

whether or not represented in the Council, would still have a de facto veto over adverse recommendations. The veto of the Palestine partition exercised by the Arabs and/or the United States is an instructive example.<sup>25</sup> Whether the de facto veto would be exercised in a given case would depend on subtle calculus by a nation prejudiced by the recommendation and in a position to prevent compliance. The immediate and direct impairment of its position resulting from compliance would be weighed against the "goodwill" cost of flouting the organization's recommendation.

Generalizations about the varying responsiveness of different nations to international "moral" pressure are dangerous,<sup>26</sup> particularly when the pressure seems to be going largely in one direction. But since proposals to change the veto have been stimulated by, and are directed at, the practices of Russia and her satellites, we may note that these countries appear to have rather tough hides. Even if Russia could not prevent uncongenial recommendations by the use of the formal veto within the Council, she could often prevent compliance with these recommendations by the use of the de facto veto outside the Council.

The crucial veto problem results from the retention of right and power by each member of the United Nations Organization to exercise the de facto veto after the Council has made its recommendation. Formal or informal exclusion of the veto from the field of pacific settlement would not touch this problem. The problem is inherent in the basic character of the United Nations as a league of "sovereign states," each one of which is legally and physically immune to coercion by the organization designed to effect compliance with the Organization's recommendations for pacific settlement.

In addition to the exercise of the restraint in the use of the veto, Dr. Evatt makes some sound, although necessarily general, proposals for procedural revisions, the improvement of the secretariat, bolder participation by the Secretary-General in the work of the Organization, the avoidance of duplication by the various committees, commissions, and specialized agencies which have mushroomed in the international economic and social field, the expansion of world economic statistics, and the avoidance of propaganda in United Nations debate.

He concludes with an admission of the secondary character of all of his proposals: They cannot "lead to a substantial improvement in the work of the United Nations so long as there are suspicion and lack of good will and understanding among its members, particularly several major powers." He properly implies that the United Nations Organization can do very little to achieve this understanding. The conclusion, unstated in his book, but underscored by the headlines, is that the Organization has only the remotest relevance to the current search for international peace and security.

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**Patterns of Union-Management Relations.** By Frederick H. Harbison and Robert Dubin. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1947. Pp. ix, 229. \$3.75.

Analysis of labor-management relations has lately entered a new stage of development as a result of group planning of research projects that is now taking place in re-

<sup>25</sup> There was, of course, an assembly recommendation in the Palestine case, but its legal consequences are no different from those of a recommendation by the Security Council.

<sup>26</sup> See Carr, *The Twenty Year Crisis*, Chap. 9, esp. p. 213 (1939).

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cently established units within a number of our universities, such as the Industrial Relations Center at the University of Chicago, from which this present volume comes. In this instance an economist and sociologist have combined their efforts to analyze labor-management relations within a "new framework." This book deals chiefly with the relations of General Motors and Studebaker with the United Automobile Workers (CIO). Its description is interesting, and its analysis is stimulating and provocative. It seems certain to make a real contribution to the study of this field because of the questions it raises and the controversies to which it will surely give rise.

The description of labor-management relations in these two automotive companies is cast in a novel setting. The authors emphasize a concept of *power centers* or "... situations wherein both the union and the company, by virtue of their size and strength, have a far-reaching influence on many other union-management relationships, if not on the economy as a whole."<sup>1</sup> The parties in these power centers are therefore pattern-setters, while the parties elsewhere follow the pattern, at least in part. General Motors is classified as setting a pattern; Studebaker as following it, especially with regard to wage rates.

At General Motors, as in every power center, a strong management and a strong union are playing for high stakes. In this instance, the long-run consequences of each move are carefully analyzed. The parties compete for the loyalty of the employees and the support of public opinion. Problems are handled in a formal and legalistic manner, with major emphasis on consistency with established policies. There is considerable friction and distrust between the parties. The company seeks to "contain" the union within its present sphere of activity, while the union seeks a scope of collective bargaining broader than is generally found in American industry, and has on several occasions made public appeals for joint or public industrial planning. The union thinks that the company would like to break it, and the company is convinced that an ultimate goal of the union is major revision of our capitalistic economy.

This is indeed a picture of sharp conflict. The authors recognize that it is only the less attractive part of the total picture. They indicate that relations at many of the individual plants are wholesome and mutually satisfactory and that both parties do a successful job of contract administration. Though the authors devote considerable space to this brighter part of the picture, their focusing of attention on contract negotiation (in accordance with their power-center concept) may give the reader an unduly dark impression of the character of the over-all relations. The extent to which the relations in many General Motors plants are equally satisfactory to management, the union and the employees seems less vividly portrayed than in the case of Studebaker, because in the subsequent analysis attention is centered on the company-wide function of contract negotiation.

The situation at Studebaker is characterized as "... a practical working model of what we term 'constructive union-management relations.'"<sup>2</sup> The company has never had a major strike. The union is stable and secure, with extensive membership participation. The scope of collective bargaining is almost unlimited, negotiations being conducted on a "problem-solving" approach without particular regard to pre-estab-

<sup>1</sup> P. 181.

<sup>2</sup> P. 202.

lished policies. The parties demonstrate a high degree of mutual trust. The authors are persuasive in indicating that the development of these policies and attitudes was facilitated by the financial insecurity of the company during the previous decade and the dependence of the community (South Bend) on the 12,000 jobs involved. One might wish, however, for a more detailed exposition of the early relations and of the subsequent major changes of policy or attitude by the parties. Such an addition might permit a conclusion regarding the significance of initial management attitudes toward union recognition as a partial explanation of the differences in the current labor relations of the two companies.

The reviewer finds himself in general agreement with the descriptive portions of the volume, but in considerable disagreement with the analytical portions. The "new framework" in which this study is set is mentioned but not explained. It is to be set forth in a later book. However, one can surmise, from the organization of this book and from statements made elsewhere by the authors, that the central core of the framework includes a separation and contrasting of pattern-setting and pattern-following relations. Together with this is the characterization of pattern-setting situations as "power centers" and some emphasis on the "bigness" of the parties at these focal points, plus a concept of "constructive labor-management relations" as here exemplified by conditions at Studebaker. However, the two concluding chapters do not contrast the situations at General Motors and Studebaker directly, but only indirectly. The first of these chapters contains a discussion of some characteristics and problems of power centers. The second presents conclusions regarding the nature of constructive relations.

Whatever the central purpose of the book, the choice of General Motors and Studebaker as sources of contrasting material is difficult to understand. If the purpose was to contrast a leader and a follower, might it not have been better to compare General Motors and Chrysler? The authors say that Chrysler seldom sets the pattern, yet it is in other respects much more analogous to General Motors.

General Motors and Studebaker are so entirely dissimilar in all respects except type of industry that it is difficult to conclude which of the differences are responsible for the contrasts in their labor relations. The implication of the authors that pattern-following is a major explanation is not convincing. In the first place, the conformity to pattern applies chiefly to basic wage rates, yet even in wage administration the similarity is so slight that Studebaker uses an incentive wage system in contrast to the general pattern of straight hourly rates. Second, why should the authors conclude that negotiation of their own basic wage rates by the parties at Studebaker would adversely affect their relations when it is said<sup>3</sup> that wages have not been a major bone of contention at General Motors? Incidentally, the General Motors-Studebaker contrast might have been more fruitful if the study had included a detailed analysis of relations in some single General Motors plant of about the same size as Studebaker and located in a city similar to South Bend.

If a major purpose of the book was to reach conclusions regarding pattern-setters (as might be inferred from chapter vi), should not the study have covered other power centers? Some references are made to the relations at U.S. Steel in support of the generalizations that are drawn, but the reader may wonder whether the similarities be-

<sup>3</sup>P. 86.

tween the relations at General Motors and U.S. Steel are not emphasized at the expense of the differences. Moreover, the factors listed in this chapter as characteristics of relations in a power center seem to apply much more to size than to leadership. Perhaps there is need for sharper differentiation between the concepts of "bigness," "power center" and "pattern-setter." After all, it may well be that Studebaker itself does a good deal of pattern-setting for other companies in South Bend, though there is no reference to this in the book.

If a main purpose of the volume was to determine the nature of constructive labor-management relations, the conclusions would be more convincing if some other companies had been included in the study or even if some of the more successful aspects of relations at some General Motors plants had been drawn upon for this purpose. It would be very useful to analyze a number of instances of constructive relations in order to see what are the common causal factors. It would be necessary to use some criteria in selecting the instances. The authors suggest that constructive relations exist ". . . when a union and a company harmonize divergent goals into an effective working agreement."<sup>4</sup> This definition needs more elaboration than it receives in the final chapter. For example, is not labor efficiency an essential element in an effective working agreement? The authors, however, give only slight attention to labor productivity in either company.

In summary, it seems doubtful that some of the conclusions are adequately supported by the material set forth in this book or could possibly be supported by a study of this necessarily limited scope. In formulating their conclusions, the authors have inevitably drawn upon their wide knowledge of labor relations throughout American industry. To suggest that some of the conclusions are insufficiently supported is not to say that they are necessarily invalid. It is suggested, rather, that they are at least premature. This is only the first of a series of publications planned by the authors and their immediate associates. When more of these studies have appeared, the present conclusions may be much more thoroughly substantiated.

In view of the current extensive research activity in this field, it is to be hoped that the authors will give in their future publications a more complete description of their methodology than is contained in the single footnote on this subject in the present volume.

Lawyers who serve as consultants on labor-management relations should find in this book many suggestions regarding methods that are conducive to the achievement of good relations.

WILLIAM H. MCPHERSON\*

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**Men of Law.** By William Seagle. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. 391. \$5.00.

This volume, in a literary style which is delightful, crams into 355 pages a wealth of information concerning the lives and achievements of fourteen illustrious men who enriched jurisprudence.

<sup>4</sup> P. 202.

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