

sible, reiteration that this is the logical and sensible approach can have some effect.

Drs. E. F. Hammer and Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., in "Psycho-dynamic Patterns in the Sex Offender," present evidence based on a study of 200 male sex offenders that one of their most striking characteristics was a pervasive fear of heterosexual contact. The continuum from rape through heterosexual contact with adolescent partners and homosexual actions with adolescent partners to homosexual interactions with child partners "appears to represent in parallel fashion the increasing intensity of castration feelings, on the one hand, and the simultaneously greater distance from the mature female as a potential sex object, on the other."¹⁰

Commissioner Alfred R. Loos of the New York State Board of Parole describes the use of psychiatry in the prisons and reformatories of his state, and makes some suggestions for improving institutional psychotherapy by such means as intensive in-service training programs and the development and training of group psychotherapy classes. Drs. Samuel Dunaif and Paul H. Hoch present their new concept of "Pseudo-psychopathic Schizophrenia," i.e., schizophrenia in which the patient acts out to such a degree that his behavior can be called psychopathic. Dr. John C. Whitehorn of Johns Hopkins contributes some interesting observations on "Psychiatry and Human Values." Other contributors include Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher, Professor Samuel Polsky, Dr. Bardwell W. Flower, Superintendent of Worcester (Mass.) State Hospital, and County Judge Hyman Barshay of King's County (N.Y.).

Chapters 5 and 15 are each followed by a few pages of "discussion." It is perhaps just as well that this device was not used for other chapters, for the discussion of Dr. Davidson's able chapter 5 adds nothing but confusion.

The Hoch and Zubin volume, as the work of almost a score of authors, is the meatier of the two books. While not too technical to be understood by lawyers, some of its psychiatric material may be too specialized to interest them. Judge Biggs' makes the lighter reading. Both constitute important contributions to the growing literature on the relationship between criminal law and psychiatry.

HENRY WEIHOFFEN*

¹⁰ P. 168.

* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.

Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. By Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955. Pp. 353. \$5.00.

"This is a study," the book begins, "of how some important decisions were reached in a large American city. The city is Chicago and the decisions had to do mainly with the location of public housing projects. Through the analysis

of this particular case we endeavor to bring empirical and theoretical materials together in a way which will further the development of the theory of decision-making and impart wider significance to the concrete data."¹ The time period was from the passage of the National Housing Act in 1949 to the approval of the sites in November, 1951.

The first chapter presents a brief background, sketching the appearance of the concept of housing as a public function and the controversies arising from this development. The authors stress that the inclusion of housing among public functions is very much opposed, and that the housing needs of the Negro can be met only by tackling the problem of racial relations generally. Both issues dominate the subsequent account, but as the book points out, "The events that constitute the case history are a complicated tangle."² Subsequent chapters describe the "organization" of housing administration, the "politicians" who operate the municipal government, and the important "climate of neighborhood opinion" which figures in the process of site selection. Chapters 5 through 8 set forth the history of the process of policy-making. A chapter of interpretation of these events for each of the major terms—"politics," "planning" and "the public interest"—concludes the story; however, each is again treated in the supplement, "Note on Conceptual Scheme."

The employment of the "case method" has been spreading from the law schools for some time. In part, it was anticipated years ago by some imaginative and sensitive teachers, alert to make their instruction more vital and challenging. One recalls, for example, collections of materials in economics such as those of L. C. Marshall and Walton Hamilton (*Current Economic Problems*), introduced at the University of Chicago forty years ago. By presenting the student with a "real life situation," from which he would himself have to make sense and formulate reasonable policy and principle, something of the stimulation and the zeal for craftsmanship which was characteristic of the law schools might be achieved. The new schools of social work had "cases" available in the files of agencies. The new schools of business began to create them from records and experience. Other currents of influence came to the social studies from governmental research, anthropology, and medicine.

One difference between many of these new case materials and the law cases may be noted. The decision in a law case exists in its own right; it is an authoritative statement of the law and becomes a fact affecting subsequent decisions. Many of the new case studies, however, are defined, and the facts presented are selected, by the case-maker; they are not supported in, or contributory to, a continuing regular official process or cumulation of precedent and influence. This has two consequences.

One is intellectual. The introduction of the new teaching device was stimulated in part by a desire to re-examine freshly some of the bodies of "principles"

¹ P. 11.

² P. 26.

which seemed to be arid and irrelevant to the changing ways of life, as well as to stimulate the student to do some thinking of his own about problem-solving. But the need for finding some connections, common terms, and principles reasserted itself. We are at the moment in a fresh hunt in the social studies for "conceptual frameworks," "schemes of reference," and the like.

Another consequence of case-manufacture, as against recourse to the "ready-made" court records, is that the more vivid and realistic we are in our selection of data, the more dependent we are on the participants in the episode recorded. And upon the quality and tone of our recording, in turn, will depend the willingness of others later to be recorded. For selected purposes, the activities of government may be sliced arbitrarily into "cases"; but the process of government goes on. Any account of its participants may be noted by them, and may affect their feelings and attitudes. This may have some influence on the welcome or rejection given to future projects. The attitudes of the recorder and analyst, in relation to his selection and treatment of data, may also be affected by knowledge of this by-product of case-making. It is not easy to be objective about the qualities of the people with whom you may have been intimately associated and concerning whose aims and decisions you yourself may have feelings and beliefs.

Thus, early in the book, the authors give the warning that:

What we have written illustrates the impossibility of achieving full relevance to immediate and practical issues while avoiding judgments which are not rigorously substantiated and which perforce often cannot be so substantiated. . . . [W]here it seemed necessary in order to achieve relevance, we have not hesitated to make conjectures or to record the conjectures of informants. . . . It should be kept in mind, that the events described here occurred several years ago and that the agencies mentioned may have changed considerably since. The reader perhaps also should be warned that our standard of good planning—rational decision-making—is an ideal one; the standard is, we think, useful for analysis, but real organizations (like real people), if the truth is told, do not make decisions in a substantially rational manner.³

How well the authors have met successfully the occupational risks of case-manufacture arising from the attitudes of those recorded and appraised is not known to this reviewer; one would have to be even better acquainted with the persons whose actions are portrayed than the authors themselves, to say. The substantive story seems honestly set forth, with every effort to record fairly and fully acts and attitudes. The story is interesting; the fact that a central question which emerges is the relation of whites and Negroes makes it all the more charged with significance. But the authors' purpose to "further the development of the theory of decision-making and impart wider significance to the concrete data,"⁴ invites us to turn from the recording of experiences to the relating of the "empirical and theoretical materials."

Dr. Banfield, in his "Note on Conceptual Scheme," begins by stating that in treating the three conceptions—"politics," "planning" and "the public in-

³ P. 15.

⁴ P. 11.

terest"—“We want a conception of politics which will apply as well to office politics as to national politics and a conception of planning which will apply as well to planning in industry as to city planning.”⁵ But in view of the great variety of experience within the single sector, government (and within that sector, municipal government), in need of clarification as to “what people who are called planners [and many who are not called planners] actually do,”⁶ and with the data here collected so temptingly awaiting interpretation, it seems a long jump to the broad generalizations of the universal. At the outset one may ask to have the three terms put in relation to the line of policy and authority along which there are to be sought the major and strategic points of decision-making. By focusing attention on what goes on at these points one may begin to accumulate data on process and structure, for example, which may be compared with similar data accumulated at similar points in other types of organizations—industrial or ecclesiastical as well as governmental—or in governments of other climes and cultures. Something of this is actually done by the authors in chapters 9 through 11. In fact the skeleton of the line of strategic points of decision-making is indicated (cast in terms of a “parlor game”): “Congress had written the first words, the Public Housing Administration had written the next several, and then the Illinois Legislature, the State Housing Board, the Mayor and the City Council and the CHA Board of Commissioners had each in turn written a few.”⁷ Thus this may be considered a study in the use of discretionary powers distributed through related units of government.

If this idea had been made central to the theoretical interpretation, one might find that “politics” and “planning” are not separate. In the political process there is a role to be played at each point of decision-making—facilitating wiser, more rational decisions—which may be called planning within the meaning given by Dr. Banfield at page 312, if the reviewer correctly understands him.

Would it not have helped the authors in their aim if they had related to the defining of their concepts the contributions of some others concerned with these matters?⁸ Our authors may reply, and rightly, that scattered throughout their chapters are observations and insights for the reader to absorb; Dr. Banfield may say that we ask him for the contents of a book within the compass of his already tightly packed chapter. But at this stage do we not need to construct

⁵ P. 303.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ P. 269.

⁸ For example, John Dewey's suggestive discussion of “public” that runs throughout *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), with his concluding discussion of “The Great Community,” is very relevant. So too is the prophetic diagnosis, made by V. O. Key in 1942, in his essay on *Politics and Administration* (in the tribute volume to Charles E. Merriam, *The Future of Government in the United States* [1942]), in which the new challenge to a wider use of discretionary administrative powers is set forth. And see Paul Appleby's *Policy and Administration* (1949), and *Big Democracy* (1945); Robert A. Walker's *The Planning Function in Urban Government* (rev. ed., 1950); and Rexford Tugwell's *Puerto Rican lectures, The Place of Planning in Society* (1954).

cumulatively across personal experiences and interpretations as we set about scheme-making? The data presented by the authors is so rich (on federal systems, interest-groups, neighborhoods, forms of city and metropolitan governments, selection and training of civil servants, "conflicts of interest," racial and cultural relations, and all the ecology of a public function) that the step to a greatly needed part-universal may be the first step toward a universal. "Leg after leg the old dog got to Dover," Elihu Root used to say when the situation seemed dark and difficult. And it is from studies such as this that a richer and more useful body of data, use of terms, and interpretation of experience will be available to future students, and more widely relevant generalizations will be created.

JOHN M. GAUS*

* Professor of Government, Harvard University.

The Three Trials of Oscar Wilde. Edited by H. Montgomery Hyde. New York: University Books, 1956. Pp. 384. \$5.00.

Some years ago the play, *Oscar Wilde*,¹ with an extraordinarily fine performance by Robert Morley in the lead, was on the boards in New York. Essentially the play was built around the trials in which Wilde was involved—first, his libel action² against the Marquis of Queensbury for the latter's card handed Wilde accusing him of "posing as somdomite" (sic) and, second, the subsequent criminal prosecutions for "acts of gross indecency" with male persons. The trial scenes were handsomely portrayed. The authors had contrived appropriate dialogue:

"Cross-examination continued—Do you know Walter Grainger?—Yes.

"How old is he?—He was about sixteen when I knew him. He was a servant at a certain house in High Street, Oxford, where Lord Alfred Douglas had rooms. I have stayed there several times. Grainger waited at table. I never dined with him. If it is one's duty to serve, it is one's duty to serve; and if it is one's pleasure to dine, it is one's pleasure to dine.

"Did you ever kiss him?—Oh, dear no. He was a peculiarly plain boy. He was, unfortunately, extremely ugly. I pitied him for it.

"Was that the reason why you did not kiss him?—Oh, Mr. Carson, you are pertinently insolent.

"Did you say that in support of your statement that you never kissed him?—No. It is a childish question.

"Did you ever put that forward as a reason why you never kissed the boy?—Not at all.

"Why, sir, did you mention that this boy was extremely ugly?—For this reason. If I were asked why I did not kiss a door-mat, I should say because I do not like to kiss door-mats. I do not know why I mentioned that he was ugly, except that I was

¹ Leslie and Sewell Stokes, *Oscar Wilde* (1938).

² The action was for criminal libel.