In Praise of Realism (and Against 'Nonsense' Jurisprudence)

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Ronald Dworkin describes an approach to how courts should decide cases that he associates with Judge Richard Posner as a “Chicago School of anti-theoretical, no-nonsense jurisprudence.” Since Professor Dworkin takes his own view of adjudication to be diametrically opposed to that of the Chicago School, it might seem fair, then, to describe Dworkin’s own theory as an instance of protheoretical, nonsense jurisprudence. That characterization is not one, needless to say, that Professor Dworkin welcomes. Dworkin describes his preferred approach to jurisprudential questions, to be sure, as theoretical, in opposition to what he calls the practical orientation of the Chicago School. But while there is a real dispute between Dworkin and Posner, it is not one illuminated by the contrast between theory and practice. It is, rather, a dispute about the kind of theory that is relevant and illuminating when it comes to law and adjudication. And the fault line marked by this dispute is profound indeed, one that extends far beyond Dworkin and Posner and has a venerable and ancient history that includes Thucydides and Plato, Nietzsche and Kant, Marx and Hegel, up to Geuss and Rawls in the present. I shall describe it, instead, as a dispute between Moralists and Realists, between those whose starting point is a theory of how things (morally) ought to be versus those who begin with a theory of how things really are. The Essay endeavors to show that our contemporaries, Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner, are reenacting a version of the dispute between the paradigmatic philosophical moralist Plato and the paradigmatic historical realist Thucydides. The Essay concludes by connecting the Posner–Dworkin dispute with recent “realist” critiques of Rawlsian political philosophy, trying to clarify the grounds for skepticism (deriving broadly from Hume and Nietzsche) about the practical value of such theorizing.

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INTRODUCTION

Ronald Dworkin describes an approach to how courts should decide cases that he associates with Judge Richard Posner and Professor Cass Sunstein as “a Chicago School of anti-theoretical, no-nonsense jurisprudence.” Since Professor Dworkin takes his own view of adjudication to be diametrically opposed to that of the Chicago School, it might seem fair, then, to describe Dworkin’s own theory as an instance of protheoretical, nonsense jurisprudence.

That characterization is not one, needless to say, that Professor Dworkin would welcome. To be sure, he describes his preferred approach to jurisprudential questions as “theoretical,” in opposition to what he calls the “practical” orientation of the Chicago School. He writes, as he says, “[i]n [p]raise of [t]heory,” while the Chicago School he opposes views court decisions as “a political occasion” in which there is an “immediate practical problem” which demands of us an answer to the question: “How can we make things better?”

It is familiar to students of jurisprudence that Professor Dworkin is an unreliable guide to the views of his opponents, and matters are no different in this instance. Judge Posner has a “theory” in any recognizable sense of that term. He argues that the cases confronting appellate courts are frequently indeterminate as a matter of law and that, in fact, judges are often influenced by their nonlegal views about questions of morals and politics. Judge Posner

1. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 51 (2006).
2. Id. at 49–50.
suggests resolving those cases with a rough-and-ready cost–benefit analysis, in which costs and benefits are understood (again loosely) in terms of utility which is, in turn, understood as the economists understand it, namely, in terms of revealed preferences (for example, willingness to pay). Claims that the law is indeterminate, that judges are influenced by nonlegal factors, that judges ought to employ cost–benefit analysis, and that utility should be understood in terms of revealed preferences certainly sound like theoretical claims to my ear. What else could they be?

There is, to be sure, a real dispute between Dworkin and Posner (I shall bracket Sunstein’s views, since they are, as Dworkin himself ultimately acknowledges, quite different from Posner’s), but it is not a dispute illuminated by the contrast between theory and practice. It is rather a dispute about the kind of theory that is relevant and illuminating when it comes to law and adjudication. And the fault line marked by this dispute is profound indeed: it extends far beyond Dworkin and Posner and has a venerable and ancient history that runs through Plato and Thucydides, Kant and Nietzsche, Hegel and Marx, as well as Rawls and Geuss in the present. I shall describe it, instead, as a dispute between Moralists and Realists, between those whose starting point is a theory of how things (morally) ought to be versus those who begin with a theory of how things really are. That is only a crude first approximation of what is at stake, but it will be the burden of this Essay to fill it out. In the end, I will argue that the Realist approach to questions of legal and political theory is the superior one.

I. PLATO VS. THUCYDIDES

We shall return shortly to Dworkin and Posner, but let us go back in time to the first emblematic instance of this dispute—between the Moralist Plato and the Realist Thucydides in antiquity. There will prove to be a sense in which our contemporaries, Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner, are merely reenacting a version of the dispute between the paradigmatic philosophical moralist Plato and the paradigmatic historical realist Thucydides.

Plato is both a moralist—a philosopher with a robust conception of the good life and the just society which he advocates—and a moralizing philosopher whose metaphysical and epistemological views are in the service of his moral aims, a philosopher who illustrates Nietzsche’s dictum that “the moral... intentions in every philosophy constitute[] the real germ... from which the whole plant [has always] grown.” For Plato, immoral behavior is irrational behavior, and it is in the interest of rational beings to forego the selfish satisfaction of their desires in favor of acting justly. The true nature of reality,
justice, and what is in our interests are all possible objects of rational cognition for Plato, though the objects of such cognition are a realm of facts that transcend the merely empirical world. The world around us, the one visible to our senses, is merely apparent, a pale imitation of the true world in which the rational is the moral, self-interest coincides with justice, and a harmony obtains between objective knowledge, objective reality, and the good. The Cambridge political philosopher Raymond Geuss aptly characterizes this Platonic "optimism" (as he calls it) in terms of a number of propositions, of which the most important for our purposes is the Platonic assumption "that when the world was correctly understood, it would make moral sense to us." Dworkin, the jurisprudential Moralist, wants the correct understanding of what courts do to make a certain kind of "moral sense" as well—namely, that court decisions are morally justified in licensing the exercise of the state’s coercive power in virtue of their conforming to a kind of Dworkinian ideal of judicial decision. We shall return to that ideal shortly.

Platonic optimism and moralism, as Nietzsche most famously argued, is the dominant theme in Western philosophy from Plato onwards, and it is for this reason that Nietzsche so much prefers the pre-Socratic philosophers, especially the fifth century Sophists, whom Nietzsche takes (somewhat, though not wholly, idiosyncratically) to be best exemplified by the historian Thucydides. It is in Thucydides, Nietzsche says,

that culture of the most impartial knowledge of the world finds its last glorious flower: that culture which had in Sophocles its poet, in Pericles its statesman, in Hippocrates its physician, in Democritus its natural philosopher; which deserves to be baptised with the name of its teachers, the Sophists. . .

In Thucydides, in other words, "the culture of the Sophists, by which I mean the culture of the realists [die Realisten Cultur], reaches its perfect expression." "Realism," here, does not mean Plato's metaphysical doctrine about the reality of a supra-empirical world. Rather, it means "the courage of all strong spirits to know their own immorality," that is, to face up to the role that (for example) avarice, malice, and selfishness play in what is otherwise instrumentally rational behavior by persons. Thus, Thucydides, the quintessential realist, is described

8. RAYMOND GEUSS, OUTSIDE ETHICS 223 (2005).
9. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, DAYBREAK: THOUGHTS ON THE PREJUDICES OF MORALITY 103 (Maudemarie Clark & Brian Leiter eds., R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1997) (1881); cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 233 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (1967) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER] ("The Greek culture of the Sophists had developed out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the culture of the Periclean age as necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus, in Democritus, in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds expression in, e.g., the high culture of Thucydides.").
11. NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER, supra note 9, at 234.
by Nietzsche as

the last revelation of that strong, severe, hard factuality which was instinctive with the older Hellenes. In the end, it is courage in the face of reality that distinguishes a man like Thucydides from Plato: Plato is a coward before reality, consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control of himself, consequently he also maintains control of things. Plat "flees into the ideal" by pretending, for example, that it is always in the rational self-interest of agents to act justly and that no rational person ever knowingly acts wrongly. Thucydides' "courage in the face of reality," by contrast, is on display in his portrayal of the dialogue between the Athenians and the vanquished Melians—a dialogue that one distinguished scholar, W.K.C. Guthrie, has called "the most famous example of amoral 'realism.'" Negotiating over the terms of surrender, the Athenians address the Melians, in relevant part, as follows:

For our part, we will not make a long speech no one would believe, full of fine moral arguments—that our empire is justified because we defeated the Persians, or that we are coming against you for an injustice you have done to us... Instead, let's work out what we can do on the basis of what both sides truly accept: we both know that decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion [that is, only among equals does right prevail over might]; but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the weak must accept that.

Nature always compels gods (we believe) and men (we are certain) to rule over anyone they can control. We did not make this law, and we were not the first to follow it; but we will take it as we found it and leave it to posterity forever, because we know that you would do the same if you had our power, and so would anyone else.

Nietzsche's own commentary on this particular dialogue highlights some of the key themes of Sophistic Realism:

Do you suppose perchance that these little Greek free cities, which from rage and envy would have liked to devour each other, were guided by philanthropic and righteous principles? Does one reproach Thucydides for the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian ambassadors when they negotiated with the Melians on the question of destruction or submission?

15. Id. at 106.
Only complete Tartuffes [that is, Socrates and Plato] could possibly have talked of virtue in the midst of this terrible tension—or men living apart, hermits, refugees, and emigrants from reality—people who negated in order to be able to live themselves.

... [The English scholar] Grote's tactics in defense of the Sophists are false: he wants to raise them to the rank of men of honor and ensigns of morality—but it was their honor not to indulge in any swindle with big words and virtues.¹⁶

Contempt for any “swindle with big words and virtues” may be one of the hallmarks of Realism, but what exactly does it mean? In the case under discussion, Realist impatience with the “swindle with big words and virtues” signifies the candid recognition that the Athenians in their dealings with the Melians are not moved at all by “philanthropic and righteous principles” but are driven, instead, by selfish and self-aggrandizing concerns, restrained only by the limits of their own power.¹⁷ Socrates and Plato, by contrast, engage in a “swindle with big words and virtues” when, as Thucydides makes plain, virtue and justice play little role in human affairs.

Of course, the speeches Thucydides presents are his own creations; in many cases (as with the Melian dialogue), he could not have even been present to hear them. Yet this is precisely why Thucydides is a Realist in Nietzsche's view: how he chooses to reconstruct events reflects his Realism about human affairs. The classical philosophy scholar Paul Woodruff aptly observes, “Thucydides’ speakers are made to say what Thucydides thinks they actually believe, whether they would have said those things in public or not. . . . He shows us their speeches refracted through a lens of honesty.”¹⁸ Thucydides, in other words, puts into the speakers’ mouths their true, amoral motives, reflecting Thucydides’ realistic view of human nature and human affairs, in contrast with the idealistic fantasies of a Socrates or Plato.¹⁹ Thus, Nietzsche declares,

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¹⁶. NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER, supra note 9, at 234.
¹⁷. We should notice here the resonance with contemporary “realist” theories of international relations, which frequently acknowledge Thucydides as their inspiration. See generally, e.g., DAVID BOUCHER, POLITICAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM THUCYDIDES TO THE PRESENT (1998) (using the ideas of philosophers such as Thucydides to explain political theory in international relations).
¹⁸. Paul Woodruff, Introduction to THUCYDIDES, supra note 14, at ix, xxiii. As Geuss puts it, Thucydides' “project is to exhibit what really moves people to act, and what then happens to them and to others as a consequence of how they act, not to write an edifying treatise or a partisan tract.” GEUSS, supra note 8, at 226.
¹⁹. Of course, on one prevalent understanding of Plato, he too accepts that humans are self-interested and simply tries to show them that “justice” and “virtue” are in their self-interest. The Realist, however, might object that this identification of morality with self-interest is so implausible as to be no different from preaching “justice” and “virtue” quite apart from any appeal to self-interest.
[M]y cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. Thucydides and, perhaps Machiavelli's Principe are most closely related to myself by the unconditional will not to gull oneself and to see reason in reality—not in 'reason,' still less in 'morality.'

Thucydides views political leaders as essentially motivated by selfish concerns—power, fear, wealth—and as creatures for whom moral considerations are rhetorical window dressing rather than a reason for action. The History of the Peloponnesian War is a microcosm for what happens when these perennial facts about motivation encounter the recurring circumstances of human social existence. Rather than delude his readers with a "swindle with big words and virtues," Thucydides puts into the mouths of his actors their actual self-serving motives—glory and power.

II. POSNER, LLEWELLYN, AND REALISM ABOUT ADJUDICATION

We have traveled far from Dworkin and the "Chicago School of... no-nonsense jurisprudence," but some points of contact between the ancient quarrel between Moralism and Realism and the contemporary jurisprudential dispute may have already suggested themselves.

Dworkin, as is no doubt familiar, believes that there exists a right answer as a matter of law in every (or almost every) dispute, and that judges discover that answer by the process of what he calls "constructive interpretation," that is, by figuring out which result would cohere with the moral principles that best explain and justify the prior official acts—the court decisions, legislation, and so on—constituting the institutional history of the legal system. Dworkin's nonsense jurisprudence, then, takes what judges say they are doing at face value. In other words, if judges say they are reaching the result the law requires (and they usually do say that), then that is what they are doing and so we must interpret them. If judges invoke moral and political principles in deciding hard cases, then we must view those principles as legally binding on them and construct a theory of law that shows it to be so. Nonsense jurisprudence treats the judicial "swindle with big words and virtues" (to borrow Nietzsche's

21. Cf. Guthrie, supra note 13 ("It is remarkable how seldom even [Thucydides'] orators, aiming at persuasion, see any point in appealing to considerations of right, justice or other normally accepted moral standards: it is taken for granted that only an appeal to self-interest is likely to succeed.").
22. In the case of Thucydides, none of the preceding is incompatible with his having a "moral" to convey to his readers about the consequences of naked lust for power and glory. But his method for conveying this is to illustrate the consequences of the conduct of the Athenians rather than to construct a moral theory about why such conduct is not justified. In this respect, Thucydides is something like one of Judge Posner's "moral entrepreneurs," discussed below.
23. Dworkin, supra note 1.
provocative phrase)\textsuperscript{25} as not a swindle but a faithful report of the essence of legal reasoning, and thus the central data point to which any theory of law and adjudication must answer. Moreover, it treats the results of adjudication—the recognition of apparently new rights and remedies and causes of action—as making a kind of "moral sense"—that is, as being morally justified exercises of coercive power by virtue of corresponding to the demands of constructive interpretation.

No-nonsense jurisprudence, from Karl Llewellyn to Richard Posner, sees matters otherwise. What judges say they are doing is one thing; what they are really doing is another. Official legal reasoning often fails to determine a single outcome as a matter of law—that, of course, is a theoretical claim in jurisprudence—so the idea that one could really understand what courts are doing by attending only to the legal arguments they present in their opinions is an illusion. Just as Thucydides shows us the Athenian "speeches refracted through a lens of honesty,"\textsuperscript{26} so too Realists from Llewellyn to Posner strip away the obfuscating doctrinal rationales judges offer to identify the real, nonlegal considerations influencing the decisions.

To be sure, our jurisprudential Realists need not ascribe to judges self-aggrandizing motives. Judges are not necessarily like our ancient Athenians in pursuing power and glory; though, as it happens, Posner himself has explored the possibility that judges are rationally self-interested maximizers of leisure, reputation, and prestige, among other desiderata.\textsuperscript{27} From the Legal Realism of the 1920s and 1930s\textsuperscript{28} to the contemporary political science literature,\textsuperscript{29} though, the primary emphasis has been on the role that nonlegal value judgments—for example, judgments about the fairness of a particular business practice, or simply value judgments reflecting a particular political ideology—play in explaining why judges decide as they do, even when those nonlegal values are absent from the opinions.

Judge Posner has sometimes expressed unhappiness with the "Realist" label, notwithstanding the obvious affinities between the law-and-economics revolution he brought to fruition in the 1970s and the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s. He has written, "We economic types have no desire to be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{25} See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 135–36 (1995). And see more recently POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 35–36, which also notes limitations of this approach.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} See generally BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing the history of Legal Realism and the inadequacy of most descriptions of it).
\end{itemize}
pronounced the intellectual heirs of Fred Rodell, or for that matter William Douglas, Jerome Frank, or Karl Llewellyn. The law and economics movement owes little to legal realism . . . .30 Whatever the chain of influence, it seems clear that economic analysis of law, like Legal Realism, is predicated on a thoroughgoing skepticism about the adequacy of existing legal categories and the need for an alternative explanation of the actual course of decisions.31

The legal historian Neil Duxbury aptly summarizes Posner’s approach to economic analysis of law as follows: “Owing to the fact that judicial opinions are frequently suffused with rhetoric, it is invariably very difficult to figure out what types of concerns lead judges to reach the decisions that they do.”32 Yet the resonance with familiar Realist refrains is obvious here. To take but one example, here is Karl Llewellyn:

[I]f I am right, finding out what the judges say is but the beginning of your task. You will have to take what they say and compare it with what they do. You will have to see whether what they say matches with what they do. You will have to be distrustful of whether they themselves know (any better than other men) the ways of their own doing, and of whether they describe it accurately, even if they know it.33

The task Llewellyn identifies is, of course, precisely the task the Posnerian lawyer–economist would discharge. Indeed, Alan Schwartz has recently argued that Llewellyn was a proto-economic-efficiency theorist when it came to the optimal rules for contract law,34 a thesis that, if correct, would suggest an even deeper affinity between Posnerian law and economics and Legal Realism.35

These historical details, however, do not matter for our purposes. What matters are the broad thematic affinities that set Realists like Holmes, Llewellyn, and Posner against Moralists like Dworkin when it comes to thinking about

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31. Judge Posner tells me that he arrived at his views about adjudication quite independently of the Legal Realists and that he is mainly concerned not to be associated with some of the more extreme and sillier aspects of Legal Realism seen in works by writers like Fred Rodell, or in Jerome Frank’s armchair psychoanalytic speculations about judicial motivations.
35. Llewellyn, as Schwartz argues persuasively, “used commercial practice as the best evidence of the efficient transaction,” and thus, by treating normal commercial practice as the benchmark for decision making, he effectively privileged economic efficiency as the goal of the rules of commercial law. Id. at 16. (I should note that Schwartz does, however, misunderstand the meaning and nature of Llewellyn’s rule skepticism, as I discuss in Brian Leiter, Postscript to Part I: Interpreting Legal Realism, in Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, supra note 3, at 103, 108–12. But that disagreement does not affect the point at issue here.) It is also striking that Llewellyn and Judge Posner have similar views on precedent. Compare Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4, at 45, with Llewellyn, supra note 33, at 51–66.
adjudication. Realists want to tell us what really goes on when courts decide cases; Moralists want to understand adjudication in terms that they adjudge morally defensible, which means, for Dworkin, taking what judges say at face value. The dispute between Realists and Moralists would be clear cut if it were only a descriptive question about what is actually happening. After all, in recent years, much evidence has been adduced that strongly supports the conclusion that the political ideology of the judge has a strong influence on his or her decisions. In a widely noted article, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein identify what they call a "Standard Pattern of Judicial Voting" in "ideologically contested cases"—such as those involving "environmental protection, labor law, immigration, sex discrimination, abortion, and campaign finance law"—in which "the political affiliation of the appointing president greatly matters to judicial votes." Moreover, while "[i]n many areas of law, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes more often than Republican appointees do," in some areas, the composition of the panel matters: "the liberal voting rate typically increases with the number of copanelists who are Democratic appointees—and correspondingly falls with the number of Republican appointees."

The Standard Pattern is not, as Miles and Sunstein readily concede, universal, even with respect to subjects that might seem to be fraught with ideological discord. As they remark, "Republican appointees and Democratic appointees do not differ in their voting patterns in some areas in which significant differences might well be expected; examples include criminal appeals, property rights, congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and standing to sue." As to what explains this convergence, Miles and Sunstein offer two possibilities: "Perhaps the law imposes a great deal of discipline in these domains, so that ideological differences cannot emerge; perhaps Republican and Democratic appointees do not much disagree in such areas."

Beyond political ideology, studies have also found that, "in sex discrimination cases, a judge’s sex matters" to the outcome, and the race of the judge appears to affect outcomes in voting-rights cases. Judge Posner, in his recent book How Judges Think, notes that "the outcome of Supreme Court cases can be predicted more accurately by means of a handful of variables, none of which

36. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
37. See generally CROSS, supra note 29; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29; CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (analyzing the influence of ideology on judicial decisions).
39. Id. at 838. Cases where panel composition does not seem to matter include those dealing with abortion and capital punishment. Miles and Sunstein write, "In those domains, judges apparently vote their convictions and are not influenced, at least in their conclusions, by the other judges on the panel.” Id. at 839.
40. See id. at 839.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 840.
involves legal doctrine, than by a team of constitutional law experts." That most people, including many legal professionals, are surprised by this indicates what an unrealistic view they have, Posner says, of what judges do. The explanation for this state of affairs is partly attributable to the judges themselves. Judge Posner writes, "[M]ost judges are cagey, even coy, in discussing what they do. They tend to parrot an official line about the judicial process (how rule-bound it is), and often to believe it, though it does not describe their actual practices." Their "actual practices," according to Judge Posner, are better described by a variety of theories that emphasize their political attitudes, their strategic behavior (as in the "panel effects" noted by Miles and Sunstein), their behavior as "rational, self-interested utility maximizer[s]," and, most importantly for Posner, their "preconceptions" which shape, often subconsciously, their "responses to uncertainty" in the face of new cases. To be sure, Judge Posner, like the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s, acknowledges that law matters, in that it constrains, and often determines, decisions at the lower-court level. But as we move up through the levels of appellate review, nonlegal factors matter more and more to the outcomes—until we get, of course, to the U.S. Supreme Court, which is, as Judge Posner candidly acknowledges, "largely a political court when it is deciding constitutional cases."

III. A DWORKINIAN REJOINDER

What is the Moralist Dworkin to say in the face of such overwhelming evidence that judges, especially appellate judges, are often—though not always—

44. Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4, at 24.
45. Id. at 2. Judge David F. Levi, now Dean of Duke Law School, takes issue with Judge Posner, claiming that Posner's "generalizations about the ways of the judge and the world are ex cathedra pronouncements that generally lack any identified objective support outside of his own experience and belief." David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 Duke L.J. 1791, 1792–93 (2009) (reviewing Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4). This is an odd charge to make against a book that synthesizes a massive amount of empirical literature from the social sciences about courts, judges, and human decision making. See Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4, at 19–56. Judge Levi identifies a dozen very specific observations and claims that are offered by Judge Posner without empirical citation. See Levi, supra, at 1796–97. However, many of them are, as Judge Levi concedes, "not . . . clearly untrue" (most are, in fact, prima facie plausible), and they are in any case fairly minor points, rather than central themes. See Levi, supra, at 1797. (Those that are more central—like Judge Posner's claim about the central role of intuition in decision making by judges—are, indeed, fair inferences from the empirical literature cited and discussed.) But the key difficulty with Judge Levi's critique is that he appears to misunderstand the central argumentative structure of the book, which is to claim that the best explanation for the massive empirical evidence about judicial decision making is that "legalism" is false as a descriptive theory of adjudication.
46. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 837–40.
47. See Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4, at 35.
48. For pertinent citation and discussion, see Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, in Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, supra note 3, at 59, 77–78.
49. Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4, at 8.
political actors? Judges do not, to be sure, write opinions saying, "Since I was appointed by the Republican Reagan, I cannot possibly find in favor of the appellee," nor do they say, "As an African-American man, I cannot countenance the electoral practices of Georgia in this instance." Yet if the Realists, now armed with their empirical studies, are right, then this may actually be the correct explanation for the decisions. Dworkin has, throughout his career, called attention to the fact that judges write their opinions as if they are discovering the right answer as a matter of law. But none of the empirical studies just noted deny that fact about the opinions they write: they simply confirm—again and again—that nonlegal considerations and influences actually explain the decisions, and there is no way for Dworkin's interpretive theory of law to accommodate what at times appears to be naked political partisanship.50

So how is a Dworkinian Moralist to respond? Although Dworkin claims to be describing what judges actually do—"the hidden structure of their judgments," as he says52—his theory is quite explicitly driven by a normative vision. Like Plato, Dworkin wants his subject matter to make "moral sense," which, for Dworkin, means that, unless judges are deciding cases through the Dworkinian method of constructive interpretation,53 their decisions could not supply a moral justification for coercing the losing party before the court.54 It does not matter for our purposes that Dworkin's own unusual theory of the conditions under which coercion is justified is so implausible55 that it has only one adherent. What is more significant is that we have no reason (and Dworkin supplies none)

50. Because in Dworkin's view of adjudication, moral and political judgments are, of course, central to fixing the content of the law, perhaps he should simply claim that the empirical literature confirms his theory of adjudication! To be sure, so the argument would go, judges differ in their moral judgments, but it has never been part of Dworkin's theory to claim that we always know what the right answer is, only that one exists, and that it follows from a process of constructive interpretation that requires moral and political judgment. The difficulty, however, for this rejoinder is twofold: first, to show that the patterns of decision identified in the empirical literature can be reconstructed in terms that look anything like a constructive interpretation; and second, to explain why the face value of the opinions fails to correspond to the social-scientific explanation for the pattern of decisions. I am hard-pressed to see how either difficulty can be overcome, but I invite a reader sympathetic to Dworkin's view to undertake the theoretical challenge the empirical literature poses.

51. Note that Posner's view is that naked political partisanship is relatively rare, but only because he thinks the ideologies of the political parties are not themselves coherent. See Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 4, at 94. That just means, however, that the category of the "political" needs to be individuated in a more fine-grained way.

52. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 265. He means, of course, the hidden "logical" or "rational" structure that underlies the opinions they write, not the "hidden" psychological motivations.

53. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

54. It is important to recognize that Judge Posner, like most theorists, is silent on this question. To be sure, he thinks utility-maximizing decisions are good ones, but that is because he thinks maximizing utility is good, not because he thinks it is necessary for the moral justification of court coercing the losing party. Indeed, like a good Realist, he thinks that question is largely idle. See generally Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003) (arguing for a pragmatic theory of democracy).

for assuming that it will or should turn out that the exercise of coercive power by courts is morally justified. We may certainly hope it is justifiable (at least in otherwise morally commendable legal systems) for courts to decide even “hard” cases where the law seems up for grabs, and there are reasons to think it is quite apart from the law supplying a “right answer” in every case—most obviously, by appeal to the Hobbesian idea that the alternative to authoritative and final resolution of societal disputes by courts would be an intolerable war of all against all, given how unrealistic it is that the legislature could address all these problems. But we need not derail our discussion into the justification of political authority, since the key point is that Dworkin is not entitled to his assumption that a theory of adjudication must show the exercise of coercive power by courts to be morally justified.

This response to Dworkinian moralism no doubt seems too quick, as well it should. For there is, in fact, another way of framing the Moralist’s challenge to Realism’s view of adjudication. Perhaps we have good Realist reasons to be skeptical about the surface of judicial opinions, with their feigned supine posture before the force of the law and legal reasoning, and certainly we have no reason to assume in advance that courts are actually justified in bringing the coercive power of the state to bear against individuals in matters where the law seems to be uncertain. But a realistic Dworkinian—I assume, for sake of argument, that this is not an oxymoron—might concede both points, and still note that, in principle, all legal arguments have the property of being susceptible to what Dworkin has recently called “justificatory ascent.” By justificatory ascent, Dworkin means that, in any legal argument, it is always possible that a particular principle on which we are relying “is inconsistent with...some other principle that we must rely on to justify some other and larger part of the law.”

And that means that even if, in reality, judges are not really deciding based on the legal principles they invoke, it is still the case that we, as observers, might demand that their decisions answer to the demand of a principled justificatory ascent suggested by the arguments they offer. (Here Dworkin signals his profound debt to the Legal Process school of thought.) Moreover, the Dworkinian Moralist might say, when such an ascent is carried out properly—namely, as Dworkinian constructive interpretation—it even yields results that would justify the court’s exercise of its coercive powers.

Dworkin must surely be right that there is “no a priori limit to the justificatory ascent into which a problem will draw” lawyers and judges, but everything turns on what legal constraints actually govern this ascent. The Realist worry is that, at some point, there are no meaningful legal constraints on justificatory ascent, and that all Dworkin has noticed is what the Realistic

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57. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 53.
58. Id. at 68.
Sophists noticed 2,500 years ago, namely, that a skilled rhetorician can give arguments for conflicting propositions.\textsuperscript{59} The Realist worry, in short, is that this new Dworkinian mantra about justificatory ascent is just another “swindle with big words and virtues.”\textsuperscript{60}

IV. DWORKIN, CARDOZO, AND JUSTIFICATORY ASCENT

Let us consider Dworkin’s own central example\textsuperscript{61} in his recent work on justificatory ascent—namely, Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s seminal 1916 decision in *MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.*\textsuperscript{62} *MacPherson* established that manufacturers of potentially dangerous products could no longer escape liability to the consumers injured by their products based on lack of contractual privity, which was usually absent since consumers typically purchased the product from some intermediary.\textsuperscript{63} As the former Attorney General and late University of Chicago Law School Dean Edward Levi—exemplar of an earlier and also Realistically-minded “Chicago School”—noted in his famous book *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning*, *MacPherson* is a powerful illustration of the basic pattern of evolution of legal concepts, which moves from creation of the concept (in this case, that of the “inherently dangerous” product for which contractual privity is not required for liability), to “the period when the concept is more or less fixed,” to the final “breakdown of the concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.”\textsuperscript{64}

Thus, we move from *Langridge v. Levy*\textsuperscript{65} in 1837, in which the son, injured by a gun sold to his father, was able to recover against the seller since the seller “knew it was defective and . . . was to be used by the [son],”\textsuperscript{66} to *Winterbottom v. Wright*\textsuperscript{67} in 1842, where recovery against the supplier of a carriage was denied to the coachman injured when it broke down due to a latent defect, on grounds that a carriage was not “a weapon of a dangerous nature” and, in any case, there was no evidence the supplier was aware of the latent defect.\textsuperscript{68} By 1851, in *Longmeid v. Holliday*,\textsuperscript{69} “the concept of things dangerous in themselves . . . finally won out,” as Levi puts it, even though the wife injured by an exploding lamp was denied recovery against the storekeeper who sold it to her husband.\textsuperscript{70} The key to the decision, however, was the finding that “the lamp was

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{59. See supra Part I.}
\footnote{60. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.}
\footnote{61. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 55.}
\footnote{62. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).}
\footnote{63. Id. at 1053.}
\footnote{64. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8–10 (1949).}
\footnote{65. (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Exch.).}
\footnote{66. LEVI, supra note 64, at 11.}
\footnote{67. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.).}
\footnote{68. LEVI, supra note 64, at 12.}
\footnote{69. (1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 752 (Exch.).}
\footnote{70. LEVI, supra note 64, at 13.}
\end{footnotes}
not in its nature dangerous," which meant the absence of privity decided the matter.\textsuperscript{71}

The next stage in the movement of the concept, according to Levi, was \textit{Thomas v. Winchester}\textsuperscript{72} in 1852, in which recovery against the packager was permitted for mislabeled poison purchased from an intermediary, since the "defendant's negligence had 'put human life in imminent danger.'"\textsuperscript{73} Soon enough, privity was waived when we were dealing with a defective hair wash, but not "a defective balance wheel for a circular saw."\textsuperscript{74} Yet by 1883, in \textit{Heaven v. Pender},\textsuperscript{75} a defective scaffold was found inherently dangerous (and so recovery permitted), though emphasis was laid upon the fact that "the necessary workmen were in effect invited by the dock owner to use the dock and appliances."\textsuperscript{76} By turn of century—from the nineteenth to the twentieth that is—Levi notes that

\begin{quote}
[t]he dangerous concept had in it a loaded gun, possibly a defective gun, mislabeled poison, defective hair wash, scaffolds, a defective coffee urn, and a defective aerated bottle. The not-dangerous category, once referred to as only latently dangerous, had in it a defective carriage, a bursting lamp, a defective balance wheel for a circular saw, and a defective boiler.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

If this is Dworkinian justificatory ascent, its principled basis is, shall we say, a bit obscure.

Just one year before \textit{MacPherson},\textsuperscript{78} our story of justificatory ascent seems to culminate with the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the Circuit encompassing New York, of course) in \textit{Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson}, in which we learn that there is no requirement of privity when it comes to manufacturers of "articles inherently dangerous," but "one who manufactures articles dangerous only if defectively made, or installed"—including automobiles—"is not liable to third parties for injuries caused by them, except in case of willful injury or fraud."\textsuperscript{79}

A year later that rule simply vanished in the hands of Judge Cardozo in \textit{MacPherson}.	extsuperscript{80} Cardozo rehearses the narrative of the concept of "inherently dangerous" products, much as Levi does, but starting with \textit{Thomas v. Winchester}, and admitting, at the start, that in the application of the so-called

\textsuperscript{71} Id.
\textsuperscript{72} 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
\textsuperscript{73} LEVI, supra note 64, at 14–15 (quoting \textit{Thomas}, 6 N.Y. at 409).
\textsuperscript{74} Id. at 15.
\textsuperscript{75} (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A.).
\textsuperscript{76} LEVI, supra note 64, at 16.
\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 18.
\textsuperscript{78} 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
\textsuperscript{79} 221 F. 801, 802–03 (2d Cir. 1915); see LEVI, supra note 64, at 19–20.
\textsuperscript{80} Of course, the New York Court of Appeals would not have been bound by the Second Circuit decision, but Judge Cardozo did feel the need to mention it, as discussed below.
principle of that case "there may, at times, have been uncertainty or even error." Soon enough, Cardozo tells us that even if the rule in Thomas v. Winchester were restricted to "things imminently dangerous to life" like "poisons, explosives, [and] deadly weapons," that would no longer govern; the rule, he says, "no longer [has] that restricted meaning." What matters, Cardozo says, is "the trend of judicial thought." And that trend quickly leads Cardozo to the conclusion that if a thing is "reasonably certain" to be dangerous if negligently made, "it is then a thing of danger." At that point, privity does not matter as to the right of the injured plaintiff to recover.

But what then of the prior year's contrary decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on essentially the same set of facts as at issue in MacPherson? It merits only passing notice by Cardozo that its holding was "contrary," and that there was "a vigorous dissent," yet Cardozo offers barely any discussion of the reasoning. He does observe that the "contrary" view holds "that the contractor who builds a bridge, or the manufacturer who builds a car, cannot ordinarily foresee injury to other persons than the owner as the probable result," to which Cardozo retorts—in probably the crucial line of the whole opinion: "We think that injury to others is to be foreseen not merely as a possible, but as an almost inevitable, result."

That the majority opinion by Cardozo had, quite obviously, changed the law—not via any justificatory ascent, but by a bit of quasi-legislative fiat—was not lost on the now-forgotten dissenter, Judge Bartlett, who remarked:

It has heretofore been held in this state that the liability of the vendor of a manufactured article for negligence arising out of the existence of defects therein does not extend to strangers injured in consequence of such defects, but is confined to the immediate vendee. The exceptions to this general rule which have thus far been recognized in New York are cases in which the article sold was of such a character that danger to life or limb was involved in the ordinary use thereof; in other words, where the article sold was inherently dangerous.

After reviewing the long history of cases, Judge Bartlett concludes that the majority's decision is tantamount to "overruling what has been so often said by

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81. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
82. Id. at 1052.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1053.
85. Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2d Cir. 1915).
86. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053–54.
87. Id. at 1054.
88. Cardozo was also a bit loose with the facts of the case, as discussed in James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.: Simplifying the Facts While Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41, 51 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
89. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting).
IN PRAISE OF REALISM

this court and other courts of like authority in reference to the absence of any liability for negligence on the part of the original vendor of an ordinary carriage to any one except his immediate vendee.\(^9^0\)

You will notice that neither the Dworkinian Moralist nor the Posnerian Realist has reason to disagree with Cardozo’s result: both can agree about the soundness of the outcome, which is why Cardozo is a celebrated figure and Bartlett a footnote. The question is whether we describe Cardozo’s decision as an exercise in justificatory ascent, or whether we describe it, more realistically, as an exercise in sensible legislation by the courts.

As Levi noted in his original discussion of the transformation of a legal concept, “matters of kind vanish into matters of degree and then entirely new meanings turn up,” and judges will, of course, pretend that “some overall rule” governs.\(^9^1\) Yet, as Levi remarks, “[t]he rule will be useless,” and the statement of the rule will be “window dressing.”\(^9^2\) One doubts Judge Cardozo would have disagreed. The new rule of MacPherson, after all, made good economic sense in an age of retailers who distributed mass-produced goods to thousands (sometimes millions) of consumers. Here, the potential for injury was enormous, but producers (not retailers) were obviously in the best position to minimize the dangers. Cardozo’s decision is thus justly celebrated as skillfully eliding clear precedents (including, of course, the Second Circuit case directly on point one year earlier) establishing the necessity of contractual privity for liability in order to create the best new rule for new social circumstances\(^9^3\)—precisely the kind of outcome-oriented decision Judge Posner often commends. As Dean Prosser noted, in his seminal 1960 article The Assault upon the Citadel—the citadel being the immunity from liability afforded by the requirement of contractual privity—“Cardozo, wielding a mighty axe, burst over the ramparts, and buried the general rule under the exception.”\(^9^4\)

Dworkin, by contrast, wants to celebrate the opinion as an exercise in justificatory ascent.\(^9^5\) Yet if we are to distinguish legally-principled justificatory ascent in Dworkin’s sense from Levi’s or Posner’s enlightened, albeit incremental, policymaking by courts, we need some compelling explanation of how the result in MacPherson was required by the existing legal materials and the principles they embodied. Dworkin does not even try to provide one, and Cardozo himself, in reflecting on the decision, does not pretend that there is such an account:

\(^9^0\) Id. at 1056.
\(^9^1\) Levi, supra note 64, at 9.
\(^9^2\) Id.
\(^9^3\) See, e.g., id. at 24.
\(^9^4\) William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
\(^9^5\) See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
What was the posture of affairs before the Buick case had been determined? Was there any law on the subject? A mass of judgments, more or less relevant, had been rendered by the same and other courts. A body of particulars existed on which an hypothesis might be reared. None the less, their implications were equivocal.\textsuperscript{96}

Indeed, Cardozo explicitly repudiates the "extreme" notion that "law is fixed and immutable, that the conclusion which the judge declares . . . has a genuine preexistence, that judgment is a process of discovery, and not in any degree a process of creation,"\textsuperscript{97} which is to say that he rejects precisely Dworkin's view of the case.

None of this will be surprising to those who recall Cardozo's 1923 book \textit{The Nature of the Judicial Process}, where he declares early on, "I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life."\textsuperscript{98} To be sure, says Cardozo, "[i]n countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion,"\textsuperscript{99} but "within the confines of [the] open spaces [of language] and those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made."\textsuperscript{100} When Cardozo titles one of his chapters "The Judge as a Legislator,"\textsuperscript{101} there can be little doubt that the author of \textit{MacPherson} is a Realist and not a Moralist when it comes to understanding what judges really do, at least some of the time.

Dworkin often takes Judge Posner to task for purporting to renounce moral theory, while at the same time asking judges to reach the "best" decisions, on crudely utilitarian grounds, without excessive regard for past practice, except to the extent that practice had affected reasonable expectations. As Dworkin has quite plausibly argued, "Posner is himself ruled by an inarticulate, subterranean . . . but relentless moral faith,"\textsuperscript{102} namely, faith in the utilitarian perspective that informs his analyses of concrete legal problems. Perhaps Cardozo was, himself, so ruled? He does say, in \textit{The Nature of the Judicial Process}, that "when [judges] are called upon to say how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its distance."\textsuperscript{103} And it is, of course, now familiar to read Cardozo as a protoeconomic analyst of the law, designing rules that would minimize the costs

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law} 41 (1924).
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Id.} at 54. See, too, Cardozo's discussion of one of the seminal cases in the history of English contract law, Strangborough \textit{v} Warner, (1588) 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B.), about which he observes, "Before the rendition of that judgment, we cannot say with justice that there was a preexisting principle or rule which the judges were extending or applying. They formulated the principle or rule themselves, and gave it potency thereafter by a process of creation." \textit{Cardozo, supra} note 96, at 39.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process} 10 (1921).
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Id.} at 129.
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Id.} at 115.
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Dworkin, supra} note 1, at 94.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Cardozo, supra} note 98, at 67.
of accidents.

Perhaps these facts might explain a subject on which Dworkin has always remained oddly silent, namely, the extraordinary influence of Judge Posner's opinions (just like Judge Cardozo's) with other courts, 104 which might suggest that, even without theoretical foundations, Posner is the proverbial Hegelian "Owl of Minerva," who has captured the moral ethos of his time and place. That Dworkin's own writings about concrete legal problems, by contrast, have had almost no influence at all on the American courts 105 might also be thought confirmation of Judge Posner's infamous skepticism about moral theory, 106 at least if we agree that Dworkin is the more skillful moral theorist. In any case, when Dworkin castigates Posner as purportedly "avoiding moral theory but keeping its use dark, cloaked under all the familiar legal phlogistons like the mysterious craft of lawyer-like analogical reasoning," 107 one thinks that Posner might as easily have castigated Dworkin for not acknowledging the role of law making by courts "but keeping its use dark, cloaked under all the familiar legal phlogistons like the mysterious" justificatory ascent.

How are we to adjudicate this dispute between Moralists like Dworkin and Realists like Posner about adjudication? At bottom, as Nietzsche noticed long ago, such fundamental philosophical disputes often seem to reflect differences

104. See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 291–318 (1998) (ranking Richard Posner at or near the top of various statistical analyses of the influence of federal courts of appeals judges, while noting that this outsized influence may be due in part to the fact that judges on the Seventh Circuit "publish more signed opinions per year than do judges in other circuits"); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 Mich. L. Rev. 859, 859–60 (2010) (noting that Richard Posner is "a judge who has left a deep imprint on American law, frequently including decisions of the United States Supreme Court"). Jeffrey S. Sutton, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, id. at 859 n.4, also writes that "I often look to him for insights in resolving difficult cases of my own, telling my clerks, 'See if Posner has written anything on the topic.' Other judges, I suspect, do the same thing." Id. at 860.


107. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 73.
of temperament and disposition. In this instance, the Moralist finds solace in a vision of how the world works that is morally upright and defensible, while the Realist expresses his impatience with what he deems childish illusion and empty rhetorical posturing. Is there any more to be said, or must we simply declare our allegiance (predetermined or otherwise) to one temperament or the other?

Notice that the Moralist Dworkin and the Realist Posner need have no dispute about the epistemology of judicial decision, only about its metaphysics. Dworkin can agree that Cardozo in MacPherson takes himself to be crafting a new utility-maximizing rule for changed economic circumstances and still insist that, in reality, his decision can be understood as an exercise in justificatory ascent—that is, that the outcome in MacPherson was, in fact, required by the “logic” of legal reasoning over all the prior cases surveyed by Levi and cited by Cardozo. To be sure, that was not Cardozo’s view or Levi’s, but they, so Dworkin must contend, are confusing their realism about the process by which the result was reached with the metaphysical question whether there exists a right answer as a matter of law. The hope that there is a justificatory-ascent story to be told about the decision in MacPherson is just the Moralist’s hope that the decision conforms to what Dworkin takes to be a morally attractive picture of adjudication, in which courts always aspire to find rather than make the law, and in which all possibly relevant moral considerations are, themselves, always part of the fabric of the law that is binding on the judge. It is an uplifting picture and aspiration, but is it not, says the Realist, complete obscurantist nonsense, denying the cogency of the settled law prior to MacPherson, as well as Cardozo’s genius in his quasi-legislative role as law reformer transforming antiquated rules of liability in response to the demands of a new economy?

V. FROM DWORKIN AND RAWLS TO POSNER AND GEUSS: MORAL THEORY VS. MORAL ENTREPRENEURS

Raymond Geuss, in defending Thucydides’ Realism against Plato’s Moralism, remarks that “[w]hat Plato takes to be morally reprehensible behavior must,
he thinks, finally be a form of irrationality that is self-defeating, and this puts such narrow limits to his ability to understand humans that it renders him unfit to be a serious guide to the world in which we live." Thucydides, by contrast, fully appreciates that historical actors can be both quite rational and morally abhorrent, which is one of several reasons why his History is a source of insight into historical events more than two thousand years after its composition.

But might we not have a similar worry about the Dworkinian Moralist, namely that he is "unfit to be a serious guide to the world in which we live"? After all, if we were all Dworkinian Moralists, then we would take every judicial opinion at face value and never inquire into the politics or the individual or group psychology of the decisions, as Realists like Posner, Llewellyn, and the contemporary political scientists do. We would only ask about the theory of justificatory ascent that supports the decision and never entertain the hypothesis that the best way to make sense of what judges like Cardozo or tribunals like the U.S. Supreme Court are really doing is that they are making decisions on nonlegal grounds and then offering legalistic window dressing for those quasi-legislative decisions. As Geuss notes, when "the most reflective members [of society] are committed to the search for abstract definitions, general principles, [and] dialectically sustainable hypotheses . . . Thucydidean political thinking informed by a study of the reality of what actually happens will be likely to wither away." Dworkin's nonsense jurisprudence has almost nothing to do with "what actually happens" in the courts: it is a just-so story, about justificatory ascent, constructed after the fact—constructed, moreover, even in cases like MacPherson where the central actor, namely Cardozo, renounces the Moralist's story!

Yet is it any worse for that? Why should we not articulate ideal standards of conduct, even if they currently have no purchase in actual practice? It cannot simply be because of Geuss's curious worry about deflecting "reflective members" of society from Thucydidean political thinking! After all, most academic disciplines that might be interested in empirical study of political and social life—political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, social psychology—are notoriously unaffected by academic philosophy, with its emphasis on "abstract definitions, general principles, [and] dialectically sustainable hypotheses." Why not let "a thousand flowers bloom"? Why not let the academic moralists in philosophy articulate ideal standards of conduct, and let the empiricists tell us what is really happening now? The latter do not seem to be dissuaded by the activities of the former.

111. GEUSS, supra note 8, at 220.
112. See THUCYDIDES, supra note 14.
113. GEUSS, supra note 8, at 230.
114. Id.
This is the dilemma over which Geuss’s recent Realist broadside against Anglophone political philosophy, as exemplified by Rawls, founders. On the one hand, Geuss suggests that we should “reject” a Moralistic approach to politics according to which we do ideal ethical theory first (a theory that abstracts from empirical particulars) and in which politics is then just a kind of applied ethics. Yet he admits that he thereby fails to “distinguish sharply between a descriptive theory and a ‘pure normative theory’ (the former purportedly giving just the facts; the latter moral principles, imperatives, or ideal norms).” But why shouldn’t he distinguish between those two kinds of theoretical inquiries, one Realistic and one Moralistic in the terminology I have been using here? His reasons for repudiating this “Is/Ought distinction” as he calls it are, alas, utterly obscure.

And yet the particulars of Geuss’s indictment of Rawlsian Moralism in political philosophy are in many ways damning. As he observes,

[i]t is . . . extremely striking, not to say astounding, to the lay reader that the complex theoretical apparatus of Theory of Justice, operating through over 500 pages of densely argued text, eventuates in a constitutional structure that is a virtual replica (with some extremely minor deviations) of the arrangements that exist in the United States.

A version of that charge has long been familiar with respect to Dworkin’s jurisprudence as a theoretical rationalization of the decisions of the Warren Court. And just “as Rawls’s purportedly egalitarian theory became more entrenched and more highly elaborated, social inequalities in fact increased

115. RAYMOND GEUSS, PHILOSOPHY AND REAL POLITICS (2008); see also GEUSS, supra note 8, at chs. 1 & 2 (providing, in many ways, a more effective polemic than Philosophy and Real Politics, especially with regard to its criticisms of Rawls, which are more cogent than those found in Philosophy and Real Politics).

116. GEUSS, supra note 115, at 7–9.

117. Id. at 16.

118. See id. at 16–17. I have no idea what the argument is here, or if there even is one.

119. The attack in Philosophy and Real Politics is, it seems to me, less successful, involving often sophomoric mischaracterization of the Rawlsian view—for example, in complaining that “[t]he ‘original position’ is obviously not at all a very good model for political deliberation or action,” id. at 72, when Rawls never presented it as any such thing.

120. GEUSS, supra note 8, at 22; cf. GEUSS, supra note 115, at 90.

drastically in virtually all industrialized countries," so too has the elaboration of Dworkin's jurisprudential theory (though without the same army of acolytes) coincided with the demise of his preferred picture of constitutional adjudication over the past forty years.

Again, though, we may ask what conclusions to draw from this. The time frame in which a highly articulated moral theory makes its impact may be longer than a generation or two, so it would hardly be fair to raise the objection that the theory has had little or no impact on practice so far. As Nietzsche

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122. Geuss, supra note 8, at 34. Geuss offers a number of interesting and prima facie plausible explanations for the success of Rawlsian Moralism in political philosophy, even in the face of growing inequality and un-Rawlsian outcomes in society at large. He suggests, for example, that "Rawls's theory gained in attractiveness as a compensatory fantasy," that is, compensating for "inability to understand or exercise any control over" the actual world. Id. at 34–35. Alternatively, Geuss notes that Rawls's system... is intricately elaborated and self-contained, and it also claims to embody a particularly well-grounded moral view of the world. Perhaps the pleasure in discussing such an aesthetically attractive and purportedly morally serious construction, and the associated sense of being part of an elite group of people who are both very clever and highly righteous, is a sufficient explanation of the omnipresence of the theory. Id. at 36–37. Geuss omits an equally important consideration, namely, the emergence of normative moral and political philosophy as an area of professional specialization precisely during the massive expansion of higher education in the 1960s. The Rawls industry is surely, in part, a consequence of the creation of a professional infrastructure supporting academic careers in its service.

123. In her spirited response to Judge Posner's polemic against academic moral theory, Martha Nussbaum calls attention to purported examples in which philosophical "arguments have mattered in public life," including "the influence of Locke and Montesquieu on the American founding," "the influence of Marx on many modern governments," and "the influence of John Dewey on American education." Martha C. Nussbaum, Response, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1779–80 (1998). The examples are striking, however, for how well they actually confirm Judge Posner's thesis. No one, including Professor Nussbaum, thinks that the American Revolution was brought about by arguments from Locke; to the contrary, the Revolution is most plausibly explained by a variety of more familiar economic and power-seeking motivations by elites in the American colonies. See Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913); The United States Constitution: 200 Years of Anti-Federalist, Abolitionist, Feminist, Muckraking, Progressive, and Especially Socialist Criticism (Bertell Ollman & Jonathan Birnbbaum eds., 1990). Locke's conclusions, not his arguments, proved useful fodder for those instigating the revolt. The Marx example is even worse: he developed no moral or political theory, no arguments about the injustice of capitalism, no Marxist counterpart to the Rawlsian theory of justice. Instead, Marx, in both his popular polemics (of which there were many) and his scholarly investigations, exposed the mechanisms by which capitalism operated and its effects on the vast majority. Marx took for granted, quite reasonably, that the victims of capitalism (whom he thought were multiplying) would be motivated to do something once they understood, realistically, what was really happening to them. Dewey shared with Marx a skill at popular prose and polemics; his poor reputation among academic philosophers, to the present, is some evidence that his influence on pedagogy, to the extent it is real (even at the University of Chicago Lab School, which he founded, his "influence" is nowhere felt much beyond the second or third grade), was due more to his skills as a moral entrepreneur than his philosophical acumen. What Professor Nussbaum misses is that the case against the efficacy of "academic moralism" is a case against the ability of systematic, discursive reasoning to change people's views and motivate action.

It is often suggested to me that a stronger case for the practical import of moral philosophy is Peter Singer's influence on the animal rights movement. Yet even Singer has admitted that the most influential part of his book Animal Liberation was chapter 3, which was an evocative description of factory farming, one designed to elicit a strong emotional reaction from those with a preexisting empathy for animals and sensitivity to apparent suffering. That the quality of the discursive reasoning
says in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the world “revolves” around the creators of new values.\[124\] The crucial question is whether systematic, discursive moral philosophers are those inventors. Nietzsche did not think so, nor, I take it, does Posner—a point to which we return below.

There is another objection to the method of Rawlsian Moralism about politics worth noting—namely, its inherent conservatism given its methodology.\[125\] As Geuss puts it:

> Despite the conscientious angst of Rawls the man, and his openness to well-focused criticism of individual sections of his work, the structure and ethos of this theory as a whole is deeply complacent, not to say smug. We who have the great good fortune to live in countries that are sufficiently like the United States in structure have got our politics basically right; all we really need to do is fine-tune our economies in various ways, particularly so as to maximize equality (while respecting the principle of difference) . . . .

. . . .

. . . [A] major danger in using highly abstractive methods in political philosophy is that one will succeed merely in generalizing one’s own local prejudices and repackaging them as demands of reason. . . .

. . . .

. . . Rawls [on this view] is not a major moral and political theorist, whose work self-evidently deserves and repays the most careful scrutiny. Rather he was a parochial figure who not only failed to advance the subject but also pointed political philosophy firmly in the wrong direction.\[126\]

R.M. Hare, the late White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford (who, unlike Geuss, is certainly no critical theorist), identified more than a generation ago the source of the conservatism in the method of “reflective equilibrium” has little or nothing to do with Singer’s purported influence on “animal rights” should be evident from the fact that the line of reasoning—based on the moral importance of sentience and the utilitarian imperative to maximize pleasure over pain—that leads Singer to vegetarianism also leads him, quite naturally, to positions that are widely rejected and denounced, such as his willingness to countenance infanticide and the killing of the handicapped. Singer draws the correct conclusions from his premises; if people were actually influenced by his arguments, then there would be as many advocates for infanticide of the mentally defective as there are for not eating meat.


\[125\] This sense of “conservatism” has little to do with the current use of the term in the United States, where it mostly picks out views that involve a retreat from the status quo, not an attempt to conserve it.

\[126\] GEUSS, supra note 8, at 38–39.
central to Rawls's theory of justice. In this method of normative philosophy, we test our general theory—of justice, or of what is morally right, or of what is good—against our intuitive judgments about particular moral cases, and we either adjust our theory to do justice to the intuitions or give up some of our intuitions about the particular cases until we achieve a theoretical equilibrium between the two. But as Hare scathingly, and correctly, observed:

It is certainly possible, as some thinkers even of our times have done, to collect all the moral opinions of which they and their contemporaries feel most sure, find some relatively simple method or apparatus which can be represented, with a bit of give and take, and making plausible assumptions about the circumstances of life, as generating all these opinions; and then pronounce that that is the moral system which, having reflected, we must acknowledge to be the correct one. But they have absolutely no authority for this claim beyond the original convictions, for which no ground or argument was given. The "equilibrium" they have reached is one between forces which might have been generated by prejudice, and no amount of reflection can make that a solid basis for morality.

The now notorious parochialism of the method of reflective equilibrium afflicts subjects far afield of ethics, but it is the case of Rawlsian Moralism that concerns us here. Is Moralism in political or legal theory necessarily conservative in the way Rawls is? Why should it be once severed from the method of reflective equilibrium?

127. See generally R.M. Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice—I, 23 Phil. Q. 144 (1973) (reviewing John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)).
128. See id. at 146 (discussing the "intuitionism" inherent in Rawls's theory).
129. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point 12 (1981). Hare does not, however, draw the skeptical (and, in my view, correct) conclusion that morality lacks a solid basis but instead thinks its content follows from claims about the logic of moral language. See id. at 13-14.
131. In an otherwise judicious critical review of Philosophy and Real Politics, Samuel Freeman's response to this kind of worry is telling. He writes, "[G]iven that we have to begin somewhere in moral theorizing, it seems more reasonable to begin with our considered moral and evaluative intuitions rather than with anyone else's or anywhere else." Samuel Freeman, 120 Ethics 175, 181 (2009) (reviewing Geuss, supra note 115). No argument is given for this assumption, or the assumption—surely the main one that Geuss, Posner, Marx, and the rest deny—that we need to "begin" moral theorizing at all.
132. The conservativism of the Rawlsian approach is most clear in one of his last and least successful works, The Law of Peoples, which, as Geuss notes, "even on the most superficial inspection" articulates a specifically American political position—more enlightened, perhaps, than that of George W. Bush or Condoleezza Rice, but generically the same kind of thing. Of course, no one can
Yet we may also fairly ask if anything other than moral exhortation, polemics, and rhetoric is left once reflective equilibrium is off the table. Reflective equilibrium has the advantage of all methods of “internal” critique and of appealing to what the audience already believed, however inchoately. But if we are not going to systematize and make theoretically explicit inchoate moral commitments we already share (as the later Rawls claims he is doing), what can we do except become what Judge Posner has aptly dubbed “moral entrepreneurs”—rhetoricians who aim to change fundamental moral commitments?

Posner’s prime example of such rhetoricians is feminist theorist and advocate Catharine MacKinnon: “Her influential version of radical feminism is not offered without supporting arguments. But her influence is not due to the quality of those arguments. It is due to her polemical skills, her singlemindedness, her passion . . . .” MacKinnon’s work, even her most theoretically ambitious work, is notorious for its analytical and argumentative weaknesses: it is no one’s idea of sound moral or political philosophy. And yet her ideas have changed the law and the discourse about women and feminism well beyond the walls of the academy. MacKinnon has done so through the rhetorical power by which she forces readers to see inequities in the treatment of women heretofore rendered invisible, but which, when illuminated with MacKinnon’s polemical prose, arouse her readers’ preexisting distaste and antipathy for such injustice. Is this not an example of creating values around which the world revolves, as object in principle to citizens helping to elaborate the national ideology (provided it is not actively vicious), but philosophy has in the past often aspired to something more than this.

Geuss, supra note 8, at 34.

133. I am assuming that the goal of moral and political philosophy is to have some influence upon practice or at least on what others believe, but that is a controversial assumption and not one shared by all (or maybe even most) moral and political philosophers. As the Harvard moral philosopher T.M. Scanlon observed—responding to Posner’s critique of “academic moralism”:

Posner gets off on the wrong foot . . . by assuming that the only point of moral philosophy is to convince [sic] people to change their moral views. This is one of the reasons that I do not find his book very enlightening or challenging.

My aims in engaging in moral philosophy are (1) to get a clearer understanding of what kind of question I am thinking about in thinking about right and wrong and (2) to make up my mind what to think about it (both how to understand certain crucial terms such as rights, blame, responsibility, and so on, and which moral claims to accept.)

... .

Insofar as I find my thoughts about morality to be unclear and conflicted, I imagine that some others may share these difficulties. So if I come up with what seems to me a satisfactory way of resolving one of them, I imagine that others might take these thoughts into account in deciding what to think. But persuading them to do so is not my main aim.


135. Id. at 43. Judge Posner also suggests that her difficulties getting tenure constituted a kind of academic martyrdom that helped her cause, but that strikes me as implausible speculation for which he adduces no evidence. See id.

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Nietzsche suggested?

Judge Posner has a straightforward explanation for why this should be so, one much indebted to Hume and Nietzsche. It is an explanation, in other words, based on the assumption that there is no necessary or intrinsic connection between knowing what is morally right or believing one knows what is morally right and being motivated to act accordingly. According to Hume and Nietzsche, then, an idea can give rise to motivation and action only if it engages our preexisting desires or emotions. Thus, Judge Posner claims that academic moral theory of the Rawlsian or Dworkinian kind "has no prospect of improving human behavior":

Knowing the moral thing to do furnishes no motive, and creates no motivation, for doing it; motive and motivation have to come from outside morality. Even if this is wrong, the analytical tools employed in academic moralism—whether moral casuistry, or reasoning from the canonical texts of moral philosophy, or careful analysis, or reflective equilibrium, or some combination of these tools—are too feeble to override either narrow self-interest or [preexisting] moral intuitions. And academic moralists have neither the rhetorical skills nor the factual knowledge that might enable them to persuade without having good methods of inquiry and analysis. As a result of its analytical, rhetorical, and factual deficiencies, academic moralism is helpless when intuitions clash or self-interest opposes, and otiose when they line up.137

We could hardly invent a more stunning confirmation of Judge Posner's Realist skepticism about Moralism than the reaction to an important book of moral and political philosophy by the late Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford, G.A. Cohen, *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?*, a book whose title is a jab at Dworkin the egalitarian political philosopher who jets between luxurious homes in London and New York.138 Cohen argues that genuine egalitarians (at least those who are not welfarists) are moral hypocrites if they do not give away significant portions of their money consistent with their egalitarian principles.139 The argument is careful and often ingenious.

Now consider the response of a committed liberal and nonwelfarist egalitarian like Thomas Nagel:

I have to admit that, although I am an adherent of the liberal conception of [justice and equality], I don’t have an answer to Cohen’s charge of moral incoherence. It is hard to render consistent the exemption of private choice from the motives that support redistributive public policies. I could sign a standing banker's order giving away everything I earn above the national

137. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4, at 7.
139. Id. at 148–79.
average, for example, and it wouldn’t kill me. I could even try to increase my income at the same time, knowing the excess would go to people who needed it more than I did. I’m not about to do anything of the kind, but the equality-friendly justifications I can think of for not doing so all strike me as rationalizations . . . .

If high-quality moral theory cannot even influence high-quality moral philosophers to change their behavior, then why in the world should we resist Judge Posner’s Realist conclusion that Moralism “has no prospect of improving human behavior”? 140

Here, then, is a Realist conclusion on which thinkers as different as Hume, Marx, Nietzsche, and Posner converge: unless a normative position engages the antecedently existing desires, passions, and emotions of persons, it will get no purchase in practice. No discursively articulated system of moral norms will yield action unless the actors are already affectively disposed to the force of those norms. But if that is correct, then normative theorizing can serve only two practical purposes: (1) to make vivid to the agent what he or she is already disposed to care about, or (2) to change the affective predispositions of its audience such that they will care about, or value, other things. Because affective dispositions are nonrational, the medium of traditional philosophy—discursive reasoning—will be causally inert with respect to (2). And vivid and emotionally moving representation of what the agent is already disposed to care about has never been the strong suit of traditional philosophy, per (1). 142 For both purposes, therefore, it seems moral entrepreneurs like MacKinnon or Nietzsche or Marx will be far more effective than Moralistic philosophers like Rawls or Dworkin. On this account, Judge Posner’s impact on his fellow judges and academic contemporaries is not attributable to his superior skills of rational discursiveness but to his being the more effective moral entrepreneur, one who exploits the antecedent intuitions of jurists in a thoroughly capitalist and commercialized society for whom “efficiency” and welfare maximization require no argument. 143

There is an additional consideration that supports skepticism about the efficacy of Moralism, and that is an obvious complement to what I have been calling the Humean/Nietzschean view embraced by Realists like Posner (and also, arguably, Llewellyn). If one thinks—as Hume, Nietzsche, and Posner

141. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 4, at 7.
142. Even Nussbaum, in her rejoinder to Judge Posner, admits as much: “[T]he jargon-laden nonwriting of the philosophical journals is a good style for persuading no human being . . . .” Nussbaum, supra note 123, at 1795.
143. Judge Posner writes, “I do not argue that economic analysis should convince opponents of [a particular position recommended by economic analysis] to give up their opposition. I do not believe that economics (or any other body of thought, for that matter) can compel a moral judgment.” Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory 47 (2001).
do—that there are no moral truths, then there is nothing to know about what’s morally right and wrong that could be the upshot of discursive reasoning. More precisely, there is nothing to know that is distinctively moral, since, of course, rational inquiry might illuminate nonmoral facts that causally affect one’s moral judgments. (For example, if I think efficiency is good, and discover through rational inquiry the nonmoral fact that a certain rule maximizes efficiency, then I will change my moral judgment.) To the extent moral theory is committed to systematic discursive reasoning about the moral, its target is an illusion: there is no subject matter about which one could make a cognitive mistake. Arouse the passions, or make vivid the nonmoral facts, and one might well cause a change in moral view. Discursive reasoning of the kind practiced by systematic moral philosophers can do neither.

CONCLUSION

Praise for Realism is praise for clarity about what really happens, since what really happens is the very stuff on which instrumental reasoning—reasoning about how to achieve what we already want, prefer, or value—operates. By the same token, opposition to Moralism is not opposition to entrepreneurial advocacy for a normative vision, to moral polemics, or to skillful rhetoric. People change their moral views, but they do so, as Humeans and Nietzscheans claim, because their passions and emotions are suitably engaged and aroused, not because they follow the conclusions of discursive reasoning. Such reasoning can establish the truth of no moral position. If there is a case for Realism and against Moralism—whether in the form of nonsense jurisprudence or Rawlsian political philosophy—it is captured by a paraphrase of Marx’s Second Thesis on Feuerbach: a philosophical dispute “which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.” If one subscribes, as I do, to Judge Posner’s Humean-Nietzschean assumptions about how moral views change (as well as to their moral skepticism), then the case against Moralism, whether Rawlsian or Dworkinian, is complete.

144. See Leiter, supra note 110, at 251–55. For classic discussions of this issue, see ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944).

145. To be sure, there may be a sociological datum, like the “intuitions” of bourgeois academics who have been appropriately socialized, but it is hard to see why armchair sociology masquerading as moral philosophy will be compelling to those who don’t share the relevant socialization experiences.
