Civil Procedure as the Regulation of Externalities: Toward a New Theory of Civil Litigation

Ronen Avraham
William H.J. Hubbard

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics

Part of the Law Commons
Civil Procedure as the Regulation of Externalities: Toward a New Theory of Civil Litigation

Ronen Avraham & William H.J. Hubbard

Civil procedure serves a multitude of goals, from regulating the cost of fact gathering, to dictating the rules of advocacy in court, to promoting public participation in trials. To what extent can procedural design serve them all, or must rules sacrifice some interests to serve others? In this paper, we are the first to introduce a theory of procedure design that answers this question. We build upon the fundamental insight that the goals of civil procedure, as varied as they are, all occupy a common conceptual space—each addresses an externality, positive or negative, that litigation creates. This insight allows us to tie together distinct strands of scholarship on procedural design, develop a taxonomy of externalities that civil procedure addresses, and propose (sometimes radical) reforms that would allow procedure to serve more of its goals at once.

First, we show that the literature on procedural design has unraveled into three distinct strands. The first strand centers on the interest in reducing cost and delay in litigation. The second strand centers on the interests in limiting gamesmanship between the parties and improving court accuracy in decisionmaking. The third strand centers on the many related interests in the positive effects of procedure on society such as the development of legal precedent, deterring unwanted (primary) behavior and so on.

Second, we tie together these strands of the literature by observing that each strand is focused on how procedure can address one type of externality. The first strand of the literature addresses what we call system externalities—the effects of actions on other cases in the same court or court system. The second strand addresses what we call strategic externalities—the effects of a party’s actions on opposing parties in the same case. The third strand implicate external effects on society as a whole, which we call public goods externalities.

Third and most ambitiously, we show that these three types of externalities give us a three-dimensional framework for procedural design. In this framework, we see how different aspects of procedure implicate one externality, or another, or two or three externalities at once. This in turn points the way toward opportunities to introduce procedural reforms tailored to types of externalities at issue. Our solutions range from surprising forms of judicial command-and-control (for example, the Supreme Court prohibiting parties from settling), to fees and subsidies (for example, a fund for judicially appointed neutral experts in important cases), to radical market-based reforms (for example, a cap-and-trade market in word limits for amicus briefs in the Supreme Court).

1 Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law; Lecturer, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
2 Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. We are grateful for comments from Bob Bone, Alon Klement, Shay Lavie, Jay Tidmarsh, Diego Zambrano, and participants at the Law Faculty Workshops at the University of Chicago, the University of Notre Dame, Tel Aviv University, and the University of Texas School of Law, as well as the ALEA Annual Meetings. We thank Ramon Feldbrin, Kathryn Garcia, Sakina Haji, Deanna Hall, Adam Picker, Jill Rogowski, and Kelly Yin for valuable research assistance. William Hubbard thanks the Paul H. Leffmann Fund and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund for research support. An earlier version of this paper was titled "Procedural Flexibility in Three Dimensions."
I. INTRODUCTION

What is civil procedure for? Scholars have long debated the goals of the civil procedure system. Many interests spring to mind: facilitating fast and low-cost dispute resolution; enabling truth-seeking at trial; tamping down gamesmanship and oppressive behavior between disputants; deterring unwanted (primary) behavior by potential defendants; facilitating the development of legal precedent; providing a public forum to aggrieved parties; increasing government transparency; democratic participation (through civil juries); and strengthening courts’ legitimacy as an organ of the coercive power of the state.

It is uncontroversial that these interests both should and do motivate the design of civil procedure. But the proliferation of these undergirding interests presents two fundamental questions. First, which procedures actually advance one or another of these interests? Second, how can a coherent system of procedure accommodate multiple interests when they conflict?

---

For many specific procedural design choices, answering the first question answers the second, because interests align. For example, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the forms of action in 1938, this simplification of procedure both reduced the costs of pleading and opportunities for gamesmanship. As another example, the norm that judges publicly announce major decisions in written orders both generates legal precedent and makes outcomes of court proceedings more transparent. And some specific design choices may serve one interest in isolation, with no adverse effect on other interests. That judges sit on elevated benches or wear black robes may reinforce the (perceived) legitimacy of the court but seems neutral with respect to other goals for the civil process.

For many other aspects of procedure, answering these fundamental questions is not easy. For example, jury trials in civil cases foster democratic participation in government processes, and broad, party-driven discovery seeks to uncover the facts underlying substantive claims, but both inflate the cost of civil litigation and multiply opportunities for gamesmanship. Thus, even if there is agreement about the descriptive question of which procedures promote which interests, there remains the normative question of how to select among design choices, each of which serves some values but diserves others. In these circumstances, debates about procedure seem to reduce to debates over whether to weigh some values more and other values less. Yet debates over first principles may be intractable.

Perhaps as a consequence, the literature on procedural design has unraveled into three distinct strands, each focusing on particular subset of the values underlying civil procedure. The first contribution of this paper is to recognize this division in the literature—a taxonomy that we will argue will be useful in constructing a framework to bring the literature back together again. We introduce this basic taxonomy in Part II. The first strand, which has been a primary focus of judicial attention in recent years, centers on the interest in

---

4 “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
6 “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Advisory Committee Notes.
reducing cost and delay in litigation. The second strand, which has been the primary focus of a theoretical law-and-economics literature, centers on the interests in limiting gamesmanship between the parties and improving court accuracy in decisionmaking. The third strand, which represents by far the largest share of the academic literature, centers on various positive effects of procedure on society: the development of legal precedent, public resolution of disputes of social significance, deterring unwanted (primary) behavior, the transparent and legitimate exercise of government power, and democratic participation in the legal system.

What is missing is a framework for reconciling potentially divergent interests when making choices about procedural design. Without such a framework, it is easy to assume that a procedural design choice boils down to the question of prioritizing one value over another. For example, if we care more about reducing congestion in courts, we should encourage litigants to settle; but if we care more about producing precedents that will benefit society at large, we should do the opposite.

But are such trade-offs between interests inevitable? For rulemakers, does the choice between one option and another boil down to a judgment about which interests to promote and which to sacrifice? In this paper, we argue that the answer is no. Rather, good procedural design seeks solutions that can simultaneously serve multiple interests. But there exists no conceptual framework to facilitate the search for such solutions.

Our goal in this paper is to develop a theory of procedural design that provides this framework. We begin by tying together the three strands of the procedural design literature. Part III presents this paper’s first key insight, which is that each strand of the literature focuses on one type of externality. The concerns that animate civil procedure—from reducing cost and delay, to promoting fair play and transparency, to preserving the legitimacy of the courts—can all be understood as different types of positive and negative externalities.

Consider again the example of going to trial rather than settling. An individual party asks whether a trial improves the expected value of the suit (relative to settlement) and whether this improvement exceeds the expected costs. Missing from this calculation is the effects of the action on everyone else: the costs of trial to the opponent, the court, and the witnesses; the opportunity for civil participation through jury trial; the chance for a judicial order and appellate review that would generate legal precedent; or what law-and-economics-oriented scholars will consider most important of all: deterrence of socially undesirable (primary) behavior. All these costs and benefits of going to trial are “external” to the party’s cost-benefit calculation. They are, in a word, externalities.

__________________________
8 See Part II.A.
9 See Part II.B.
10 See Part II.C.
In the first strand of the literature, the interest in reducing cost and delay implicates external effects on other cases in the same court or court system. We call these external effects system externalities. The problem in this context is that parties are thinking about their own cases, but not other cases in the same court. (Analogies in other contexts are polluters not taking into account their effects on neighbors, or drivers on a congested road not taking into account their contribution to other drivers’ delays.)

In the second strand, the interests in avoiding the use of procedure as a cudgel implicates external effects on opposing parties in the same case. We call these external effects strategic externalities. Here, the problem is not that parties are oblivious to their effect on other cases, but the inverse: they are too keenly aware of the effects of their procedural moves on their own case. (An analogy outside the procedure context would be a monopolist lobbying for expensive and unnecessary regulation, so that potential competitors cannot afford to enter the industry. This is profit-maximizing for the monopolist, but costly and wasteful for competitors and consumers.)

And in the third strand, the numerous interests in legitimacy, norm-creation, deterrence, democratic participation, and so on implicate external effects on society as a whole. We call these external effects public goods externalities. (An analogy might be scientific innovation or artistic creation that generates ideas that others can freely copy.)

Regardless of the precise type of externality, all prescriptions for improving outcomes when faced with an externality boil down to the same basic essence: implement a policy that ensures that the party creating the externality will “internalize” the externality, or, barring that, impose command-and-control regulation (i.e., mandates or prohibitions) to better align behavior that fails to account for the externality. If it is a negative externality, that means that the actor must bear the costs that she is imposing on others. If it is a positive externality, then the actor must gain the benefits that she is conferring on others. When both types of externalities occur simultaneously, actors might be required to bear some costs while gaining some benefits.

The externalities framework equips us with a single, unifying principle to guide judgments about procedural design. A key idea that we develop in this article is that the interests at stake in each strand of the literature are not diametrically opposed. Rather, they each represent different “dimensions” of externalities—more of one externality doesn’t necessarily mean less of the others.

This means that procedural design choices do not necessarily have to trade off one externality against another (for example, reductions in court congestion need not come at a cost of reduced public goods). Some design choices can improve the status quo along one dimension without compromising on other dimensions. In this way, procedural design can point toward positive-sum reforms, regardless of the values at stake.

Part IV introduces this paper’s second and more important main insight, which is that how procedure attempts to regulate externalities is intimately bound up with how procedure allocates discretion and flexibility among
participants in the system. Not all cases are alike, and thus not all cases generate the same type or amount of externalities. Yet it is impossible for rulemakers to write procedural rules perfectly tailored to each individual case. Thus, when rulemakers create a system of procedural rules tailored to the typical case, recognizing that a one-size-fits-all system will create inefficiencies, they build procedural flexibility into the system. By giving judges or even the parties themselves discretion to modify the defaults in the rules, a well-designed system grants flexibility that better tailors procedure to the idiosyncratic needs of individual cases.

But modifications to procedural defaults (either by parties or the judge) carry with them not only potential benefits but also potential costs. As noted above, the interests that procedural design tries to promote all involve some form of externality. What this means is that parties or even judges who exercise flexibility based on their own sense of what is “best for them” will not necessary make choices that align with what is “best for everyone”—i.e., what improves positive externalities like civic participation and suppresses negative externalities like court congestion. Thus, any normative theory of civil procedure must account for when, how, and to whom rulemakers should give discretion to deviate from the default rules.

This, in turn, requires an understanding of what options rulemakers have for adding flexibility to procedure. Fortunately, there is already a well-developed literature on procedural flexibility. The simplest approach to procedural flexibility is to conceptualize it as a binary, on/off decision about whether parties can modify the default civil procedure rules. Flexibility means that parties, through mutual agreement, can opt out of procedural defaults. Lack of flexibility means that procedures are fixed by rule, or at least subject to modification only by the judge.

Procedural flexibility takes many forms, not all of which had previously been widely recognized. Ronen Avraham and William Hubbard showed in detail how civil procedure spans a spectrum of forms of flexibility involving varying amounts of discretion by parties and/or judges. They observed that sometimes rules allow a single party to unilaterally opt into or out of a default, and sometimes rules require agreement among the parties and the judge. More provocatively, they went beyond bargaining over civil procedure rights between participants in a single case to consider trading, buying, or selling through agreement or contract. 

11 Sometimes procedure is inflexible: there is a rule, and no one in any given case can change it; probably the best known inflexible rules are those governing the subject matter jurisdiction of the United States courts. Sometimes the judge has discretion to apply the rule or not apply it; for example, a judge may grant (or not) a new trial after a jury verdict, and this is within the judge’s discretion and may be done with or without motion from a party. Rule 59(d). And other times the rule is merely a default rule that explicitly allows the parties to agree to a different rule. For example, parties have broad discretion to modify default limits on discovery by mutual agreement. Rule 29. For a review of the literature on procedural flexibility, see Part II.A of Ronen Avraham and William H.J. Hubbard, The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2020).

12 Id.
procedures across cases. They argued that courts could—and sometimes already do!—allocate things like jury trials, class counsel assignments, and access to mass settlements through mechanisms not unlike bartering, auctions, or prices. After all, procedure can be understood as a set of rules for allocating entitlements (to file motions, to obtain discovery, to conduct a jury trial, to appeal a judgment) to parties. Markets, auctions, user fees, Pigouvian taxes, and subsidies are all familiar (and often highly effective) methods of allocating entitlements to serve various societal objectives.

Recognizing this descriptive reality, in Part V we take up the normative question of what kinds of procedural flexibility are optimal—in other words, if there is a spectrum of procedural flexibility, where on that spectrum should any given type of procedure be?

To this end, our first insight (three types of externalities motivate procedural design) informs our second (flexibility is a key tool for procedural design, due to its ability to make parties internalize the harms and benefit they cause third parties). Indeed, over a hundred years of economic literature has explored how mechanisms for allocating entitlements (barter, cap-and-trade, auctions, Pigouvian taxes, subsidies) can be used to regulate externalities, such as pollution or road congestion. Indeed, it is evident that not all externalities require the same remedies. We will argue that for some types of procedure, court-regulated markets may improve upon the status quo, but we reject the idea that markets or flexibility are desirable in general.

To be more specific: each strand of the existing literature corresponds to a bundle of externalities that imposes costs and benefits on a different group, and thus we tailor our proposals accordingly. The first strand deals with cost, delay, congestion—what we’re calling system externalities. Once framed in this way, we think it becomes clear that the right approach to reducing these externalities is to make parties take account of the costs their choices impose on the court system. We call this the internalization solution—de-linking the parties from their specific case so that they bear the costs of delay felt by the whole system. (The analogy here is a tax on, or a cap-and-trade system for, carbon emissions.) Many times, the best mechanisms to address system externalities are market solutions.

To take a simple example, consider all of the rules and motion practice devoted to page limits for briefs and time limits for hearings. One might imagine a novel way to approach this problem, such as cap-and-trade mechanisms. Such a system for pages and minutes would require parties who want to exceed their default number of pages or minutes to buy credits for those excess amounts from other parties (in the same case or in other cases) who will use less than the default amount. Such a change will doubly improve the use of courts’ time hearing motions and reading briefs: First, parties will be more likely to forgo borderline arguments since they now need to pay for the time and space to make them. Second, courts won’t have to spend their time hearing and deciding motions for extensions of page limits or additional hearing dates. That time and space will be allocated through supply and demand rather than costly, command-and-control judicial deliberation.
The second strand deals with the social waste from gamesmanship—what we’re calling *strategic externalities*. Here, we want to bind the fate of the parties more tightly together. We call this the *tethering* solution—linking a party’s own payoffs to the payoffs of their opponent. For example, if our concern is sophisticated lawyers using broad discovery requests to impose costs on their opponents, one solution may be cost sharing, in which each party pays part of the other party’s costs of responding to discovery. (The analogy here would be a rule requiring the monopolist to pay for any lobbying by competitors up to the amount the monopolist spent on lobbying.)

The third strand collects interests in legitimacy, norm-creation, deterrence, democratic participation, and so on—what we’re calling *public goods externalities*. Here, we think the obvious approach is simply to subsidize or mandate the relevant conduct. Notably, this is already the case in practice, to some degree.

As an example, in socially important cases that could produce major precedents, the judicial system should encourage and perhaps even subsidize the costs parties have to bear in order to for the court to hear expert witnesses who may aid the court in reaching a more accurate decision. (An analogy here is governmental grants in support of science and the arts.) To be clear, we do not take a position on which interests or values should or should not be given higher priority. We take as given the values identified in the extant literature and seek to build our proposals upon them.

Having constructed the normative framework, we then turn in Part VI to the question of potential policy prescriptions. Lawyers and economists have long studied a range of policies that can regulate externalities in ways that alleviate their harms (or capture their benefits) with the fewest side effects. Once we recognize that procedure regulates externalities, we can import proven regulatory policies from other domains. These policies include relatively familiar regulatory moves, such as taxes, fees, and subsidies, and more exotic moves, such as auctions and tradeable credits for procedural entitlements.

For example, no subject within civil procedure currently raises more questions about rulemaking and procedural design than multidistrict litigation (MDL). In the course of managing sprawling, consolidated pre-trial proceedings in hundreds or thousands of distinct cases, MDL judges, in concert with enterprising plaintiff-side and defense-side attorneys, have aggressively innovated with procedures, leading one pair of commentators to describe MDLs as “something of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the *Godfather* movies.”

Observers have begun to lament the costs—in the currency of transparency, norm-creation, accountability, and legitimacy—of the sweepingly discretionary and

---

unsupervised power of MDL judges. Yet it is hard to deny that the rise of MDLs has leveraged the benefits—in terms of cost, speed, and access to justice—of massive case aggregation. Procedural flexibility in MDLs has reached the point that, as a practical matter, even important features of individual case control, such as attorney representation, pleading, discovery, and even trial, are reallocated across cases. How should one trade off the benefits of flexibility afforded in MDLs with the benefits of formality afforded by more uniformly applied rules—or is there a tradeoff at all? Can we have both? As we explain in Part VI, we see MDLs as implicating system externalities (and potentially strategic externalities) that are best addressed through market-based allocation mechanisms. These mechanisms make feasible an approach to MDL procedure that offers, on the one hand, greater transparency and accountability than the existing regime of ad hoc discretion and bargaining and, on the other hand, further improvements in the efficiency of case management of aggregate litigation.

As we seek to show in this paper, our framework can help both courts at the local level and policy makers at the more global level improve the performance of the legal ecosystem. Court or even individual judges can benefit from the simple framework of thinking about the three types of externalities generated by procedure when they assess how, when, and which motions, requests, and parties’ agreements should be accommodated by the law, and our framework can guide courts and policy makers in interpreting the current rules of civil procedure on questions of judicial control versus flexibility.

To be sure, individual judges (who see, and attempt to control, strategic externalities in everyday litigation) are not necessarily well positioned to deal with system externalities or public goods externalities. But court administrators and chief judges could nonetheless implement through local rules policies that address, in a more self-aware and deliberate way, these externalities. Examples might include rules requiring a party to compensate the other party for motions that might generate strategic externalities such as extra discovery requests, or replacing a single filing fee at the outset of a case with “a la carte” court fees for individual motions that contribute to system externalities, such as motions for extensions, for extra brief pages and the like.

At the more global level our framework can help legislatures design novel reforms that can reduce litigation cost, increase tailoring of procedure to parties’ needs, reduce court congestion, and improve the various positive outcomes the law can generate such as deterrence and distributional equity. By broadening our design choices, which include novel bottom-up, market-based solutions, we can identify opportunities for win-win reforms that

16 Avraham and Hubbard, supra note 14, at 936–942.
improve one externality without necessarily worsening any other externalities. For example, our framework can help legislators implement the more ambitious and complex possibilities, such as tradable credits for procedure; it can also inform them on how and when to establish administrative compensation schemes to combat system externalities; and it can guide them on how to reform the Federal Arbitration Act to better sort which cases stay in the legal system and which cases should be systematically channeled out.

Importantly, our framework provides an analytical tool for studying the entire ecosystem of dispute resolution, not just court procedure. When we discuss our framework, our examples include forms of dispute resolution beyond courts, such as compensation funds and arbitration. Our framework works both at the inter- and the intra-procedural levels: it can be used to compare procedural systems, not just evaluate procedures within any given system. We therefore hope to impact both global reforms implemented by state or federal governments as well as local reforms implemented by judges or Chief Judges.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW: THREE STRANDS

As mentioned, the literature on procedural design has split into three separate strands that focus on different values underlying civil procedure.

A. Cost and Delay

The first strand focuses on the interest in reducing cost and delay and its concomitant benefits for access to justice. Scholarship in this area tends to focus on court congestion and efficiencies from aggregation. This literature, written by both scholars and judges, explores procedures that have been developed to enable courts to respond to docket pressure through large-scale consolidation of cases (such as through the MDL process); greater judicial assertiveness in pushing cases toward settlement or bench trials rather than jury trials; and greater use of procedural devices such as summary judgment.

---

17 For literature on court congestion, see, e.g., Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016); George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527 (1989); but see Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085 (2012) (using empirical data to argue that litigation is not excessively costly or slow).

It also deals with, for example, how judges should respond to requests that would increase court congestion and taxpayer expense.\textsuperscript{19}

B. Gamesmanship

The second strand focuses on the interest in suppressing gamesmanship and its concomitant distortion of the truth-seeking function of procedure. This literature builds from the basic premise that parties are adversaries and therefore have incentives to impose superfluous costs on each other, like threatening to go to trial, in order to gain strategic advantage.\textsuperscript{20} For example, part of this literature examines whether plaintiffs can extract settlements from defendants even when their claims have little or no merit.\textsuperscript{21} Much of the literature centers on cost allocation during discovery.\textsuperscript{22} Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld, for instance, advocate cost-shifting to reduce discovery abuse without arbitrarily limiting open-ended discovery,\textsuperscript{23} and Martin Redish advocates cost-shifting to handle e-discovery’s unique costs and opportunities for gamesmanship.\textsuperscript{24} Both H. Allen Blair and W. Mark C. Weidenmaier find that although many parties choose not to contract about procedure with each other, there are large potential gains to be realized with private control.\textsuperscript{25} Other literature focuses on the role of judges and procedural rules in


\textsuperscript{21} William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement, 32 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 545 (2016); Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 979 (1998) (“[P]arties settle lawsuits based on tactics and expenses as much as—if not more than—their predictions of how a judge would apply law to fact.”); Bebchuk 1996.

\textsuperscript{22} See, e.g., Benjamin Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil Discovery, 34 REV. LITIG. 769 (2015); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011);


controlling parties’ strategic behavior and specifically on limiting strategic flexibility—such as banning settlements in class actions—or even, as Owen Fiss advocates, discouraging settlements in all litigation. We build on these insights, which show the power of procedural flexibility (or inflexibility) to regulate the externalities generated by litigation. While these earlier works emphasize the benefits of restraining flexibility for the parties, one of the benefits of our theory is that it reveals the counterintuitive idea that procedure can control strategic behavior by expanding procedural options for parties.

C. Societal Values

The third strand focuses on a bundle of interests related to the effect of the court system on society, such as norm-creation through precedent and legitimation of the court system. This literature addresses the allocation of discretion between the judge and the parties to a case, and its object is identifying the optimal scope of private contracting over the state-provided default procedure. This literature treats civil procedure as a top-down system that identifies the set of procedures that cannot be altered by parties. These are the aspects of procedure that are central to the role of the courts in society such as dispute resolution, norm creation, democratic participation, court...
legitimacy, distributive justice, and providing incentives for future parties to behave optimally.

III. UNIFYING PRINCIPLE: PROCEDURAL VALUES AS EXTERNALITIES, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

Steve Shavell famously exposed the fundamental divergence between the private and social motives to use the legal system by identifying the negative and positive externalities involved in the decision to bring a lawsuit. Because private parties are primarily concerned with their self-centered benefits and costs when dealing with the legal system, they ignore costs and benefits they impose on their counterparties and the legal system as a whole. Yet this does not mean that judges are necessarily better positioned than parties to exercise choices in litigation. Judicial decisions too have external effects far beyond a judge’s own courtroom or docket.

Building upon Shavell’s work, we start this section by identifying three different types of externalities: System Externalities, Strategic Externalities and Public Good Externalities. These three types of externalities match the three types of costs discussed above. We then explicate how these externalities can help us understand civil procedural design and help us develop new solutions to old problems.

A. System Externalities

There are three types of negative external social costs associated with running a legal system fall under the rubric of system externalities: Congestion costs are costs an action imposes on the court docket (and therefore the judge and other litigants). An intuitive example involves a court scheduling an additional hearing. Even if both parties agree that more hearing time is desirable, the new hearing affects the court’s docket and delays hearings in every other case. Not surprisingly given the effect on the court’s docket, the judge’s approval is required; but we will argue that requiring judicial approval is not the only way to control congestion costs.

---


Spillover costs are costs parties or judges impose on other courts. This includes when the action is transferred or removed to a different court in the same jurisdiction, a different jurisdiction, or even from a state court to a federal one. Whereas trial judges might be pretty good at controlling their own congestion costs, they do not have the same incentive to control spillover costs. In the example above of a request for an additional hearing, the judge internalizes at least part of the external costs associated with congestion in their docket, whereas in a request to transfer a case to another court, the judge does not suffer the spillover costs on other courts. The framework we develop shows how spillover costs can be better controlled.

Third-Party Costs are the third type of system externalities. These are the costs imposed on third parties, such as witnesses. Since witnesses (other than expert witnesses) are not compensated for their time, there are no optimal incentives to avoid over-burdening them. A simple solution might be to compensate the witnesses for their time, but if that raises concerns with access to justice or the like, other means of correcting this externality should be considered. As we shall show, our framework will demonstrate new ways to control third-party costs.

B. Strategic Externalities

Strategic externalities are externalities parties impose on each other. When a party requests a deposition of the other party or requests a broad range of documents, this serves the goal of gathering evidence in the case—but every increment of discovery also increases costs for the other party. (And for some types of requests, the costs falls asymmetrically on the responding party.) And given that parties are adversaries, one would predict that parties would attempt to impose costs on their opponents to push them toward a favorable settlement. Similarly, parties might refuse to reduce costs (i.e., objecting to stipulate to fewer depositions) just to make litigation too expensive for the other side.

Sometimes judges can control this strategic externality. Other times, parties can solve this problem by agreement if they find a mutually advantageous way to allocate costs between them. Yet bargaining might be very expensive or might fail entirely. As we shall show, our theoretical framework opens up new ways to control strategic externalities.

C. Public Goods Externalities

Public goods externalities include the unique contributions to the common good of litigations and trials over other forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration. Litigation not only resolves disputes, but also fosters public values: norm creation, democratic participation, court legitimacy, and optimal deterrence incentives for future parties. We do not debate the relative significance of each of these aspects. We simply bundle them under the rubric of “public good externalities” because these are all contributions the court system makes to the common good beyond the private benefits it provides to parties.
In other words, these benefits of litigation are a positive externality, because parties and judges in a civil action bear most of the costs of creating these benefits (for example, legal research, argument, and opinion drafting) while only capturing their pro rata share of the benefits to the system as a whole.\footnote{See Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 267 (1985).}

The civil justice system has several features that address the public good externalities generated by litigation by incentivizing lawyers to bring cases: subsidized court fees, enforceability of contingency fee contracts, one-way fee shifting in favor of plaintiffs, and court-awarded fees to class counsel in class action settlements.\footnote{Of course, these measures are often crude and are not necessarily tailored to the value of the public goods created.} Yet any time that a judge or the parties agree to forgo full-blown litigation—most obviously, by settling—they save time and expense for themselves but reduce the positive externalities generated by litigation and trial.

***

Now that these externalities have been identified, our theoretical framework helps crystalize how they work in tandem by making the various tradeoffs explicit. It then enables us to engage in innovation of procedural design.

IV. PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY AS A TOOL FOR PROCEDURAL DESIGN

A. The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility

In a recent paper, Avraham and Hubbard introduced the \textit{spectrum of procedural flexibility}—a tool to visualize the range of ways in which procedural rules do (or don't) permit participants in litigation to modify the rules, either by unilateral decision, mutual agreement, or some other transaction.\footnote{Avraham and Hubbard, \textit{supra} note 14.} The spectrum will be essential to our analysis later in the paper, as it will be the main working tool with which we will introduce novel ways to solve difficulties and dilemmas that plagued legal procedure for decades. We thus begin this part by exploring the full length of the spectrum.

Figure 1 illustrates the different ways that control over flexibility can be allocated among the judge and parties in any given case. Moving left on the line we move to more “command and control” by the judge, while moving right on the line takes one toward more freedom allotted to parties to modify the default civil procedure rules. While most academic and judicial discussions of procedural flexibility focus on the role of party agreement and judicial discretion, these are only a subset of the forms of flexibility that we encounter (or might encounter).
Figure 2 below builds on Figure 1 above and presents the full spectrum of procedural flexibility, which incorporates payments (fees, subsidies, and transfers) for exercising flexibility. Sometimes parties may act unilaterally, but only upon paying a fee to the court, or compensating the other party (for ease of presentation we sometimes do not distinguish between them and call both fees and compensation “payments”). Other times unilateral action is subsidized.\textsuperscript{39} More exotic is the idea that fees (or subsidies) might be imposed in addition to a requirement that the parties reach agreement to alter a default, or in addition to seeking judicial approval. Even more exotic is the idea that parties do not have to trade their civil procedure rights in barter but can rather use money payments to smooth transactions.\textsuperscript{40} For example, we can imagine that for some procedures, the law could allow a party to unilaterally deviate from the default only so long as it fully compensates the other party (and, if appropriate, the court) for the burden it imposes on them. Rather than negotiating an agreement to flex procedure, a party unilaterally flexes the procedure, but pays for doing so. Thus, for example, a plaintiff may exercise its option to take more depositions, provided he pays the defendant a predetermined price and the court system a predetermined fee.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} The initiation of a civil action is itself an example of this, insofar as it is within the discretion of the plaintiff, conditional on paying a fee—but at a cost that is itself subsidized, relative to the cost of operating the court system. Other examples from current practice are rare but do exist. See Rule \textsuperscript{30}{(d)} (allowing a party to unilaterally designate a method of recording a deposition but requiring that party to pay for the method chosen).

\textsuperscript{40} Avraham and Hubbard, \textit{supra} note 13, at 918

\textsuperscript{41} Avraham and Hubbard, \textit{supra} note 13, at 916–22.
Most exotic of all are “market-based” forms of flexibility. Other forms of flexibility are limited to the participants in a given case. Default procedures are set on a per-case basis (for example, each civil action in federal court gives each party an entitlement to 10 depositions and one appeal, as a default) and allow parties partial flexibility to negotiate around those defaults (up or down from 10 depositions, but only down from one appeal). A “market” in procedure, in contrast, sets quantities at the system level, allowing flexibility in procedure across cases. For example, the federal courts could give every party the entitlement to take two depositions and make those entitlements fully tradeable—parties that wanted to take more depositions could buy them from parties who didn’t need to take any, even parties in a different case.

Because the notion of markets in procedural entitlements may seem radical, even absurd, we discuss how market-based procedural design might work, and why it could be useful in addressing the externalities that procedure attempts to address.

42 FRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(i); FRCP 31(a)(2)(A)(i); FRAP 3(a)(1).
43 An interesting case study in the impetus toward flexibility rather than one-size fits-all, mandatory rules is the federal courts’ treatment of interlocutory appeals. The judicially created collateral order doctrine declares entire categories of district court decisions to be appealable, or not appealable, on an interlocutory basis. In contrast, the statutory provision for interlocutory appeals of most types of district court decisions, 28 USC § 1292(b), vests discretion both the district court judge (who can simply decline to enter the findings required by the statute) and the appellate court in deciding whether to hear an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the value of tailoring appealability to the features of individual cases in their cases restricting the application of the collateral order doctrine in favor of alternatives such as Section 1292(b): “[R]ulings adverse to the privilege vary in their significance; some may be momentous, but others are more mundane. Section 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and appeals from contempt citations facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential attorney-client privilege rulings.” Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 112 (2009) (rejecting application of the collateral order doctrine to decisions denying attorney-client privilege and noting that the categorical treatment of all such decisions as collateral orders would prevent appellate courts from filtering out relatively unimportant appeals).
44 For a recent work that attempts to demystify the idea of markets in procedure, see Avraham and Hubbard, supra note 10.
B. Markets, Prices, and Auctions: Addressing Externalities through Procedural Flexibility

The idea of trading procedural entitlements across cases is utterly alien to civil litigation (and professional legal ethics), but trading entitlements is familiar in the field of environmental protection policy. Pollution is a classic example of a negative system externality: polluters reap the full rewards of polluting activity but bear only a fraction of the costs imposed on the environment. Cap-and-trade is a celebrated solution for this problem. By capping the quantity of permits to emit a pollutant, the regulatory system reduces the impact of emissions; and by allowing potential polluters to sell their permits, the system rewards producers that reduce their emissions while forcing high-emissions producers to pay more. Cap-and-trade is behind one of the great success stories of environmental regulation, the dramatic reduction of acid-rain-causing sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in North America over a twelve-year period (which was three years ahead of schedule) at a fraction of the projected cost to industry.45

Given the judicial systems’ current failure to effectively solve congestion issues and other manifestations of system externalities, we argue that not only are market-based approaches to procedure a conceptual possibility—they are potentially an attractive possibility. Rather than Federal Rules setting various defaults for discovery, forcing judges to rule on all manner of requests for extensions and exceptions to the Rules, or relying on parties agreeing to modify procedure, we could imagine a regime for allocating procedural entitlements (from page limits to the right to file an appeal) through market processes. Initial endowments could be distributed either through cap-and-trade (think greenhouse emission credits) or by auction (think broadband spectrum). Either way, those endowments would then be freely tradeable on a secondary market. A plaintiff in an antitrust case could purchase higher page limits for briefing from a defendant in a tort action. A defendant seeking to conduct additional depositions could buy the rights of another defendant—or from a procedure broker (if such businesses arise), a non-party who buys from parties who no longer need their procedural endowment and finds interested buyers. A party seeking to make a second appeal might even be able to purchase that right from a party willing to forgo any appeal. And, to the extent we are worried about excessive trading of procedures, the courts could regulate the market to make purchases more expensive.

Markets are important because they provide a systemic solution for a systemic problem. Indeed, there is a long-standing disconnect in debates about procedural reform. The problems (or alleged problems) that occupy the attention of advocates and policymakers are things like court congestion, delay, and expense: problems at the systemic level that critics allege burden courts as a whole, deny access to justice to plaintiffs as a class, and/or impose unjustified costs on defendants in general. Yet the policy tools under consideration almost inevitably are tools that operate at the individual case level. For example, Rules amendments announce that judges should have more

discretion, to manage discovery or regulate party conduct; that parties should cooperate more; or that they should file fewer motions.

Of course, such an approach is logical. The court system operates quite literally on a case-by-case basis. Reforms to how individual cases are litigated will, in the aggregate, affect systemic performance. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental mismatch between means and ends when courts manage procedural flexibility and attempt to combat systemic problems on a case-by-case basis. This arises because systemic problems, like court congestion, are caused by externalities—parties in a given case are doing what is individually optimal, but which negatively affects the judge or parties in other cases. Case-by-case responses to externalities in litigation are doomed to frustration for at least three reasons:

First, and most obviously, addressing a problem like court congestion on a case-by-case basis requires parties and judges to figure out how to scale back litigation activity to account for the effects of their case on the overall level of court congestion. It is simply unrealistic to think that parties and judges in individual cases have the information or motivation to even begin such a calculation.

Second, even though judges are constantly and adversely affected by court congestion, they themselves lack full incentive to reduce it. The efforts of a single judge to reduce court congestion is itself a positive externality: it redounds to the benefit of all, while the costly effort is borne entirely by the individual judge.

Third, and more subtly, if we are concerned about modifications to procedure having negative effects on the court and third parties, then judicial oversight of procedure on a case-by-case basis means judges must consider the systemic effects of procedural flexibility in every case. But judges doing this is itself a burden on the system!

Markets could potentially address some of the misalignments that arise under current procedure, which relies heavily on mutual party agreement for flexibility in case management and discovery. First and most obviously, neither parties nor courts currently have incentives to adjust their behavior in individual cases to account for adverse effects on court congestion. A pricing mechanism can account for the systemic cost of congestion by making parties pay for more procedure. Second, under current rules, a party that needs to deviate from procedural defaults but faces an uncooperative, stonewalling opponent cannot turn elsewhere to bargain for more or different procedures. In a market where procedures are tradeable across cases, however, parties will not be beholden to their (stubborn) opponents. This will reduce gamesmanship and hold-up behavior. Markets replace the bilateral monopoly between the parties with a multi-party, competitive environment reducing strategic

46 See FRCP 16, 26 Advisory Committee Notes.
48 See FRCP 1 Advisory Committee Notes to 2015 Amendments.
49 See FRCP 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1983 Amendments.
externalities. Third and relatedly, under current procedure, the only recourse to a party facing a stonewalling opponent it to seek an order from the court. This increases the burden on judges and congests courts. With markets, courts will have less need to review procedure-modifying contracts for one-sidedness or unconscionability. Parties will be able to obtain their preferred bundle of procedures in a competitive, open market.

Further, although market-based approaches would impose epistemic challenges on regulators, who would have to assign prices or set aggregate quantity limits on procedures, we believe these challenges can be overcome. In particular, a cap-and-trade approach that sets aggregate quantities creates a lighter epistemic burden than setting prices or fees for procedures directly (and it may be more politically palatable, too). The current number of appeals or jury trials or depositions is a measurable quantity. Rulemakers need only make judgments about whether to increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the aggregate, status quo quantity.

To be sure, any attempt to regulate total quantities or prices for procedural rights is a fraught undertaking. As noted above, the normative underpinnings of procedure are highly diverse and hotly contested, and any attempt at regulation by cap-and-trade or auction would only sharpen these debates. By focusing on aggregate targets for quantities (such as total numbers of motions) rather than prices, our proposed approaches may invite less controversy than explicit taxes and fees for procedure, but we recognize that framing in terms of quantities rather than prices only goes so far. Still, our view is that normative debates about the exact justifications and rationales for procedure need not be resolved in order to implement our proposals. There are likely many aspects of procedure where some consensus exists. For example, it may be uncontroversial to set targets for the aggregate number of motions for reconsideration at lower than current levels.50

And of course, our proposals need not reduce aggregate quantities of procedural entitlements. The move that is least likely to be controversial is to maintain the status quo in the aggregate. Even if the aggregate cap (motions, or depositions, or whatever) is identical to the status quo, the ability of parties to re-allocate procedures across cases will address the concerns about strategic hold-up and judicial decision-making burden noted above.

We recognize that designing markets in procedure would be an extremely complex task. For example, establishing a cap-and-trade system requires answering the question of how (and specifically to whom) to allocate the initial endowments of procedure. The obvious answer is simply to give everyone who files a lawsuit a pro-rata bundle of procedural entitlements. But conditioning an endowment of tradable procedural rights on participation in litigation might create incentives to increase “activity levels”: some parties might file collusive lawsuits whose only purpose is to obtain and then sell the procedural rights that come with the suit. We believe this concern is manageable—after all, filing a lawsuit is not free, and filing a frivolous suit is sanctionable—but

50 See Avraham and Hubbard, supra note 14, at 929.
there are also alternatives to cap-and-trade for creating a market, such as “universal endowment of procedural rights.”

Avraham and Hubbard showed that a different way to allocate procedures is by auction. This treats the capped amount of procedure not as credits to be allocated to individuals, but as a public resource to be auctioned off. The auction process, plus a freely trading secondary market, would ensure that procedures would be available to all litigants, but at prices that would force them to account for their impact on the system as a whole and purchase the procedure only if the procedure is still worth it to them.

The auction system avoids the problem of allocating initial endowments and the possibility of inviting gamesmanship. The challenge for the auction approach, however, is ensuring that the distributional effects of the system are progressive rather than regressive. An auction of procedural entitlements would offer distributional benefits if, for example, the revenue from the auction permits a reduction in filing fees or improved subsidies for low-income plaintiffs. Further, as a practical matter, the cases that demand the greatest share of the courts’ time and involve the greatest procedural complexity are not cases brought by impecunious plaintiffs—they can’t afford to litigate that way anyway—but by large corporations and powerful, well-heeled plaintiffs’ firms. As with cap-and-trade, the costs of pricing procedural rights will be borne by those who can better afford it (and who already exercise the lion’s share of such rights today), but unlike cap-and-trade, the auction method does not create a potential incentive to file bogus suits solely to cash in on the procedural endowments that come with it.

In other words, the costs of paying for additional procedure in a market-based system would be disproportionately borne by wealthy and sophisticated litigants—the same litigants that consume a disproportionate amount of court time today, but who do not have to pay extra for the extra attention they receive. And the revenue raised can be used to subsidize plaintiffs with few resources, or fund claims that serve the public interest. In this way, market-based solutions to system or strategic externalities can, in turn, provide funding for subsidy-based solutions to public goods externalities. We explore

51 By that we mean to endow every citizen with an allocation of procedural rights, either to use in the event of litigation or to sell. Although this seems far-fetched, another paper has noted that one could imagine a world in which well-developed, low-transaction cost markets for procedural rights exist, such that every person who has no interest in litigation can cash in their annual (decadal, or even lifetime) endowment at an online store. Avraham and Hubbard briefly hint at this. See id. at 927–28. But this scenario involves a lot of shuffling around of rights among hundreds of millions of people, most of whom will never directly use the court system.

52 Id. at 928–29.

53 One could also imagine that it would facilitate the development of procedural brokers, market-makers who buy up huge blocks of rights and re-sell them at the retail level for litigants as they need them, further reducing the epistemic and transaction costs of more efficiently allocating procedures to cases. Id.

54 Id. at 948.
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION

these possibilities further below, as we elaborate on how procedural flexibility can address different externalities across different cases and procedures.

* * *

The spectrum of procedural flexibility provides a toolkit for solving the externality problems we have identified. We may slide along this scale to find the best fit for each case or procedural device, with the goal of identifying the degree of party and judicial control and/or the payment mechanism that best addresses the externalities created by those procedures. With this toolkit in hand, we now turn to our framework for matching up the externalities with the forms of flexibility that best address them.

V. A 3-D FRAMEWORK FOR PROCEDURAL DESIGN

Our most ambitious step is bringing together the three strands of the literature into a single unified theoretical framework that can produce a new understanding of the legal terrain. To do this, we leverage the fact that each strand of the literature corresponds to a focus on a different type of externality, as we identified in Part III. Our analysis proceeds in three steps.

First, in Part V.A, we discuss how different forms of procedural flexibility are better suited to address different types of externalities. For example, public goods externalities are often (but not always) well-suited for “command and control” regulation—i.e., rules limiting discretion (if any) to the judge—while system externalities may be amenable to “market-based” solutions, such as fee-per-use or even tradeable credits for procedures.

Next, in Part V.B, we construct a three-dimensional graphical model—literally, a “cube”—for visualizing how the three types of externalities can interact in the context of a particular type of procedure or type of case. The key idea here is that the interests at stake in each strand of the literature are not diametrically opposed. Rather, they each represent different “dimensions” of externalities—more of one externality doesn’t necessarily mean less of the others. This means that some questions in procedure may not seriously implicate any of the externalities that motivate procedural design, while some question may implicate all of them.

We illustrate this by treating each type of externality—system, strategic, and public good—as a distinct axis or dimension in three-dimensional space. We can then locate a particular type of procedure or type of case in this 3-D space, depending on which externalities are at stake. For example, the question of whether or not judicial decisions should be made public or revealed only to the parties has major implications for the public goods quality of litigation, but may have relatively small impacts on system externalities like the length of court proceedings or on strategic externalities like parties using procedure to run up opponents’ costs.

55 Other times, whether the decision of the court is public or not may well drive parties’ strategy, generating strategic externalities and even system externalities.
Finally, in Part V.C, we use the “cube” to identify the best choices for procedural flexibility, depending on the combination of types of externalities involved. To continue the example from above, if the question is publicity of judicial decisions, the degree of flexibility should reflect the fact that the public goods externality is large, while the other externalities may be modest. As we will argue, judicial control—inflexibility—may be the best response to this externality. This is of course what we observe in practice—judges decide, often upon parties’ request, whether or not their decision will become public. In this example, our theory agrees with practice. In other instances, such as some forms of discovery, our theory will point to a radical departure from current practice—such as adhering to market-based or pay-per-use mechanisms.

After constructing the “cube” and discussing its implications for procedural design, we then turn in Part VI to (very tentatively) consider further potential policy implications of our analysis.

A. Different Forms of Flexibility Address Different Types of Externalities

Let’s begin by taking the types of externalities one at a time and matching them to the forms of procedural flexibility that will tend to be best suited to address them. (In the next subpart, we will then consider the externalities together.) For each type of externality, we will consider examples at both the “case level”—in other words, what kinds of cases will involve this type of externality—and at the “procedure level”—in other words, what kinds of procedures will implicating this type of externality.

We begin by noting that, once we recognize that the concerns that animate procedural design represent different types of externalities, we see that the considerations that go into questions of procedural design are familiar ones. First, giving an actor control over the choice of procedure allows that actor to protect his interests, and excluding an actor from control over procedure means that those with control can externalize costs onto him. For example, giving judges discretion over procedure allows the judge to account for system externalities (especially congestion and third party costs) among cases in her courtroom, to protect weak parties from negative strategic externalities imposed on them, and to protect the public from being denied the public good externalities embedded in a good precedent. However, it does not protect the wider court system from the judge externalizing spillover costs from her court to others.

Second, including more actors in choosing an agreed-upon procedure raises the transaction costs associated with bargaining (for parties) and decision making (for judges). Procedural flexibility that involves the parties and judges reaching agreement maximizes transaction costs. Thus, externalities with diffuse, system-wide effects can be addressed at lower cost through market-based regulatory approaches, such as cap-and-trade, cap-and-auction, or Pigouvian fees.

As we argue below, these considerations mean that, at least in general, markets in procedure do well with system externalities. As will seem intuitive
to most economists, we will argue that market-based mechanisms allow for a better allocation of judicial resources than any attempt by judges to optimally manage, one at a time, hundreds of thousands of individual cases. But markets require more nuance when considering strategic externalities and public goods externalities, which often depend on case-specific factors rather than system-wide conditions. This explains, we think, why in an era of market-based regulation, the approaches we identify still seem unintuitive.

1. System Externalities

First, consider system externalities. This type of externality includes the effects of a case on cost, congestion, delay, and the like for the third parties and court system as a whole. At the case level, cases most likely to affect system externalities would include complex mass litigation and class actions—cases that involve extensive motion practice and judicial involvement (but which also can generate economies of scale through aggregation of claims). At the procedure level, any procedure that provides for motion practice and hearings has the potential to burden the court, and therefore increase congestion and delay in the entire system. Parties have incentive to file motions when they expect to gain from a favorable ruling, notwithstanding any negative effect this has on the court’s ability to give justice to other parties in other cases. Like a traffic jam on a busy highway, every driver has a reason to be driving, but every driver wishes the other drivers weren’t on the road.

As noted above in Part III.A, system externalities are not limited to congestion externalities. Even if judges and parties perfectly accounted for the congestion costs of procedure within their courts, there are still spillover effects on other courts, and third-party effects on persons not even in court. An example of the former is a court that reduces congestion on its docket by dismissing cases for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or forum non conveniens. Congestion isn’t eliminated, so much as moved elsewhere. An example of the latter is third-party discovery. A deposition of a non-party may be very valuable to the parties, but it is nothing but a burden on the deponent. If the parties do not compensate the deponent, then they do not internalize that cost.

These externalities are not unlike externalities familiar to economists and policymakers in other contexts. And like externalities in other contexts—traffic, pollution, and so on—they involve harms that are largely fungible. In terms of the system externality at issue, it doesn’t matter which cars are on the road, just the total number of cars on the road. It doesn’t matter who is emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, just the total carbon footprint. And it doesn’t matter which cases have hearings, just the total amount of court time consumed.56

For these reasons, market-based solutions or prices are optimal policy responses to system externalities. Just as a cap-and-trade system for sulfur emissions essentially eliminated acid rain in North America (and is being used

56 As we will see later, the nature of cases becomes important when we deal with public good externalities.
in some jurisdictions for carbon emissions), we might imagine a cap-and-trade system that limits the total amount of court time in hearings or the total number of pages of briefs and memoranda, but allows parties to trade their entitlements, thereby forcing parties who “hog” court time to pay for it, while allowing parties who receive less court time to be monetarily rewarded. Alternatively, just as toll lanes are a solution for traffic congestion, activities that increase system externalities should be priced with fees to disincentivize their use (on the margin).

Notably, these suggestions are radical relative to current rules, which focus on proactive judicial oversight and case management to ensure that cases do not drag on or consume excessive court time. In our view, this solution is paradoxical: if the problem is the excessive devotion of court time and attention to problematic cases leading to cost and delay, how can the solution be for the court to devote more time and attention to those cases? Existing rules and exhortations from judges and rulemakers for better case management and party cooperation do not work because they cannot work. What is needed are forms of procedural flexibility that address the misalignment of incentives caused by the system externality.

2. Strategic Externalities

Second, consider strategic externalities. This type of externality includes the deliberate imposition of costs on a party opponent for the purpose of gaining strategic advantage in litigation. At the case level, this occurs when the case itself is the weapon (think of SLAPP suits). More germane to procedural design, at the procedure level, strategic externalities arise in context such as party discovery, where a discovery request is made not with the goal of uncovering facts but simply to pressure the other side into settlement to avoid the costs of responding.

The externalities from gamesmanship are both easier and harder to address than system externalities. They are easier because they do not extend beyond the individual case. In this respect, they do not require system-wide solutions, because the impact of the externality is at the case level, not the court level. But they are harder because the harms are not fungible in the same way as system externalities. A one-hour hearing in one case versus another case is an hour of the judge’s time either way. But a broad discovery request in one case may reflect the strategic imposition of costs while in another case it may be uncontroversially appropriate.

Parties’ control is an obvious way to make sure one party cannot unilaterally impose costs on its adversary. This is why very few deviations from the default civil procedure can be done unilaterally without the opponents’ (or

57 See Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 26.
59 Cite; Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. REV. 869, 875 (1990) (analyzing the use of “litigation not to vindicate a substantive legal right, but as a strategic device to secure a business advantage by imposing costs on the other party”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4069495
the judges') consent. As long as parties are both equally rational, sophisticated and resourced, parties’ control might be enough. In contrast, any asymmetry along these dimensions might call either for judicial control to protect the weak party, or for the use of price mechanisms to prevent the strong party from raising his rival’s costs to make him surrender the case.

How can we use the price mechanism to address strategic externalities? The goal in addressing strategic externalities is, as with any externality, to internalize the costs imposed. We distinguish between three levels of externalities. For small strategic externalities we think fixed compensation can work. If a party wants 2 more pages for its briefs, the strategic externality is quite small and a fixed compensation to the other party (which perhaps could be set in a government provided menu) might be enough for the purpose of internalization.

For midlevel strategic externalities our suggestion is what we call “tethering”—tying together the fortunes of both parties, so that imposing unnecessary costs on an adversary is self-defeating. For example, some scholars have proposed and some courts have experimented with the idea that, beyond a certain threshold, the requesting party in discovery must compensate the producing party for some or all of its costs of production. Here, the compensation might not be fixed but rather based on party’s actual (certified by an accountant) costs. Lastly, when the strategic externalities are large judicial control either separate from or together with the use of pricing is a viable option. But caution is warranted here, to the extent that judicial supervision of party gamesmanship becomes a burden on courts. This would replace a strategic externality with a system externality. Below we show how our theory of civil procedure can deal with simultaneous externalities.

Current approaches to strategic externalities are not entirely out of step with our analysis here. As noted above, some courts have undertaken active judicial supervision of a case to ward off strategic behavior, and a few courts have even experimented with “tethering,” by requiring the party imposing costs to also compensate (in part) those costs. In the main, however, courts largely take a hands-off approach to discovery and many other party-driven

---

60 Of course, a fixed fee to the government might be needed to compensate for the system externality, too.

61 See Boeynams v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (requiring requesting party to pay for costs of additional discovery after extensive discovery had already taken place); Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., 18-cv-01100 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (shifting costs of additional discovery to requesting party after review revealed that additional discovery was redundant with prior productions).

62 As before, fee might be needed to reimburse the government for system externalities. Note that the distributive effects of the expense of this proposal to requesting parties is not a reason to reject this proposal. Maldistribution of resources in the civil justice system is itself a public goods externality and can be addressed through subsidies. Poor parties could receive lump-sum credits for the cost of discovery (and those who do not or cannot use them can sell those credits on the market). But a tethering solution increases the marginal cost of additional discovery, which should disincentivize impositional discovery by the rich and poor alike.
aspects of strategic litigation. Our analysis, therefore, is an invitation to consider more creative alternatives to address strategic externalities.

3. Public Goods Externalities

Third, consider public goods externalities. As we’ve explained, this type of externality implicates the impact of the courts on society as a whole, through legal precedents that clarify the law and provide future actors with certainty regarding the legally expected behavior, the legitimizing the authority of the civil justice system, and so on. At the case level, a case implicating public goods externalities would be, for example, a suit raising a novel legal question of importance to the legal system beyond the parties to the case. At the procedure level, we might think of matters that implicate court legitimacy, but which individual parties don’t have a stake in, such as judges wearing black robes.63

These externalities are the hardest to address through party control over procedure. By their nature, public goods externalities benefit the court system as a whole, and even beyond that, society as a whole. As a consequence, we cannot expect one or both parties to fully account for these benefits, even if each party fully internalizes the costs and benefits of their actions on the other parties, or on the judge, or even on the court system as a whole. This is the key feature of public goods externalities that procedural design must account for. The first lesson in this context, therefore, is that unilateral action, agreement between the parties, or even agreement among the parties and the judge will be inadequate to address the externality. If parties are to be involved in exercising flexibility, there must be fees or subsidies attached to align their incentives with the public interest. For example, if parties prefer the decision to be unpublished, or their settlement (approved by the court) to remain secret, they might have to compensate the court for the system externalities, the treasury for the lost public good externality, or some combination of the two.

Although it can be argued that all cases create public goods to some extent, some public goods externalities are particular to individual cases. For example, most cases do not raise legal questions that will give rise to new precedent, but some will. For these types of externalities, fixed subsidies or one-size-fits-all mandates will not work well. In this context, judicial control may be necessary, i.e., the judge should have discretion to flex into or out of a procedure based on the presence or absence of the public good externality.64

63 More generally, all of the formalized rituals of judicial hearings and trials can be understood as serving the public good interest in the legitimacy and authority of courts. The fact that arbitration is usually specifically designed to do away with these elements of court procedure reflects its suitability for resolution of disputes that concern only the parties before it.

64 We recognize that even judges’ incentives are not ideal in this context, since they do not internalize the larger public benefit. But to the extent that public goods are idiosyncratic to certain cases, we believe that judges’ incentives are better aligned than parties’ incentives to correctly identify those cases with the distinctive public good value.
For example, if a case is a good vehicle for setting valuable precedent, we might imagine a rule that encourages amicus curiae to provide the judge with as many good legal arguments, on both sides, as possible. We can even imagine a rule that says that the judge can overrule the parties and have control over whether the case can settle!

Subsidies and judicial control can be combined, such as by giving judges discretion to award subsidies to cases raising important legal issues. For example, when courts identify a case with a significant public interest component, they could provide more pages for the briefs, more oral argument time, funding for attorney fees, waiver of court fees, funding for expert witnesses, and even the right to a second appeal.65

B. Externalities in Three Dimensions

Now that we have discussed each type of externality in isolation, we bring them together, and we do it, as we did before, by discussing them both at the “case level” and the “procedure level.” Our key claim here is that the externalities are not opposites, such that procedures with more of one type have less of the others. Rather, each type of externality runs along a separate dimension, such that any given case or any given procedure could have more or less of each one. We illustrate this with a three-dimensional representation of the three externalities in Figure 3. Each arrow represents increasing externalities in a given dimension. The farther one goes along an arrow, the greater risk of significant externalities, and a greater need for procedural design to address that externality.

Point A in Figure 3 represents a situation with large system externalities but little gamesmanship or societal significance. We can think of this as factually complex but legally uninteresting task for the court. But we need not even limit ourselves to court settings. When there are large system externalities but there are few concerns about gamesmanship or the production of public goods, alternatives to court may be optimal. Courts have elaborate procedures to control party behavior (i.e., gamesmanship) and generate precedent and public proceedings (i.e., public goods), but these come with cost and delay (i.e., system externalities). Alternatives to courts, such as statutory schemes like workers compensation or victim compensation funds, can operate with streamlined procedures to reduce costs when strategic and public goods externalities are not at stake. Perhaps the purest example of a procedure at Point A is the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund, a statutory scheme created by Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks to provide government-funded compensation to the victims of the attacks in lieu of litigation. In this context, there was little concern about gamesmanship (given that the victims were an identifiable group) and few public goods externalities (given that the wrongdoers—Al Qaeda—were beyond the reach of civil process, making deterrence irrelevant). But calculating individual damages would be...

---

65 Subsidizing expert witnesses or having discretion to grant a free, second (or third) appeal are unfamiliar policy options in the United States, but for cases involving the public interest, these policies are codified law in Israel.
expensive, and litigation against deep-pocketed potential defendants (such as United Airlines and American Airlines) would be complex and highly uncertain.

**Point B** describes a scenario with large public goods externalities and little or no system or strategic externalities. The scenario implicates legal questions of broad interest but is otherwise simple and has few opportunities for gamesmanship. Many issues in civil procedure that are resolved by the Supreme Court fall into this category. A simple example of this is rules governing the calculation of filing deadlines in federal court. While some deadlines are easy to calculate, sometimes complexities arise that require judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, for example, has sought to clarify when a late-filed amendment to a pleading “relates back” to the original pleading so that it is timely.\(^66\) What is important is that all parties have a clear rule. Litigation over the rule isn’t particularly complex or strategic; rather, the parties simply need an answer.\(^67\)

**Point C** describes a scenario with large strategic externalities and little or no public goods or system externalities. We can think of this as a simple, but big-money, dispute (either an entire case or a specific issue within a case) of no societal importance but which creates opportunities for gamesmanship. Perhaps the best example for Point C is a contentious family law dispute, such as an acrimonious divorce proceeding that doesn’t involve extensive hearing time or otherwise clog the courts but that does involve impositional discovery requests, harassing motion practice, or the like.


\(^{67}\) This situation arises outside the procedural context as well. An example of this is *Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 304 U.S. 202 (1938), the very first case to apply *Erie Railroad v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), one week after *Erie* was decided. The issue in *Ruhlin* involved the interpretation of the “incontestability clause” that was present in many life and disability insurance contracts that New York Life had issued. After the defendant New York Life prevailed on appeal and the plaintiff Ruhlin petitioned for certiorari, citing a circuit split. New York Life, notably, did not oppose the petition. 304 U.S. at 205. More important to the insurance company than winning the case was having the Supreme Court announce a clear rule for all the federal courts.
Importantly, each type of externality, and thus each arrow, points in a different direction. **Point D** is at the base of each arrow, and we can think of it as the origin in a three-dimensional space defined by three axes. Point D represents a distinctive set of litigation scenarios: those with few externalities of any type. At the case level, some entire categories of cases might fit here, such as small claims proceedings in specialized courts with simplified proceedings, or routine arbitrations among repeat-play commercial actors. At the procedure level, this could include routine aspects of procedure, such as scheduling the order of witnesses or issuing interrogatories.

Notably, small claims court and commercial arbitration are both known for their informality and flexibility of procedure.\(^6^8\) This is not only the state of practice, but exactly what our framework would suggest. When all three types of externalities are low, there is no need to worry about misalignment between party interests and larger systemic or societal interests. Whatever works best for the parties or the arbiter should be allowed, because the only goal here is dispute resolution between the parties. In this context, therefore, so long as

---

the disputed issue or even the entire case is not socially important, and deviations from the procedural rules cause no externalities, it makes sense for party control to be the order of the day; the law is merely a default. That is why arbitrators don’t wear black robes and small claims courts don’t publish their opinions.

Of course, not all disputes or procedural issues fit neatly into only one type of externality or none at all. Indeed, what makes procedural design so challenging is precisely that distinct interests, sometimes many distinct interests, are all implicated by the same procedure. For example high stakes, complex factual issues tend to involve broad and expensive discovery (and thus potentially impositional discovery requests) and extensive motion practice (some of which may be driven by strategic externalities rather than the merits of the claim), both of which also require time-consuming judicial supervision, causing system externalities. Our three-dimensional space provides a canvas on which we can visualize all the different possible combinations of externalities working at the same time. Figure 4 builds on Figure 3 and presents “the cube”—a way of locating any procedural issue in a conceptual space based on the types of externalities it implicates.

**Point E** describes a scenario with large public goods externalities and large strategic externalities, but few system externalities. This is a dispute that is simple, but raises important issues and, despite its simplicity, can give rise to gamesmanship, perhaps because the stakes are high or there is a resource imbalance between the parties. At the case level, you could imagine a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law, where there are no factual issues, but parties play games with forum shopping or amicus briefs. At the procedure level, we might think of some issues that implicate court legitimacy, but which can be gamed by the parties, such as requests that the court rely only on affidavits, requests to limit the number of witnesses, requests to have no cross examination of witnesses, or even requests that the court flip a coin to resolve some issues (all of which reduce system externalities). These may seem unlikely in current practice, but consider confidential settlements: these deprive the action of transparency and the possibility of norm creation, and also may implicate concerns about parties using confidentiality to impose costs on (or extract money from) their counterparts.

**Point F** describes a scenario with large public goods externalities and large system externalities, but few strategic externalities. This is a dispute that is complex and raises socially important issues, but, despite these factors, doesn’t involve much gamesmanship. At the case level, we might think of a case that is simple, but which raises very sensitive and novel legal issues, such that public goods externalities are high and (for the very same reason) the burden on the court is high. For example, constitutional tort test cases, especially if the government is the defendant (and therefore strategic externalities are expected to be relatively low), may fit the mold here. At the procedure level, judicial opinion writing might fit into this category. Judicial opinions are a source of public goods externalities—they are how lawyers and the public are informed about the law by courts—but they are also a time-consuming part of a judge’s work.
Figure 4: The Cube

Point G describes a scenario with large system externalities and large strategic externalities, but few public goods externalities. This is a dispute that is complex and subject to gamesmanship, but which doesn’t implicate legal precedent, etc. At the case level, we expect that most complex litigation (including class actions and MDL) is going to fall in this category. Further, highly contentious, even if not complex, cases can involve the imposition of high costs on the parties and the courts. Some complex family and trust law court battles typify this category. Imagine estranged family members disputing a large estate and related trusts after a wealthy family member dies. Like the simple but acrimonious divorce example for Point C, the proceedings here involve strategic externalities as the parties attempt to wear each other down with discovery and motion practice. And unlike that example, in the complex trusts and estates litigation, the court must interpret a dense web of legal documents, appoint special masters, and conduct an accounting of trust assets, all of which generate large system externalities. At the procedure level, this would be judge-time-intensive motion practice, like summary judgment motions or sanctions motions, especially if these require the judge to hand down a written opinion.

Point H describes a scenario where all types of externalities are substantial. Precedent or other public goods are at stake, the case is highly
complex and burdensome on the court system, and the parties have occasion for gamesmanship. At the case level, you have blockbuster, cutting-edge class actions, MDLs, and impact litigation (which, by its nature, has broad social importance, high stakes, and high-intensity lawyering). At the procedure level, consider jury trials. They serve many public values, but jury trials are expensive and a playground for gamesmanship by sophisticated lawyers.

By locating a given issue within the cube, we can then gain insight into how procedural design can be used to address the externalities that are relevant to that issue. We now turn to this.

C. Procedural Design in Three Dimensions

In Part V.A, we discussed how each type of externality called for a potential mix of forms of procedural flexibility that were suited to the scope of the externality—for strategic, within one case; for system, across cases; and for public goods, extending beyond the courts. And in Part V.B, we noted how different types of cases, and different procedures within cases, can implicate zero, one, two, or all three types of externalities. This raises the question: If different types of externalities call for different types of procedural flexibility, how does one decide what form of flexibility, if any, applies to scenarios involving two or three types of externalities? The challenge here is to identify a form of flexibility that is appropriate for both (or even all three) externalities. So, for example, if “judicial control” is appropriate at Point B (public goods externality only) and at Point C (strategic externality only), then we would deem it appropriate at Point E (public goods and strategic externality).

For some points in the cube, this is straightforward. For Point E, as just noted, judicial control is well suited for many public goods and strategic externalities. Solutions reliant on prices or subsidies are tricky here, because the public good aspect points toward subsidies, but the strategic aspect points toward prices/taxes. Nonetheless, pricing and subsidies tools may be appropriate. For example, amicus curiae briefs may be valuable in a case involving an important legal issue, but a court may be concerned about parties evading limits on the length of briefs by recruiting additional amici in order to file multiple briefs with related arguments. Judicial control (simply refusing to accept additional amici) is one option, but requiring parties to pay a fee to the court or compensate their opponents to raise the limits on amici is an option, too. The fees would net out both the desire to subsidize amici in order to increase the quality of the judicial process (public good externality) and the need to disincentivize excess briefing (system externality). The compensation will cause the party paying for the amici support to internalize the strategic externality it potentially imposes on the other party by evading limits on briefs’ lengths.

Likewise, for Point G, both system and strategic externalities are amenable to market-based regulation that forces parties to internalize the costs their actions impose on others. Although judicial control is well suited for strategic externalities, it is not well-suited for system externalities—remember
that addressing system externalities, almost by definition, requires efforts to reduce, not increase, judicial involvement.

But what if our prescriptions for different externalities point in entirely different directions? This occurs where system and public goods externalities are both substantial—at Points F and H on the cube in Figure 4. In some respects, these externalities can both be managed with price-based mechanisms, even though the externalities point in different directions (fees versus subsidies). For example, should filing fees for a complaint in a civil action be positive or negative? From a public goods perspective, there may be value to incentivizing litigation, but from a system externalities perspective, additional filings add to court congestion. In principle, these countervailing considerations can be netted out. (And the status quo, which involves a partial but not complete subsidy for case filing, may reflect such a balancing.) One could take the same approach to procedures that apply generally across cases that implicate both public goods and court congestion, such as hearing time or jury trials, and require parties requiring those procedures to pay the court system a reduced fee while fully compensating their opponents.

But the difficulty here comes from public goods that depend on the circumstances of the case—test cases for precedent, class actions of broad social significance, or the like. These cases generate large positive externalities to the legal system and society but also consume court attention and resources. The net benefits of judicial attention to these cases cannot be priced out ex ante, because they depend on the case. Some precedent is more important than other precedent. Consequently, we must rely on ad hoc judgments, by judges, about whether a given case merits extra attention due to its importance. In other words, the form of flexibility that is likely most appropriate here is judicial control, if even to determine whether specific cases should be subsidized by the state.

Nonetheless, we hasten to add that from the perspective of a rulemaker, who must ask what solutions will work for the court system as a whole, the difficult questions at the intersection of large public goods externalities and large system externalities are narrow in scope. This is because most cases simply don’t have particularly large implications for society. Even among complex litigation, MDLs, and class actions, most are of concern almost exclusively to the parties, class members, and lawyers.

We have now identified—admittedly, at only a high level of abstraction so far—preferred forms of procedural flexibility for cases and procedures depending on which externalities they implicate, i.e., where they fall in the cube in Figure 4. What we see is that when public goods externalities are large (the region bounded by Points B, E, F, and H), party control or market-based mechanisms may be useful for some procedures, while for others procedural flexibility should be limited to judicial control—although such judicial control would not be limited to what we are used to (accepting or rejecting motions) but may mean in this case that judges award compensation between parties, waive filing fees, or even award ad-hoc subsidies.
When public goods externalities are not paramount, however, markets and prices—although not often used in current practice—are well-suited to address system externalities and strategic externalities (Points A, C, and G). And when no externalities are large (Point D), there is no need to constrain procedural flexibility or introduce market-based solutions. Within any given case, parties should have flexibility to alter procedure by agreement.

Figure 5 summarizes our conclusions from this Part. The “flex zone” represents the area where party control dominates. It is where all types of externalities are small or medium. The entire region of the cube where the public goods externality is high requires judicial control, rather than party flexibility, although pricing (including negative prices, i.e., subsidies) may be an option for regulating party choices (such as filing suit) that affect public goods. When system externalities or gamesmanship are primary concerns, however, our analysis recommends consideration of more innovative approaches—some mix of markets and prices could be employed.

**Figure 5: Procedural Flexibility as a Function of Externalities in Civil Procedure**
To be clear: these “zones” are merely generalizations to organize ideas about the relationships between externalities and forms of procedural flexibility. When we leave the realm of abstraction and enter the realm of concrete policy and specific procedures, much more nuance is required. For specific procedures, flexibility (not inflexibility) may be appropriate even when public goods are paramount. Conversely, judicial control rather than markets may be best to address certain system externalities. The devil, as is usually the case, is in the details. But, as we are not afraid of the devil (!), we therefore devote the remainder of this paper to beginning a conversation about specific procedures or practices, and how our analysis can inform policies choices on the ground. We use our cube as a general starting point but then prescribe remedies based on the nuanced reality of specific issues in civil procedure. As we will show in Part VI, sometimes current practice reflects a sound, implicit understanding of how procedural flexibility can address externalities in procedure. Other times, our suggestion is that an innovating with markets or other novel mechanisms may offer a path forward for addressing dilemmas of procedural design.

VI. POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We emphasize that our theory of procedure is not merely normative but prescriptive: it can speak to concrete policy choices embodied in specific rules of procedure. In this Part, we consider a handful of specific examples of real-world procedural rules. We did not choose those examples randomly, but rather chose those over which there are active debates. We use three main examples to show how our framework can simplify or harmonize the analysis or identify potential procedural innovations that could mark a novel “third way” in polarized debates. Out of the three, our main example discusses class actions and multidistrict litigation—two of the most highly debated procedural mechanisms currently applied by judicial systems. Class actions and MDLs are subject to contentious debate precisely because they involve many types of externalities, making them an ideal ground on which we can apply the framework brought forward in the paper.

A. Expert Witnesses and Amicus Curiae

For some claims, current law requires parties to support their claims with expert opinions. In some states a party can’t file a medical malpractice case unless it has a physician expert supporting his claim.69 Experts providing reliable scientific evidence confer a public good externality on the system; they help the court reach an informed and hopefully correct outcome that can serve as useful precedent. Requiring expert testimony may also reduce system

69 See, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/2-622 (Illinois); Idaho Code § 6-1012 and 6-1013; NY CPLR § 3012-A (2019). For a compilation of 29 state statutes that require an Affidavit of Merit in medical malpractice cases, see Christine Funk, Affidavits of Merit in Medical Malpractice Cases, EXPERT INSTITUTE (June 23, 2020), https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/affidavits-merit-medical-malpractice-cases/#_ftn1.
externalities to the extent that it blocks or deters meritless claims because no expert could be found to support it. At the same time, to the extent parties engage in an arms race for expert opinions which are based on junk science, they also create a strategic externality. To cheaply reduce strategic externalities, we might expect courts to check the credentials of experts and evidence, for example by looking at the expert’s record of scholarship and whether the research has been subject to peer review. Indeed, Daubert standards do just that. Still, experts passing the Daubert standard and the cross examinations that follows their testimony delay trials and impose costs on opponents and therefore create system and strategic externalities. The “battle of the experts” is a costly event, not just for the parties but for the system as a whole. Here we sometimes find court appointing their own experts to avoid these particular system externalities.70

But why not do this more often? It seems to us that in most cases (e.g., a car crash with accident reconstruction experts), there is little public good benefit, other than perhaps educating the judge about relevant science that might apply in future cases. Strategic and system externalities loom larger than public goods concerns in most these cases. This suggests less party flexibility and perhaps some regulation in the form of Pigouvian taxes and money paid to the other party—because experts burden the system more than they benefit it in the typical case, this activity should be “taxed.”

In contrast, in cases with large public-good externalities, the reverse would be true. We may want to invite non-parties to propose experts, perhaps via the mechanism of amicus curiae. Or we can just have more court-appointed experts. And again, the price mechanism can work here as well, through subsidies instead of taxes. If this sounds far-fetched, it isn’t! In Israel, there is a government sponsored NIS 1 million annual fund which covers experts in class actions the fund committee finds to be socially important, or, in the lingo of our framework, to generate large public good externalities.71

Indeed, it is worth considering the extent to which the discussion here applies to some extent to discovery generally, not just experts. A lot (probably most) of discovery has few public-goods ramifications but can be used for strategic reasons. This may help explain why the US is an extreme outlier internationally in its use of party-driven discovery.72 If strategic externalities

70 For articles giving examples of state and federal courts appointing their own experts, see Stephanie Domitrovich, Mara L. Merlino & James T. Richardson, State Trial Judge Use of Court Appointed Experts: Survey Results and Comparisons, 50 JURIMETRICS 371, 371 (2010); Shirley A. Dobbin, Sophia I. Gatowski, Rebecca J. Eyre & Veronica B. Dahir, Federal and State Trial Judges on the Proffer and Presentation of Expert Evidence, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 9 (2007).

71 Class Action Law, 5776-2016, SH No. 2054, p. 264, Art. 27(a) (Isr.). For discussion, see Eli Bukspan, “the Israeli Public Class Action Fund: New Path for Integrating Business and Social Responsibility” (working paper 2019) (fund serves to pay expert witness fees to support socially important cases, and guarantees legal fees imposed on plaintiffs (under the loser-pays rule) in unsuccessful cases).

are a major concern, parties should not have unilateral control over the procedure. Most countries utilize a system of court-directed discovery, which seems more consistent with our analysis. Nonetheless, court-directed discovery raises a different concern—a greater burden on the court, which generates system externalities. Thus, the US approach to discovery, insofar as it is party driven, may reflect prioritization of system externalities over strategic externalities. Party-driven discovery allows the court, in most cases, to withdraw from the litigation process for the entire phase of litigation from the end of pleading to the beginning of trial or summary judgment.

Nonetheless, experts may really be different. A notable distinction between expert discovery and other forms of discovery is that other forms of discovery are limited to that evidence that already exists. Experts are about creating new evidence, which in principle has no limit. For this reason, strategic externality concerns may loom even larger. Hence, our focus is on experts here.

Perhaps an even more valuable method for the introduction of new information crucial for court rulings in high-stakes, high public goods externality cases is Amicus Curiae briefs. Indeed, in a court system with judicial precedent, a tension exists between the fact that an individual case resolves a concrete dispute between two parties and the fact that the decision sets a precedent that potentially affects future parties, whose interests are not directly represented in the present suit. One way that courts address this tension between the public goods externality of judicial precedent and the private incentives of individual parties is to permit non-parties to file amicus curiae briefs (“amicus briefs”). The main role of amicus briefs is to enrich courts with more and better legal arguments. In principle, amicus briefs ensure that a court properly accounts for the broader effects of its decision on non-parties, thereby maximizing the public goods benefit of judicial precedent.

Amicus briefs have a downside, too. They exacerbate congestion caused by a proliferation of briefs and cause delay as timelines extend to accommodate them. Parties can use them strategically, too. A party seeking to evade word limits or to raise an opponent’s costs of responding to arguments can recruit third parties to file amicus briefs. Such briefs may be written by the party itself and merely signed by the third party.

---

73 Discovery was not originally envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules to pose significant opportunities for gamesmanship. [Cite to statements by Charles Clark.] Depositions, not document discovery, were seen as the centerpiece of discovery, and the Rules easily limit the abuse of deposition discovery through numerical limits—in other words, procedural inflexibility—rather than open-ended party control, which more accurately characterizes discovery of documents, tangible things, and electronically stored information. Compare Rule 30 (depositions presumptively limited to 10 per side) with Rule 34 (no numerical limits on requests for production).

74 Experts can sometimes inform the court about the law in other countries, and amicus curie can inform the court about relevant facts or technologies relevant to the case.

75 For a recent article describing how orchestrated and intentional the amicus world is see Allison Larsen and Neal Devins, *The Amicus Machine*, 102 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1901 (2016).
All of these factors would lead us to expect a proliferation of amicus activity in high-stakes, precedential litigation, and of course this is what we see. The number of amicus curiae has increased dramatically over the past decades. In the U.S. Supreme Court alone about 800 amicus briefs are filed each term (an average of about 14 briefs per case). This is an 800% increase from the 1950s and a 95% increase from 1995.76

If the public goods value of amicus briefs is high, we should see courts citing those briefs, and it appears that they do. Indeed, Supreme Court justices routinely cite amicus briefs, with many of them doing it in more than 1/3 of cases, and one of them, Justice Kagan, doing it (in the 2017 term) in 2/3 of cases.77 More importantly, briefs are often thought to exert influence on the Court’s final ruling.78

Given that the benefits of amicus briefs must be weighed against their costs, we should expect the use of these briefs to drop off as the public good externality falls, such as when the court is lower in the legal hierarchy. Thus, it is not surprising that amicus briefs are so prevalent in the Supreme Court and less so in other courts. And as a normative matter, since the public good externalities in the U.S Supreme Court are large, amicus briefs should be encouraged (at least, up to the point when the incremental costs of more briefs balance the incremental benefits).

Indeed, even in the Supreme Court our theory suggests there should be rules mitigating strategic and system externalities. The Supreme Court is a setting where potentially all three externalities are large, and thus our theoretical framework suggests parties should have less flexibility.79

Consistent with what our theory would predict regarding strategic and system externalities, the Supreme Court has issued (unfortunately only recently) explicit formal guidance on the standards for filing amicus briefs.80 The guidance announced rules that combat system and strategic externalities. To combat system externalities, the guidance explicitly provides word limits to the briefs, including a requirement that the amicus certifies compliance with the word limit.81 And specifically with respect to delay, the guide states that

---

76 Larsen and Devins, *ibid* at 1902.
79 See point H on our cube in Figure 5.
81 See Sections 3e and 3g to the memorandum.
the court will not entertain motions to extend various filing deadlines or to file a reply brief.\footnote{82}

Our theory, however, opens up new, more creative ways to combat system externalities. For example, one could imagine a cap on the total number of words allowed in all amicus briefs filed in a Supreme Court term and then have parties trade words within the cap (cap-and-trade). This would be an example of scenario where market-based solutions may be appropriate even in a setting (the Supreme Court) where large public-goods externalities otherwise require a heavy dose of direct judicial control.

To combat strategic externalities, the guide requires parties’ consent for amicus briefs, presumably enabling a party to signal to the court its fears that the opponent uses the amicus briefs strategically.\footnote{83} In such a case, the court itself will decide whether to accept the brief. The guide also requires the brief to include the interests of the amicus, and to disclose the financial arrangements of the parties involved in the brief.\footnote{84}

As before, our theory opens up new and potentially more effective options to combat strategic externalities. For example, there could be a fee for filing an amicus brief that would balance the (negative) system and the (positive) public good externalities the brief creates. This fee could be a one-size-fits-all amount fixed in advance, or it could depend on the importance of the case or even on the contribution of the individual brief to the court analysis and determined by the court in retrospect, similar to the way courts all over the country determine attorney’s fees in thousands of cases a year. To combat strategic externalities there could be a limit on the number of amicus briefs filed by the parties, or even better, on the ratio of the number of amicus briefs filed by the parties, so that the strong party will not be able to bombard the court with many more legal documents than its opponent. Alternatively, the side that has fewer amicus briefs could be compensated by getting more time for its oral arguments, and to prevent system externalities, that time should come at the expense of the stronger party.

B. The Boundaries of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Settlement/Withdrawal of Pending Cases and Arbitration

We begin our discussion of alternative dispute resolution by highlighting the simple notion that for a case to have value to anyone but the parties involved in it, it must receive some degree of publicity. It is thus evident that as a society we should strive for cases with high public good externalities to be resolved within courtrooms, rather than privately, far away from the public eye. In this Section, we consider two ways in which parties’ decisions can deprive cases of these public good externalities: settlement and agreements to arbitrate.

\footnote{82 See Sections 2b, 3a, and 6, respectively, to the memorandum.}
\footnote{83 See Section 1 to the memorandum.}
\footnote{84 See Sections 3c and 3d to the memorandum.}
1. Settlement

Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on hearing cases that allow it to resolve circuit splits. From the perspective of the parties, the value of review by the Supreme Court may simply be to decide which party wins. But from the perspective of the legal system as a whole, the value of the case lies in its capacity to create a uniform and predictable legal norm; i.e., a high level of public good externalities. In the context of the Supreme Court, we might not want parties to tinker with the rules because keeping them untouched might be valuable for the case’s precedential value.

When the public good externalities are very large, our objection to parties’ opting out from the default civil procedure rule is large as well, in that we might sometimes even object even to the parties’ most basic way to opt-out of procedure—by settlement. While settlement is desirable in most cases and eliminates negative system externalities (of all types), it may be socially harmful when parties settle in the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court grants cert in exceedingly few cases per year (about 1% of petitions for certiorari are granted), devotes a substantial fraction of its attention to each case, and chooses cases not because those cases require dispute resolution but to set legal norms for the courts. In this context, settlement by the parties after the Court has invested significant resources may be privately optimal for the parties, but a waste of the Court’s resources and lost opportunity for provision of a public good. Thus, for a court like the US Supreme Court, the public good externality may be so large that it displaces even traditionally accepted forms of procedural flexibility, such as allowing parties to withdraw a pending case.

Alternatively, withdrawing parties might be required to compensate the court system for the system externality they created, and the treasury for the loss of public good externality their case could have created. While the magnitude of the compensation for the “lost chance” of public externality may be fixed over time, the compensation for the system externality might increase over time. If parties settle very late in the game, say a day before the Supreme Court opinion is delivered, they should pay more for the congestion externality they have created than if they settle early in the game, say a day after their case has been picked by the Supreme Court.

86 We found one Israeli Supreme Court case where the parties asked the court to extend the deadline for their briefs, in order to let them mediate the case. The Supreme Court refused, saying the issue is too principled for mediation and requires a full resolution by the court. CA 7368/06 Dirot Yokra vs. Gov-Ari (2009).
87 Of course, there are all sorts of complications here. Could parties settle their individual dispute but continue to litigate? If not, how can a court compel parties not to settle? If so, could this still satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement under Article III? We acknowledge these concerns, but note that they are orthogonal to the normative argument we make. Further, there may be ways to address these concerns if the value of discouraging settlement is great enough. For example, the Court could favor for certiorari those petitioners who commit not to settle, perhaps even through posting a bond that is forfeited if the case settles before the Court renders its opinion.
2. Arbitration

Another mechanism for alternative dispute resolution on which our theory can shed new light is arbitration. Private arbitration under the FAA is an increasingly common, and increasingly controversial, form of dispute resolution. Viewed through the lens of our framework, we see that both its popularity and its controversy emanate from the mix of externalities implicated when a dispute moves from court to arbitration. Indeed, each of the major narratives about arbitration, pro and con, correspond to one dimension of externality.

The traditional pro-arbitration story is that litigation is beset by cost, delay and gamesmanship, and arbitration is a means for faster and cheaper dispute resolution.88 This is basically an account of system and strategic externalities pushing cases into arbitration.

The traditional anti-arbitration story is that because arbitration is confidential and informal, dispute resolution through arbitration produces none of the most important benefits of litigation—development and exposition of the law, uniformity of judgments, and public confidence.89 This is basically an account of public goods externalities lost when cases move to arbitration.

A more nuanced pro-arbitration story is that employment and consumer protection class-action litigation is largely suits of low merit (or perhaps some merit but little practical importance) that nonetheless produce large paychecks for entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers, who use impositional discovery and other sharp tactics to extract lucrative settlements (not necessarily lucrative for the class, but for the lawyers). This is basically an account of strategic externalities in courts pushing cases into arbitration.

There is a mirror-image anti-arbitration story, which is that employment and consumer arbitration is a way to push claims of high merit (or perhaps some merit but high aggregate value) out of court, where the class action device makes them viable, and into individualized arbitration, where arbitral fees render claims impracticable. This is basically an account of strategic externalities in arbitration—which makes things worse.

Organizing these arguments within our framework suggests some possible paths for using arbitration in a way that serves the goals underlying procedure. For cases of limited social concern between parties of equal sophistication,

In any case, this concern rarely arises in the US Supreme Court, given the infrequency of settlement in that court.


arbitration is an uncontroversial ideal. Those cases fall in the “flex zone” in our cube, for which party choice is maximized. Indeed, if anything for cases in this region, we would want to encourage more arbitration, not less, because of the avoided system externalities.

For cases with some public goods qualities or concerns about strategic behavior, though, a more nuanced approach is necessary. Importantly, as our recitation of the arguments above notes, the pro-arbitration argument based on strategic externalities depends on inefficiencies in the administration of court-related procedural rules—such as class action certification and discovery rules. The claim is that these rules allow for gamesmanship by plaintiffs with questionable claims. If so, then identifying the right reforms for arbitration law is tied up in identifying the right reforms for court procedure. The case for limiting arbitration improves when the rules for litigation are reformed to address the strategic externalities created by court-related procedures. Reduce the pathologies of class actions and discovery that arise in large, complex, and important cases, and the normative case for keeping more cases in court and out of arbitration becomes one sided.

But the debate over arbitration reform should not be limited to a debate over whether the availability of arbitration should be scaled back, or whether arbitration should be banned for categories of disputes, such as consumer or employment cases. Our approach points to a more nuanced approach. Arbitration ameliorates system externalities, but it deprives the courts of their ability to generate public goods externalities. (We set aside strategic externalities, which cut both ways.) Given these facts, the design of arbitration reforms should be tailored to retaining the benefits of arbitration to system externalities while minimizing the costs to public goods externalities. Banning arbitration (altogether or for categories of cases) only addresses the need to protect public goods externalities; it fails to account for system externality benefits.

We see alternatives that account for both. For example, one concern about public goods externalities is that entire areas of law are being moved outside of litigation, depriving courts of their precedent-generating function. A related concern is that wrongdoing by parties to arbitration agreements will be shielded from public view. Reforms to arbitration law could seek to ensure that courts do not lose that function by channeling a share of cases into court, even if they contain otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements. Although we recognize that this would entail dramatic changes to current law, such a change could be accomplished through amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act. A radical possibility would be to randomize the enforceability of arbitration agreements, with courts sending a small, randomly chosen subset of disputes to court, despite the presence of arbitration agreements. This would ensure that courts continue to make law in every area of law, even those

---

90 Although randomization in law is rare, it is sometimes used. The procedure we describe here could be analogized to random audits by the IRS of tax filings to ensure compliance. Here, the goal of randomization is not to deter law breaking, but to sustain law making.
for which arbitration agreements are the norm. This would also ensure that a representative sample of disputes (that otherwise go to arbitration) become public. A less radical possibility would be to amend Section 10 of the FAA, which governs the enforcement of arbitral awards. Currently, Section 10 permits the vacatur of an arbitral award only in the event of misconduct by the arbitrators or a party or the arbitrators exceeding their authority. The bases for vacatur could be broadened, however, so that those disputes with the greatest public goods externalities are pulled out of arbitration. An additional basis for vacatur of an arbitral award could be that the arbitration raised novel questions of law such that, without a court judgment on the merits of the claims, those questions of law would remain unanswered, even though they are likely to recur in future in arbitrations. Cases in which an arbitral award is vacated on this ground would then be litigated. This possibility would occasionally lead to litigation that duplicates an already-completed arbitration, but given that the vast majority of arbitrations do not involve novel issues, this reform would only affect a small share of arbitrations while protecting the courts’ role in creating precedent.

C. Class Actions and Multidistrict Litigation

In federal court, class actions and multidistrict litigation are procedural devices for the aggregation of many claims into a single proceeding. A class action aggregates into a single civil action many claims, including claims of individuals who never become a party to the case, but are nonetheless bound by the judgment as class members. MDL proceedings take already-filed actions (some of which may themselves be class actions) and transfer them to a single district court for consolidated pre-trial proceedings before a single judge, even as each action retains its identity as a separate case.

Class actions and MDLs have distinct relevance to our analysis, because they both address and create massive externalities for courts. While aggregative mechanisms help relieve congestion and bring before the court important cases that would otherwise would not have been pursued (something likely to happen with a widely dispersed harm that is small for each victim but

---

91 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (permitting vacatur of an arbitration award only “(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”).

92 The logic of this exception to the enforceability of arbitration agreements would parallel the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. See, e.g., Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).

93 See Rule 23.

large in the aggregate)—they also exacerbate some externalities. Notably, as noted by scholars and judges alike, the accountability of the representative plaintiffs and lawyers to the remaining claimants is weakened in MDLs and class actions. This is a form of strategic externality that, while intrinsic to the agency relationship between lawyers and their clients, is especially large in class actions and MDLs.

Given these large sets of externalities, we would predict (as a positive matter) and hope (as a normative matter) to see the rules governing class actions and MDLs structure these processes in ways that address the challenges that arise in aggregate litigation. We address these possibilities below.

1. **Strategic externalities**

The heightened risk of strategic externalities in aggregate litigation should lead rulemakers and courts to exercise judicial control to a greater extent. This judicial oversight could take the form of traditional command-and-control, with judges directing outcomes in the litigation, or perhaps with the use of the kinds of innovative tools we have described. Precisely because of the unusual extent of externalities in this context, we argue that judges should (and in fact do) innovate with procedural flexibility to a greater degree in the context of class actions and MDLs than anywhere else. In terms of our cube in Figure 5, high levels of strategic externalities call for judicial control or regulated markets and prices.

In the class action context, this takes the form of the unique suite of procedural protections codified in Rule 23. Rule 23 specifies greater judicial oversight of the attorney-claimant relationship than found in any other context in civil litigation. For example, in order to certify a class action, the court must satisfy itself that the attorneys represent the class will “fairly and adequately represent” the class and even look into the attorneys’ proposed fee arrangements. The Federal Rules nowhere else provide for such an insertion of the judge into attorney representation. Further, the class action rule is unique in requiring that a settlement involving a class be approved by the judge. Indeed, courts reject settlement when they feel the class attorney sold out the claim for a hefty fee for herself.

---

95 If damages vary across potential claimants, it is possible for both effects to occur—those with higher damages who find it worthwhile to sue congest the courts, while those with lower damages who do not sue forgo creating a benefit shared by all.

96 Because the strategic externalities extend beyond counterparties to unrepresented claimants, requiring consent between the parties is not alone sufficient to discipline this externality.

97 Rule 23(g).

98 Rule 23(e). We note that this treatment of class actions is not unique to the U.S. In Israel, the attorney general can object to any class action settlement. [Cite]

99 In *In re Trulia, Inc Stockholder Litigation*, 2016 WL 270821 (Del. Ch) the Delaware Court of Chancery announced it will no longer lightly approve class action settlement
Based on the reasoning above, we would predict that MDLs have the same features as class actions in this regard: they would consolidate counsel in order to reap the benefits to system externalities, but then subject the representation process to extraordinary safeguards in order to mitigate strategic externalities. In this respect, what we observe in practice strongly confirms our predictions—and not because the rules actually require this! As noted above, the rules governing judicial oversight of representation, fees, and settlement are unique to class actions and do not apply to MDLs. Rather, our prediction is confirmed in the most striking possible way: the statutes and Rules governing MDLs do not permit these safeguards against system and strategic externalities—but judges use them anyway. Lawyers and parties tacitly, even explicitly, endorse this, and appellate courts look the other way. MDL judges themselves say that “the very hallmark of the MDL is the ability to deviate from traditional procedure.”

As Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has shown, one divergence from well-established legal rules in MDLs is the capping of contingent fees. The fee agreement that a lawyer and a client enter into is generally seen as a private contract. Courts can typically only interfere with private contracts when there is some exceptional reason such as mental infirmity of a party to the contract. Nonetheless, MDL judges have capped attorneys’ contingent fees without any evidence or suggestion of exceptional reasons being present. Judges in prominent, closely-watched MDLs, including Vioxx, Zyprexa, and Guidant capped attorney fees, notwithstanding the absence of any apparent authority to do so.

Similarly, as Andrew Bradt and Teddy Rave have shown, MDL judges have inserted themselves into settlement agreement processes, even when not authorized to do so. As a matter of statutory law or the Federal Rules, “in MDL cases the judge has no authority to reject a settlement agreement as unfair to

when the settlement does not include any monetary recovery for the class (the so called: “disclosure only” settlements).


102 Judge Fallon in the Vioxx case capped attorneys’ fees at 32% and initially allocated 8% of that amount to lead lawyers further reducing non-lead lawyers payment. *Id.* at 109 (citing *In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (E.D. La. 2010); *In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 & n.1 (E.D. La. 2008))

103 Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa case capped attorneys’ fees at 35%. *Id.* at 110 (citing *In re Zyprexa*, 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (allowing special masters to vary caps upwards to 37.5% and downwards to 30%)).

104 Judge Frank in the Guidant case capped all contingent fees at 20%, although he allowed special masters to adjust the fees upward to 33.33% or the contracted-to fee. *Id.* (citing *In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig.*, MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008)).
the potentially thousands of parties ensnared in the litigation.”  Yet sometimes at the invitation of the parties, and sometimes despite the apparent intentions of the parties, judges have intervened to approve or disapprove settlements. Parties can reconfigure a mass settlement in an MDL as a proposed class action settlement, thereby explicitly inviting (and formally authorizing) judicial review of the settlement. In other cases, MDL settlement agreements contain provisions for judicial review. While the law allows for parties’ rulemaking in this way, the reality is that the judge is involved as well. High profile examples of this model include the Zyprexa case, where the lawyers “sought and obtained Judge Jack Weinstein’s formal approval of their non-class aggregate settlement,” the Guidant case, where the lawyers “sought and obtained Judge Donovan Frank’s formal approval of their non-class aggregate settlement,” and in a more complex structure but in the same vein, in the Vioxx case. And in at least one case, a judge reviewed a settlement without any basis in the parties’ agreement.

The same pattern appears with respect to representation. There is no explicit provision in law for the appointment of lead attorneys in MDLs like there is under Rule 23 for a certified class action. Yet, it is standard practice for the MDL judge to appoint lead attorneys to serve on behalf of the entire group, and “[t]he individually retained attorney has no power to appoint or discharge the leaders who assume control of her clients’ cases.” And MDL judges have then gone on to award attorney fees to lead counsel, despite lacking what Elizabeth Chamblee Burch tactfully calls a “unified doctrinal basis” for doing this. In authorizing compensating lead attorneys, judges have “borrowed piece-meal from class actions’ common-fund doctrine, contract principles, ethics, equity,” and cited their “inherent managerial authority” or “inherent equitable authority.” As noted by Avraham and Hubbard, this operates as a de facto market in legal representation, where the power to

106 Id. at 1292.
107 Id. at 1263 (stating that the judges in the Vioxx and Zyprexa litigation (who were given contractual authority to review the settlement) “say that MDLs are really quasi-class actions” that demand formal judicial oversight in order to protect claimants who have had little involvement in the actual litigation, but whose rights may be profoundly affected.”). See also Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV at 118 (arguing that judicial oversight may improve “the transparency and legitimacy of [a] deal negotiated by self-interested attorneys that occur[ed] with little client involvement, monitoring, or consent.”).
108 Bradt & Rave, at 1296-1297.
111 Id. at 74.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 105. Judges have also invoked Rule 42, which allows courts to consolidate actions and “issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay, in support of the invocation of managerial or equitable authority. Id.
allocate litigation resources and procedure (depositions, discovery requests, even trials) is traded across cases. It is market-based procedural flexibility in everything but name.\textsuperscript{114} In terms of Figure 5, we are talking about a form of regulated markets, where judges monitor something akin to barter or an implicit cap-and-trade system.

We take no position on the formal question of the extent to which existing legal authority provides a sufficient foothold for these innovations by MDL judges. As a normative matter, we endorse the view that MDL procedure must be unusual, because the MDL process itself creates unusually large strategic externalities even as it reduces unusually large system externalities.

The specific methods of addressing system and strategic externalities, however, should be open to debate. For example, it is worth considering whether MDLs should further borrow from class actions in experimenting with market-based approaches. Rather than having a judge unilaterally choose class counsel and evaluate attorney fees, a market-based approach would invite competition among law firms. One possible method, which some district courts have employed in class actions, is for the court to auction off the right to represent the class (and therefore to collect fees).\textsuperscript{115} The basic idea is that firms bid by offering the amount of fees they would charge, and the lowest bidder wins. A challenge here, and a reason why auctions for class counsel have been criticized, is that while the court can easily assess the lowest bidder, it is not necessarily in the best position to weigh bids against the quality of the lawyering each bidder can provide.\textsuperscript{116}

Unique to the MDL context would be market-based solutions to the disconnect between the lead attorneys—usually organized as a “Plaintiffs Steering Committee” or PSC—and the individual attorneys and their clients who benefit from the efficiencies of the MDL process but lose much of their control over their own claims to the PSC. For example, rather than offering bids to the court, as in the class action context, law firms vying for a seat on the PSC could bid for seats by offering to take a smaller cut of the total fees from individual plaintiffs (and their attorneys). The fact that bids can be offered directly to plaintiffs and their attorneys is a distinct advantage of this market-based approach in the MDL context over the class action context. When a court is assessing bids, it is difficult for the court to weigh a lower (i.e., better) bid on price against hard-to-quantify factors like lawyer skill. In the MDL context, the court would not have to make these tradeoffs, but rather allow the individual parties and lawyers to judge for themselves.

\textsuperscript{114} Avraham and Hubbard, supra note 10, at 938–39
\textsuperscript{116} Cite.
2. System Externalities

Class actions and MDLs are designed to solve, not create, system externalities. Nonetheless, there may be a need to manage system externalities here, as well. As the saying goes, “build a superhighway, create a traffic jam.”\textsuperscript{117} Precisely because MDLs involve most decisionmaking being made by a PSC rather than the individual plaintiff or lawyer, it can become cost effective for lawyer to file suit on behalf of a plaintiff with a very weak claim, with the expectation that the claim will be swept up in a mass settlement in MDL proceedings. This will generate a settlement payout with little cost to the plaintiff or lawyer and little risk that the validity of the individual claim would be tested in court. Such claims, known as “tag-alongs,” undo some of the benefits of MDLs: tag-alongs crowd the MDL judge’s docket and dilute the value of legitimate claims, both of which are negative spillovers.

As other work has noted, an approach to combatting congestion like this is the judicial equivalent of toll roads—forcing parties to internalize the cost they are imposing on others.\textsuperscript{118} Under current practice, some courts attempt to screen tag-along cases using “Lone Pine orders,” through which MDL judges require plaintiffs to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of injury and exposure to the defendant’s products or other alleged tortious conduct, and sometimes even specific causation.\textsuperscript{119} By raising the cost of piling into an MDL (for low-merit claimants but less so for high-merit claimants, one hopes), a Lone Pine order regulates the flow of cases into an MDL the way that a tollbooth controls congestion on a highway, i.e., by charging for entry and not letting slow vehicles (tractors, horse and carriages, etc.) go on the highway.

But do these orders work as intended? Lone Pine orders impose evidentiary burdens at a stage of litigation—the pleading stage—where the plaintiff may lack the very evidence the order demands.\textsuperscript{120} If so, then the orders may fail to sort between low- and high-merit claimants. Rather than regulating the flow of traffic, so to speak, they may simply block it.

Our approach suggests the possibility of replacing the figurative “toll” (the Lone Pine order) with a literal toll, imposed on claimants or, perhaps even better, imposed personally on lawyers representing them. As indicated in Figure 5, pleading in MDLs falls in the zone of “regulated markets/prices” where judicially regulated pricing would allow parties to join the MDL as long as they internalize the externalities they create. This pricing-based solution offers three potential improvements over the Lone Pine order. First, it does not require plaintiffs to produce evidence they do not have. In this way, it better allows sorting between stronger and weaker claims. Lawyers representing claimants will be more willing to front the cost for a strong claim than a weak claim; this is no different than how contingency fee attorneys approach legal

\textsuperscript{117} This analogy is explored in depth in Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, \textit{Induced Litigation}, 98 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 545 (2004).
\textsuperscript{118} See Avraham and Hubbard, \textit{supra} note 10.
\textsuperscript{120} Id.
costs in other contexts. Second, rather than potentially and unintentionally erecting a (figurative) blockade to the superhighway, a (literal) toll can be calibrated up or down to regulate congestion depending on the needs of the court in any given MDL. And third, *Lone Pine* orders impose a deadweight loss—the resources spent on filings, evidentiary submissions, and fact sheets are used up—while tolls/fees are merely a transfer of resources. The revenue received by the court could be spent on providing legal services or rebated to the population at large.

3. Public Goods Externalities

Finally, while class actions and MDLs facilitate positive spillovers across claimants, the lead plaintiffs or lead attorneys still need incentives to bring the actions and make the arguments in the first place. Further, some aggregate litigation generates public good externalities even beyond the claimants directly affected; class actions in particular often raise issues of importance to society at large.

This suggests that, at least for actions with societal importance, a subsidy for the cost of fully litigating a class action or MDL could be appropriate. Under current U.S. law, there is no explicit subsidy given for litigating important cases, although perhaps the large compensation earned by the elite class action bar—which, we should recall, is reviewed and sometimes set by courts—could be understood as, in part, reflecting an implicit subsidy for positive spillovers. Still, we are not aware of cases where courts adjust that compensation based on the public or social important of the cases. Elsewhere, though, the law is explicit. Israeli law provides a “Public Fund to Finance Class Action Lawsuits,” which by its own terms serves “to assist representative plaintiffs to finance the submission and hearing of petitions for the approval of class actions of public and social importance.” In terms of Figure 5, the regulators helps markets achieve efficiency by providing a subsidy to cases with large public good externality.

Since class actions often raise issues of social importance, protective orders, settlements and other confidentiality agreements that bar information obtained in private litigation from reaching the public eye should be avoided to protect society from losing the public good externality the class action generates. Rule 26(c) allows the court to issue a protective order, for good cause, to protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”. The problem is that often shielding the defendant from “embarrassment” also shields society from learning important life-saving information. We therefore expect that in important cases such as safety related class actions Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement will be construed narrowly so that important information will reach the public or at least government

121 Class Action Law, 5776-2016, SH No. 2054, p. 264, Art. 27(a) (Isr.). For discussion, see Eli Bukspan, “the Israeli Public Class Action Fund: New Path for Integrating Business and Social Responsibility” (working paper 2019), who notes that the fund serves to pay expert witness fees and reimburse expenses for unsuccessful claims, among other things.
agencies. Indeed, both NHTSA and CPSC have recently published guidance urging parties and courts to ensure safety information is disclosed to the government agencies claiming that otherwise they violate the “good cause” requirement of Rule 26(c).¹²²

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we organize existing arguments about procedural design into three strands and show that each strand is focused on how procedure can address one type of externality.

The first strand of the literature addresses what we call system externalities, the effects of actions on other cases in the same court or court system. The second strand addresses what we call strategic externalities, the effects of a party’s actions on opposing parties in the same case. The third strand implicates external effects on society as a whole, which we call public goods externalities.

Our framework allows us to identify approaches to procedural design that can address these externalities, whether singly or in combination. Our focus is on different and sometimes radically new forms of procedural flexibility that tailor procedures within and across cases. Some of the solutions arising from our theoretical framework were brought forward in this Article and include surprising forms of judicial command-and-control—for example, the Supreme Court prohibiting parties from settling or withdrawing a pending petition. Other ideas were explored by Avraham and Hubbard, where, among other things they illustrated specific examples of “regulated markets”—including establishing markets for depositions or appeals.¹²³ What is clear is that when we perceive the dilemmas of civil procedure in terms of externalities, a whole new world of possibilities opens up—allowing us to provide new solutions for the problems legal scholars have been debating for years.

Even more exciting, we believe that allowing this kind of market-based tailoring of legal rules could be extended beyond civil procedure. In principle it is not obvious why our arguments could not also apply in the criminal procedure context.¹²⁴ Plea bargaining has long been controversial for inducing defendants to trade away their constitutional and procedural rights. Given that plea bargaining is here to stay, one could imagine that creating open markets for procedural rights in this context might increase the options available to defendants, make trials more viable in some cases, and better leverage the overtaxed resources of public defenders and state’s attorneys. For example, a rich criminal defendant who wants a jury of twelve rather than six

¹²³ Avraham and Hubbard, supra note 12, at 926-931.
¹²⁴ Ramon Feldbrin, Procedural Categories, LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO L. J. (forthcoming) (arguing that formal rules of criminal and civil procedure were introduced as recent as the in 1930 and that Europe that are still context where the is no such divide).
could buy the right to six jurors from a poor defendant who would use the sale of such rights to finance his defense in a bench trial.  

The ideas in this paper can apply more broadly to the role of explicit markets increasing transparency and access to governmental institutions beyond the courts, too. For example, how lobbyists and constituents gain access to meetings with elected representatives may be opaque, difficult to navigate, and reliant on anything from large campaign contributions to social networks to expensive meals. Imagine a representative distributing freely tradeable credits for meeting time among all of her constituents, or a government agency distributing tradeable credits for hearing time and meeting time.

In such a scenario, would big money still dominate lobbying? Inevitably, yes—but three things would change: First, powerful interests will have to compensate regular citizens if the powerful interests are going to monopolize lobbying opportunities. Currently, weak and disorganized groups are shut out of the process but receive nothing in return. Second, groups that are politically engaged but lack financial resources could refuse to sell their credits and pool them instead, thereby gaining access they lacked before. Third, the information available to stakeholders is (partially) equalized. Everyone can observe the “going price” for access to decisionmakers. And it is no rejoinder to say that this commodifies access to government—does anyone believe that there isn’t already a “market price” for gaining access to authority, whether judicial, legislative, or executive? Making the “market price” a literal rather than figurative reality would make the process more comprehensible and accessible to the relatively powerless.

While some literature on these possibilities exists, we leave all that to another day.

---


126 We thank Sarath Sanga for suggesting this direction of inquiry.