motivated the Convention’s decision, at least not in the main. Rather the major impetus behind the decision was simply the desire to give the vice president some official function, other than standing by in hopes of succeeding the president. Roger Sherman argued that “[i]f the vice-President were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employment.”

Oliver Williamson likewise observed that “such an officer as vice-President was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time.”

The reference here is to the electoral scheme for president and vice president adopted in Article II, section 1, clause 3, and later modified by the Twelfth Amendment.

This is not to say, however, that no normatively attractive reasons for constitutionalizing the choice of the Senate’s presiding officer existed; some were even discussed at the Convention. Sherman buttressed his argument for vice presidential employment with the idea that, if the presiding officer were chosen from among the senators, “some member by being made President must be deprived of his vote, unless when an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be but seldom.” The premise of this argument was wrong; the member chosen to preside might retain his vote in the ordinary course and receive a tiebreaking vote. This alternative, however, would in effect give the presiding member two votes. Story’s improved version articulated the dilemma:

If the speaker were not allowed to vote, except where there was an equal division, independent of his own vote, then the state might lose its own voice; if he were allowed to give his vote, and also a casting vote, then the state might, in effect, possess a double vote.

Unfortunately, both Sherman’s original argument and Story’s improvement rest on a non sequitur. At most the voting argument shows that the Senate should be constitutionally required to choose a presid-

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108 Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 537 (cited in note 19).
109 Id.
110 Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 537 (cited in note 19).
ing officer from outside the membership. It does not show that the Constitutional Convention itself should have decided who that outsider would be. To support that separate choice requires, in addition, some reason to believe that the framers had some comparative advantage over future Senates in choosing the outsider who should preside.

The same problem afflicts a second argument for constitutionalizing the presiding officer's identity, an argument articulated by early commentators but not during the Convention itself. On this view, state jealousies made it imperative that the presiding office be held by an impartial outsider. Senators, elected by state legislatures, were to be national representatives of the states; the vice president, although a citizen of some state, was not elected from any state in particular, and would be able to preside over the Senate without the appearance of sectional favoritism.\(^{12}\) (On this view, the House could be given authority to choose officers from among its own membership, who represent districts, not states.) The impartiality argument accords with Bentham's idea that "[i]n a numerous legislative assembly, a president ought not be a member," an "exclusion" that is in part intended "to guarantee him from the seductions of partiality, and to raise him even above suspicion, by never exhibiting him as a partisan in the midst of debates in which he is required to interfere as a judge."\(^{13}\)

But the non sequitur problem remains: the argument from impartiality does not entail that the outsider should be chosen by constitutional framers. Bentham correctly distinguished the two points by stipulating both that the presiding officer should be an outsider, and also should be chosen "freely and exclusively by the assembly over which he is to preside."\(^{14}\) These two stipulations might appear inconsistent because the exclusion of members from the presiding office curtails the members' free choice of a presiding officer, but this objection is implausible. Generally, choice remains free despite the presence of legal constraints, and under any imaginable design, the members would be forced to choose their presiding officer within some set of constitutional constraints, such as the Article VI requirement that all federal officers take an oath to support the Constitution.\(^{15}\) A more respectable, because more pragmatic, argument for the Convention's decision to choose the identity of the presiding officer is that the very

\(^{12}\) See id at 514-15 (explaining the motivation for appointing the Senate's presiding officer as "founded upon state jealousy, and state equality").

\(^{13}\) Bentham, Political Tactics ch V, § 2 at 67-69 (cited in note 11).

\(^{14}\) Id § 3 at 69.

\(^{15}\) US Const Art VI, cl 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.").
state rivalries that require an outsider to preside would also prevent
the Senate itself from reaching a consensus on the identity of that out-
sider. Yet we might also imagine that the necessity for compromise
would have caused the Senate to choose the lowest common denomi-
nator from among the candidates presented, settling upon a presiding
officer inoffensive to all concerned. That has historically been the pat-
tern in the Senate's choice of the president pro tempore, who presides
in the vice president's absence.

Even if the Convention had good reason to choose the identity of
the outsider given authority to preside, rather than leaving the choice
to future Senates, it was a separate and equally contestable decision to
mandate that the presiding outsider be a high official in the executive
branch. The mandated choice of an outsider compromises legislative
autonomy in the service of impartiality, but the mandate that the out-
sider be an executive officer adds the usual risk of aggrandizement by
institutional competitors. As Elbridge Gerry put it at the Convention,
"[w]e might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legis-
lature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the President &
vice-president makes it absolutely improper." 16 Morris's memorable
response was that "[t]he vice president then will be the first heir ap-
parent that ever loved his father"; 17 in general, many framers antici-
pated that the president and vice president would be institutional ri-
vals, rather than allies, in part because of the latter's perpetual hope of
succeeding the former, in part because the two officers were to be se-
lected independently, and in part because each was anticipated to be
drawn from among the nation's leading politicians. 18 On this view, the
Senate would have little to fear from the vice president's status as pre-
siding officer.

The risk of interbranch aggression created by the vice president's
constitutional role has indeed never materialized, 19 but not for the
reasons the framers envisaged. The vice president's structural rivalry
with the president has become a minor theme, because the enactment

17 Id at 537.
18 This rivalry suggests a rationale for the rule that the chief justice, rather than the vice
president, would preside over the impeachment trial of a president. The concern might be, not
that the vice president would be biased in the president's favor, but that he would be biased
against him.
19 It is, however, a mistake to think that the vice president's role is vestigial or a historical
curiosity; recurrently, if infrequently, the vice president's authority to make procedural rulings
importantly affects legislative outcomes, and the tiebreaking vote is a significant power. See
Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian, Interview No 4. Filibuster and Cloture 39 (discussing
Vice President Rockefeller's controversial ruling on a point of order motion by Senator Mans-
field involving a cloture motion), online at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
resources/pdf/Riddick_interview_4.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2004); 1 Guide to Congress 456 (CQ
of the Twelfth Amendment and the rise of joint party slates for the two offices made the vice president a nonentity in the nineteenth century, while the consolidation of presidential power to nominate the vice president made the office a wholly owned subsidiary of the presidency in the twentieth. These developments might have posed a real risk of presidential domination of the Senate, if the Senate had not developed various means of self-defense, such as Senate precedents suggesting that the vice president may act only as directed by the Senate’s own rules and lacks any intrinsic constitutional authority to keep order or to make procedural rulings. The framers were wrong about the political mechanisms that have dampened the risks created by their choice of the Senate’s presiding officer; the benign outcome of their choice is best described as a lucky historical accident.

Finally, we need to consider Bentham’s argument that an appropriately impartial presiding officer would possess no right to vote, even to break ties. Indeed, for Bentham, the rule authorizing the presiding officer to vote only to break ties “is more opposed to impartiality than that of allowing him to vote in all cases.” On this view, the framers’ decision to grant the vice president a tiebreaking vote undermines the impartiality rationale that best justifies his status as a senatorial officer to begin with, and this is so whether the alternative is full voting rights or no vote at all. The mechanism that Bentham has in mind here is, however, obscure; why should voting only to break

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121 Id at 141 (noting that the “the functions of the vice-presidential candidate were echo, defender of the standard-bearer, and attacker of opponents,” and that these duties continued in office).

122 See Currie, *Federalist Period* at 11 (cited in note 88) (describing Vice President Adams’s active participation in Senate affairs); Tiefer, *Congressional Practice* at 490 n 61 (cited in note 71) (discussing a failed experiment allowing the vice president as speaker to select all committees, until such biased choices were made that the Senate took the power away).

123 Alexander Hamilton argued that the Senate, necessarily composed of an even number of legislators, would be incapable of “definitive resolution” in all cases unless the vice president possessed a casting vote. Federalist 68 (Hamilton), in *The Federalist* 457, 461 (cited in note 25). This is just wrong. As Bentham points out, in case of a tie the decision may be relegated to a default rule; the typical default in assemblies is that in case of a tie the motion is defeated. See Bentham, *Political Tactics* ch V, § 2 at 67–69 (cited in note 11). A tie vote may occur either where the presiding officer has no casting vote, and thus possesses less voting power than the vice president, or where the presiding officer may vote not only to break ties but also to create a tie, and thus possesses greater voting power than the vice president, who has no general power to cast a decisive tie-creating vote. See Henry M. Robert, ed, *Robert's Rules of Order* 392 (Perseus 10th ed 2000).


125 An intermediate alternative would have been to give the vice president the power either to break a tie or to create one, but not to cast nondecisive votes. See Robert, ed, *Robert's Rules of Order* at 392 (cited in note 123).
ties create a greater appearance of partiality than casting both tie-breaking votes and ordinary ones? Recall that on Story’s view the latter regime in effect doubles the partisan import of the vice president’s vote. We may, however, save Bentham’s argument by interpreting it in expressive rather than consequentialist terms, as a claim that the tie-break-only regime creates an inconsistent symbolism. On this view, the abstention from ordinary voting in the tiebreak-only regime creates a pretense of impartiality that is violated whenever a tiebreaking vote is cast, whereas the regime that includes ordinary voting makes no pretense that the presiding officer is impartial in the first place.

The upshot of all this is that the framers’ decisions to foist the vice president upon the Senate and to give the vice president (only) a tiebreaking vote both seem dubious from the standpoint of sound constitutional design. What is worse, the former decision may also have been unnecessary. The simpler solution to the problem of vice presidential unemployment, if it is a problem at all, would have been to mandate, not that he be given a legislative post, but that he be given additional executive duties—perhaps as one of the “Heads of Departments” or cabinet officers, perhaps as one of the “Ambassadors, other public Ministers [or] Consuls,” the existence of which are presupposed by Article II. Such an arrangement would have eliminated the institutional risks of interbranch service. And, as it turns out, subordinate executive and diplomatic tasks are what vice presidents mostly do anyway.


Article I sets the basic quorum rule for congressional voting by providing that: “a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.”

126 Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 Mich L. Rev 1703, 1714 (1988) (suggesting that the vice president’s “role as presiding officer of the Senate should be eliminated” and that the vice president should be allowed to hold other offices in the executive branch). For a critical response to this proposal, see Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice-Presidency, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev 505, 556–57 (1995) (arguing that additional vice presidential duties may put the vice president “in a position where he would likely accumulate enemies and be mired in detail”).

127 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.

128 See Goldstein, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev at 556–57 (cited in note 126) (“Successful recent Vice Presidents, like Mondale, Bush, or Gore have been generalists who have been free to dabble in the range of problems that government, and a President, faces.”).

129 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 1.
In the ordinary case of simple majority voting, this provision is straightforward enough. An important interpretive question arises, however, when the Constitution specifies that a supermajority vote is needed to execute some power vested in one or both houses separately, such as the expulsion of a member or the approval of a treaty, or in the Congress jointly, such as the override of a presidential veto. Does the heightened voting requirement mean that a supermajority of the whole house is needed, or is only a supermajority of a majority needed? Although this question is sometimes thought to implicate the constitutional quorum rule, it does not. Whatever the voting rule, a quorum to do business is present if and only if a majority of the relevant house is present. The possibility that a supermajority requirement is satisfied only if a supermajority of the whole house votes in favor of a bill is an interpretation of the voting rule itself. Quorum rules, by contrast, are insensitive to whether votes are cast for or against a bill; a quorum can be composed of both aye votes and no votes. Nonetheless I will treat this question under the slightly misleading head of "supermajority quorum rules," to follow previous discussions and as a useful shorthand.

I shall begin by examining the ordinary quorum rule from the standpoint of optimal legislative design, and will then show that the question of supermajority quorum rules lacks independent significance; it collapses entirely into the question of optimal voting rules.

a) Ordinary quorum rules. Define a "quorum rule" as any rule that permits the legislature to conduct business with less than all members present. What effects are produced as the quorum rule is decreased from the full number of members down to one member? In general, where the underlying voting rule is enactment by simple majority, there will be strong pressure to adopt a majority quorum requirement as well. If a minority cannot defeat an enactment on the merits, the intuition runs, why should the same minority be able to block an enactment by absenting themselves and thereby breaking the quorum? Conversely, with a high quorum rule, such as three-fourths majority, a handful of legislators may extract strategic concessions by threatening to prevent a majority from enacting its preferred policy. As Gouvernor Morris observed at the Convention:

the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum. . . . Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular [part] of

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the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a secession, some unjust & selfish measure.  

The costs of organizing this sort of holdout faction to break the quorum rise as the quorum rule is reduced.

To be sure, empowering minorities to defeat legislation by breaking the quorum will in some cases also reduce majoritarian exploitation. George Mason "admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number: but he had also known good produced by an apprehension of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia." The combination of this point with the previous one just means that high quorum requirements display the same mix of costs and benefits as supermajority voting rules; indeed, the voting rule sets an effective upper bound on the quorum requirement. Given these considerations, the combination of simple majority voting rules with supermajority quorum requirements is rare in state and foreign constitutions.

The harder question is why there should be a lower bound, or indeed any quorum requirement at all. Following Bentham, we may identify three principal costs that may be incurred when legislatures proceed with business despite high rates of absenteeism. The first cost is outcome error, defined as any difference between the outcomes that the legislature would produce with full attendance and the outcomes it would produce with a bare quorum present. Low attendance increases the variance of legislative outcomes and thus the possibility of countermajoritarian results. One ambition of quorum rules is to minimize this form of error by ensuring that the legislature may not proceed with only a few in attendance. A second cost is the loss of legitimacy said to result when the legislature proceeds without a full complement or even majority participation. As Bentham put it, "[i]s the part absent greater than that which is present? The public knows not to which to adhere. In every state of the case, the incomplete assembly will have less influence than the complete assembly." A third cost is the deliberative deficit produced by low attendance. On a Condorcetian interpretation of legislative deliberation, any reduction in the number voting reduces the probability that the eventual majority's decision is correct, so long as each legislator is more likely to be right than wrong, and where there are right (and wrong) answers to be.

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131 Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 252 (cited in note 19) (brackets in original).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 58. But see Ind Const Art IV, § 11 ("Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.").
134 This compresses Bentham's six principal costs. See Bentham, Political Tactics ch IV, § 4 at 57–58 (cited in note 11).
135 Id at 58.
found.\textsuperscript{136} Even where the subject for legislative deliberation involves value choices, more heads may still be better than fewer, if exposure to a broader number and variety of views blocks group polarization and dampens opinion cascades.\textsuperscript{137}

To be sure, if attendance is optional then self-selection may ensure that the attending legislators are precisely those most informed and most engaged on the relevant subjects, and this may be the best subset of deliberators available. Yet against this optimistic story is the possibility that self-selected attendees will hold extreme preferences or biased views; legislators with lower stakes in outcomes may prove more dispassionate deliberators, albeit less informed ones. Conversely, legislators’ willingness to invest in the information needed to cast an intelligent vote may itself be a product of attending the legislature, so that legislators induced to attend by quorum rules or other institutional reasons, rather than by the stakes or intrinsic interest of the subject matter, might fear to be seen casting an obviously uninformed vote. They might thus learn enough to form a reasonably defensible view, or at least to decide intelligently which other legislator’s position should be copied.

It is tempting to think that the outcome errors produced by low attendance are harmless. The legislative majority that would have prevailed with full attendance may, on this view, simply repeal the minoritarian enactment the next time it assembles, and the minority, anticipating this, will refrain from the useless exercise. As Bentham described parliamentary practice, “[i]f the decision taken by the small number be contrary to the wish of the majority, they assemble in force the day following, and abrogate the work of the previous day.”\textsuperscript{138} The ability to reverse minoritarian legislative action functions as an ultimate constraint that reduces the importance of the quorum minimum, a point missed by George Mason when he argued to the Convention


\textsuperscript{137} See Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes}, 110 Yale L J 71, 108–09 (2000) (showing that heterogeneity of views in the deliberating body dampens group polarization). Several European constitutions do not require a quorum for deliberation, as opposed to voting. See, for example, Spain Const Part III, ch 1, § 72, online at http://www.ecln.net/elements/euro_constitutions.html (visited Feb 20, 2004). But establishing a quorum for voting may nonetheless have valuable indirect effects on deliberation, and it is far easier to monitor compliance with quorum rules for voting than for deliberation.

\textsuperscript{138} Bentham, \textit{Political Tactics} ch IV, § 7 at 62 (cited in note 11).
that without a quorum minimum "the U[nited] States might be gov-
erned by a Juncto."^{139}

Yet the constraint is a weak one, and may fail on either de jure or
de facto grounds. If the legal regime permits the legislature to enact
entrenched statutes, irrepealable by later legislative enactments (al-
though not by constitutional amendment), then the legislative minor-
ity's initial act may stand.^{140} Moreover, in Parliament and in some
states, constitutional or quasi-constitutional traditions or rules bar re-
consideration of rejected bills within the same legislative session,
based on a general rule that "the same question should not be twice
offered" within that session.^{141} If these rules are interpreted expans-
ively, so that the earlier enactment is deemed a rejection of the oppo-
site proposal, they may preclude intra-session reversals. Even if the le-
gal regime neither permits entrenchment nor bars reversals within the
session, it may be more difficult for the legislative majority to repeal
an earlier minoritarian enactment than it would have been to vote it
down in the first instance, even if the enactment has only been law for
a brief period. The change in the status quo point may affect outcomes
if some legislators support neither the enactment nor its repeal, per-
haps because they desire to use that portion of the legislative agenda
to pursue other business entirely. An implication of these considera-
tions is that constitutions that permit entrenching statutes or that bar
reconsideration of enactments within the same legislative session
should, all else equal, have higher legislative quorum requirements
than constitutions that do not—subject to a qualification to be dis-
cussed below.

Bentham also goes wrong by saying that "every proposition the
success of which has resulted from absence, and which would have
been rejected in the full assembly" should be counted as a "surprise."^{142}
With rational expectations, however, absentees will anticipate that di-
minished attendance increases the variance of legislative outcomes
and thus the possibility of results that contradict the preferences of
the legislative majority. The result may, however, surprise the public if
monitoring of absenteeism is imperfect. Moreover, in two-party sys-
tems, error in Bentham's sense occurs only when there is asymmetrical
absenteeism, such that the absenteees from the party that would prevail

\^139 Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 252 (cited in note 19).
\^140 See generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 Yale L J 1665 (2002).
\^141 See Thomas Erskine May, Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and
Usage of Parliament 557-58 (Butterworth 17th ed 1964) ("When a bill has been rejected, or lost
through disagreement, it should not, according to the practice of Parliament, be reintroduced in
the same session."). See, for example, Tenn Const Art II, § 19 ("After a bill has been rejected, no
bill containing the same substance shall be passed into a law during the same session.").
\^142 See Bentham, Political Tactics ch IV, § 4 at 58 (cited in note 11).
with full attendance are sufficiently more numerous than the absen-
tees from the minority party as to reverse the outcome. The modern
Senate has evolved a complex norm to reduce the error costs of
asymmetrical absenteeism: the pair system, under which senators form
agreements with members of the other party not to vote if one is ab-
sent. Although the pair system makes the senators immediately con-
cerned better off by permitting symmetrical absences, it possibly cre-
ates an externality by increasing absenteeism and thereby detracting
from legislative deliberation. We will return to this concern below.

Against the foregoing benefits of quorum rules must be set their
principal cost, which is to block legislative action. Here, too, quorum
rules resemble supermajority rules in their common bias in favor of
the status quo. A less obvious complication is that attendance may it-
self be an endogenous effect of the quorum rule, at least in part. As
Gouvernor Morris brilliantly argued at the Convention, “fix the [quo-
rum] number low and they [that is, legislators] will generally attend
knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence.” To the ex-
tent that this rational-expectations account is persuasive, increasing,
rather than decreasing, the harms that legislative minorities may inflict
by opportunistic action in the legislative majority’s absence will
maximize the expected costs of failure to attend and thereby maxi-
mize attendance. On this view, legal regimes that permit entrenching
statutes, that bar intra-session reversals, and so forth should have
lower quorum requirements, not higher ones. But the flaw in this posi-
tion is that maximizing attendance is an implausible aim; some ab-
sences are strategic, but some are justified, so the right maximand is
not attendance simpliciter but attendance without good excuse.

Quorum rules are not, of course, the only rules that affect atten-
dance. Two other variables that have indirect effects on attendance are
the transparency of legislative proceedings and the permissibility of
proxy voting, either in committee or on the floor. The publication of
roll call votes encourages attendance if absenteeism has political costs;
there is some empirical evidence for this. I examine transparency
and its effects below. As for the second issue, proxy voting has never
been permissible on the floor of either house; it was largely abolished
in House committees in 1995, although it continues in Senate commit-
tees and in intercameral conferences. Although the permissibility of
proxies affects attendance, it does not follow that the proxy rules can
or should be calibrated with the sole aim of optimizing attendance. Al-
though proxies lower the costs of absenteeism, and thus reinforce the

143 Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 252 (cited in note 19) (moving to fix the quorum at
a majority).
144 See note 177 (providing empirical evidence for politically motivated attendance).
deliberative externality discussed earlier, proxy voting also bolsters majoritarianism, "ensuring that political control could not slip away to a well-organized minority that might concentrate its strength at a single location for a 'sneak attack' on the majority."\(^{146}\) Maximizing attendance prevents countermajoritarian surprise, but if less than full attendance is a given, a ban on proxy voting may undermine majoritarian control.

Jiggering the quorum rules, transparency rules, and rules about proxy voting so as indirectly to maximize or optimize attendance thus looks like a difficult and potentially counterproductive enterprise. The more straightforward procedure may simply be to establish penalties for nonattendance by statute or internal rule. Almost all jurisdictions thus permit a minority smaller than a quorum to enact rules and set penalties to compel attendance by absent legislators, and Bentham proposed an intricate system under which absentees would suffer an automatic deduction from salaries or deposited funds.\(^{147}\) Yet in many jurisdictions such rules go largely unenforced, not (or not only) because of collusion between the enforcing legislative officers and the offending legislators, but because of the undesirable side effects of a compulsory regime. Mandating a fine for nonattendance may implicitly announce that "a fine is a price," and thereby undermine, rather than reinforce, social norms that support legislative attendance.\(^{148}\) Moreover, if legislators differ widely in personal wealth, as they do in the House of Representatives, then a system of fines might produce (in Bentham's words) "two classes in the assembly—those who were paid for their functions, and those who paid for not fulfilling them."\(^{149}\) Bentham fell back on the idea that attendance might be enforced by criminal sanctions, but this seems implausible, given quasi-constitutional traditions of legislators' personal immunity and the high procedural costs of disproving legislators' stock excuses. Finally, compelling attendance is inadequate to prevent strategic quorum-breaking if the quorum is determined by the number of votes cast on a roll call (the traditional practice), and if the minority may attend the legislature without casting votes. In the nineteenth century, strategic refusal to vote was frequently used as a delaying tactic, and was suppressed only in 1890, thanks to a ruling by the Speaker of the House that

\(^{146}\) Id at 552.

\(^{147}\) Bentham, *Political Tactics* ch IV, § 5 at 58 (cited in note 11).


\(^{149}\) Bentham, *Political Tactics* ch IV, § 5 at 59 (cited in note 11).
members physically present but not voting counted toward a quorum.footnote{150}

Given that optimizing attendance through direct regulation is as problematic as the indirect regulation that animates quorum rules, most jurisdictions parallel (or copy) the federal Constitution by adopting a mix of the two strategies, prescribing quorum minima within a narrow range (typically a majority, occasionally two-thirds), and conferring legislative authority to compel attendance. On this score the framers seem to have gotten things about right, at least if we ignore their failure to anticipate strategic refusals to vote, and at least in the sense that no strikingly superior alternatives to their major design choices exist.

b) Supermajority "quorum" rules. The framers, however, blundered by leaving open the critical interpretive question whether the express majority quorum for ordinary majority voting still obtains where the Constitution requires a supermajority of the votes cast. The constitutional text is ambiguous on the question of supermajority quorum rules. In several places, including the supermajority rules for treaties and impeachment, the framers pointedly provided that a supermajority vote "of the members present" would suffice;footnote{151} this suggests by negative implication that in other settings, such as the supermajority requirements for veto overrides or constitutional amendments, two-thirds of the whole membership of each house is required.footnote{152} Against this interpretation is the idea that where the framers wanted to vary the ordinary quorum rule, they did so expressly. An example is the Article II procedure by which the House of Representatives chooses the president; the framers provided that "[a] quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States," even though (only) "a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice."footnote{153} That the framers required a supermajority in a particular setting need not entail an implicit decision to require a supermajority of the whole body, rather than simply a supermajority of a majority quorum. In settings that expressly require a supermajority vote yet are silent about quorum rules, "the Framers expressly changed the multi-

footnote{150} See William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation 131–34 (Yale 1986). A recent redistricting controversy in Texas involved an escalated version of this same tactic. To stymie the Texas legislature's Republican majority's efforts to adopt a congressional redistricting plan, Texas Democrats twice broke the quorum by fleeing the state, evading Texas Rangers who were ordered to return the absent legislators to the capitol. Ralph Blumenthal, After Bitter Fight, Texas Senate Redraws Congressional Districts, NY Times A1 (Oct 13, 2003); David Barboza and Charles Hulse, Texas' Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain AWOL, NY Times A17 (May 14, 2003).

footnote{151} US Const Art II. § 2, cl 2 (treaties); US Const Art I, § 3, cl 6 (impeachments).

footnote{152} See US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2 (veto overrides); US Const Art V (amendments).

footnote{153} US Const Art II, § 1, cl 3.
plier [from majority to supermajority] for determining the requisite
majority; there was no reason to think they had also changed the multi-
plier [from majority quorum to full house]."

The stakes of the issue are high. In a house comprising one hun-
dred legislators a majority of a majority (the ordinary quorum rule)
requires only twenty-six votes, a two-thirds supermajority of a major-
ity requires thirty-four votes, and a two-thirds supermajority of the
whole requires as many as sixty-six votes. The difference between
the second and third thresholds is far greater than the difference between
the second and first. In light of the foregoing analysis, however, this in-
terpretive question is easily resolved on consequentialist grounds. The
principal constraint on supermajority quorum rules is the ubiquity of
the simple majority voting rule, and this constraint disappears when
the underlying voting rule is itself supermajoritarian. Nor, of course, is
the indirect effect of quorum rules on legislative attendance an impor-
tant consideration here. A quorum must be present whether superma-
jority requirements are interpreted to require a supermajority of the
whole house, or just a supermajority of a majority. In the absence of
those considerations, the topic of the optimal multiplicand for super-
majority voting rules collapses entirely into the topic of optimal voting
rules themselves. Increasing the multiplicand is in principle equivalent
to increasing the requisite supermajority. So from the consequentialist
standpoint the issue is parasitic on the familiar debate over the costs
and benefits of supermajority rules, a topic that I need not rehash
here.

5. Transparency (of deliberation and voting).

Among the most significant of Article I’s provisions regulating
congressional procedure is the Journal Clause, which provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in
their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of
one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal."

This provision makes a number of fundamental design choices:
for open voting rather than the secret ballot in Congress, at least as to
some matters and on the request of a minority of legislators; for a

154 Currie, Jeffersonians at 62 (cited in note 83).
155 See McGinnis and Rappaport, 80 Tex L Rev at 707-08 (cited in note 6) (discussing the
costs and benefits of supermajority rules).
156 US Const Art I, § 5. cl 3.
157 Note that the Clause requires only one-fifth “of those present” to trigger a roll call vote,
not one-fifth of a quorum. But in the Senate (not the House), the practice is for the presiding of-
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default obligation to publish a journal of proceedings; and for an optional override of the transparency obligation in defined circumstances. Equally important are the design possibilities the Clause rejects, and that are present in constitutions of other jurisdictions, such as constitutionally mandated roll call voting in legislative committees and a public right of physical access to legislative proceedings. To understand the stakes, consider that throughout most of its history the English Parliament operated in secrecy and indeed punished attempts to publish records of its proceedings, that the Continental Congress initially closed its proceedings to outsiders and the Constitutional Convention did so throughout, and that even today most legislatures use secret ballots to select their officers while some, like the Italian Parliament, have until quite recently used them for final voting on legislation. The transparency of legislative deliberation and voting is in broad historical compass a recent design innovation, and a normatively controversial one, or so I shall argue. There are many good reasons for citizens and legislators to fear the effects of transparency on legislatures, and if we ultimately approve of the major thrust of the framers’ design choices along this margin—as I will—we should do so with full awareness of the institutional costs of those choices.

I will break down this complex topic into three parts. The first sketches briefly the general tradeoffs inherent in legislative transparency; the second turns to the question of open versus secret voting, examining the purposes, scope, and mechanics of the Journal Clause’s roll call provision; and the third examines constitutional mandates.

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158 See, for example, Mich Const Art IV, § 17 (“On all actions on bills and resolutions in each committee, names and votes of members shall be recorded.”); Mont Const Art V, § 11.2 (“Every vote of each member of the legislature on each substantive question in the legislature, in any committee, or in committee of the whole shall be recorded and made public.”).

159 See, for example, Idaho Const Art III, § 12 (“The business of each house, and of the committee of the whole shall be transacted openly and not in secret session.”); Iowa Const Art III, § 13 (“The doors of each house shall be open, except on such occasions, as, in the opinion of the house, may require secrecy.”).


that require roll calls for certain votes (rather than merely allowing a set fraction of legislators to require them).

a) Transparency, deliberation, and bargaining. At a general level, the institutional-design tradeoffs inherent in transparency are well understood, although it is a daunting empirical task to specify how the relevant variables should be weighed in particular settings. Transparency reduces the cost to principals, such as citizens and voters, of monitoring their agents, such as legislators, who would otherwise divert resources to themselves or simply shirk their official duties. It is thus a favored recipe of democrats and good-government reformers who seek to reduce official corruption and to encourage regular attendance by legislators; we will see below that agents may even compete among themselves by offering principals institutional arrangements that provide for ever-greater transparency.

This is all to the good as far as it goes, but transparency has important costs, in part precisely because of its democratizing effects; transparency changes official and legislative deliberation both for good and for ill. Without transparency, agents gain less from adopting positions that resonate with immediate popular passions, so transparency may exacerbate the effects of decisionmaking pathologies that sometimes grip mobilized publics. Transparency subjects public deliberation to reputational constraints: officials will stick to initial positions, once announced, for fear of appearing to vacillate or capitulate, and this effect will make deliberation more polarized and more partisan. The framers closed the Philadelphia Convention to outsiders precisely to prevent initial positions from hardening prematurely.


166 Many public pathologies are relevant here, including reputational and informational cascades, preference falsification, rational and irrational herding behavior, and group polarization. See Sunstein, 10 J Pol Phil at 176 (cited in note 52) (discussing group polarization, where “members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies”) (emphasis removed); Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Harvard 1995) (explaining the implications of preference falsification, “the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine wants under perceived social pressures”); Jacob Gersen, Informational Cascades, Cognitive Bias, and Catastrophic Risk (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (exploring “the political economy of catastrophic risk from natural disasters in the United States”).

167 At the Federal Convention, the sessions were closed and secret. As Madison said later:

Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no
The pressure to take a principled public stand also dampens explicit bargaining. Although anticorruption reformers count this as an unqualified good, it is in fact a qualified one.\footnote{See Elster, 2 U Pa J Const L at 405–18 (cited in note 14).} Bargains may represent corrupt deals by which agents enrich themselves at principals’ expense, but bargains also permit logrolls that may allow the legislative process to register the intensity of constituents’ preferences,\footnote{Logrolling may permit, of course, either socially beneficial trades or the infliction of socially harmful externalities on nontraders. Much depends on the details of the situation. “Today, no consensus exists in the normative public choice literature as to whether logrolling is on net welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, that is, whether logrolling constitutes a positive- or a negative-sum game.” Thomas Stratmann, \textit{Logrolling}, in Dennis C. Mueller, ed, \textit{Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook} 322, 322 (Cambridge 1997).} and that help to appease policy losers by giving something to everyone. Argument by reference to public principle, by contrast, is a hydraulic force that presses competing camps toward total victory or total defeat. Alternatively, transparency might simply drive decisionmaking underground, creating “deliberations” that are sham rituals while the real bargaining is conducted in less accessible and less formal venues, off the legislative floor or in closed committee markup sessions.

So transparency is a mixed boon; not coincidentally, the historical and political record concerning legislative transparency presents a mixed picture. It is best to examine that record in the focused setting of particular constitutional questions, however. I shall begin with the baseline roll call provisions applicable to ordinary voting, and then move to constitutionally mandated roll calls for supermajority votes and other special circumstances.

\textit{b) (Open) voting and (secret) ballots.} An intuitive and widely held view is that, in a representative democracy, legislative voting must be publicized if citizen-voters are entitled or obliged to judge the performance of their representatives through periodic elections. In principal-agent terms, voters are the principals, legislators are the agents, and constitutional provisions that force agents to publicize their actions lower the monitoring costs that principals must incur, thereby making principals better off. Secret voting, on this view, confines principals to monitoring or judging outcomes alone, rather than both actions and outcomes. Rather than knowing both how elected representatives voted and what the political and economic outcomes of those votes were, voters are relegated to making reelection decisions solely on crude outcome-based proxies for successful government, such as the state of the economy or the voter’s personal finances at the time of election (or changes in either of those variables between

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\footnote{man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.}

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The last election and the current one). Secret voting, it might be said, simply throws away information about legislators' actions, or legislative inputs, that is of value to citizen-principals.

The framers were quite aware of this principal-agent account, at least in its simplest outlines. Wilson argued in the Convention that "[t]he people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings." Formally, of course, the Journal Clause does allow a sufficient supermajority of the legislature (four-fifths plus one) to do just that, by refusing roll call votes and by closing the legislative journals to public scrutiny (the latter simply on a majority vote). Yet we may surmise that the framers anticipated that competition between legislative factions would routinely produce public voting, as indeed it has done. Congress as an institution (although not voters) might be better off if all legislators, in both houses, could agree to enforce strict secrecy provisions, but competition among legislators and candidates produces socially beneficial transparency.

As this last point emphasizes, where present or would-be legislators compete to achieve or retain office, modern accounts of the principal-agent relationship between voters and legislators have emphasized the benefits to legislator-agents themselves of reducing the costs of monitoring to principals. By offering contracts or arrangements that lower expected agency costs, either by reducing monitoring costs or in other ways, would-be agents induce principals to select them rather than others. Would-be agents also increase the discretionary power with which principals will entrust them; the lower the costs of monitoring, the lower the risk that the agent will shirk or will divert power to his own ends rather than the principal's, and the more power the agent will receive. These effects may of course operate through the mediation of political parties, rather than through the decisions of individual legislators. Parties will oppose secret voting to the extent that it reduces their ability to monitor their members' behavior and thus credibly to offer the electorate attractive policy packages. Consider

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170 Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 260 (cited in note 19).
171 An ingenious, or diabolical, interpretation might emphasize that the roll call provision merely requires that "the Yeas and Nays ... shall, at the desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal," and that a bare majority might subsequently decline to publish that "Part" of the Journal, deciding that "in their Judgment [it] require[s] Secrecy." US Const Art I, § 5. But this would essentially nullify the submajority one-fifth requirement for forcing a roll call, in violation of standard canons of textual interpretation that bar interpreting one proviso to swallow or negate another. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 27, 99 (1994). So the better interpretation is that the roll call provision trumps the secrecy option provided in the Clause; roll calls must be published. To my knowledge neither house has ever refused to publish a roll call vote.
172 This paragraph and the next draw heavily upon the important account in Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority at 133 (cited in note 8).
the Italian Parliament, which uniquely among major liberal democracies had a regular, although complex, practice of secret voting until 1988, when the major political parties cooperated to abolish the practice as a means of asserting greater control over their own rank and file.\footnote{See Mershon, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev at 545 (cited in note 164).}

In historical terms, we may interpret these points as suggesting two hypotheses: (1) that constitutional framers who wish to strengthen government power will propose constitutionally mandated rules of governmental transparency to induce popular ratification; (2) that subsequent elections under the new constitution may bring about increased transparency through voluntary legislative action, as competing candidates and competing houses of the legislature bid for popular support by proposing institutional policies that reduce the voters' monitoring costs. Both suggestions resonate with the historical evidence. As to the first, framers who advocated mandatory transparency of congressional deliberation and voting did so with the explicit recognition that encoding transparency in the constitutional bargain would help to dispel antifederalist concerns about the power of the new national government. Wilson, after arguing that the people had a right to know the actions of their legislative agents, added that "as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds would be easily misled."\footnote{Farrand, ed., 2 Federal Convention at 260 (cited in note 19).} As to the second, the Senate's decision to proceed behind closed doors for the first years of its existence, and to limit publication of its debates and votes, caused popular interest to center on the House; by 1801 the Senate was bidding for popular attention by opening its proceedings to the public.\footnote{See Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority at 138-39 (cited in note 8) ("Indeed, within a very few years, the Senate itself was transformed from a closed council to a highly public showcase of the rhetorical talents of the leading orators of the day.").}

Subsequent developments in congressional procedure extend the story. Modern legislators have imposed transparency obligations on themselves, such as roll call voting in congressional committees, with a view to encouraging attendance and dispelling popular suspicion of legislative corruption.\footnote{Id at 139.} Furthermore, some empirical evidence suggests that transparency obligations do at least hamper shirking by allowing opposing candidates to publicize incumbents' attendance records.\footnote{See, for example, id ("For example, following the institution [of] recorded teller voting, attendance at roll calls roughly doubled. Similarly, when roll call votes began to be recorded in committees, participation on roll calls increased from around 40% to over 90%."); David M. Olson, The Legislative Process: A Comparative Approach 392-93 (Harper 1980). See also Bruce}
So far the story is a happy or at least a straightforward one. We may complicate it by examining reasons that might give legislators good reason to fear the consequences of the transparency of legislative voting, and that might even cause their voter-principals to agree that public voting has important costs as well as benefits. From the legislators' point of view, a major historical concern is that the executive branch will punish them for voting contrary to executive interests; the fear of monarchical influence animated Parliament's elaborate attempts to maintain the secrecy of its proceedings during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\footnote{From the social standpoint, voter-principals might well approve of the legislature's attempts to shield itself from executive-branch coercion. If the constitutional design seeks to minimize agency costs in part by creating institutional competition between branches, then executive aggrandizement and consequent domination of the legislature enabled by legislative transparency increases those costs.}

Yet legislative secrecy may itself be an unnecessarily costly response to the threat, because it also deprives voters of valuable information about their agents' behavior. We might then understand the Speech and Debate Clause as an institutional-design device that promises an alternative, and less costly, means of dampening executive aggrandizement. The Clause provides that "for any Speech and Debate in either House, [legislators] shall not be questioned in any other Place."\footnote{Its historical purpose and most important function is to prevent the executive from using its control of prosecutorial power to punish or, better yet, threaten to punish noncompliant legislators for their words and actions. Whereas legislative secrecy indirectly protects legislators from executive coercion by constricting the executive's information, the Speech and Debate Clause does so directly by constricting the executive's opportunities, thus allowing voter-principals to use the information themselves while denying their executive agents the ability to use it coercively. The Clause is an incomplete substitute for secrecy, because the executive may use carrots as well as sticks, bribes as well as threats. Yet bribes are more expensive than threats, since a credible threat that deters its targets from disobedience is costless if the threatener never has to incur the costs of actually punishing those targets. Moreover, the constitutional design independently restricts the executive's ability to bribe legislators along the}
most obvious margins. Consider the Emoluments Clause and the Incompatibility Clause, which together constrain, although they do not eliminate, the form of executive bribery most familiar to the framers: the offer of executive places or offices. The latter Clause bars legislators from simultaneous service in the executive branch, while the former limits the president's ability to appoint a legislator to a newly created or newly augmented executive post during the legislator's term of service.

The fear of executive influence is a special case of a more general problem: open voting allows legislators to give third parties credible—because verifiable—commitments to vote in particular ways in return for bribes or in response to threats. With secret voting, by contrast, legislators cannot strike credible vote-selling bargains with the executive or interest groups, so the value of legislators' promised votes to those groups declines. From the standpoint of voter-principals, the ability of legislators to commit credibly to sell votes to interest groups represents an agency cost insofar as the interest groups' goals differ from the voters'. To be sure, even with secret voting, interest groups may always pay for outcomes, even with open voting, so secret voting at least reduces the value of the legislator's vote by removing one dimension over which bargains can be struck. And paying legislators for legislative outcomes is senseless unless interest groups can identify the swing or marginal legislators, who alone control outcomes anyway. But the interest groups' ability to identify swing legislators is endogenous to the voting practice; with secret voting, any legislator may claim to be marginal in order to win an interest-group payment, but no such claims will be credible.

There is an illuminating comparison here to voting in general elections, which was usually open during the nineteenth century but is

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180 US Const Art I, § 6, cl 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time.").

181 Id ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").


183 Whether an open market in votes provides legislators themselves any benefit is a separate question. As Ferejohn points out, ex ante competition between candidates for legislative office may dissipate the rents that legislators could otherwise obtain from vote-selling. Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority at 140 n 6 (cited in note 8). This effect merely reallocates rents from legislators to their interest-group supporters; it does nothing to alleviate the agency loss to voters of legislative vote-selling, and indeed exacerbates it insofar as increasing expenditures on (rent-dissipating) competition between candidates is itself socially wasteful.
today almost invariably secret. The switch produced important debates between advocates of open voting, who thought that secrecy produced irresponsibility and corruption, and advocates of the secret ballot, who argued, among other things, that secrecy would diminish electoral corruption and extortion by rendering noncredible voters’ promises to sell votes to party bosses or local grandees for implicit payments, thereby reinforcing legal bans on explicit vote-selling. The response to this latter claim by advocates of open voting was and is that the sheer number of voters in general elections, and the infinitesimal chance of casting a decisive vote, ensure that the value of particular votes is too low to be worth buying; no voter can deliver a bloc of votes as such. Whatever its merit, the argument emphasizes the far greater value of legislative votes, and the far more serious worry about third-party corruption in legislatures; after all, there are far fewer votes to buy in a legislature, and each has a far more direct effect on policy outcomes than general-election votes do. Ignoring the loss of information to voters that legislative secrecy produces, we might even be surprised to find the pattern of secret voting in general elections and open voting in legislatures; the theory that produced the former militates even more strongly against the latter.

To be sure, the principal-agent problem is not the same in the two cases, if we see voters as agents for no one but themselves, whose only task is to express a preference to be aggregated socially. But then it takes a complex collective-action account to explain the ordinary legal ban on vote-selling. On a more elevated but also more straightforward account, we may see voters as agents for all citizens, and see elections as aggregating voters' judgments about the social good rather than their preferences. On this view, to allow voters to sell

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Consider some of the differences between a legislature and the populace: (1) Votes are cast by secret ballots in direct democracy, not so in legislatures. So, votes can hardly be bought and sold since there is no chance of adequate policing; (2) voters are not “repeat players” in the sense that they interact with one another on a statewide level such that their allegiances and behavior can be watched by others; (3) voters have no continuing oversight mechanisms to enable them to secure influence over interest groups, regulated industries or others; their only redress is an initiative that is considered at the next appropriate election.

their judgments to third parties inflicts the same type of agency cost on society that legislative vote-selling inflicts on the electorate. This view straightforwardly justifies both the ban on explicit vote-selling and the accompanying practice of the secret ballot.

The upshot of these points is that open voting has cross-cutting or ambiguous effects on voters’ control of their legislative agents. On one hand, a switch from secret to open voting reduces agency costs by reducing voters’ costs of monitoring their legislative agents. On the other hand, a switch from secret to open voting also creates an agency cost by creating an open market for legislative votes, allowing interest groups to divert legislators from voters’ goals. These two variables move in opposite directions, so the institutional-design question is how the two costs net out. The question is empirical, not a priori, so if our task is to evaluate Article I’s mandate for public roll call voting from the standpoint of normative institutional design, we should take comfort in the fact that open voting is ubiquitous in the representative assemblies of liberal democracies, often by constitutional prescription. If there is even a weak tendency for institutions, specifically constitutions, to evolve toward rules that minimize agency costs, we should infer from this strong uniformity that the loss of information to voters produced by secrecy outweighs the agency costs produced by an open market in legislative votes.

This is not to say, however, that we should uncritically approve of the roll call provisions in the Journal Clause. If the empirical regularity of open voting in legislatures suggests that the Clause does not go too far, we might believe, on precisely the same grounds, that the Clause does not go far enough. Although the constitutional text provides for roll call voting on “any question,” early interpretations settled that the rule extends only to final votes on enactments, not to voting in standing or ad hoc committees, not even the Committee of the Whole that the House uses to process amendments. Many state and foreign constitutions, however, mandate (or permit a small minority to require) roll call voting in committee as well as on floor passage.

Rev 567, 567 (1988) (“When citizens strive to identify the common good and vote in accordance with their perceptions of it, the vote of the Assembly of the People can be taken to be the most reliable means for ascertaining the common good.”).

189 See Walter J. Oleszek, House Voting Procedures: Forms and Requirements 2, CRS Report 98-228 GOV (updated Feb 20, 2001) (noting that under House Rule XVIII, in the Committee of the Whole, one can obtain a roll call vote only when the quorum is one hundred members of the committee and twenty-five of those members agree to the roll call vote).

190 See, for example, Ark Const Art IV, § 12 (“The yeas and nays on any question shall, at the desire of any five members, be entered on the journals.”); Fla Const Art III, § 4(c) (“Upon the request of five members present, the vote of each member voting on any question shall be entered on the journal.”); Ga Const Art III, § 5.6 (“In either house, when ordered by the presiding officer or at the desire of one-fifth of the members present or a lesser number if so provided by the rules of either house, a roll-call vote on any question shall be taken and shall be entered
Given the major nineteenth-century shift that made congressional committees, rather than the floor, the dominant locus of legislative dealmaking, we might wish ex post that the federal Constitution had indisputably provided the same thing. More recent Congresses have attained the same result by voluntary rulemaking, but instead of taking this to suggest that an updated interpretation of the Journal Clause is unnecessary, we might equally take it to suggest that an updated interpretation would not prove unduly disruptive. On both textual and functional grounds, then, the prevailing interpretation of Article I's roll call provisions is underinclusive; Congress should recognize a constitutional, not merely self-imposed, obligation to reinterpret the Journal Clause to cover voting in all legislative fora.

c) Mandatory roll call voting. A striking characteristic of many state constitutions is that they mandate roll calls—in contrast to roll calls that, as with the Journal Clause, must be triggered by a set fraction of legislators. State constitutions often require roll call voting for the final passage of any bill and for supermajority votes. Although by tradition the Senate always uses roll calls to vote on treaties, the Constitution expressly mandates roll calls in one case only: where the houses vote by two-thirds supermajority to override a presidential veto. "In all such Cases," the provision runs, "the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
House respectively. The difference between mandates and trigger provisions at first seems less than dramatic, at least where the fraction needed to trigger a roll call is as small as the Journal Clause's one-fifth, but the striking consequence of such provisions is that even unanimous consent cannot dispense with the need for a roll call, something that is very rare for constitutional transparency rules.

On the account offered here, it is straightforward to evaluate the marginal effect of such provisions, over and above the baseline roll call rules. The mandate for roll call voting increases the information available to citizens about legislators' behavior on the most consequential votes: those involving final passage and the extraordinary circumstances in which supermajority voting is required. Because the stakes are so high in such situations, it might be a plausible concern that even legislators who otherwise compete to offer transparency to constituents would develop mechanisms to overcome their collective-action problems and collude to prevent the roll call procedure from being triggered. Alternatively (although this point is compatible with the last one), it might be thought that citizen-principals should most suspect that their legislator-agents have fallen prey to deliberative pathologies, or are engaging in self-dealing, precisely when those agents are unanimous, or sufficiently near unanimous that even the small number of votes needed to trigger a roll call cannot be found. The ambiguity of unanimity is always with us. Unanimity might suggest, along the lines suggested by the Condorcet jury theorem, that there is a right answer and everyone has figured it out. It might also suggest that a legislative mob is stampeding toward a dubious policy, or that a legislative gang has passed out sufficient side payments to all participants.

The flip side of the coin, of course, is that the mandated transparency also enhances the monitoring of bargains between legislators and other actors. The mandated roll call on veto override votes probably enhances presidential power on net by permitting the president to strike marginally more enforceable bargains in anticipation of veto showdowns, and this might or might not be thought positive taken by itself. But the magnitude of this effect is probably rather small, and the
widespread and consistent use of roll call mandates by state constitu-
tions suggests that the background evolutionary or institutional pres-
sure to monitor supermajority votes and final-passage votes more
closely than other votes ought to be deemed more important than a
loss of legislative autonomy that is marginal in both the colloquial and
formal senses. By the same logic, however, the Journal Clause can be
criticized yet again as being too narrow: a mandated roll call vote on
all bills up for final passage would incorporate what is plausibly a
valuable state-level innovation.

6. The Origination Clause.

The Origination Clause provides that "[a]ll Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Sen-
ate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
Bills." The Clause presents a variety of important historical issues. We have seen
that the Convention was riven by struggles over the Clause, a question
intertwined with the all-important question of the basis of representa-
tion in the Senate. The principal rationale for origination restrictions
was typically that the upper house, where hereditary (as in England)
or elected on a geographic rather than proportional basis (as in the
Senate) was remote from or unrepresentative of "the people," a ra-
tionale that would disappear if the Senate were elected on a propor-
tional basis. Accordingly Pinckney initially proclaimed the question of
the Origination Clause "premature[:]
If the Senate [should] be formed
on the same proportional representation as it stands at present, they
[should] have equal power [that is, to originate money bills]; otherwise
if a different principle [should] be introduced." After much maneu-
vering, the Clause was inserted as compensation to large states in con-
sideration for their acquiescence in the state-based, rather than pro-
portional, composition of the Senate. I shall not explore this back-
ground in any more detail, however, as my project is not to trace the
provenance of the constitutional law of congressional procedure, but
to evaluate it prescriptively.

In the origination setting, the framers faced a superficially simple
menu of design choices: to have no origination restriction, to create a
category of bills subject to exclusive House origination with no Senate
amendments permitted (remitting to the Senate for an up-or-down
vote), or to make House origination exclusive while permitting Senate
amendments. The no-amendment regime roughly describes the tradi-

194 US Const Art I, § 7, cl 1.
196 For a full account, see J. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Con-
tional practice of Parliament, in which the Lords were not permitted to amend fiscal measures originating in the Commons, while the regime permitting amendments had been adopted in several state constitutions. The framers were divided on the question of whether the various possible versions of the Origination Clause would have any effects at all, and if so what those effects would be. I shall suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Clause indeed has effects, and that they are largely beneficial from Congress's point of view—so much so that exclusive privileges of origination tend to evolve endogenously. The best criticism of the Clause, then, is not that it is ineffectual or a nullity, but instead that (putting aside the need to make the proposed Constitution acceptable to the ratifiers) it was unnecessary for the Convention to constitutionalize the Clause; a similar norm might well have evolved in its absence.

More than a few framers argued that the third option, an origination clause with Senate amendment power, would have no effect at all. James Wilson put the argument metaphorically:

With regard to the pursestrings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H[ouse] of Rep[resentatives] the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which last.

The proposal that Wilson was addressing would have required House origination of both revenue bills and appropriations bills, while the enacted version of the Clause limits the restriction to revenue bills alone, so the metaphor of pursestrings may be slightly misleading; I shall take up the question of appropriations bills below. Nonetheless Wilson's basic point is an important one. The Senate can, and not infrequently has, simply stricken out the whole substance of a bill enacted by the House and inserted its own proposal (as an "amendment"). The resulting bill, if approved by the subsequent conference committee, will have nominally originated in the House, but will in substance have originated in the Senate; indeed some major tax-

197 See, for example, Mass Const of 1780 Ch I, § 3, Art VII ("All money bills shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills."); Del Const of 1776 Art VI ("All money-bills for the support of government shall originate in the house of assembly, and may be altered, amended, or rejected by the legislative council.").


199 Senators may be the true authors of revenue bills even if the Senate does not substitute its "amendment" for the House's bill. This point is emphasized by the important institutional detail that most current tax legislation is reviewed by the expert staff of the standing Joint Committee on Taxation before funneling through House Ways and Means or the Senate Finance Committee. See Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Joint Committee on Taxation, online at http://www.house.gov/jct/rolehist.htm (visited Feb 20, 2004) (explaining the Com-
reform legislation, such as the reworking of the tax code in 1986, has just this provenance. So either origination regime—the one barring amendments and the one permitting them—in effect allows the Senate to make counteroffers, and it is unclear in what respect the House’s exclusive power to originate revenue bills makes any difference.

But this argument is overblown. Even where counteroffers are permitted, in the form of de jure or de facto amendments, standard bargaining models suggest that the first-mover may obtain a disproportionate share of the gains. The intuition is that the first player will benefit from his ability to make an initial offer that gives the second player only an iota more than the second player would obtain at the end of the sequence of offers and responses; the second player can do no better than to accept. To be sure, this advantage is of uncertain magnitude, and much depends on the precise specifications of the model. The more quickly the value of obtaining agreement later (rather than now) declines, the greater the first-mover advantage is, but the relative impatience of the players—the rate at which they discount future gains—is also a critical factor, and of course either house may anticipate future or unrelated negotiations and thus decide to invest in a reputation for obstinacy. Informally, however, softer considerations support the idea that the House gains something from its origination privilege. Even where the Senate enjoys amendment power, the House might enjoy an intangible but real form of first-mover advantage from its ability to set the policy agenda in ways that structure both legislative and political debate. The question is empiri-

mittee’s role in the tax legislative process).


201 An unexplored issue, tangential to the discussion in text, is the effect of the Clause on tax-related treaties. The Clause might bar the president and Senate from creating a self-executing agreement with foreign nations to change revenue rules, as the Clause requires the House to initiate the statutory changes needed to bring the treaty into force. Thanks to Julie Roin for this point.


204 If the players have equal discount rates, the first-mover retains an advantage. If the second-mover discounts less steeply than the first, however, that advantage may dissipate or even be reversed, depending on the players’ specified traits. See Dixit and Skeath, Games at 537–38 (cited in note 203) (discussing an alternating-offers model with impatience as a factor influencing decisions).
cal, and the literature suggests that there is indeed an appreciable first-mover advantage in the legislative game.  

A related argument suggests, more broadly but equally wrongly, that the Origination Clause is a nullity because any origination restriction can be circumvented through intercameral contracting, whether or not the Clause permits Senate amendments. At the Convention, Madison advanced the following argument:

Experience proved that it ["the exclusive privilege of originating money bills"] had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same States in the lower branch who would originate it. The restriction as to amendment was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to members in the other house.

In modern terms, the two houses may contract around the Origination Clause at low cost, in part because their repeat-play relationship has produced elaborate institutions for intercameral bargaining (such as conference committees and the Joint Committee on Taxation).

But this Coasean analysis ignores the distributive effect of the initial specification of constitutional entitlements. Even if the same revenue levels are produced with or without the Clause, the House's ability to demand a payment for the renunciation of its origination privilege with respect to particular bills will skew the distribution of political benefits between House and Senate in the House's favor, relative to a world with no Origination Clause at all. The flawed assumption


206 Farrand, ed, 1 Federal Convention at 527 (cited in note 30).


208 The point here is not that the outcomes in either case would be socially efficient. As one possible source of inefficiency among many, note that the Origination Clause will, at the margin, increase the inefficiency of redistributive measures by Congress. Under certain assumptions, it can be shown that redistribution is more efficiently handled through taxation than through regulation. Compare Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 667 (1994) (arguing that income redistribution "through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and typically is less efficient"), with Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J Legal Stud 797 (2000) (noting that even in the presence of an optimally redistributive tax, legal rules should nevertheless deviate from efficiency to redistribute income where policy makers place any weight on equity, so long as all individuals are not perfectly identical in their interaction with the legal system). But if there is a cost
underlying the argument must be that there is in effect no constitutionally specified entitlement to begin with, because there is no external mechanism for enforcing the Clause. Under the Supreme Court's current doctrine, this assumption is simply false; the Origination Clause is fully justiciable.\textsuperscript{209}

Indeed, the best analysis of the Origination Clause's behavioral effects flips all of these arguments on their head. Far from being ineffectual, origination restrictions of greater or lesser formality may be predictable or inevitable, in the sense that they tend to evolve endogenously as norms governing the behavior of bicameral legislatures. Here the basic intuition is that a lower chamber with more members, such as the House, may obtain policy-relevant information at lower cost than an upper chamber with fewer members, such as the Senate. Over time, the two houses may attain an equilibrium arrangement in which the lower house specializes in information in return for the distributive advantage of having the first move. The House receives a larger share of the larger pie, but the Senate too benefits on net from the House's informational expertise.\textsuperscript{210}

to the Senate in making a side payment to the House (to buy off its constitutional objection) whenever the Senate wishes to redistribute by originating a revenue bill, then the Senate will shift marginally from redistributive revenue projects to less efficient regulatory projects, and the total output of Congress will contain more regulation and less taxation (holding constant the overall redistribution) than in a regime with the revenue-origination rule.

\textsuperscript{209} The Supreme Court has never invalidated a statute on Origination Clause grounds. But the Court has consistently said that the Clause is justiciable, and it has several times considered Origination Clause challenges on the merits, in each case finding that the statute under review was not a "Bill[] for raising revenue" within the meaning of the Clause. See, for example, United States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 387-88 (1990) (holding that a bill requiring "courts to impose a monetary 'special assessment' on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor" did not "violate the Origination Clause because it is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue'"); Twin City Bank v Nebeker, 167 US 196, 202 (1897) (holding that a statute providing for a national currency to be issued by designated banks, secured by government bonds and financed by a tax on the notes, "is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatitives"). On one account, the Court has strained to deny that the challenged statutes were revenue measures, presumably in order to avoid the difficult questions of judicial capacity that would be posed by any effort to determine whether a bill originated in the House or Senate. See Hubbard v Lowe, 226 F 135, 140-41 (SD NY 1915) (invalidating a federal statute under the Origination Clause, and opining that "[the Supreme Court] sometimes required a good deal of mental strain to demonstrate that some piece of legislation originating in a Senate was not a bill for raising revenue"). Part of the historical picture, however, was the possibility that the enrolled-bill rule of Marshall Field & Co v Clark, 143 US 649 (1892), might bar the Court from looking behind Congress's formal certification of a bill's house of origin. Id at 672 (holding that official signatures on the enrolled bill are sufficient evidence that a bill passed Congress, even "if the journal of either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in which it was signed"). The Court clearly limited the enrolled-bill rule in Munoz-Flores, saying that the rule does not apply when "a constitutional provision is implicated." 495 US at 391-92 n 4.

\textsuperscript{210} See Rogers, 42 Am J Pol Sci at 1025 (cited in note 8) ("Under specified conditions, bicameral chambers sequence themselves to take advantage of one chamber's informational expertise.").
Obviously many other variables and forces may vitiate or drown out this effect; it is at its strongest when the two houses are dominated by the same political party (and thus have similar preferences). But the quasi-constitutional traditions surrounding appropriations legislation confirm the general model. The Convention, as we have seen, rejected a proposal to include appropriations measures in the Origination Clause. Nonetheless, a longstanding norm has evolved within Congress to the effect that the House has the exclusive prerogative of initiating appropriations measures. Much about this norm is contested, and its scope and weight are uncertain; the Senate takes it to be a subconstitutional “custom” rather than a tradition of constitutional stature; the House insists that the “immemorial practice” has been constitutionalized by prescription. But the norm’s perseverance in the face of uncertainty about its precise constitutional status testifies to the persistent benefits of cameral specialization.

The upshot, then, is that origination privilege may often evolve endogenously. While this point undermines the claim that origination restrictions are ineffectual, it does suggest a different criticism of the Clause: it may have been unnecessary to constitutionalize the revenue-origination privilege in the first place. The large states, such as North Carolina, that demanded the Origination Clause as compensation for accepting an equal basis of representation in the Senate might have been better off with a different form of side-payment. To be sure, in hindsight, the social harm of the Convention’s normatively questionable decision to constitutionalize the Clause has been quite small. In this sense the Clause’s critics are pointed in the right direction, albeit for the wrong reasons.

7. Cameral autonomy and congressional rulemaking.

May Congress enact an ordinary statute, presented to the president, that prescribes binding internal rules for the houses of Congress acting separately? An internal rule means, as always, a rule that could otherwise have been enacted by the houses alone under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. A notable and little-explored feature of the public-law landscape is the prevalence of statutory law that bears on internal congressional procedure. Consider the Alaska Natural Gas

211 See note 198 and accompanying text.
213 See Medina, 23 Tulsa L.J at 186 n 126 (cited in note 196).
214 See, for example, Farrand, ed., 2 Federal Convention at 233 (cited in note 19) (reporting Williamson’s remonstrance that North Carolina “had agreed to an equality in the Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to the other House”).
Transportation Act,\textsuperscript{211} which barred consideration by either house of Congress of certain resolutions concerning energy policy, or the recent Congressional Review Act,\textsuperscript{216} which establishes special internal legislative procedures for disapproving proposed agency regulations.

Critically, however, Congress often inserts a proviso that subjects the statute to override by a subsequent internal legislative rule of either house in the ordinary course.\textsuperscript{217} These qualifiers create a positive puzzle. Rule-prescribing statutes that contain such provisos are essentially hortatory or directory; they have no legal effect on the rule-prescribing power of the houses. Why then does Congress enact the underlying statute in the first place? An obvious possibility is that the statute serves a coordinating function between the two houses, announcing focal points (such as numerical deadlines) so that legislators from one house may shape their behavior in conjunction with legislators from the other. Yet the aim of coordination could be equally well served by a concurrent resolution, not presented to the president. Why use the ordinary statutory form, exposing internal congressional business to executive involvement and a potential veto?

A more plausible conjecture is simply that the procedural alternative to such statutes is unappealing.\textsuperscript{218} Instead of enacting a statute that contains both substantive policy directives and (hortatory) internal rules, Congress might split the substantive questions from the procedural ones, enacting the former in the ordinary manner and enacting the latter through each house's separate rule-making process. Such a course of action, however, requires at least two votes (in each house) rather than one, and thus creates more opportunities for strategic behavior. By bundling substantive with procedural provisions, the rule-prescribing statute achieves the effect of an omnibus bill, allowing enforceable deals to be struck where the alternative of sequential voting would permit defection in later votes. Moreover, in both the House and Senate, mid-session rule changes are difficult to accomplish; by tacking what is in effect a rule change to a statute already under consideration, each house conserves agenda time and minimizes decision costs.

\textsuperscript{211} 15 USC § 719f(d) (2000). See also Metzenbaum v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 675 F2d 1282, 1284 (DC Cir 1982) (holding that alleged violations of the Act's procedural requirements are nonjusticiable).
\textsuperscript{216} 5 USC § 801 et seq (2000).
\textsuperscript{217} See, for example, 5 USC § 802(g)(2):

This section is enacted by Congress . . . with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

\textsuperscript{218} Thanks to Elizabeth Garrett for this conjecture.
As to the normative questions: the first task is to set the constitutional baseline. Are genuine rule-prescribing statutes, lacking the typical proviso, valid or invalid under the current Constitution rightly understood? An example is the Electoral Count Act, which "puts strict time limits on the electoral count: when the two Houses separate to debate an objection to an electoral vote, each Member of each House may only speak once on the objection for a maximum of five minutes, and total debate in each House is limited to two hours." Here, in contrast to statutes whose prescription of internal rules is merely hortatory, the positive value of the enactment is easy to understand.

First, the power to make binding rules in advance of particular controversies allows legislators to proceed as though behind a veil of ignorance, or uncertainty, and thus helps to ensure the impartiality of the resulting rules. The procedures mandated by the Electoral Count Act fit this picture nicely; it is much better to settle the management of contested presidential elections before competing parties and factions know who the candidates will be. In any event, where binding statutory prescription of internal rules is impossible, rules are always subject to ex post adjustment when the substantive valence of the rules has become apparent.

A second positive value of rule-prescribing statutes is that they entrench procedural rules as against future houses, which may be of potential value to both the enacting Congress and later Congresses. Entrenchment permits credible commitments to be made, both among legislators and between legislators and outside actors, such as the executive, constituents, or foreign nations, in situations where a non-entrenched rule would be exposed to subsequent opportunistic change by one party to the deal. By making commitment possible, entrenchment allows all concerned to strike a range of bargains that are otherwise unattainable. On this view, the constitutional authority for the rule-prescribing component of these statutes is, simply, whatever substantive legislative power authorizes the statute, in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause.

One constitutional objection to such statutes is the hoary anti-entrenchment maxim that one legislature may not bind its succes-


220 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 Stan L Rev 155, 160 n 31 (1995) ("[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to carry into execution its own powers, including the rule-making powers of both Houses[,] any separate authority regarding legislative officers seems unnecessary."). See also Michel v Anderson, 14 F3d 623, 628 (DC Cir 1994) (suggesting, in dictum, that a procedural rule created by statute would "trump any authority of the House to change its rules unilaterally to grant that power").
That objection is, however, untenable, for reasons explained at length elsewhere. But there are other, more formidable objections as well. First, it is plausibly the best reading of the Rules of Proceedings Clause that the power of each house to “determine the rules of its proceedings” is exclusive as well as permissive; the Clause, that is, not only authorizes internal one-house rulemaking, but also bars internal rulemaking through other instruments. (Note that this objection is entirely distinct from the anti-entrenchment objection; the latter concerns the legal authority of houses over time, while the former addresses the question of which legal instruments—rulemaking alone, or both rules and statutes—a given house can use to make internal rules.) On this view, the claim that the “Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to carry into execution its own powers, including the rule-making powers of both Houses” is mistaken; the rule-making powers of the houses taken separately are not powers of Congress as a joint body, and thus cannot be exercised by statute. A second important objection sounds in the separation of powers; quite apart from the Rules of Proceedings Clause, it might be said that presidential involvement in Congress’s internal rulemaking poses an unacceptable risk of executive invasion of core legislative functions. Accordingly, Congress might be able to enact rules by concurrent resolution, but not by statutes subject to presentment.

If statutes that prescribe binding internal rules are unconstitutional, is this good constitutional design? Probably not. In these settings the Constitution deprives Congress of its first-choice instrument, thereby imposing discernible costs for uncertain benefits. The costs arising from the inability of earlier Congresses to commit to future rules behind the veil of ignorance are the forgone bargains made possible by entrenching instruments that codify binding commitments. The benefits of prohibiting Congress from seizing such opportunities are obscure. The bare insistence on cameral autonomy—that each house simply must make rules to govern itself and itself alone—just restates the conclusion, rather than explaining it. After all, an instrument that prescribes binding internal rules is simply another policy tool at Congress’s disposal. It is hard to see, in general, why such an instrument should be thought any more dangerous, or more susceptible

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221 See, for example, United States v Winstar Corp, 518 US 839, 872 (1996) (stating that “one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors”).


223 Calabresi, 48 Stan L. Rev at 160 n 31 (cited in note 220).

224 The Kansas Constitution creates such a mechanism; it allows the two legislative houses to adopt joint rules on certain matters, and to provide the “manner” in which those rules may be changed in the future. Kan Const Art II, § 8.
to abuse, than a myriad of other instruments that Congress uses routinely, such as the many varieties of taxation, spending, and delegation. The structural problem of presidential encroachment, if it is one, might be obviated by providing a constitutional mechanism for binding concurrent resolutions in areas also subject to the Rules of Proceedings Clause. All in all, it is a flaw in the current Constitution that bars Congress as an institution from prescribing internal rules binding on the houses taken separately.


Finally, I shall briefly analyze some legislative-procedure rules that might, with the benefit of two centuries of hindsight, be described as "missing" from the federal Constitution. These are provisions that have, since the founding era, come into wide use in other jurisdictions' constitutions. I shall make no attempt at a comprehensive survey of the terrain, nor shall I discuss important state constitutional innovations that are substantive rather than procedural in my sense. Examples in this last category are single-subject rules, which typically prohibit enactments that contain unrelated provisions, and prohibitions on special or local bills, which bar enactments for the benefit of geographically or socially confined interests, as opposed to the public interest. In both cases, the prohibitions look to the enactment's content and substance, ruling out certain legislative outcomes, rather than addressing the mode of the bill's enactment; in this respect they are closely analogous to the federal Equal Protection Clause. The examples I shall discuss here, by contrast, are genuinely procedural, in that a bill of given content may either satisfy or violate them in light of the history of its passage through the legislature.

a) Three-reading rules. A striking feature of the legislative procedure mandated by state and foreign constitutions is the prevalence of "three-reading rules." Such rules typically require that no bill shall "become a law unless the same shall have been read on three several days in each house previous to the final vote thereon." In most jurisdictions, however, the three-reading requirement may be

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225 See, for example, Ill Const Art IV, § 8(d) ("Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.").

226 See, for example, NY Const Art III, § 17 ("The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill.").

227 Idaho Const Art III, § 15. For other state constitutional provisions, see Ala Const Art IV, § 63 ("Every bill shall be read on three different days in each house."); Colo Const Art V, § 22 ("Every bill shall be read by title when introduced, and at length on two different days in each house."); Ind Const Art IV, § 18 ("Every bill shall be read, by title, on three several days in each House."); SC Const Art III, § 18 ("No Bill or Joint Resolution shall have the force of law until it shall have been read three times and on three several days in each house."). For foreign constitutional provisions, see France Const Art 45 (requiring two readings of the bill).
overridden by a supermajority vote, at least in cases of "urgency."

In the national Congress, each house early adopted three-reading rules; although the Senate rules still in effect require three readings on three different days, the House rules currently allow a bill to be read three times and enacted all in a single legislative day.

Bentham's argument for three-reading rules, which is the standard argument, illustrates their justifications and their characteristic problems. Bentham argues, chiefly, that the three-reading rule operates as a self-binding mechanism that allows the legislature to guard against the consequences of its own future passions, myopia, or herd behavior. By requiring that bills be read and debated on successive days, the legislature may anticipate and forestall future occasions on which it will be seized by deliberative pathologies. "The more susceptible a people are of excitement and being led astray, so much the more ought they to place themselves under the protection of forms which impose the necessity of reflection, and prevent surprises."

Bentham was aware of the most obvious counterargument: delay, reflection, and deliberation amount to inaction, and inaction produces opportunity costs. By preventing legislators from acting in a passionate frenzy, the three-reading requirement minimizes the risk of false positives—occasions when the legislature should not have acted but did. Yet the requirement also increases the risk of false negatives—occasions when the legislature should have acted expeditiously, yet, stewing in its own deliberative maturity, failed to do so. Bentham responds as follows:

It may be objected, that this plan [the three-reading requirement] occasions great delays, and that circumstances may imperiously require that a law should be passed with rapidity. To this it may be replied, that in cases of necessity the Houses of Parliament

\[228\] See, for example, Alaska Const Art II, § 14 ("[A]ny bill may be advanced from second to third reading on the same day by concurrence of three-fourths of the house considering it."); Colo Const Art V, § 22 ("[A]ny reading at length may be dispensed with upon unanimous consent of the members present."); Fla Const Art III, § 7 (requiring three readings unless the "rule is waived by two-thirds vote"); Md Const Art III, § 27(a) (requiring three readings unless "two-thirds of the members elected to the House where such bill is pending determine by yeas and nays"); Or Const Art IV, § 19 (requiring three readings "unless in case of emergency two-thirds of the house where such bill may be pending shall, by a vote of yeas and nays, deem it expedient to dispense with this rule"); W Va Const Art VI, § 29 (requiring three readings, "unless in case of urgency, by a vote of four fifths of the members present, taken by yeas and nays on each bill, this rule be dispensed with").

\[229\] House Rule XVI, cl 8 (omitting from the three-reading rule the requirement that each reading occur on a different day); Senate Rule XIV, cl 2 (specifying that the readings "shall be on three different legislative days").

\[230\] Bentham, Political Tactics ch XI, § 3 at 131 (cited in note 11).
can suspend their usual orders, and that a bill may be made to pass through all its stages in both houses in one day. But this view collapses under its own weight unless the three-reading rule is entrenched, perhaps by constitutionalization. Without entrenchment, the very same decisionmaking pathologies that produce hasty and ill-considered substantive legislation will produce hasty and ill-considered suspensions of the three-reading rule. Bentham has overlooked that nonentrenched procedural rules are endogenous products of the legislature, and are thus subject to the control of the same majorities that Bentham seeks to restrain.

So the key design problem here is that three-reading rules must be constitutionalized or otherwise entrenched to achieve their intended effects. The necessary entrenchment of three-reading requirements might be constitutional or cameral, and, if it is cameral, either formal or informal. In many states, as we have seen, three-reading requirements are formally entrenched in the constitution. In the Senate the requirement is cameral only, but it is also formal. A motion to change or suspend the Senate rules, including the three-reading rule, is subject to filibuster and thus requires sixty votes to attain cloture; the cloture rule is itself formally entrenched. (Here the Senate is using a supermajority rule to protect its ordinary processes; I shall return to the relationship between three-reading rules and supermajority rules momentarily.) In the House, however, the barriers are more porous. We have seen that the current House rules allow all required readings to occur in a single day, and even the requirement of three readings can itself be waived. Although there is an appreciable de facto cost to changing the House rules after their biannual re-adoption at the beginning of a new Congress, no formal barrier prevents intrasession rule changes or, more commonly, suspensions by simple majority. We

\[231\] Id at 130–31.

\[232\] In a different passage, however, Bentham makes the very argument I have given in the text:

It is true, that in a single assembly, rules may be established which prescribe multiple examinations . . . . But a single assembly may have the best rules, and disregard them when it pleases. Experience proves that it is easy to lay them aside; and urgency of circumstances always furnishes a ready pretext, and a popular pretext, for doing what the dominant party desires.

Id ch I, § 5 at 26. Bentham’s institutional solution is bicameralism: “If there are two assemblies, the forms will be observed: because if one violates them, it affords a legitimate reason to the other for rejection of everything presented to it after such suspicious innovation.” Id.

\[233\] See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1694–95 (cited in note 140) (describing the entrenchment of the cloture rule through the interrelation of Senate Rules V and XXII).

\[234\] Enactment of a bill using the suspension procedures of House Rule XV does require a two-thirds vote. See House Rule XV, § 1(a) (“A rule may not be suspended except by a vote of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present.”). However, “[i]f a suspension motion fails to receive the required two-thirds vote, the House can consider the bill in question

might, then, plausibly see it as a defect in the federal constitutional law of legislative procedure that it failed to codify and entrench the three-reading requirement, a device that was well known to the framers from parliamentary practice, and that they in fact adopted, in slightly diluted form, to govern the business of the Convention itself. 235

The entrenchment of three-reading requirements, however, reanimates the concern that deliberative delay will produce costly inaction. Most states have sensibly attempted to maximize the net benefits of three-reading requirements through design devices that sort occasions for swift action, on the one hand, from legislative frenzies, on the other. A common technique is to use supermajority requirements, sometimes combined with a substantive trigger that permits the supermajority to override only in case of “emergency” or “urgency.” It is tempting to condemn such provisions on the ground that supermajority rules allow legislative minorities to hold out for side payments, and that the existence of an emergency will exacerbate this concern, forcing the legislative majority to acquiesce in the minority’s extortionate demands. Yet a holdout threat will not be credible under such circumstances. 236 If a genuine emergency is at hand so that the result of inaction will be worse for all concerned—including the minority—than will passage of the necessary legislation without side payments, then the minority can do no better than to acquiesce. The majority, knowing this, will ignore the minority’s demands entirely, and the necessary supermajority will support the bill even without payments.

b) Temporal restrictions on proposed legislation. In the national House and Senate, bills may be introduced at any time during the legislative session; the Constitution contains no restrictions on this practice. Many state constitutions, by contrast, restrict the period during which bills may be introduced, typically by counting either forward or backward from the beginning or end of the session. The Washington Constitution, for example, prescribes that “[n]o bill shall be considered in either house unless the time of its introduction shall have again and under procedures that require only a simple majority vote to pass it.” Stanley Bach, Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features 2, CRS Report 98-314 GOV (updated Jan 25, 2001).

235 Farrand, ed, 1 Federal Convention at 9 (cited in note 30):

A Writing, which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once throughout, for information, then by paragraphs, to be debated, and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards the question shall be put upon the whole, amended, or approved in [its] original form, as the case shall be.

See also Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business in the Framing of Statutes 204–11 (Riverside 1922) (detailing the evolution of multiple-reading requirements).

236 See Elster, 2 U Pa J Const L at 383–84 (cited in note 14) (making a similar point about the Origination Clause).
been at least ten days before the final adjournment of the legislature,"\textsuperscript{237} subject to a supermajority override. The Missouri Constitution bars nonappropriations bills from being introduced "after the sixtieth legislative day,"\textsuperscript{238} subject to an override by simple majority. In some states the class of legislation subject to timing requirements is more narrow—appropriations bills, or bills relating to official salaries—but most states that have timing restrictions parallel Washington by permitting a supermajority override.

Here, as with the case of three-reading requirements, I shall suggest that the absence of a similar provision from the federal Constitution is cause for regret. The point of such provisions is straightforward. Timing limitations, whether of the forward or backward variety, protect the end of the legislative session from overcrowding, and with good reason. First, the multiple delays built into the structure of legislative procedure routinely create a press of business at the end of the legislative session. By creating a period during which no new business can be added while old business is being processed, timing limitations help to minimize the costs of legislatures' complex internal structure. Second, timing limitations reduce the likelihood that ill-considered or technically maladroit measures will pass during the end-of-session flurry, measures that might not obtain majority approval in calmer moments. Finally, in many states timing provisions were enacted as progressive reforms in response to episodes in which legislatures finished the session with a flurry of quasi-corrupt (or simply corrupt) spending legislation or special bills. The massive volume of business that always marks the end of legislative sessions increases the costs to other legislators and outside groups of monitoring and blocking such legislation; timing limitations create a buffer period in which public outrage may be mobilized, permitting the most inefficient legislation to be repealed or reversed in the current session. Without timing limitations, legislators may hope to weather the political storm after the legislature has recessed and public attention has receded.

To be sure, some of the relevant problems might be dampened by more-precisely targeted provisions, such as constitutional restrictions on special-interest legislation. But the sponginess of such provisions, resulting from the notorious difficulty of identifying special-interest measures or even understanding the "public interest" at a conceptual level, means that a quantified rule such as a timing restriction is easier to enforce, and thus a valuable prophylactic device.

Another stock objection to timing restrictions is the possibility of circumvention. In most states the relevant provisions are held not to

\textsuperscript{237} Wash Const Art II, § 36.
\textsuperscript{238} Mo Const Art III, § 25.
bar amendments offered outside the permissible window for introduction, so that legislatures have sometimes introduced "skeleton" bills within the window and then tacked on sweeping amendments. But this, like the gambit of thoroughgoing amendments that the Senate occasionally uses to circumvent the Origination Clause, presents an ordinary form-and-substance problem. Officials charged with enforcing constitutional rules must constantly resolve similar questions; the threat of circumvention is rarely thought such an insuperable problem as to condemn the underlying rules entirely. Note that this point does not assume that judges are the ones enforcing the provision, so the point holds even in jurisdictions where the enrolled-bill rule prevents judges from examining the timing of the bill's introduction to check compliance with the restriction. Legislatures vigorously enforce many such restrictions, as we also saw in the Origination Clause setting. In general, it is a mistake to assume that constitutional prohibitions are somehow unreal unless backed up by judicial review, although it is a mistake that routinely seduces court-centered constitutional lawyers.

In both the case of three-reading requirements and the case of timing restrictions, then, other jurisdictions have pioneered innovations in the constitutional law of congressional procedure that the federal Constitution would do well to imitate. That it has not done so is a special case of a more general problem: the higher cost of federal constitutional amendment works for both good and, in this case, ill, by creating a status quo bias that blocks both misguided experiments and valuable innovations. But it is not far-fetched to imagine that a political coalition might arise to support procedural requirements whose substantive political valence is, as in these cases, uncertain ex ante; many constitutional amendments, especially in the modern era, have just this procedural and structural character. So it is a plausible recommendation, or aspiration, that the constitutional law of congressional procedure should be supplemented in these respects.

CONCLUSION

In the framers' view, and in ours, the constitutional law of congressional procedure should accomplish a range of laudable aims. The relevant rules should promote well-informed and cognitively undistorted legislative deliberation, ameliorate the principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation, and make technically efficient use of the legislature's resources, especially its compressed

239 See, for example, US Const Amend XX (addressing congressional terms and presidential succession); US Const Amend XXII (addressing presidential term limits); US Const Amend XXV (addressing presidential succession); US Const Amend XXVII (addressing legislative compensation).
agenda space. Unfortunately these aims cannot all be simultaneously attained in full, as the framers were well aware. The framers’ eventual choices aimed to optimize the inevitable tradeoffs between and among these goods, alleviating legislative pathologies without cramping the self-governance of future legislative institutions. Yet there is no guarantee that their instrumental choices were successful ones, and I have refused to take it on faith that they were. Centuries of subsequent experimentation and innovation in Congress and in state and foreign constitutions provide rich resources with which to evaluate and improve the Constitution’s fundamental provisions that structure the legislative process.