BOOK REVIEWS

THE PRAGMATIC PACIFIST
WITH REFLECTIONS ON SOME RECENT BOOKS*

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I

The sermon on the Mount expresses the appeal of an ideal good will and pacifism. So far as it may refer to simple ideas of God and the soul, corrections derived from Greek thought were wisely made by the great thirteenth century religious philosophers, Mohammedan, Jewish, and Christian. The Sermon's communism and anarchism were similarly supplemented and almost superseded by Greek ideas developed and systematized by medieval thinkers. The child-like dream of affection may unfit the dreamer for the conditions of human life. It has been treated with a caution which for some purposes is useful.

Yet the dream appears to have its biological human uses today. A Catholic symposium, Morality and Modern Warfare, is particularly distinguished by the contributions of Professor Zahn and Father Murray. Professor Zahn, the most thoughtful of contemporary religious pacifists, follows the Catholic tradition in appealing explicitly less to affection than to reason. Sanity is imperilled by the animal hatreds of war, and particularly threatened by current threats of thermonuclear war.

Paradoxically, questionable features of Professor Zahn's statement strengthen it. Intraspecies lethal violence is limited to special situations among other animals, while it is universal except for special situations among us. It is not insane in any familiar sense with us, since it is so nearly universal. Yet the effects of the war now threatened will be like the effects of insanity, disease, and consequent destruction.


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The biological sources of hostile destruction are not understood. Predatory animals, among whom we belong, destroy their prey; but they apparently "love" it, as we "love" a good roast, and they are little if at all more prone than herbivorous animals to lethal intraspecies violence. Sexual aggression, always observably different from fighting, is associated with hormones which commonly intensify other forms of aggression. Conflict over sexual possession, a little like our jealousy, is the most often observed source of intraspecies lethal violence among other animals. There are conflicts over food and territory. Acquiescence in a hierarchy determined with reference to manifest power is the usual animal adjustment, an adjustment which we often take pride in not making.

The circumstances of the long childhood peculiar to the human young doubtless contribute to our hostilities, if they do not account for them. Pleasure and love are accompanied by frustrations, dominations, jealousies, and fears, interacting with one another, and with the guilts and hostilities to which they contribute. Identifications and projections occur throughout life. They take peculiar forms, expressed in the Abraham, Christian, and Wotan legends, among the middle aged and elders, who—as in many uncivilized tribes—determine policy in our contemporary civilizations.¹

The truth in Professor Zahn's approach to conflict is apparent as we explore its problems. It is better, as Socrates said, to die sane than to live an insane and unjust life. It is better, as Professor Zahn says, to live and contribute to life, so long as personal sanity can be maintained, though in the catacombs, than to participate in modern war, particularly thermonuclear war.

The argument explicitly depends on Greek observation and teaching. Nevertheless it is made by a Christian, and it seems to be influenced in its tone by the life-giving affection which is the theme of the Sermon on the Mount.

Professor Zahn's pacifism does not appeal to fear, but to health. While we feel the fear of thermonuclear war, we recognize fear as an emotion which can dehumanize us. It may also have contradictory and perhaps unexpected social effects. Fear or panic may for example intensify hostilities and contribute to the violence which the pacifist wishes to avoid.

Fear may distort our own judgment. If we were threatened today with a

¹ Further information about the author's general position on the subject of these comments may be found in some of his earlier discussions, for example Aggression: A Study of Values and Law, 57 ETHICS (1947 Supp.); The Management and Control of Aggression, in a Symposium, SOCIAL WORK AS HUMAN RELATIONS 250 (1949); Biology and Law, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (1949); Who Killed the Peace? with Walter Johnson and Philip E. Mosely, 1950 University of Chicago Round Table, March 12, 1950; and The Limits of Law, 61 ETHICS 270 (1951). Cf. his Was Justice Done? THE ROSENBERG-SOBEll CASE ch. 17 (1956). And see two of his book reviews, 64 ETHICS 325 (1954) (further questions of anthropology); 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (1951) (further questions of history). The evolution of the pacifist opinion presented here, as one example of contemporary reflection, is indicated in the author's Freedom—The Role of the Bar, 17 LAW. GUILD REV. 1, 3-4 (1957); Book Review, 15 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 44 (1959); Agreement and Disarmament, 16 id. 179 (1960); Graduated Unilateral Disarmament (a comment), 17 id. 113 (1961).
world which would be forever made up entirely of Nazi concentration camps, I for one would accept the view that we are threatened with the end of human value in insanity and injustice. Following Socrates, I would hope to choose the high risk, or the certainty, of human annihilation in an attempt to deal with a threat to all human quality. Here I would hope that we could discount fear in dealing with an ultimate threat.

Karl Jaspers thinks the present threat is of this character. He urges, in *The Future of Mankind*, that it justifies risking what he considers a probability of thermonuclear war even if that means human annihilation. My own view is that a little reflection will show the difference between the threat supposed and the actual one. The difference seems to me sufficiently important to furnish an answer to Dr. Jaspers' views.

Moreover, if we think Dr. Jaspers exaggerates to a critical extent, we may be warranted in considering possible explanations, which will not of course answer his case, but which may help us to discount it. He belongs in the Calvinist tradition, where a harsh if not cruel God is to be worshipped in spite of, or even because of, his part in the predestination of sinners. He belongs also in the tradition of religious Existentialism, where the myth of Abraham and Isaac serves to symbolize our devotion to a God however destructive he may be.

The Catholic tradition is of course not wholly free from similar difficulties. Professor Zahn has, however, not only an advantage over other pacifists today in his lack of preoccupation with fear. He has also a critical advantage over his principal philosophical opponent, in his loyalty to a tradition which includes an Hellenic love of life and an ultimate distaste for destruction.

Professor Zahn of course faces the threat of Soviet rule and of course he does not welcome it. Christians, he says, would return to a life like that associated with the catacombs, when Rome ruled their part of the world. The comparison is far from perfect, if only because the Roman rule was old and somewhat relaxed. It is however a closer comparison than that urged by some pacifists. Some for example propose that we emulate Gandhi in non-violent resistance to a Russian conqueror; but Dr. Jaspers is persuasive in pointing out that Gandhi's success was made possible by the elements of liberalism in the tradition of his imperial opponent. Some have urged the parallel of the French Resistance; but the existence and success of the Resistance were made possible by British, Russian, and American power.

In supporting a pacifist position, I should hope there might be a few heroes to die if necessary in protest against such gratuitous cruelty as the Slansky purge in Czecho-Slovakia in 1952. But most of us, I should suppose, would become involved in daily work. We should have to count on the slow work of science, industry and cooperation to eliminate whatever new restrictions the Russians may be so unwise as to impose upon us.

Professor Zahn, though a Catholic, is of course not representative of Catholic thought. Father Murray is a more representative American Catholic teach-
er. He is of course not a pacifist, any more than was Pope Pius XII. He quotes Pius, who alone among the popes has made a systematic treatment of modern war, in dealing with possible human annihilation in war.

In any case, when the employment of this [modern] means entails such an extension of the evil that it entirely escapes from the control of man, its use ought to be rejected as immoral. Here it is no longer a question of defense against injustice and of the necessary safeguard of legitimate possessions, but of the annihilation, pure and simple, of all human life within its radius of action. This is not permitted on any account.2

Depending somewhat on the extent to which we or the Russians or both can and will control a thermonuclear attack or counter attack, as well as on the technology of attack and defense, we face a range of destruction, now or within the next ten years, including total human annihilation.

Three hundred megatons delivered over military targets are the minimum attack that has been seriously considered. A favorable estimate of fatalities, limited by fallout shelters in prospect, is about five million, an estimate used in September by Life. Similar force applied to city targets would produce some fifty million fatalities, according to testimony given last August in support of a shelter program. Explosions with fifteen hundred fission megaton capacity, spread in various ways, would produce thirty to seventy million fatalities, with "minimum" fallout shelters, according to Mr. Herman Kahn, in his comprehensive and thoughtful book, On Thermonuclear War.

Mr. Kahn thinks that American and Russian commanders will control thermonuclear attacks, limiting them to military targets, and then turning to threat and bargain. It is this concededly problematical opinion that makes it possible for Mr. Kahn to consider at all the effects of a twenty thousand fission megaton attack.

The United States and Russia each apparently can soon have enough bombs and warheads for this purpose; but each apparently doubts whether manned bombers, even with air to ground missiles for part of their equipment, could deliver anywhere near this amount over enemy targets. The general deployment of missiles in the next years will eliminate present obstacles to delivery. Delivery will remain subject to the possible development of new defenses, which ironically would give the first user a great immediate offensive advantage.

Mr. Kahn thinks and hopes that there is not in existence anywhere a "Doomsday Machine," using for example something like the means talked of two or three years ago in connection with the "cobalt" bomb, capable of destroying human life at once; but if he is read carefully he does not seem absolutely confident. And he writes that a Doomsday Machine of one sort or another will be feasible and perhaps achieved within ten years.

We have not yet spoken of delayed genetic effects; of the delayed effects of Strontium-90 on bones and blood; of the delayed and long lasting effects of Carbon-14; or of the recognized dangers of unknown effects from the two hundred odd isotopes produced by a thermonuclear attack, in addition to the three—Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Carbon-14—whose effects have been studied.

Birds would be destroyed and their nesting places would be eliminated or ravaged, while some insects would perhaps survive or return, in case of a large attack. No one knows what the balance between economically destructive insects and other insects preying on them would turn out to be. Testimony on ecology at last August's hearings was marked by frank statements by experts of our lack of knowledge about the effects of thermonuclear attacks. The plains, and country areas generally, may be harder to decontaminate than urban areas; and even in an operating agricultural economy Mr. Kahn observes that the threat of Strontium-90 might lead us to give up producing milk in the United States. Mr. Kahn ingeniously and fairly checks exaggeration and he courageously argues in some detail that we are resourceful enough to survive and rebuild after any attack he feels called on to consider. In one of his cases, our fifty principal cities are destroyed (but not their entire populations, it seems) and he thinks we could survive that. He neglects the cities' part in distribution, and does not consider the economic consequences for specialized producers in the southern hemisphere as well as here, but we hope he is right.

Mr. Kahn's military ideas are worth further consideration. We may ask here only whether we now face "annihilation" within the principle stated by Pope Pius. We may consider national annihilation; the annihilation of the populations of the northern hemisphere; the annihilation of our civilization; or the annihilation of human life. It seems to be the case that we are taking something like even chances that now or within the next ten years one or more of these various forms of annihilation will take place. The more one doubts the psychological feasibility of controlled thermonuclear attacks and counter attacks, the less unlikely one or more of the various forms of annihilation, within the next ten years, seems to be.

Except that we deal inevitably in probabilities—non-mathematical probabilities—we seem to be in the position designated by Pope Pius as "not [to be] permitted on any account." Pope Pius' doctrine is an expression of the devotion to life expressed not only in Freud's philosophy, but in the teachings of Jesus, Aristotle and St. Thomas, as well.

II

Christian teaching is relied on for justification of the idealizations of freedom among us and equality among the Russians. The good will and affection of the Sermon on the Mount are thought in the West to be expressed in mutual
respect for one another's ideas and practical choices. The Scriptures contain the original of the Communist ideal: "to each according to his need; from each according to his ability."

Yet our ideologies, including our ideologies of economic activity, diverge. Their divergencies are the most persuasive justification for our conflict, including a possible war. This is not to say that the divergencies are factors among the origins of the conflict. Communities with rival ideologies live together without conflict, and may be allied—as in both the recent world wars—against other communities. Communities with similar ideologies may be enemies. In the First World War the Western democracies had less similarity of purpose to Tsarist Russia than to Austria-Hungary, whose collision with Russia in eastern Europe started the war. The relatively liberal, nearly federal Austria was, however, Catholic and monarchical, and perhaps less similar in thought to its liberal western enemies than to the relatively illiberal but clerical—if Orthodox—and monarchical Russia. Ideological divergencies, as reflection on other familiar cases will remind us, have no simple correspondence to alignments in wars. They are however commonly the most persuasive justifications for wars once fighting occurs. Somewhat, though of course not exactly, as romantic love may be a result of sexual desire, so the idealizations which occur in conflict may become humanly more important than the sources of the conflict.

Idealizations in the conflicts between the Greek cities and Persia and between Athens and Sparta are appealed to today as parallels for the present conflict between "West" and "East." An admirer of the Greek civilization may indeed get from such comparisons his greatest satisfaction in the present conflict. Yet the Greeks themselves were skeptical about simple idealizations. Greek cities in Asia Minor rebelled against the Persian rule, which Greeks and Jews alike recognized as relatively free and beneficent; and their rebellion led to the Persian expedition to secure the Persian frontiers.

Thucydides gave an account of the Athenian war, or wars, with Sparta, in which he examined critically the factors at work in their origins. Pericles' speech on the dead is a magnificent statement of the advantages of Athenian democracy. Yet Thucydides ignored attachments to these advantages in his account of the intricate tensions among the small Greek cities on their small peninsula, which became a part of the collapse of the incomparable Athenian society.

Thucydides recognized an economic factor. Athens depended for her life on her grain trade with Black Sea ports, and her traders were expanding their trade elsewhere, in competition with that of rival cities. The Periclean "empire" depended partly on tribute for its finance. Nevertheless Thucydides as a matter of clinical observation treated "interest" as the least of the three principal factors which he saw at work.

Like ideology, the sense of justice or injustice was hardly noticed. What
were given particular attention were fear, the rational apprehension first of Persian and later of Greek attack; and—the critical factor, the source of the threat of attack—the love of honor, or pride, shared by all contestants.

The Greek word for love of honor is untranslatable, like the related "wrath," the first word in the Iliad and so in western literature, and the related "spirit" in Plato's Republic. The Greeks in their disorderly and perpetually warring society, with their naturalists' interests, observed the presence of a factor which Christian thinkers have been disposed to treat as a source of sin and not a subject for observation.

Trivial events may occasion primitive wars, but Thucydides' observations seem to furnish an hypothesis about civilized wars which reading and observation constantly confirm. Professor Toynbee treats the rather small scale wars of Pericles and his successors as a critical turning point in ancient history. The defeat of Athens did indeed—and perhaps by a close decision—prevent Athens from ruling the Mediterranean societies, as the less brilliant and more Spartan Rome later did. Rome did not even conquer Persia, still less rule the known world, but she left a dream of world rule to the mediaeval society. Members of that society were constantly at war among themselves. We may use Professor Toynbee's hypothesis about their critical war to suggest one other example among the large number and great variety which history, or just western history, furnishes.

The 11th, 12th and 13th century wars between Hildebrandine Popes and Salian and Hohenstaufen "Emperors" represent for Mr. Toynbee the critical wars of the civilization. Both parties were Christian. Each recognized the function of the other, and had difficulty in articulating its preference for its own greater share in ruling the turbulent society. It is hard for a critical modern to identify himself with either party, as he is likely to identify himself with Athens or with England, in their wars. It is an example of the inadequacy of an ideological theory of war.

Economic factors were present. The Church was often in rough conflict with kings and emperors over the sources of revenue. But the Hildebrandine Popes were not like the Renaissance Popes. Innocent III, the most powerful of them all, was ascetic and as industrious in his diplomacy and his wars as the late Mr. Dulles. Income for the Church meant to him, so it seems, only a source of power.

The popes were on the offensive in a revolutionary attempt to enlarge their power over ecclesiastical and secular affairs alike. No one was much moved by fear of fighting in that society. The observer can account for the wars in which Papacy and Empire destroyed one another's remote hope of ruling Europe, only by the ambitions to which Thucydides referred by his word for love of honor, or pride.

We have come to accept, to the amazement of anyone who lived through the period, an account of the war of 1914 which treats it as a mistake. Broad-
casting with President Eisenhower on August 31, 1959, Prime Minister Mac-
millan, who fought in the war of 1914, said: "Now the first war I feel ought
never to have happened. It happened by mistake. I believe if we'd had the
same kind of international meetings that we have now it wouldn't have hap-
pened. The second war was different...."3

In his long controversy with Professor Fay, Professor Schmitt, the leading
scholarly defender of the war-guilt provisions of the Versailles Treaty, has
recognized from the beginning the difficulties of his position.4 For my genera-
tion, "the Kaiser" was an incarnation of evil, and it is reassuring to find that
Professor Fay is correct, that no such creature existed, and that it was a mis-
take to think so.

Mr. A. J. P. Taylor has just published a convincing account of The Origins
of the Second World War which treats it as a mistake. His view is that Hitler
was gambling on a fearful but peaceful correction of the European balance
and the worst humiliations of Versailles; and that he would probably have
succeeded in August, 1939, if he had started his critical diplomatic offensive
a day earlier. Hitler was indeed very different from "the Kaiser"; but it is
worth recalling that the worst atrocities of his regime occurred after fighting
started, and that his foreign policy was what European standards of "honor"
required.

In addition to his persuasive treatment of Hitler's foreign policy, which
seems unaffected by any sympathy with his domestic policy, Professor Taylor
gives an equally persuasive treatment of western and German relations with
Russia in the events leading to the German-Russian agreement for Russian
neutrality in 1939. His account is much more persuasive than Mr. Kennan's
recent account of these events, which does, however, contain three passages
of profound wisdom on the German and Russian conflicts.5

Mr. Kennan, while effectively arguing our subjective friendliness or tolera-
tion, recognizes to what an extent our association with groups hostile to Rus-
sia at the end of the First World War contributed to later mutual suspicions
between us and the Soviet Union. He argues for our familiar views about the
purges of the '30's and the Nazi-Soviet neutrality agreement of 1939.

Mr. Taylor, showing respect for the views of our ambassador at the time,
thinks that the truth about the purges is unknown and perhaps undiscover-
able. There seems nothing inherently unlikely in the official account of a con-
spiracy among surviving original intellectual leaders, combined with military
leaders, against the less philosophical Stalin, going back to the hardships and
harshness of 1931–1932, and extending to 1936. In its later stages, the con-
spiracy may well have been strengthened by a tradition and practice of cooper-

4 See Schmitt, Review Article: The Origins of the War of 1914 (discussing Luigi Albertini),
24 J. MOD. HISTORY 69 (1952).
5 Kennan, pp. 368–69, 391, 398.
ation with Germany, expressed at Rapallo and before, combined with a sense of threat from the emerging new Germany. In these days Stalin was turning to the West, [however tentatively] and the opposition's mistrust of the West had not yet been vindicated, in Russian eyes, by the events of the summer of 1939. In another connection, Professor Taylor wisely states a presumption against explaining history, unless the matter is clear, by the madness of leading participants. However unsatisfactory as a device for policy formation, the purges of the '30's do not seem acts of simple irrationality or the simple madness of autocratic ambition.

Mr. Taylor thinks the British in 1939 did not want to turn the Nazis, and the Poles, toward conquest of Russia, if only for reasons of balance. Nevertheless he recognizes, as does Winston Churchill in *The Gathering Storm*, that the British missed a chance in 1939 to bring the Russians into the balance against the Nazis. He recognizes also that the British conduct of their negotiations with Russians, Poles, and Germans was such as to occasion legitimate fear of a hostile combination, in the minds of Russian leaders.

It is commonly said that Stalin trusted Hitler. Newspaper accounts at the time and the record since, including the record of the invasion of Finland, have seemed to me to indicate the contrary. In fact the record, including those parts of it discussed in this connection by Mr. Kennan and by Mr. Byrnes in *Speaking Frankly*, seems to me to furnish some indication that the Russians increasingly baited the Germans into attacking before the Germans had time to defeat the British finally. The Russians' purpose would thus have been to create a situation in which they could effectively employ their traditional strategy of active defense, aided by the two-front war which Hitler himself had condemned as a hypothetical strategic mistake.

Our oversimplification of reactions to the Nazi-Soviet neutrality pact, and to the Russian invasion of Finland, both of which were understood by Churchill in a way different from ours, contributed to the cold war. They doubtless explain the then Senator Truman's declaration of war against both Germany and Russia immediately upon the German invasion of Russia in 1941.

Well known to both the British and the Russians, if neglected by our Russian experts, that declaration is enough to account for every alleged Russian breach of good faith occurring after President Truman took office and after his position was confirmed in September, 1945, in London. President Roosevelt's death, and President Truman's succession, gave a legitimate occasion for the application to Russian agreements of the familiar qualification, *rebus sic stantibus*. An agreement governs, "things remaining the same"; more particularly, in the absence of a threat to a signing nation's power or existence.

The principle could properly be invoked in relation to such clean cut agreements as those setting dates for Russian evacuation of Iran and Manchuria in 1946, which the Russians did not observe. It could be applied to the ambiguous
provisions and questionable acts of alleged violation of other agreements affecting Iran and China. It could be invoked with special justification in its application to Russian renunciation of territorial claims against Japan, in view of our Japanese occupation policy, beginning with Secretary Byrnes’ refusal to talk about it with the Russians in September, 1945, in London. It could be applied to the invasion of Korea; but here, in addition, the complete lack of evidence of Russian participation and our complete ignorance of the circumstances in which fighting broke out, must leave us skeptical about the facts charged as a breach of good faith. *Rebus sic stantibus* sufficiently explains the continued Russian support of revolutionary governments in Lithuania, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and elsewhere, strengthened as it doubtless was by a theory of legitimate revolution differing from but also resembling our own doctrines of rightful revolution.

*Rebus sic stantibus* explains even more adequately, if the explanation is necessary, the Russian positions in 1945 about the marvellously ambiguous and uncertain supposed agreements at Yalta, affecting Rumania and Poland. The dispute over these agreements led to Mr. Truman’s position about the Polish agreement in his now well known conversation with Molotov just before the end of the German war, which could fairly have been understood, in the context of the time, as a second declaration, this time of cold war.6

For all the intervening years, threats, counter-threats, concessions, and threats in turn have followed one another. Arrangements for the occupation of Germany have been at once ambiguous and uncertain and particularly subject to the qualification of *rebus sic stantibus*. From 1947 until 1949, in 1958-9, and again today, these arrangements about our conquered foe have given rise to the ambivalent threats of war and hopes of peace, on both sides, which are like the phenomena to which Mr. Taylor draws attention in his account of the events leading to the Second World War.

Mr. Kennan and Mr. Taylor, without discussion, both seem to think that any questions of justice raised by the interwar conflicts, result from the interplay of fear and destructive domination, particularly the latter. There is always an accompanying ambivalent conscious hope for victory without destruction. Nevertheless, in the interaction of attitudes toward the two possible kinds of victory, which for example Mr. Taylor attributes to Hitler, one can detect the attraction of force, which can be detected also among the harried prime ministers of July and August, 1914, the great medieval popes, and the leaders of the 5th century Greek cities. If one’s attention is arrested by such observations, one can see the same factors in today’s newspaper accounts of the threats and conciliations of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev and their advisers.

6 See Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins 265–70 (1961). Professor Fleming’s fresh and critical volumes came to my attention too late to be included among the subjects of the present discussion.
The new factor today is a rather widespread and rational apprehension of destruction on a new scale. Under some circumstances, disorder within a society has appeared worse than the irrational and cruel law, for example the law of ordeals, which was available. The punishment of "treason" in the great 17th century in England was more savage than anything we have seen in our time except the Nazi concentration camps. As long as we avoid a complete and permanent Nazi concentration camp society, we may keep our mutual regard and our self confidence; and we may choose, rather than national or human annihilation, a government by either of the great contending powers. Such a suggestion has, of course, little present political appeal, and it can be read by a practical man, either here or in Russia, only as a way of emphasizing the importance of mutual concessions and agreement.

III

Mr. Herman Kahn is known primarily as a critic of those who consider a thermonuclear war out of the question, whether as a matter of expectation or as a matter of practical policy. The equilibrium of mutual deterrence seems to him in any likely future to be subject to quite possible destabilization. He thinks that preparation by organizing civil defense evacuations and shelters and by planning for controlled war may enable us to survive for a more happy future.

He is by no means an enthusiast for thermonuclear war. He considers our ideological differences inadequate to explain the conflict between the United States and Russia; and he recognizes that a compromise of our theoretical differences would be a reasonable price for avoiding thermonuclear war.7 Returning in other respects to our position in 1942–1945, he observes that each country recognizes itself as a status quo country, with no simple interests in territorial expansion or conquered economic resources. "It is probably true that the major thing that the Soviet Union and the United States have to fear from each other is fear itself."8

So far as he depends on a simple fear theory of war, Mr. Kahn may betray a bias which seems to affect him elsewhere. The revolution, including the palace rebellion, is the simplest answer to any general fear theory of warfare. Revolutionists are frequently quite free of any superficial fear, at any rate; and once this is noticed, an observer is ready to consider the greater importance attached by Thucydides to "pride" and combativeness. Nevertheless fear is an important component of many sequences, including no doubt the present one. It may be indeed that a "deep" fear is the most common source of pride.

However that may be, Mr. Kahn wisely discounts the most popular current explanations of our conflict with Russia. He does not for that reason think that war is out of the question, nor does he by any means discount the importance of our victory if war occurs.

7 Kahn, p. 226. 8 P. 568.
He does think that surrender is preferable to national destruction, say fifty
million deaths resulting immediately from an attack; and still more clearly
preferable to human annihilation. He thinks we should not say so except
in such an obscure way as his. Victory without annihilation seems to him im-
portant and possible, and it will be facilitated, perhaps even without war, if
we do not encourage the Russians to expect surrender.

We have seen that Mr. Kahn faces heavy destruction of people and wealth,
as probable consequences of thermonuclear war. He emphasizes the impor-
tance of evacuation and shelters in minimizing loss. Yet when he deals with
the “late” attack, twenty thousand fission megatons delivered, say in 1969 or
1973, he is unwilling to depend entirely on civil defense to prevent losses
which he concedes to be unacceptable.

He recognizes that his conservative estimates of both the genetic and
somatic effects of such an attack, persisting after any reasonable period in
shelters, are not really dependable; and apparently our ignorance of the
unstudied isotopes involved in such an attack leaves open the possibility of
disastrous unknown consequences. It is not a matter simply of exaggerating
unknown dangers; the known dangers are serious enough, so that an appre-
ciable chance of unknown additions leads to an increase in apprehension
which seems rational.

In dealing with the immediate casualties likely to result from a “late”
attack, Mr. Kahn gives us what seems to be his only muddled table. On the
following page he seems to recognize that his computations as they stand are
unconvincing, and that for our survival we must come to count on the general
acceptance of a principle of controlled thermonuclear (or other) war.13

If read carefully, Lecture I, primarily concerned with civil defense, can be
understood only with the aid of Lectures II and III, in which the character
and importance of the theory of the controlled war become increasingly clear.

In the second chapter of Lecture II, a discussion of the circumstances in
which a thermonuclear war, if it occurs, is most likely to originate, makes
one contribution to the theory of the controlled war. Perhaps because he
thinks that neither great party is seriously interested in world conquest, per-
haps because of the extent to which mutual deterrents seem to him effective,
perhaps for both reasons, Mr. Kahn discounts the danger of unprovoked
deliberate attack. He thinks the three most likely sets of circumstances in
which thermonuclear war may originate are to be classed as “accidents,” the
next three as “miscalculations,” the next three as “calculations” in fear and
crisis situations, and the next two, in order, as “preventive war” and “world
domination.” Only “catalytic” wars are considered still more unlikely.14 An

10 Pp. 525, 527.
11 Pp. 74, 92.
13 Pp. 113–14. See also, particularly, p. 518.
14 See p. 227, Table 36, which follows a related discussion beginning on p. 190 and pre-
cedes one ending on p. 231.
appropriate response to an accident, or even a miscalculation or a calculation in crisis, would hardly be a "late," twenty thousand fission megaton attack, on either side.

Moreover, in view of the present defenses against manned bombers and the time it will take to multiply missiles which can be fired accurately and with heavy impact, there will be a period in which each side will have strong reasons for giving priority to military targets, say missile bases, to prevent retaliation by the other. As forces increase, in the absence of what Mr. Kahn has considered an unlikely discovery of effective defensive weapons against missiles, it will still be apparent that military objectives must have priority. Though Mr. Kahn is not confident on this point, the common sense advantages of conquering a going economy will strengthen a tendency to give secondary priority, even if enough weapons are available for them, to cities and country areas.

Difficulties about guidance, about knowing where to aim, and about the relations between impact and shelter, may be or may be thought to be obstacles to an effective attack or counter attack directed at military objectives. In such a case, though Mr. Kahn does not say so, a commander might attack one or two cities. He may plan a pause after his first attack, on military objectives or cities or both, and offer to bargain. If a first attack promises much heavier destruction in case it is resumed, a cool government in the country attacked, at least if its retaliatory forces are somewhere nearly destroyed, will, in Mr. Kahn's opinion, surrender.

Mr. Kahn deals separately with the problem of shelter for military objectives against thermonuclear weapons, including one hundred megaton bombs. He finds the problem not insoluble. When he passes to the problem of protecting other objectives as well, as means of attack develop over the next ten or fifteen years, he recognizes that though shelter may help, our protection will increasingly depend on decisions to conduct war "carefully." He may have in mind a revival of interest in "clean" explosions.

One reader finds it useful to remind himself from time to time that in ten or fifteen years he will be seventy-five or eighty and his eldest grandchild, a grandson, twenty or twenty-five. Any reader may then multiply the cases until he reaches the figure which he may choose to stand for national annihilation, or the human annihilation which, with the feasibility or existence of Doomsday Machines, will then be in reach.

In his Lecture II Mr. Kahn has thoughtful and persuasive sections on the necessity and means of developing agreements, explicit or tacit, to serve in preventing, or controlling and moderating, thermonuclear war. In his Lecture III, surveying the development since 1914 and that to be guessed at or expected until 1977, Mr. Kahn repeatedly recognizes the steadily increasing importance of such agreements. Indeed his treatment of the controlled war has, as one of

15 P. 518.
its modestly half avowed objects, the purpose of promoting acceptance by both the United States and Russia of something comparable to the regard for non-combatants which was part of the old so-called international law. One great question presented by his theory of the controlled war is whether the theory, and the considerations to which it draws attention, are likely to be practically effective.

While it seems no longer useful to try to determine the odds for or against war, it seems that the odds against control in case of war are appreciable, although public argument for control may have done something to reduce them. The pride and combative ness that will be aroused by any attack seem likely to be such as to produce a counter attack with any force that may remain. If the attacker thinks this is so, and if he has any doubts about his ability to destroy retaliatory forces completely, he may well use his military resources to the limit for the purpose of completely disabling the society attacked.

It is to be noticed that our “attacker” may well be one who has been subjected to a mistaken or miscalculated attack himself, or a calculated attack influenced by fear or crisis. He may have no means of knowing about the circumstances. In some cases at least the values and impulses connected with pride and combative ness will influence him. He will to that extent become less like players in cooler games, and less subject to the reasonable kind of fear that may lead to reasonable action.

Moreover, if ordinary competition in bases and weapons continues, the ideal controlled attack or counter attack on military objectives will automatically tend to become heavier and heavier. It may be moderated by the development of interest in “clean” explosions. On the other hand, it may come to coincide with the “late” attack, of which we have considered the effects, immediate, genetic, somatic, ecological and economic. As the progression develops, what may at some point be a protective institution, will tend to become itself an instrument of annihilation. Effective control may require, as Mr. Kahn at points seems to recognize, effective arms control, which is not now in view.

If these are the likelihoods, they are strong reasons for us to regard the principle of Pope Pius, and for us or preferably the Soviet Union to acquiesce in the best terms on which one will concede military hegemony to the other. At least if the change is made without war, the way can be prepared for the evolution here and abroad of a more humane society than any the world has known. The society will be protected by a power which may at first apply a rather crude law, but a law which in the course of time may well come to promote peace and mutual regard. If there is any doubt about the application of the teaching of Pope Pius to the present situation, one may still find it an occasion for agreeing with Professor Zahn, and for recognizing the anarchism of the Sermon on the Mount as the best single guide to a current philosophy of law.