Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places

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COURTING DISASTER: LOOKING FOR CHANGE IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES

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I. INTRODUCTION

What role can courts play in furthering Progressive social change? For generations of both law school students and political liberals, courts have been understood as powerful producers of Progressive social change. Starting with the civil rights cases of the mid-twentieth century, and spreading to the issues raised by women's groups, environmental groups, 

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political reformers, gay rights supporters, and others, Progressive forces in the United States have increasingly turned to courts to produce the changes they seek. In many cases they have won. American courts seemingly have become important producers of political and social change. Cases such as *Brown v. Board of Education*,1 *Roe v. Wade*,2 and *Lawrence v. Texas*,3 to name just three, are heralded as having produced major Progressive change. Interestingly, such litigation has often occurred when the other branches of government have failed to act. This suggests that courts can produce Progressive change even when the other branches of government are inactive or opposed. In times of Conservative domination of the elected branches of governments, litigation can seem very attractive to Progressives. It holds out the possibility of protecting minorities and defending liberty in the face of opposition from the democratically elected branches. Progressives see activist courts, then, as playing an important role in the American scheme.4

As powerful as the belief in the Progressive potential of courts to help the relatively disadvantaged may be, it is a historically odd idea. Traditionally, courts in the U.S. have protected privilege. Throughout U.S. history and until the second half of the twentieth century, Progressives, for the most part, understood this and avoided litigation when possible. They understood that judges, and the courts in which they served, were dedicated to preserving the status quo and unequal distributions of power, wealth, and privilege. They understood that Progressive social change could only come from legislation and social movements. However, since roughly the mid-twentieth century, particularly during the Warren and Burger Courts, this was forgotten. Progressives increasingly turned to litigation and pointed to great victories in cases such as *Brown* as proof that the role of the courts in the U.S. political system had changed. They were wrong.

This brief Article expands on these two main points. First, it reviews the Court’s historical record as a defender of privilege in the areas of civil rights, civil liberties and dissident speech, and economic rights. Second, it argues that the great legal victories to which Progressives point as proof of the efficacy of litigation did not, for the most part, produce the change they

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4. This belief is developed in more detail in GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991), particularly in the introductory chapter.
wanted. Further, such litigation mobilized opponents, creating additional obstacles for change. Forgetting the lessons of history, the Progressive agenda was hijacked by a group of elite, well-educated, and comparatively wealthy lawyers who uncritically believed that rights trump politics and that successfully arguing before judges is equivalent to building and sustaining political movements. This Article concludes that Progressives have failed to understand the limits of litigation when they have won and have forgotten the historic role of the judiciary as a defender of status quo and unequal distributions of power, wealth, and privilege. The political left’s flirtation with litigation is fundamentally flawed.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S HISTORIC MISSION TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO AND UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER, WEALTH, AND PRIVILEGE

The following pages briefly sketch the historic role of the Court as a protector of privilege in the areas of civil rights, civil liberties and dissident speech, and economic rights. While this Article paints with a broad brush, these substantive areas of law, and the cases noted, are illustrative of the conservative role the Court has played throughout U.S. history. The only minority the Court has consistently protected throughout U.S. history is wealthy white men.

A. Civil Rights

For most of U.S. history the Supreme Court has supported and reinforced racial discrimination against non-whites. This is an unpleasant fact that most citizens do not know and most lawyers ignore. While the cases are legion, three stand out: *Scott v. Sandford*,6 the *Civil Rights Cases*,7 and *Plessy v. Ferguson*.8 They merit brief discussion.

The main issue in *Dred Scott*, in 1856, was the citizenship status of a slave under federal law.9 Dred Scott, a slave, brought suit in federal court arguing that because he had been in states and territories that prohibited slavery, he was now free.10 Sandford, the slave owner, denied that Dred

5. Obviously there are other areas that could have been selected as well, including gender.
10. *Id.*
Scott could bring suit, arguing that as a slave he was not a citizen entitled to call upon the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney held that African-Americans were not intended to be "citizens" in the Constitution. They were not "part of the people" and "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." African-Americans, as a matter of constitutional law, were simply "ordinary article[s] of merchandise."

The Court's decision, as horrific as it appears to modern sensibilities, reflected both the prevailing racist beliefs and legal understandings of the time. As Professor Graber has carefully shown, the decision was in accord with "[v]irtually every state court that ruled on black citizenship," the views of four U.S. Attorney Generals who had issued opinions on the question, and "the leading northern treatise on jurisprudence, James Kent's Commentaries on American Law." Politically, the decision was in accord with the policies of "the dominant Jacksonian coalition" and "Republican legislators in New York and Ohio who in the wake of Dred Scott did make a show of support for black citizenship were almost immediately voted out of office." As the women's right crusader Susan B. Anthony sadly acknowledged, the decision was "but the reflection of the spirit and practice of the American people, North as well as South." The Court simply reflected the racist understandings of the times.

The Dred Scott decision was overturned by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The three post-Civil War Amendments made slavery unconstitutional, prohibited the states from denying people "the equal protection of the laws[,]" and guaranteed the right of citizens to

11. Id.
12. Id. at 404–05.
13. Id. at 404, 454.
14. Id. at 407.
15. Id.
17. Id. at 283.
18. Id. at 284.
19. Id. at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
vote regardless "of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." As the Court noted in the *Slaughter-House Cases*, decided in 1872, only a few years after the adoption of the three Civil War Amendments, they had "a unity of purpose"—the protection of the newly freed slaves. "[T]he one pervading purpose found in them all," the Court wrote, is "the freedom of the slave race." They were dedicated to "the protection of life, liberty, and property, without which freedom to the slave was no boon."

Although this language suggested that the dark days of constitutionally-sanctioned racism were at an end, any such thoughts were quickly put to rest in the *Civil Rights Cases* of 1883. At issue was a challenge to the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which, in Section 1, prohibited race-based discrimination in public places such as hotels, restaurants, and theaters. Despite the passage of the Civil War Amendments, and despite the fact that seven of the Justices had been appointed by Presidents Lincoln and Grant and only two members of the Court were Southerners, the Court struck down the Act by a vote of 8–1. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to action by the State, not to the private action of individual business owners. Because almost all businesses in the U.S. were privately owned, the decision meant that the federal government lacked the power to prohibit racial discrimination in most aspects of people's lives. Only Justice Harlan dissented, writing that the Court's opinion was based on "grounds entirely too narrow and artificial" that sacrificed "the substance and spirit" of the Civil War Amendments. Justice Harlan argued in essence that when businesses serve the public they are amenable to public regulation.

In gutting the Civil War Amendments, the Court's majority opinion went out of its way to express annoyance with African-Americans for seeking guarantees of nondiscrimination:

23. *Id.* amend. XV, § 1.
25. *Id.* at 67–68.
26. *Id.* at 71.
27. *Id.*
29. See *id.* at 26 (indicating that of the nine Justices on the Court, Justice Harlan was the sole dissenter).
30. *Id.* at 23–26.
31. *Id.* at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. *Id.* at 55–56.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws... 33

Although the case was decided less than two decades after the abolition of slavery, and a mere fifteen years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court made it clear that the Constitution preserved white privilege and condemned African-Americans to second-class status. The constitutional support for racial discrimination was further strengthened in Plessy v. Ferguson, 34 decided in 1896. At issue in Plessy was the constitutionality of a Louisiana law requiring railroads to segregate passengers by race. 35 Given the holding of the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment was concerned with state action, and the open and ongoing creation of an apartheid system in Louisiana and other Southern states, it should have been easy for the Court to hold the law unconstitutional. The Court did find the case easy; it upheld the constitutionality of the law by a vote of 7–1. 36 The Court reasoned that even though the case involved state action, there was an important distinction between political and social equality. 37 The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held, was aimed at political equality, not social equality, arguing that “it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality.” 38 Then, in disingenuous language, the Court claimed that laws requiring racial segregation “do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.” 39 In what can only be seen as a deeply dishonest denial of reality, the Court wrote:

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. 40

33. Id. at 25.
34. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. Id. at 540.
36. Id. at 540, 552.
37. Id. at 544.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 551.
Again, it was Justice Harlan who explicitly noted the Court’s racism. Arguing segregation laws were based on white beliefs in racial superiority, he poignantly wrote: “The thin disguise of ‘equal’ accommodations . . . will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.”41 Once again, the Court had supported white privilege.

While it is true that in the twentieth century the Court backed away from giving constitutional commendation to racial discrimination, it did so only with hesitation and often in cases which affected only small numbers of people. For example, in a series of cases the Court struck down segregation in graduate and professional schools.42 To this day, the Court has never explicitly overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.43 It was not until 1954, eighty-six years after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Court invalidated racial segregation in public schools with the Brown decision. Yet, as discussed below, the decision was not implemented.44 Further, the Court backed off its mandate in 1974 in Milliken v. Bradley45 where it disallowed a desegregation remedy that included suburbs as well as cities “even though there was extensive proof of official actions producing segregation and no viable solution within largely nonwhite and poor central city school systems.”46 Moreover, in a series of cases at the end of the twentieth century, the Court found no constitutional limitations on the re-creation of segregated schools as long as such segregation was not explicitly required by state laws.47 As Orfield and Lee concluded, the U.S.

41. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. See discussion infra Part III.A.
47. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–01 (1995) (holding that the educational components of desegregation plans could be cancelled even if they had not yet produced educational progress); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492–93 (1992) (permitting school districts to dismantle desegregation plans even though integration had not been achieved); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (establishing the policy of terminating desegregation plans and returning to segregated neighborhood schools after a period of years). For a collection of new research on
is witnessing "[t]he resegregation of blacks . . . [which] appears to be clearly related to the Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s permitting return to segregated neighborhood schools." 

B. Civil Liberties and Dissident Speech

Despite the majestic language of the First Amendment and the existence of judicial review, historically, the Supreme Court has seldom protected political dissent. Only in those rare instances when dissidents were supported by large segments of the elite did the Court provide any protection.

From the founding of the United States in 1789 (and the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791) until the later part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court provided little protection to political dissidents. Government at all levels repeatedly and consistently silenced speech critical of their actions with the approval of the Court. U.S. history is full of examples, such as: the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Civil War, the repression associated with the First World War, the subsequent decades of silencing of labor and left-wing activists, and the Cold War. In examining the pre-World War I judicial history of political repression, David Rabban noted that "[t]he overwhelming majority of prewar decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech claims, often by ignoring their


50. Id. at 32–33.

existence.” His study found a “pervasive hostility” to political dissent and a “tradition of judicial hostility to free speech” led by the Supreme Court. Indeed he found that “[n]o court was more unsympathetic to freedom of expression than the Supreme Court.”

Consider, for example, that the great free speech opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, in cases like *Abrams v. United States*, *Gitlow v. New York*, and *Whitney v. California*, were either concurrences or dissents in which convictions for speech critical of the government were upheld. As Rabban points out:

[These and similar decisions] during and immediately after World War One were neither a temporary aberration from a libertarian tradition nor the consequence of an initial encounter with the First Amendment. The wartime and postwar decisions were depressingly similar to their prewar antecedents. They continued an existing tradition of hostility to free speech claims . . .

The Court’s lack of protection for critical speech continued during the Cold War. In 1951, the Court upheld conspiracy convictions of the national leadership of the American Communist Party in *Dennis v. United States*. The evidence supporting their convictions was their teaching of the classic works of Marxism—many of which are assigned readings at colleges and universities across the country. Government indictments and judicial convictions of lower-level officials continued into the early 1960s.

The Cold War repression, to which the Supreme Court lent its legitimacy, is all the more telling when compared to the treatment political dissidents received in other democratic nations. The United Kingdom,

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53. *Id.*
54. *Id.* at 589.
55. *Id.* at 523.
61. *Id.* at 497–98.
62. *See id.* at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
France, and Australia all dealt with issues of domestic subversion and communism during the Cold War years. In comparison to the United States, none of the three countries had a full-fledged First Amendment, and neither the United Kingdom nor France had a tradition of judicial review whereby courts could invalidate the acts of the other branches of government. Further, both the United Kingdom and France were "weaker militarily and economically" than the United States, and, in terms of "proximity," both were closer to the Soviet Union. Yet, despite these differences, all three countries did a substantially better job of protecting political dissent than did the United States. Indeed, the U.S. treatment of political dissent in the Cold War years stands out among western democratic nations, being characterized by Dahl as a "deviant case" and, more bluntly by Shapiro, as "pathological.

In the 1960s and 1970s, while government at all levels took steps to harass civil rights and antiwar activists, the Court became somewhat more protective of political dissent. However, the level of protection must not be overstated. It was also the case that the federal government engaged in massive surveillance of the lawful political actions of countless Americans, and the Supreme Court upheld the program in 1972 in Laird v. Tatum. Those who publicly dissented against the war in Vietnam, and even those who did not—such as parents, relatives, and friends of protesters—ran the risk of government surveillance and harassment. One must also remember that it was not until 1965 that the U.S. Supreme Court first invalidated a congressional act on First Amendment free speech grounds.

64. See Herbert H. Hyman, England and America: Climates of Tolerance and Intolerance—1962, in THE RADICAL RIGHT 227, 231 (Daniel Bell ed., 1963) (writing about the United Kingdom, but his statements apply to France as well).


67. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 4 (examining social change in the 1960s and 1970s and both the courts' role and governmental reactions).


70. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (invalidating an act requiring addressees to affirmatively notify post office of their desire to receive foreign communist political propaganda).
And, of course, historically, the First Amendment was entirely useless in protecting the speech rights of African-Americans.\textsuperscript{71}

Given the Court's historic support of governmental repression of dissident speech, how did criticism of the Vietnam War flourish, and how has muted criticism of the War in Iraq been protected? The answer is that both elites and regular citizens were divided over both wars, increasing the political costs of repression. When elite elected officials and media organizations (such as \textit{The New York Times} and the \textit{Washington Post}) take up the cause of political dissent it is likely to be better protected than when such elite support is missing. In such situations there will be both fewer governmental attempts at repression and less judicial support for them. This suggests, however, that it is political support, not judicial action, which protects political dissent.

Perhaps no case more powerfully and poignantly illustrates the Court's unwillingness to protect even the most fundamental civil liberties and civil rights as \textit{Korematsu v. United States}.\textsuperscript{72} In this World War II era case, the Court upheld the conviction of Mr. Korematsu for remaining in a military control area in violation of an executive order requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast be evacuated from the area.\textsuperscript{73} As commentators have repeatedly pointed out, none of the 112,000–120,000 people subject to the order, including approximately 70,000 U.S. citizens, were charged with a crime.\textsuperscript{74} No evidence was presented that they had violated any laws and no hearings were held. Yet they were all shipped to what were in essence prisoner-of-war camps, where they remained throughout the war. It is hard to imagine a more blatant violation of civil liberties. Indeed, in 1988 Congress agreed, enacting legislation giving all living survivors of the camps a $20,000 payment.\textsuperscript{75} In addition, Congress offered an apology: “For these fundamental violations of the basic civil liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation.”\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{71} See, e.g., \textit{Dred Scott}, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1856) (declining to extend the privileges and immunities of citizens to African-Americans because “it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects”).

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Korematsu v. United States}, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Id.} at 215–16.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.} at 215–16.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id.} at 215–16.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Id.} at 215–16.
As with civil rights, this brief history shows that historically the Court has supported repressive majorities against vulnerable minorities. Civil liberties have only been protected when there was more than a minimum of elite and popular support for them. Looking to the Court to protect core freedoms has not worked historically. Elliott Richardson put the point well, writing more than half a century ago:

The great battles for free expression will be won, if they are won, not in courts but in committee rooms and protest-meetings, by editorials and letters to Congress, and through the courage of citizens everywhere. The proper function of courts is narrow. The rest is our responsibility.\(^7\)

C. Economic Regulation

Throughout much of U.S. history the Court has been no friend of working people. Until the Court's capitulation in 1937 to democratic forces, it regularly and steadfastly sided with capital against labor, employers against employees, and with the wealthy against everyone else. In particular, at the end of the nineteenth century, it accepted the conservative call to read the Constitution to limit the power of government. This history is reasonably well-known. Consequently, this discussion is very brief.

In an 1886 book, Christopher Tiedeman, a professor of law at the University of Missouri, argued that the Constitution severely limited the power of government to regulate the economy.\(^8\) In the Preface he described the threat the wealthy faced, attacked democracy as tyranny, and called upon the Court to protect conservative wealth and power:

Governmental interference is proclaimed and demanded everywhere as a sufficient panacea for every social evil which threaten[s] the prosperity of society. Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized world. The State is called on to protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to determine what wages a workman shall receive for his labor, and how many hours daily he shall labor. . . .


\(^8\) CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES vi–vii (1886).
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great army of discontents, and their apparent power, with the growth and development of universal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the conservative classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority.

The principal object of the present work is . . . to awaken the public mind to a full appreciation of the power of constitutional limitations to protect private rights against the radical experimentations of social reformers . . . .79

The Court accepted the invitation. Largely through a constricted reading of the Commerce Clause, and an expansive reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court had been unwilling to do to protect African-Americans), the Court stymied Progressive change for nearly half a century. For example, it invalidated the federal income tax in *Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.* in 1895.80 It prohibited Congress from outlawing child labor in two cases in 1918 and 1922.81 It denied that either Congress or the states had the power to regulate working hours82 or provide for a minimum wage.83 It prohibited Congress from requiring railroads to provide pensions84 and disallowed both Congress and the states from outlawing “yellow dog” contracts (contracts prohibiting union membership as a condition of employment).85 It took the Great Depression and the threat of FDR’s Court-packing plan, backed by enormous Democratic majorities in Congress, to break the Court’s protection of wealth from governmental regulation.

In civil rights, civil liberties and dissident speech, and economic regulation, the Court steadfastly protected privilege. Progressives crusaded against it. In fairness, however, the Court was not consistently

79. *Id.* at vi–viii.
that much worse than the other branches. The point is that it was no better, and as discussed in the next section, even when the Court became less hostile to Progressive causes, its decisions were not fully implemented—if implemented at all.

III. THE ILLUSION OF PROGRESS

An obvious response to the discussion of the historic role of the Court as a protector of privilege is that history is not destiny. Merely because the Court has acted in defense of privilege for most of its history does not mean it is destined to always so act. Indeed, many people believe the role of the Court fundamentally changed in the post-World War II era. The Court, many claim, became a great defender of the relatively disadvantaged.

While history may not determine the future, structural constraints limit it. 86 That is, it is more likely than not that the Court will consistently, over time, support conservative outcomes. This is the case for four main reasons. First, the appointment process means that federal judges, and particularly Supreme Court Justices, must be broadly acceptable. Presidents are unlikely to nominate radical Progressives and the Senate is even less likely to confirm such nominees. This is because Progressives lack the political support that would make their appointments broadly acceptable. Second, the Constitution is a conservative document. It protects private control over the allocation and distribution of resources. It does not provide for basic Progressive rights such as employment, health care, decent housing, adequate levels of welfare, or clean air. Third, the Court is constrained from pushing too far ahead of the positions of the other branches because it needs their support to implement its decisions and is susceptible to sanctions. Fourth, the Court lacks the power to implement its decisions. Thus, even if it overcomes the first three constraints and issues an opinion that furthers the Progressive agenda, that decision is unlikely to be implemented. This point is illustrated with brief discussion of three important cases.

86. See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 9–41 for further development of this argument.
A. The Victory That Wasn't: Brown v. Board of Education

*Brown v. Board of Education* may be the most well-known and widely celebrated case in Supreme Court history. In declaring that racial segregation of public schools was unconstitutional, the Court repudiated its prior, pro-segregation approach to the Constitution. This was clearly for the good but the question for Progressives is whether *Brown* made a difference in ending race-based segregation in public schools in particular, and racial discrimination more broadly. The answer is no.

On the most straight-forward level, public schools remained segregated after *Brown*. A decade after *Brown* virtually nothing had changed for African-American students living in the eleven states of the former Confederacy that required race-based school segregation by law. For example, in the 1963–1964 school year, barely one in one hundred (1.2%) of these African-American children was educated in a non-segregated school. That means that for nearly ninety-nine of every one hundred African-American children in the South a decade after *Brown*, the finding of a constitutional right changed nothing. Change did come to the South, but that occurred only after the Congress acted—providing monetary incentives for desegregation and threatening to cut off federal funds if segregation was maintained.

More subtly, there is little or no evidence that supports the claims that *Brown* gave civil rights salience, pressed political elites to act, pricked the consciences of whites, legitimated the grievances of blacks, or inspired the activists of the civil rights movement. What *Brown* did do was energize civil rights opponents and channel resources away from building the civil rights movement. In the wake of *Brown*, resistance to ending segregation increased in all areas, not merely in education but also in voting, transportation, and the use of public places. *Brown* "unleashed a wave of

88. For an extensive exploration of *Brown*’s lack of efficacy, see ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 42–169.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 205–06.
92. Id. at 207.
racism that reached hysterical proportions." By stiffening resistance to civil rights and raising fears before the activist phase of the civil rights movement was in place, Brown may actually have delayed the achievement of civil rights.

Litigation may also have delayed the achievement of civil rights by channeling resources toward litigation and away from political organizing. Progressive reformers always have scarce resources. There was great hostility over both fundraising and tactics between the NAACP and the groups that led the activist wing of the civil rights movement. As Martin Luther King, Jr. complained: "to accumulate resources for legal actions imposes intolerable hardships on the already overburdened."

In sum, Brown's constitutional mandate that racial segregation in public schools end confronted a culture opposed to that change. The American judicial system, constrained by the need for both elite and popular support, was unable to overcome this opposition.

B. The Decision That Didn't: Roe v. Wade

In many ways Roe fared better than Brown. That is, the number of legal abortions increased in the years following Roe—though at a slower rate—both numerically and percentage-wise, than in the years immediately preceding the decision. But they did so unevenly, with abortion services widely available in some states and virtually unobtainable in others. What explains both the increase in the number of legal abortions and the uneven availability of the constitutional right Roe proclaimed?

The number of legal abortions increased after Roe because there was public support for legal access to abortion, and demand for the service. A national abortion repeal movement was flourishing with widespread support among relevant professional elites and rapidly growing public support. By the eve of the Court's decisions, eighteen states had reformed their restrictive abortion laws to some degree. Indeed, in 1972, the year before the decision, there were nearly 600,000 legal abortions performed in the U.S. To the extent that Roe increased women's access to legal...

96. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 180 tbl.6.1.
abortion it did so because a grass-roots political movement had won many legislative victories and had dramatically influenced both elite and public opinion.

On the other hand, Roe faced the same problem as Brown—the existing institutions necessary to implement the decisions (hospitals in the case of abortion) refused to do so. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of both public and private, short-term, non-Catholic hospitals, have never performed an abortion. Like public schools and desegregation, the existing institutions ignored the law. Constitutional rights were protected under law, but denied in practice. However, in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, the Court struck down Georgia’s requirement that all abortions be performed in accredited hospitals. This allowed market forces to meet the demand for abortion services by opening abortion clinics. Pro-choice activists, feminists, and doctors, who wanted to expand their practices, were relatively free to respond to the demand. Clinics could and did open to implement the decision.

The problem with market mechanisms is that they implement rights unevenly. This is principally because they are dependent on local beliefs and culture. In places where political leaders or large segments of the population oppose abortion, it is less likely that such clinics will open. Thus, the availability of abortion services varies widely across the country. Considering that the Court has held that women have a fundamental constitutional right to obtain abortions, the drawbacks to the market mechanism as a way to implement constitutional rights are important. The availability of a market mechanism can help implement Court decisions, but cannot guarantee them.

In addition to only providing limited access to legal abortion, Roe, like Brown, appears to have strengthened the losers in the case—the anti-abortion forces—and weakened the winners. The fledgling anti-abortion movement grew enormously after Roe and the pro-choice movement that had been able to change laws in eighteen states collapsed. One of the results of the collapse was the lack of pressure on local institutions to provide abortion services. This history suggests that if Roe is overturned there may be a massive mobilization of pro-choice forces. While at least some states may prohibit abortion, these are likely to be states where, under Roe, abortion services are virtually impossible to obtain.

97. Id. at 190.
99. Id. at 194.
In sum, the finding of a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy has not guaranteed access to abortion for women. It derailed the pro-choice movement and energized its opponents. As the executive director of a Missoula, Montana, abortion clinic destroyed by arson in 1993 put it: "It does no good to have the [abortion] procedure be legal if women can't get it."100

C. The Opinion That Backfired: Goodridge v. Department of Public Health101

Goodridge, perhaps more than any other modern case, highlights the folly of Progressives turning to litigation in the face of legislative hostility. In Goodridge, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the state could not deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.102 This decision followed an earlier decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court that the state's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages, absent a compelling justification, violated the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws,103 and a decision of the Vermont Supreme Court that essentially forced the Vermont legislature to enact civil unions.104

The result of these judicial victories has been nothing short of disastrous for the right to same-sex marriage. The people of Hawaii effectively overturned their court's decision by constitutional amendment. Then, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the so-called Defense of Marriage Act denying all the federal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.105 Many states followed suit, and as of the 2004 election, at least thirty-nine states had adopted measures designed to prevent the recognition of same-sex marriage.106 Even worse, there was a movement to limit marriage to heterosexual couples by amending both the federal and state constitutions. While a federal amendment has yet to be passed by Congress, every constitutional amendment presented to state voters has been approved—in

102. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
almost all cases by lopsided majorities. As 2004 came to a close, more than one-third of all states, representing close to one-quarter of the American population, had banned same-sex marriage by constitutional amendment. With several constitutional amendments on ballots in 2006, and perhaps in 2008, more states are likely to join the list.

What happened? The answer is simple. Same-sex marriage proponents had not built a successful movement that could persuade their fellow citizens to support their cause and pressure political leaders to change the law. Without such a movement behind them, winning these court cases sparked an enormous backlash. They confused a judicial pronouncement of rights with the attainment of those rights. The battle for same-sex marriage would have been better served if they had never brought litigation, or had lost their cases. Now, they must either convince majorities in more than one-third of the states to remove the constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage that have just been added or hope that the U.S. Supreme Court will strike down prohibitions on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. This is a daunting task—one that ought not to have been faced.

IV. WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? RETURNING TO PAST UNDERSTANDINGS

The sad story of the turn to litigation by same-sex marriage proponents illustrates the current Progressive failure to understand that successful social change requires building social movements. From Brown to Roe to Goodridge the Progressive agenda was hijacked by a group of elite, well-educated and comparatively wealthy lawyers who uncritically believed that rights trump politics and that successfully arguing before judges is equivalent to building and sustaining political movements. Litigation is an elite, class-based strategy for change.107 It is premised on the notion that it is easier to persuade similarly educated and wealthy lawyers who happen to be judges of certain liberal principles than to organize everyday citizens. That might be true but without broad citizen support change will not occur.

Litigation substitutes symbols for substance. The collapse of the pro-

107. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted more than a century and a half ago, lawyers are elitist by training. He wrote: "hidden at the bottom of a lawyer's soul one finds some of the tastes and habits of an aristocracy. . . . [American lawyers] conceive a great distaste for the behavior of the multitude and secretly scorn the government of the people." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1848).
choice movement after Roe is a perfect illustration as it remains the case that for many women abortion services are difficult to find. Similarly, the growing re-segregation of the nation's public schools is occurring at a time when Brown has achieved almost mythical, symbolic status. The danger of celebrating a symbol is that it can lead to a sense of self-satisfaction and insensitivity to actual practice. Seen in this light, Brown is "little more than an ornament, or golden cupola, built upon the roof of a structure found rotting and infested, assuring the gentlefolk who only pass by without entering that all is well inside." Celebrating legal symbols encourages us to look to legal solutions for political and cultural problems. Without political support, court decisions will not produce social change. To valorize lawyers and courts encourages reformers to litigate for social change. But if political support is lacking, the effect of this vision is to limit change by deflecting claims for reform away from substantive political battles, where success is possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not. In this way, courts play a deeply conservative ideological function in defense of the status quo. When social reformers succumb to the "lure of litigation" they forget that deep-seated social conflicts cannot be resolved through litigation.

Today, there is some hope that Progressives may be turning away from litigation as a strategy for change. The cause, alas, is not a re-learning of historical lessons and an understanding of the limitations on courts and the need for political mobilization. Rather, it is a realization that the current Supreme Court is unlikely to promote progressive principles. If this were the only effect of a conservative Court it would be a good thing. The problem, of course, is that even if courts are limited in their ability to help Progressives, they have more room to do damage. Courts are not symmetrically constrained from furthering both progressive and conservative change. This is because typically Progressives are asking courts to require change while Conservatives are supporting the status quo. Further, it is easier to dismantle Progressive programs than to create them. For example, with Justice Alito replacing Justice O'Connor, affirmative action plans may be found to be unconstitutional. We are now in a position where courts can be an obstacle to change.

None of this means that law is irrelevant or that courts can never further the goals of the relatively disadvantaged. For the civil rights

108. Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court 1969 Term—Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1970). Tigar wrote these words specifically about the Warren Court's criminal rights decisions but they are more generally applicable.
movement, for example, courts played an important role in keeping the sit-in movement going, ending the Montgomery bus boycott by providing the boycotters with leverage, furthering school desegregation by threatening to cut off federal funds under Title VI, and upholding affirmative action programs. But in each case courts were effective because a political movement was supporting change. The analysis does mean that courts acting alone, as in *Brown* or *Goodridge*, are structurally constrained from furthering the goals of the relatively disadvantaged.

As Progressives look to the future, they must understand that American courts are not all-powerful institutions. They were designed with severe limitations and placed in a political system of divided powers. To rely on litigation rather than political mobilization, as difficult as it may be, misunderstands both the limits of courts and the lessons of history. It substitutes symbols for substance and clouds our vision with a naive and romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics. And while romance and even naïveté have their charms, they are no substitute for substantive change.
DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): At this point, I would like to open it up to our fellow speakers for comments, questions, and various thoughts.

PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: I just want to say to start, I do not know how many of you have read Professor Rosenberg's book *The Hollow Hope*, but it is really a seminal part of the discourse on the role of courts; if you have not, you ought to. I think he really made a contribution as far as changing the terms of the debate, particularly on the left.

Having said that, I do wonder some about the kind of images of social change that Professor Rosenberg uses—it sounds from his account like pro-choice, gay rights, or civil rights litigators are hopelessly naive and expect that the courts are going to be the only place where they can fight their battles.

I think these groups are much more sophisticated and see litigation as only one strategy among several that could be pursued. I also wonder if you might talk a little bit about litigation as part of a dynamic set of interactions where there are courts, legislatures, and cultural strategies and how you analyze the role of the courts in the context of these multiple forces.

For example, you used the *Roe v. Wade* example to say, "Well, what happened when pro-choice forces won that court victory is they sort of went to sleep on the politics." I am not really sure that is true, number one. Number two, suppose there was no *Roe v. Wade*. Justice Ginsburg has made the argument that if the political process had just sort of produced the change over time, and this seemed to be where things were heading, that there would not be a pro-life movement. I personally doubt that. I think it would have reached a point where it was obvious where things were going, and people who felt very passionately about it on the other
side would have risen up.

Now, they would not have had the Court to beat up. It would not have been a conversation about judicial activism, but I think—and we can take the same thing—and I will talk about this in the same-sex marriage context—there would be opposition to it.

So, there might be something equally caricatured about assuming that these debates are really only about the institutional question of who does what. So let me throw a bunch of stuff at you to comment on.

**PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG:** Thank you. These are really useful comments. One of the responses I often hear from progressive lawyers is just what Professor Schacter said, “Well, of course we are more sophisticated. This is part of a multi-tiered strategy.” And I say, “Oh. Well, that’s interesting. What have you been doing on the rest of the strategy? What part of your budget goes to this?” And they respond: “We are really not doing much now, but we are depending on other people.” So I do not believe it. I want to see the numbers and the expenditures. I think this is a line we get from lawyers who realize that there is at least some literature that suggests that courts cannot solve all their problems, and they give lip service to it. I think this is an empirical question worthy of investigation.

Are there going to be some groups who actually do have litigation as part of a multi-faceted strategy? I am sure that there are. But my concern is too many groups are not really serious about this commitment. Now, I think abortion is a fascinating issue, and Professor Schacter brought up a couple of things: One, there probably would have been a counter-mobilization regardless of whether there was a *Roe* because that is the nature of the issue and it is the substance that matters; not the institution that produces it. And she also asks, “What if there was no decision—what if the Court had punted with *Roe*?” Again, with these counterfactuals, we don’t know. But what was so interesting was that eighteen states had reformed their laws prior to *Roe*. There was a national movement. It was going state by state. Pro-choice proponents were fighting the issue politically.

I recall the response of anti-abortion forces in New York, when the
New York legislature legalized abortion in 1970; there was some backlash, but it was not to the extent that we saw after Roe. My concern here—and I was going to bring this up in the discussion over your paper, is that I do not know if there is a difference between reactions to decisions by different branches, but I suspect that there is. It is an empirical question, and here is why: I think when the legislature decides something, it's an opinion reached by elected officials who, in turn, have to go out and try to get reelected. What this means is that a decision is more likely to represent the majority opinion. When courts decide things, for better or worse, I think that many Americans feel they are unaccountable. They feel helpless. They feel there's little they can do. And that creates a sense of outrage. Now, again, I think this is a great empirical question, and I am trying to figure out how one could study it.

What if there was no Roe? Well, we may get to find out. As we are talking we are probably one vote away, and there is an article by Jeff Rosen that is coming out in the Atlantic Monthly on this very question. My best guess is after a short period of uncertainty, the laws will look about like how they look today. Will South Dakota ban abortion? Maybe. There are only 800 abortions performed in that state at the moment. Many women from South Dakota who seek abortions leave the state. I am not sure much will change. But, we may get to find out.

PROFESSOR JOHN EASTMAN: I want to pick up on the abortion point because I am from California, and we were at the lead of the liberalization movement. But what most people forget is that pre-Roe, California was starting to retrench a little bit. I do not see that as a negative throwback; I see that as part of the political conversation—"We reacted in a genuinely compassionate way to the stories of abortions in Mexico or backrooms. We may have overreacted." We are forgetting that there's a bit of a balancing act that needs to go on here. There are clearly legitimate and maybe even compelling interests on both sides of this equation, and we need to try and find some solution that takes into account the concerns of both sides.”

Now, it's a very interesting political debate that was occurring. Now, you may end up with a majority-supported rule, or a deliberative rule that is even broader than the majority on fundamental questions like this; and even people that lost the political fight feel that they have had a say. This
was going on until Roe, and then Roe shut that conversation off.

I will talk a little bit about it in my paper, but I think Planned Parenthood v. Casey basically shows that the Court is not even going to respond to the political opposition. That would question the legitimacy of the Court, and it shows how intent the Court was on shutting that sort of conversation off. So I think there’s much to that argument.

The second point I want to ask is, you make the argument that the courts are ineffective in bringing about social change, but I wonder if you might be even stronger than that and argue that they actually have a negative impact because the courts have taken on the role of final arbiter, and the elective branches now somehow think that they have no obligation whatsoever to pursue these matters. This becomes particularly clear in First Amendment cases. The argument is “We do not need to worry about whether our campaign finance law restricts First Amendment rights. The Court will decide that. I can vote for it, even though I think it is probably unconstitutional and even though the authors of the bill on the floor are saying, ‘Yeah. This is probably unconstitutional. We will let the Court sort that out.’” This approach really takes the other two branches out of play altogether. And if the courts then take a pass, as I think they have done in a number of the First Amendment cases, we are worse off than we were at the beginning.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Thank you. I want to encourage my other panelists to get involved, but let me respond in two ways. A graduate student of mine finally did a project that I have been trying to get a student to do for about a decade, which is to take a look at newspaper coverage of abortion, starting in the mid-1960s through the 1990s. I had a theory that the way in which abortion was talked about changed after Roe. My student looked at the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal editorials, in particular, and what he found is that pre-Roe, much of the focus is on women’s health; but post-Roe, it is all about rights. And so the discourse changed, and changed away from an area in which I think it is easier for people to deliberate and reach some kind of consensus to a debate where it is now much harder to do so. So I think this study supports what you are saying.
On your second point, there’s an old argument credited to a Harvard Law Professor by the name of Thayer, that when the Court gets involved in a constitutional matter, it removes the issue from democratic deliberation. It gives elected officials a free pass. They do not have to deal with it, and they can be less responsible. I think that is an empirical question. I really have not seen a good study on this issue. I think that it is at least plausible. It sounds intuitively right to me, but the empiricalist in me wants to be very careful here.

PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: Let me jump in on one point that responds to both of the last comments. I think we have to be careful not to adopt an overly romanticized picture of the legislative process where we have this wonderful conversation and all interests are represented and everybody feels they were treated fairly and had their say. You know, much of what we know about contemporary politics does not support this image—look at the rates of who is really engaged in politics. It is really a game of organized groups. Now, on a few issues—like choice—there are active people on both sides. But on lots of other issues, including some issues that the courts take up, there either are not active groups across the board or there is a tremendous skew in resources.

So we can go back to some of our basic ideas and worry a little bit about how the political process operates. I saw a recent study by political scientist Martin Gilens at Princeton about levels of democratic responsiveness. He looked at a bunch of issues where a poor and more affluent people agree and disagree. Where they disagree, it is tremendously more likely that the legislative process will respond to the more affluent. So much of what we know about the political process, I think, should make us give pause about overvaluing what will come out of it, what does come out of it, and the people’s sense of its legitimacy. We live in a time where there is tremendous cynicism about the political process, which does not necessarily build up the court side, but we should be realistic.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: That last point I think is right. What are many litigators for progressive causes saying? They say, “Look. There’s no way we are going to convince the legislature today or in the foreseeable future”—which is probably correct. “So, therefore, we have to go to court.” It’s the “so, therefore” that makes no sense. It only makes
sense if there is a good reason to believe (a) you can win, and (b) that victory will translate into change. Without that, even if you're right that the legislature will not produce what you want, you need to have another strategy.

Now, sometimes that's very hard. What I want to say to same-sex marriage proponents, unfortunately, is: "Litigation is not going to work for you. You are unlikely to convince many state legislatures. You did in California, but the governor did not help you there, so you have got to think of other strategies." Now, people will respond and say, "Wait a minute. My rights are at stake, and you're telling me I have to wait?" It is a very hard thing to say. But I'm afraid that the reality and the structural limitations on courts make that an accurate statement.

PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: If I can intervene. The way you have structured this argument actually makes a lot of sense to me. I do not necessarily agree with the conclusions you have reached, but I do agree that one should focus on what the limitations on courts are—on the process of the judicial branch and the powers of judicial branches—as this is critically important. The vocabulary within which that process takes place, when you shift from vocabulary of politics to vocabulary of rights is also important. This then narrows the range of options that seem to be available. But it is important also to remember that when you are talking about the Constitution, you are talking mainly in the context of the federal courts. Many state courts are quite responsive to the electorate. My state court (Texas) is, for example, quite responsive to the electorate because they have to get elected. And so the question of where politics come in and how you use the language of rights essentially to mark out the boundaries of politics, I think is really important and needs to be examined so that progressive litigation does two things: One, it might produce a change in a particular case, but it also can change the way in which people talk about the politics of that issue.

I will take an example. Marian Edelman, who was my first boss, had a very sensible approach to litigation. We would go down to Mississippi, and we would litigate. During the day we would be in the courts, but at night, until we could not do it anymore, we would be organizing in the community. Her theory was that we were going to go back to Washington, and we were going to leave the people of Jackson and other places with whatever we did. And they better be ready to support and defend their own victory.
So in fact, it is complex. When you look at the reality of progressive litigation and the role of the courts, it is actually a more complicated story than just a naked belief in the capacity of the courts to produce change. What’s missing I think is the discussion or the explanation of the link that explains the theory of change that you are talking about.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Right. I wish Mark Tushnet would not have been delayed for many reasons. But one is, in his paper he has a very interesting argument about what he calls “off-the-wall constitutional claims.” And he says what makes something off-the-wall is not legal, but social and without a kind of social movement, you cannot make those kinds of rights claims in a state court. So he would say it is more complicated when you have that kind of social movement and change in conceptions, then you can go to state court, and what was viewed as off-the-wall at one point is now seen as more mainstream.

Now, Marian Wright Edelman is unique in many ways, and one of them, I think, is the experience you have described. If you look at the NAACP budgets, they were spending somewhere between twenty and fifty times as much money on litigation as they were on other strategies.

PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: But you cannot look at the NAACP’s budget without looking at the budget and the organization of SCLC, for example.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Yes, but the SCLC did not believe in courts.

PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: But their lack of belief in courts and belief in organization gave the Inc. Fund the freedom to pursue its strategy in the courts. And so if you look at not just as what the Inc. Fund was doing but, in fact, what the movement for black rights in the South was doing, it’s a more complicated picture.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: I agree with this: You have a number of groups that are working for the same goal, employing different strategies, but they often do not cooperate. There is a lot of hostility between . . .

PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: That is politics.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: No, here is the point: If you’re litigating, you cannot rely on the hope that there are going to be other groups having other strategies. If that is your theory, you’ve got to coordinate; otherwise you end up with the same-sex marriage situation, which I think has been a disaster.

PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: Well, it may have been a disaster, but it is not for lack of coordination. The human rights campaign, LAMBDA, and all the major legal groups are by no means restricting themselves to the courts. They are heavily involved in organizing in the fifty states. And I do not think it is descriptively accurate—they may have made a bad tactical decision and maybe the calculation to press forward with litigation was wrong—I do not disagree with your bottom line—to say they have not thought about the legislative side.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Perhaps. I remember about ten years ago having a very heated discussion with Evan Wolfson, one of the main litigators. And he went on and on about how litigation is a last resort. We have to have a whole strategy, we have to invest most of our resources, and he hasn’t done any of that. All he’s done is litigate with disastrous results.

PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: Now, I do not think that’s true, either. He has actually spearheaded a movement. It may not be particularly effective, but it is sort of about public education. The other thing about same-sex marriage is that when the Hawaii case was brought in the early 1990s, it was not brought by any of the organized gay rights groups. The movement did not make a decision, “Now is the time for same-sex marriage.” An entrepreneurial lawyer brought a case that had unexpected success in the Hawaii Supreme Court that just unleashed a set
of events. Sometimes movements pushing for social change are not easily controlled.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Right.

PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: So it actually can be understood as maybe a debatable set of decisions about how to respond to it. But not as a decision with just full force in the courts with a consequences be damned mentality.

PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: I think it is also important to think carefully about how you define a victory as not every defeat in court is in fact, a defeat; and conversely not every victory in court is a victory. It is only from the context of politics that you can reframe or consider this question. Let me give you an example: The unreported case of Delgado v. Bastrop ISD. Under the Texas constitution they were supposed to equalize school funding and not racially discriminate, and they had Mexican schools in Texas. And so the kids—or the parents from Bastrop—argued that this is a Mexican school, and it ought to be funded equally. Well, what the court did is to say, "If that is true, if they are segregated on the basis of race and the funding is unequal, then it ought to be changed." And the response was, "Well, we never really thought Mexicans were a different race, and so we changed the name from Bastrop Mexican School to the Bastrop School." And since there is no obligation for us to respond to class-based differences in funding, these are just the breaks—so it is a defeat.

On the other hand, what it does is cause people to start thinking about school funding as a class-based matter. So now you have race on one hand and class on the other, and this caused people worried about funding public education to think about different strategies. So it was a defeat, but not really, because it did change the frame in which the politics of school finance went forward—which we are still fighting over. In fact, we are about to start a special session in Texas any minute now and continue this fight.
PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): If I could just ask you a question as well. I am struck by the sort of zero-sum view you have of resources. You sort of seem to have an argument that, "Well, if you do not put the resources into litigation, you could put it into the legislature." As a former civil rights lawyer, my experience was that a victory in litigation—and you don't always win—generates funding, and there is an energizing effect. In your book you discuss the catalyst effect, and you do some really important empirical analysis. But you mentioned apartheid. Even in South Africa, where I have friends who have litigated, they talk about the energizing effect to their litigation effort in South Africa of the Brown decision. And so when an organization like the LDF has an important success, it generates funding. I do not have empirical evidence as to the amounts, but it just seems commonsensical that when you do have some of these victories, you are going to generate funding, and that funding can be used not just for litigation but for legislation which means that it is not a completely zero-sum game.

I suppose one argument on the other side is that Brown and the actions of LDF energized the right so that now the right has groups like the LDF. But the LDF formula for doing things had an influence regardless of how one sees Brown. So I would be curious to know what you think about that.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Yeah. It used to be that my mailbox was full of requests for money saying, "Look. We just won this great case. Look at what great work we are doing. Send us your checks." The question becomes what other organizing tools are there? Often groups litigate cases to raise money, but there are other ways of raising money. For example, the NAACP at the time of Brown, started a major fundraising campaign that was independent of Brown—just the timing happened to work that way—and it brought in substantially more money than past efforts. So to me, it is not merely the case—it is an organization's choice to go out on a campaign to raise money, and it seems to me they can choose other avenues to do so. Now, cases are useful because you can more likely win here than in the legislature; so, yes, you can use it to raise money, but you can also do other things. And my concern is the negative costs that you raised. But I agree, and Professor Schacter often talks about caution in using context, and I agree with that maxim, and I have been ignoring it. A lot of the comments I think have been very useful in trying to take my broad brush and make it a little finer. I do not disagree with the
spirit, although I sometimes disagree with the examples.

PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): Why don’t we see if there are some audience questions?

ED MANSFIELD (Audience): Professor Rosenberg, as I listen to your review of history, it seemed to me you were kind of making two different points. One is that there is sort of an inherent limitation in the ability of the Court that makes them unable to successfully bring about social change. But the other point you seem to be making is that there have been some bad decisions over the years; and maybe if you had the right people in the courts, you would get better decisions that would bring about social change. Are there two different points you are making, or is this just one?

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: I think that is a good question. Sorry for the confusion. I think there are two different points, but they come together. And you use the word “bad people.” I would say people not committed to a progressive agenda. My point is, I think structurally you are unlikely to get courts full of people committed to a progressive agenda. And if you do, you will not need the Court at that point because you’ll have a political system that is committed to that agenda. But I think they’re both important. Then the other strand, I was attempting to point out that even when you win, there are many constraints that make it unclear or uncertain whether that decision will be implemented.

PROFESSOR RUSSELL LOVELL (Audience): Gerry, it seems to me that you have made the point that progressive lawyers are naive to think that the courts are always going to be a faction of social change. But really, is not the larger point to be found not in terms of realizing that a broad-based remedial strategy is always present, but that it also recognizes the human dynamic? You did not talk about prison reform litigation. But it seems to me that this was a perfect example of progress that almost never would have happened in the legislative process. There just was no constituency to mobilize that faction, and if Warren Burger who had preceded the conservatives had opened the door to the federal courts and litigation, reform would not have happened. Now, I recognize that there
was backlash and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of '95 has kind of halted that, but you have to look for these windows of opportunity. There was about a twenty year window, and it did effectuate some really dramatic changes.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Prison reform is a really interesting area. I do, actually, write about it in the book and what I suggest is that there are four conditions which, if any one is met, it then makes sense for progressives to litigate. One of them is when the key administrators or people who are required to implement the decision either support the aims of the litigation or see it as a way of leveraging other resources. So one of the things you find in a lot of the prison litigation is that the named defendants are actually the plaintiffs. What these prison administrators are trying to do is gain more resources to upgrade their prisons and they do not think they can get them from the legislatures, so they basically work hand in glove with the plaintiffs to see if they can lose cases and then use that as leverage. Ed Rubin, the dean of Vanderbilt, and Malcolm Feeley have a really interesting book that focuses just on prison litigation.

The second point was that there were forces at the time very concerned about prison conditions, and one of them was the organization of prison administrators. Now, they were unable to get many resources until the litigation, but their commitment made litigation a good idea. I do not know. Does that respond at all? I think I am coming a long way toward your position.

PROFESSOR RUSSELL LOVELL (Audience): I think your point that oftentimes administrators or legislatures utilize or leverage federal court decisions to shift the political heat to the courts is certainly a reality. And I think that there are also times where defendants who maybe would not have staked their political career on making the change or working for it, but where it would not inhibit or resist the change. On the other hand, there were certainly many schools or prisons that deeply resisted and without the courts and their enforcement power.

PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Right. Well, on the other hand, often in those cases change has been slow and has been much less
than the courts have ordered. But I think we basically agree, actually.

**PROFESSOR MARK KENDE** (Moderator): I think we have time for one more question.

**DENNIS GOLDFORD** (Audience): Given that judges get on the bench either because they themselves are elected or they are appointed or confirmed by people who are elected, you can make the point, that if your political movement needs the aid of the courts, you are probably not going to find favorable courts in the first place. And if you are going to find favorable courts, you did not really need them in the first place. But if that is the case, are you basically saying goodbye to Justice Jackson’s argument that the very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to take certain matters out of the electoral process. What is left for the courts to do, at least the federal courts, other than decide separation of powers issues in federal cases?

**PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG**: I think the response is an empirical one, and I think that the Bill of Rights does not particularly matter because the courts seldom defend it, and when they do, the decisions are not implemented. One of the interesting things I do with my law students is ask how many of them said prayers in their public school classes, and it is usually about a third of the class. You know, the last time I checked, that was unconstitutional, but it happens all over the place. So I am a Bill of Rights skeptic.

**DENNIS GOLDFORD** (Audience): So in a sense, you come at the same position from the left that many on the right come from?

**PROFESSOR ROSENBERG**: Yes, but for different reasons. Very different reasons.