human beings need to keep them in order. The policeman is enforcing
obedience to law. The robber's force is used to break the law.

The force that we need in the world today is the force behind world law,
not the illegal, or at most non-legal, force of those who set themselves up
as a law unto themselves. That force means the degradation and impover-
ishment of those who employ it—and war at last.

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS*

A PLEA FOR A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM OF WAR AND PEACE

THE tragic paradox of the life of our world today is that the thing for
which we strive eludes us. As a general proposition this is not a new
one. Some of our saddest human thought, some of our greatest literature
has been upon just this theme of the appearance of a malignant fate bal-
ing man's best efforts ad hoc, a fate which suddenly sets him reeling just
when his feet seem firmly planted upon the road of heart's desire.

Nor has human thought and great literature been free of the haunting
deeper dread, the niggling doubt, the sudden flash of light—that it is we
ourselves who often defeat ourselves, that what we strive with is so often
our own shadows, and that it is they who suddenly lay us in our turn upon
the grass.

It is to the thought of the last fifty years that we owe a clearer enlighten-
ment which we must no longer shun; thought fed upon observations ham-
mered out inexorably and with pain by one great enquirer. Sigmund Freud
of Vienna was as obsessed a man as Jean Jacques Rousseau and is destined
to be as great a revolutionary. He is the real source of our discovery of
man's thwarting self by the road of psychoanalysis.

It is more than time for psychoanalysis to cease to be a cult, at least in
the social and political implications of some of its surest truths. Among
Freud's great sticks of dynamite was the following contribution to knowl-
edge:

Men are not gentle friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves
if they are attacked. A powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned
as part of their instinctual endowment. ... All the institutions and laws of civiliza-
tion are directed to protect it against the normal individual.

This finding, not undreamt of by earlier philosophers, is confirmed by
the many "analysts" and the much more ordinary doctors like the present
writer who have tried to cure the fears, obsessions, and prejudices of their

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patients by discovering what unconscious motives and misapprehensions lie behind them. Both in the treating of patients and in the training analysis of "normal" students we discover how very often the mind is divided, deceives itself, and does in fact oppose by its own deep and contrary passions the course chosen by its more rational "self." The results show clearly enough upon the surface of our lives. A man, obsessed at once by vanity and the best intentions, invites an attractive and unsuitable woman friend to keep his wife company throughout the lonely winter evening, and "has to" drive the lady home afterwards, with wholly avoidable results. A woman forces her husband to beat her, hate himself in consequence, and take to drink, all so that she can forgive him—and very likely she loses him in the bargain. The devoted administrator must give all his time to managing a difficult staff when he might have found it an easy staff and thus achieved his ostensible aim instead of enjoying the luxury of a nervous breakdown from tension and failure. Which did he really want, the holiday in bed fussed over by his wife and nurses, or the success of his enterprise? Which indeed! "I do not wish to appear erratic," says a noble lord in the Proper Place. He does wish to appear both learned and erratic, and to be forgiven for being both. Human motives conflict, the conscious with the unconscious, the unconscious with itself. A great deal of undesirable tension is thereby generated.

The unconscious drives of normal man include vanity, the desire for love upon our own terms, to have our cake and eat it. How often is it Freudian "aggression" that we desire? Often it is something much vaguer than that. When the quiet man in the orchestra raises the trumpet to his lips, when the Lowland Scot hits his golf ball hard and far, through all the chain of sports, in the final overturning of a barrow-load of leaves on the manure heap, there runs the satisfaction of a deep instinct of "There! that's done it." The emotion behind the final thrust is a complicated buildup of striving, uncertainty, and anxiety. The catharsis should be satisfying of all that has gone before. Man is by nature striving, uncertain, combative, vanquished, and gloriously victorious. He belongs to a species whose existence is fraught with risk and danger to life, attaining security only by effort. That effort, often enough in his history, has had to be a violent one. Suppose it is no longer a game that we play. Suppose that we have an enemy, or see an enemy before us: for when we strive for anything seriously, we find plenty of candidates for slight misunderstandings. Suppose, further, as so often happens, that there is a sort of King Charles's Head that always gets mixed up with our enterprises: we cannot stand aspiring subordinates, or bullying chiefs, or women-like-Mother about us.
Then suppose, which, alas, is also often true, that we must have bullying chiefs, or women-like-Mother about us; that we attract such figures onto the stage of our lives, angle for them, invite their most detested qualities—then finally feel the urgent need to end our troubles with one great destructive effort, against something. In the civilized businessman that last desire—for really destructive violence—is often deeply repressed. Instead there is internal tension. Or he may be seized with a worried melancholy, he cannot face the world, dare not contemplate his life in it. He tortures himself instead of his adversary, and suffers a "nervous breakdown."

We approach the problem of control. The primitive and disturbing passions of individuals find a three-fold control in conscience, public opinion, and the law. Conscience works from within upon every trained citizen. Public opinion operates in continual correction from without. And whenever necessary the law controls the more flagrantly aggressive manifestations of our passions, usually preventing them through our mere awareness of its presence.

So much for individuals. What of groups? Group passion is a more serious affair than individual passion, primarily because our first ravings of thwarted rage or lunacy ("Do you see what a nasty face X has?") do not find the answer "Nonsense!" but "Of course!" The problem of controlling the isolated passion of self-righteous men is the problem of controlling an isolated lunacy (or in milder language a peculiar prejudice) in a man with a trained social conscience; opposing it in its early stages by sweet reasonableness, backed later, if need be, by force. The problem of controlling group passion is the problem of controlling a shared and so a greater lunacy by much more naked force. Trade unions have had to be controlled by force; so also capitalists; perhaps very nearly doctors; each in their times of megalomania. The machinery of control may be simple or complicated. Its essential requirements are two: that the emergence of opposing passion on the part of the Greater Society is avoided (and with it the risk of its involvement in a counter lunacy obviated) by rules laid down in advance, applied by officers trained and appointed for their purpose. Established law, impartial judge, trained police, these are among the essential machinery of civilization. Our police are carefully trained to arrest with minimum violence; our judges are trained to set aside their prejudices in favor of the law as it is laid down; and the law itself is laid down in the light of previous experience, yet well in advance of the serious occasions of its testing-times ahead. One other requirement is forthcoming. In any organized society such as we take as our model for World Order the citizens still have their social consciences and the public are trained to accept without demur the decision of the courts.
There need be no great mystery about the public conscience. Like horse and dog, man is a domestic animal apt to be trained to social service. Define his community and you elicit his loyalty to it. His nature appears to justify the modern democratic assumption about popular consent: that our law can be at once adequate, impartial, and democratic because most men usually wish to obey it; there is behind it the constant force of a majority whose actual composition is ever changing. The erring minority may contain you today and me tomorrow, but it will continue to remain a minority. Does the psychology of Freud justify us in such assumptions?

By Freud's own obiter dicta, no! Freud thought, Germanically, of society as consisting of huge crowds being kept in order by "appalling force" which he found "undeniably a grand project." But the findings of his science as employed by himself and others have yielded an unending mixture of two opposing traits from within the human heart: one an impulse to dominate, with universal self-assertion and ready aggressiveness at thwarting; the other an impulse to co-operate, a "social instinct," with loyalty, self-denial and support for society, if need be, against self. Freud himself gave continuous priority to the self-assertive aggressiveness. Some of us now believe that we have good evidence that he did so because of an unanalysed personal bias in his own passionate nature. Other analysts such as Ian Suttie (in *The Origins of Love and Hate*) have been swayed the other way and report a predominance of loving co-operation yielding to aggressiveness only upon thwarting. The inescapable truths are two: one that, psychoanalytically, man's nature is deeply divided and confused between two opposing motives; the other that, politically observed, the co-operative instinct seems to win in most men at most times in all well-established communities of socially well-trained citizens.

All this is true of man in an organized and civilized society, trained from cradlehood to be a good family man and a decent and respectable citizen. He succeeds in being both these things—usually. The law is there to help him—occasionally.

Unfortunately our World Community is not yet an organized society but only in early process of becoming one. Men are not yet trained from cradlehood to be loyal to the United Nations, though many men and women swore and have maintained to a high degree an adult loyalty to it and to its predecessor the League of Nations. We shall be adequately trained some day. But our need and our inquiry are immediate: How to bring that day near? How to bridge the gap till it comes? How in fact are we to deal realistically and effectively with the ill-established, ill-assorted society which the world community still is?—a community in which it is impossible to divide a majority of sheep from a minority of goats, or only
possible subjectively, by making the sheep and the goats change places with the view-point of the observer!

The educational factor must be quickly passed over in this article. It is nonetheless important; and since such education depends not least upon the fluctuating and transferable emotion of loyalty (with its natural and "instinctive" propensity for the strong) it may be possible to induce an altered frame of mind very much more rapidly than has been thought, once World Order gains its symbols and still more when it achieves its power.

The bridging of the gap between loyal communities in a divided world and the inception of World Order is, however, the direct and chief concern of this article. The remedies appear to the writer to be institutional, in brief summary, for the following reasons: First, because human nature is naturally susceptible to external control, expects it, and can readily adjust itself to a change in the directing authority. Parents, school, national government, world government, lie psychologically along a straightforward progression. Second, because machinery for the control of recalcitrant minorities, without prior assumptions as to who these minorities shall be, is a well established model, a going concern, in all existing civilized democratic communities. The machinery of municipal law is a tried machinery which works. It would seem to follow that, since loyalty is a strong passion with a variable object, loyalty to the World Community awaits only the effective creation of the institutions of world community, namely the institutions of world law and world government.

The admitted failure of the two first attempts at World Order of our twentieth century appears to the present writer to be due to only one thing—that they did not transfer authority and power to the World Community through an institution which represented that community and could elicit its loyalty. The League of Nations rested not upon the faith that men would support a central authority which would act effectively for the general good, but rather upon the faith that men would act together though their loyalty remained enshrined in different states with divergent interests and their power remained vested in the national governments of those divergent states. It was a fatal assumption; although with leadership and common interests which were clear and unimpeachable, the League might have survived to recreate itself effectively. The United Nations started with the assumption that the few governments which represented the greatly predominant power of the world when they did act together, from common interest, in 1941-45 would go on acting together under wholly different circumstances, despite the very evident divergence of their natural aims and interests. This one must ask leave to call a very foolish assumption.
The institutions of world government are simply the institutions of any government—of good government as it has been tried and has worked through the centuries behind us. Those institutions are fourfold, namely:

1) **A central legislature** with control of the essentials of law, order and good government. History tells us that such a legislature should not only be democratically conceived, but should be progressively democratic in its composition if it is to maintain its continuity far into the future. The Assemblies of the League and the United Nations have surpassed in wisdom and cool judgment the Councils of both those bodies simply because they were more widely and less passionately representative. Though the Assembly of the United Nations is not representative enough, its power might usefully be increased. We are safer in its hands than in those of the passionate permanent Four and their fluctuating, make-weight colleagues of the Security Council.

2) **A central executive** related to the legislature according to one of the best democratic models.

3) **An impartial judiciary** operating with the guidance of a well-drawn code.

4) The certainty of sanctions in the institution of a **centralized force**, which, like any other police force must secure the society which it serves and all its institutions against attack, and guarantee the decisions of the executive and judiciary.

In cataloguing these institutions the writer has been formulating the psychological requirements of the government of mankind. His formulations do not pretend to be cast in legal terms, for which task he possesses no competency. They are, however, offered by a student of human nature equipped with the techniques of modern psychology who is profoundly conscious of the challenge of our times. They appear to him to be at once well-based in human nature and the only possible road to World Order and peace.

It is for statesmen to take up this challenge and either to prove their denials of our prescriptions or else to implement them forthwith. We can assure our statesmen that the latter task will not prove as difficult as they think if they will but enter upon it now. Their difficulties are due to the fact that, since each of them mistakes the normality of his opponents, they all seek solutions designed to keep those opponents in check whilst remaining free themselves. Such methods of thinking must have delayed human organization at every stage of progress, from village to commune, from barony to kingdom, from class-war to the democratic and socialist states of today. We cannot control the other party except by submitting to a like control of ourselves. Our statesmen must bind the world to law. The law they create will bind their own peoples to security.

This remains to be said. Should anyone doubt the need for world government (perhaps few now do?) let them look around them and note how
their own country has to be governed not by co-ordination but by external judgment and force superior to all groups. For the larger number who doubt the practicability of world government I would point to the controllability of mankind everywhere when the correct means of control are employed. Of those readers, perhaps the majority, who see world peace just around the corner but who find it thwarted by the Russians, as their fathers found it thwarted by the Germans, the writer would ask this final question: If there is always the “other fellow,” and he always happens to share the power of the world about equally with ourselves and numbers his millions as we do, is it not time to form a “Superior Force,” as Thomas Hobbes put it, “to keep us all in awe”?

Why do our statesmen find it so difficult even to try this solution? Solely, we submit, because they cannot see the normality of their enemies’ prejudices nor the reality of their own. Neither they nor we whom they serve are aware of the forceful contribution to war of our own unconscious aggressiveness.

Verbum sat sapienti! Let them so act, and relieve our world of its present nightmare and misery forever.

RANYARD WEST, M.D.*

WHO ARE THE UTOPIANS?*

The Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution is a draft of a full-fledged constitution. It proposes a full complement of organs of government. It makes explicit the purpose to establish world justice as well as world peace, since it is based on the belief that justice is always the prerequisite of peace, and that peace and justice stand or fall together. Furthermore, powers proposed for the organs of world government are those necessary for a federal government directed to these ends.

Since the publication of this draft, the committee which framed it has often been labelled as utterly Utopian for imagining that under any circumstances world government could come into being by the adoption of such a constitution. In this comment, I would like to consider the relative Utopianism of this and other conceivable routes to a world community under law.

1 Grotius, the “Father of International Law” and a Dutchman, found it thwarted by the Portuguese, in 1625.

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* Dr. Ranyard West’s books, Conscience and Society and Psychology and World Order, furnished the principal theme for the comment which follows, taken from an address on the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution before the University of Chicago Alumni Club of Washington, D.C.