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2017

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Recommended Citation

Adam S. Chilton & Eric Posner, "Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements," Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, No. 807 (2017).

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CHICAGO

COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 807

COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE
FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL

WHY COUNTRIES SIGN BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS

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THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

April 2017

Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements*

Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner

March 3, 2017

Abstract. Countries have entered several hundred bilateral labor agreements (BLAs), which control the conditions under which source countries send migrant workers to host countries. Using an original data set of 582 BLAs extending from 1945 to 2015, we conduct the first statistical examination of these agreements. We find that the standard explanation for BLAs—that they are entered into by countries with large differences in wealth and political regimes—is true for host countries are Middle Eastern, but this pattern reverses for other countries that have formed BLAs. We also find that countries that enter BLAs experience greater migration flows, though we are not able to verify that the BLAs cause these increases.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) are agreements that control the conditions under which source countries send temporary migrant workers to host countries. BLAs are diverse but they contain many common elements (Trachtman 2009). Host countries usually provide legal protections for migrant workers—protecting them from abuses by employers, allowing them access to health care, giving them information and aid when needed. Source countries are often obliged to control the flow of migration by screening migrant workers and accepting their return. Parties often agree to monitor the workers, share information, keep records, and engage in other good-governance practices.

While the first BLA was apparently signed in 1904 and BLAs received attention from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the 1920s, they became common only after World War II (Wickramasekara 2015). The subsequent ratification activity fell into three periods. From 1945-1973, BLAs were used mostly by European countries, which sought labor from eastern and southern Europe, and North Africa, for reconstruction. From 1974-1989, relatively few new BLAs were negotiated, perhaps because the 1970s were a period of economic stagnation. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new era of globalization, ratification of BLAs accelerated in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this third period, countries in the Middle East and Asia played a more significant role both as hosts and sources.

In the standard account, BLAs are entered into by host countries that are wealthy and need labor and source countries that are poor but concerned with the rights of their nationals who labor abroad (e.g. Blank 2011; Chanda 2009; Chi 2008). This account appears to be based on recent experience with Gulf Countries, which have entered into numerous BLAs with countries like the Philippines and India. Extensive criticism of the use of migrant labors in the Gulf Countries by human rights advocates has drawn attention to this practice (Human Rights Watch 2015).

However, a problem with this account is that it does not explain what host countries gain from a treaty. To be sure, source countries have been eager to enter BLAs (Go 2004), and it is obviously why they would be. Source countries seek to ensure that host countries will protect migrants from abusive employers, give them access to public resources, and facilitate the return of remittances. In fact, some source countries have

threatened to block nationals from seeking migrant work in countries that refuse to ratify BLAs (Wickramasekara 2015). It is less clear why host countries would want to enter into BLAs. After all, host countries (typically) control access to their territory. If they want to give access to migrant workers, they can; if they do not, they can shut off the flow. If they do permit migrant workers, then the host countries can unilaterally impose whatever legal regime they wish—whether exploitative or generous (OECD 2004; Go 2004).

The answer to this puzzle must be that the host country gains something in return from the source country. One possibility is that BLAs are attractive to host countries because host countries can use them to secure assistance from source countries in screening migrant workers so as to block terrorists, criminals, and people who do not seek work but public aid, and in other ways controlling the flow of migrants to the host country (Plotnikova 2011). This would suggest that host countries tend to be wealthier than source countries, and also that host countries tend to be less democratic since democratic countries voluntarily give rights to people on their territory. But this is not the only possibility. The host country might enter into a BLA in order to secure a benefit from the source country that is unrelated to migration (Sykes 2013). In addition, it is always possible that the host country obtains general albeit symbolic political benefits from entering into a treaty with another country (Chilton 2016; Poulsen & Aisbett 2016).

In this paper, we conduct the first statistical analysis of a dataset of BLAs in order to explore these possible explanations for why countries enter into BLAs. We have created an original dataset of BLAs signed between 1945 and 2015. We attempted to identify every BLA signed during this period. To do so, we examined reports compiled by international organizations, searched databases of international treaties, reviewed the relevant academic literature, and searched the foreign ministry websites of countries that have signed a large number of BLAs. Through this process, we were able to identify 582 BLAs. Although we have probably not identified the complete universe of BLAs for reasons we will discuss below, our dataset is the most comprehensive that has yet been compiled.

We use our dataset to empirically examine BLAs in two ways. First, we explore the patterns of BLA ratification. To do so, we estimate a series of logit regressions that test for the onset of BLAs. With respect to the conventional hypothesis that host

countries are wealthier and have different levels of democratization, we find a greater wealth disparity between host and source countries, and a greater disparity in political regimes, are correlated with a lower probability of entering a BLA. For Middle East Hosts, this pattern changes. Middle East hosts are more likely to sign BLAs with source countries that are poorer and more democratic than they are. The results provide support for the conventional story only with respect to Middle East hosts, and suggests that BLAs are used for other purposes elsewhere in the world.

Second, we investigate the effect of BLAs on the stock of migrants from the source country in the host country. Despite the apparent enthusiasm for BLAs among governments, the literature about their effects is thin, and authors have been pessimistic about whether BLAs do much good. Most authors argue that the BLAs have had little effect on migrant rights, migrant flows, or other relevant outcomes (see Batistella and Khadria 2011; Chi 2008; Hárs 2003; Wickramasekara 2015, pp. 37-44; OECD 2004, p. 29). These arguments are based on case studies and general impressions. To our knowledge, no study has yet examined the effect of BLAs using statistical techniques.

We thus use our dataset to estimate a series of time-series cross-sectional regressions designed to test the relationship between treaty ratification and the stock of migrants from the source country in host countries. We find that the signing of BLAs is associated with an increase in the stock of migrants in host countries. However, because of limitations with our data, we are not able to say whether the BLAs cause this increase. It is instead possible that the correlation reflects the fact that countries are likely to sign BLAs when migration between them increases for independent economic, demographic, or political reasons.

We proceed as follows. In Part 2, we provide historical and legal background on BLAs. In Part 3, we develop a theoretical account of why countries would be interested in BLAs, and use this theory to generate several testable hypotheses. In Part 4, we introduce the dataset of BLAs that we created for this project. In Part 5, we present our results for the factors that predict the formation of BLAs, and in Part 6 we present our results for the effect of BLAs on stocks of migrants. Part 7 discusses our findings and concludes.

2. BACKGROUND ON BLAS

2.1. Historical Background

The modern era of the BLA began during the reconstruction in Europe after World War II.¹ European countries with badly damaged industrial capacity—including France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium—entered BLAs with countries in and on the periphery of Europe, including Italy, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Portugal, and Morocco. But there were exceptions to this pattern. The United States, despite the huge influx of returning soldiers, used BLAs to obtain labor from Mexico, the Philippines, and Canada. A few BLAs involved African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. By 1973, at least 209 bilateral agreements had been signed.

From 1974 to 1989, only 61 BLAs were ratified. The slowdown in growth of the BLA regime can be attributed to many factors. European countries no longer needed vast armies of migrants to repair damaged infrastructure. Economic stagnation in rich countries also reduced the demand for foreign workers. At the same time, the focus of BLA activity shifted from Europe to elsewhere in the world where new sources of wealth created new demand for labor. For instance, Argentina and Bolivia entered a BLA in 1978, Libya entered a BLA with the Philippines in 1979, and Qatar used BLAs in the 1980s to regulate migration from India, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.

A new golden age of BLAs began with the end of the Cold War. At least 312 new agreements were ratified from 1990 to 2015. The host countries that most frequently used BLAs now extended beyond the large European countries, and included South Korea, Australia, the UAE, Qatar, and New Zealand. Among source countries, the most frequent BLA parties were the Philippines, Poland, Indonesia, and Romania. Strikingly, Germany entered BLAs with more than a dozen countries within a few years of unification—mostly, eastern European countries, plus Turkey and Russia. With the huge problem of integrating workers from the former East Germany into the workforce, we

¹ This account of history of BLAs from 1945 to 2015 is based on both existing literature (see, e.g., Wickramasekara 2015; Plotnikova 2011; Trachtman 2009) and analysis of the BLAs we identified for this project. The data for the Figures, and totals we report, are from our new BLA dataset.

surmise that the goal of these BLAs was to signal political good will rather than attract foreign labor. The other treaties of this era are hard to summarize, but very roughly most of them involved a wealthy country in Europe or the Middle East and a developing country in Asia, Africa, or South America. There are also a few intraregional agreements between developing countries, including the Philippines and Indonesia (2003), Paraguay and Bolivia (2006), and Slovenia and Macedonia (2008).

Figure 1: Cumulative Number of Bilateral Labor Agreements Over Time

Figure 1 shows the growth of BLAs over time. The shape of the curve is consistent with the three-period model posited by Wickramasekara (2005). Figure 2 shows a map of the world with countries shaded according to the extent to which they enter BLAs. Figure 3 breaks down the map by period. Since this will later be part of our focus, Figure 4 shows a map with the BLAs signed by countries in the Middle East.

Figure 2: Number of BLAs Signed by Country – 1945 to 2015

BLAs are not the only way that countries have used international agreements to regulate the flow of labor. In parallel with the BLAs, countries have attempted to negotiate multilateral treaties that granted rights to migrants. Starting in 1951, an ever-expanding group of European countries entered into multilateral treaties that allowed citizens of those countries to cross borders and work on the territory of other parties. While most (although not all) BLAs make a sharp distinction between host and source countries, and often tolerate discriminatory behavior on the part of the host country in its treatment of foreign workers, the European system contemplated generalized free mobility, allowing citizens of any country to work in any other country for as long as they wanted to. Additionally, countries also negotiated a multilateral treaty called the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was signed in 1990 and went into force in 2003. The treaty was mainly concerned with protecting the rights of legal and illegal migrant workers. However, this treaty was a failure. Most of its 48 parties are developing countries in South America and Africa, and no major host country ratified the treaty (Chi 2008, p. 507).

Figure 3: Number of BLAs Signed by Country – By Period

A. Period 1 (1945 – 1973)

B. Period 2 (1974 – 1989)

C. Period 3 (1990 – 2015)

Figure 4: Number of BLAs Signed by Countries in the Middle East – 1945 to 2015

2.2. Legal Background

The terms of BLAs are diverse. Some are long, others short. Some are memoranda of understanding, while others are legally binding. Some clearly distinguish a host and source state, others do not. But there are many common themes. To illustrate, we briefly describe contents of six BLAs.

Germany-Romania (1992). This short agreement contains only nine articles over five pages. It omits the elaborate “whereas” clauses found in many treaties, and imposes identical obligations on both countries rather than identifying a host and source. Foreign workers are defined as young adults who have completed vocational training and seek temporary employment to improve their vocational and linguistic knowledge. The BLA provides that the host country’s employment law will apply; limits permits to 500 per year for each country; and provides for administrative cooperation.

Philippines-Qatar (1997). This treaty governs Philippine migrant workers in Qatar. The Philippines agrees to screen workers and inform them about life in Qatar in advance of travel. Employers in Qatar must initially apply for Philippine workers through the Qatar government. Employers must bear the cost of travel of workers unless the workers break their contract. Employers must supply written contracts, with copies for the governments. The Qatar government will resolve disputes between workers and employers. A joint committee is set up to administer the agreement.

Argentina-Bolivia (1998). This elaborate agreement begins with a preamble affirming the countries' cooperative activities and citing human rights instruments. The agreement authorizes each country to offer 6-month legal residence, renewable for another 12 months, to nationals of the other country who either wish to enter the country to engage in temporary work or are already residing in the country illegally and seek to regularize their status. It lists eligibility criteria (e.g., no criminal record) and documentary requirements. Migrant workers are guaranteed the same civil rights as nationals are. The countries agree to cooperate in restricting illegal migration and promoting development, and they establish a commission for administering and reviewing the agreement.

Korea-Nepal (2007). This memorandum of understanding imposes significant obligations on agencies of both governments—the Nepalese government to screen and assist workers; the Korean government to monitor them once they arrive. Workers must pass a Korean language test as well as medical and criminal-record hurdles. The governments agree to engage in various types of cooperation including computerized information sharing. Korea reserves the right to reduce the number of permits if the number of Nepalese workers who illegally stay in Korea exceeds a “certain percentage.”

Canada-Mexico (2013). This nine-page document governs the employment of Mexican workers in the Canadian agricultural sector. It includes detailed provisions regarding pay, hours worked, lodging and meals, insurance, record-keeping, workplace safety, and travel—imposing most obligations on employers, but some on workers as well, who are required to obey the employer's rules and leave the country at the end of

the term. The agreement is written as a model employment contract, with certain details to be filled in by the employer, depending on its requirements. The agreement does not contain an explicit quota.

India-Saudi Arabia (2015). This short agreement governs domestic service workers sent from India to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia agrees to (vaguely) protect the rights of the workers; ensure that employment contracts are authentic and enforce them; resolve disputes between workers and employers; “facilitate” the employer opening a bank account for the worker, in which his pay is deposited; provide 24-hour assistance to workers; and “facilitate the issuance of exit visas” when their contract ends or in emergencies. India agrees to screen workers for disease and criminal records; verify employment contracts; encourage prospective workers to obey the laws and moral rules of Saudi Arabia; and facilitate the removal of workers from Saudi Arabia and their travel to Saudi Arabia. The agreement establishes a committee to administer it.

While the agreements vary considerably in their elaborateness and generosity to workers, they share many common elements (Trachtman 2009). They typically: (1) establish health, criminal-record, and other criteria for workers seeking employment in the host country; (2) obligate the source state to screen the workers; (3) give the workers legal protections in the host country; (4) limit or regulate recruiters, employers, or both; and (5) establish institutional mechanisms for administering the agreement. In short, typically the host state agrees to give rights and assistance to foreign workers, while the source state agrees to help with screening, information provision to workers, and repatriation. As far as we can tell, this is the essence of the BLA.

3. THEORY

Migration, like international investment and trade, is a major source of wealth for countries, but it also creates risks, problems, and opportunities for strategic behavior. The source states gain most directly from remittances—in some countries, remittances are as much as 32% of GDP (Chi 2008, p. 507). But they also gain in indirect ways: by the circulation of citizens to foreign countries, where they may gain skills as well as

capital (Plotnikova 2011, p. 79), and as a way of relieving tensions arising from population pressures (Blank 2011, p. 188). But source states are also harmed when their nationals are mistreated abroad. Host states gain from cheap labor, but competition from foreign labor can create resentment at home, and in most, if not all, countries natives distrust foreigners. Host states also fear migration by people who seek welfare benefits and other amenities, or who plan to commit crimes.

States can and do set migration policy unilaterally, just as they do with trade. We assume that in the absence of a treaty, states will adopt the migration policy that maximizes national welfare.² In trade, the basic strategic problem is that a country with a large economy can use tariffs to affect the prices of goods set by exporters.³ A country that sets a high tariff will cause foreign exporters to reduce the price in that country, with some of that loss incurred by foreign citizens. If, as is normally assumed, a country disregards the well-being of foreigners, it will impose tariffs on imports. But if two trading partners impose tariffs on each other, then they are worse off than if neither did. Through a trade agreement, the partners can eliminate the “terms of trade” externality, as it is called.

This logic applies to migration as well. If a host country restricts migration from a source country—which in the trade analogy is equivalent to a quota rather than a tariff—the bargaining power of migrant workers is reduced, as potential migrants must compete among each other for fewer opportunities. The result is that employers in the host country can pay lower wages and offer worse working conditions than they could otherwise. As in the case of trade, two countries that act in this way do worse than if neither do, and can therefore jointly improve their utility by entering a treaty. Freedom of movement rules in the European Union address this problem in the context where many countries have roughly similar economies and populations.

² This is obviously a very loose starting point. In trade theory, economists have moved from this assumption to a more complex political economy starting point, where typically they distinguish groups with different interests—like importers, exporters, consumers—who may influence government policy in different ways.

³ Here and elsewhere in this Part we follow the discussion in Sykes (2013).

But there is a key distinction between the EU system and trade treaties, and BLAs. As Sykes (2013) points out, flows of migrant workers tend to occur in one way: from a populous developing country to a capital-rich developed country. While the traditional bilateral trade treaty symmetrically provides equivalent benefits to countries that could gain from trade, a BLA would seem to offer more to the source country than to the host country. As Sykes notes, the countries may evade this asymmetry by linking the BLA to other forms of cooperation—military, diplomatic, etc. But, as we have already noted, it turns out that the source country does have something to offer: control over the out-migration of its nationals, including screening, repatriation, and other services. A useful analogy is the bilateral investment treaty (BIT), through which a country that receives capital promises not to expropriate the returns on investment from a country that exports capital. While capital goes only one way, the benefits are joint, and the treaty helps ensure that the capital-receiving country does not renege on the bargain. In the case of BLAs, the agreement aligns expectations so as to reassure each party that the other party will adhere to the bargain.

If all this is true, it is possible to generate hypotheses about (1) when countries are likely to form BLAs, and (2) the effect those agreements are likely to have.

1. Formation of BLAs. The conventional wisdom is that BLAs will be most attractive to source countries that are poor and populous, and to wealthy host countries with ample capital but relatively small populations. These countries mutually benefit by the transfer of labor from the capital-poor country to the capital-rich country. To keep our empirical analysis manageable, we focus on relative wealth. Our first hypothesis (H_1) is that BLAs are more likely when the host country is wealthier than the source country is.

In a typical BLA, the source country seeks to obtain rights for its nationals while they work and reside in the host country. When there are large differences in the political regimes between the hosts countries and source countries, source countries are more likely to be concerned about the rights of their nationals. By contrast, if the host country has the same regime as the source country—for example, if they are both democracies—then a BLA is not necessary to secure them. Our second hypothesis (H_2) is thus that

BLAs are more likely when the host and source countries have differences in their political regimes.

Other factors are likely to influence the probability that two countries enter into a BLA. Because entering and enforcing a treaty has a fixed cost, countries are more likely to enter a BLA as migration increases (and hence the benefits of having a treaty increase). Migration in turn depends on a range of geographic, demographic, and historical factors. We treat these factors as controls because they predict migration rather than whether countries enter into a BLA. These variables are: distance (migration is most likely between countries that are geographically close); contiguity (for similar reasons); a former colonial relationship; common language; trade; a prior bilateral investment treaty; membership in the EU; and a formal military alliance.

As we explored our data, we noticed a significant change in the pattern of BLAs over time. In the postwar and Cold War era, most BLAs involved European host countries. Starting in the 1990s, a much more diverse group of countries became involved, and middle eastern (and especially Gulf) countries played a particularly important role as hosts. This pattern dovetails with discussions in the migration literature, which identifies Gulf countries as particularly important (and also problematic) users of migrant labor in recent decades (Human Rights Watch 2013). Accordingly, we include a Middle East host dummy variable.

2. The Effect of BLAs on Migration. So far, we have assumed that countries mean what they say when they enter BLAs. But the literature on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) suggests a different story. BITs, like BLAs, are asymmetric agreements where nationals of one country supply capital (instead of labor) to host countries. The major difference is that with BITs, because capital is expected to flow from wealthy countries to poor countries, the expected host is relatively poor and the expected source is relatively rich. The BIT literature initially found that BITs did increase capital flows (Haftel 2010; Neumayer & Spess 2005; Salacuse & Sullivan 2005),⁴ but in recent years skepticism has arisen about the robustness of the earlier results and a political story has

⁴ A number of other studies did not find evidence that BITs increased investment flows (Peinhardt & Allee 2012; Yackee 2010; Gallagher & Birch 2006).

emerged (e.g. Poulsen & Aisbett 2016; Minhas 2015; Poulsen 2015; Poulsen 2014; Poulsen & Aisbett 2013). On this view, countries enter BITs in order to strengthen their relationships. In some cases, a rich country is just providing a photo opportunity to leaders of a poor country. Consistent with this view, empirical research has found that the political relationship of countries predicts whether they enter BITs (Chilton 2016).

It is thus unclear whether BLAs are likely to increase the flows of migrants, or instead were simply negotiated by source states in order to gain domestically from having signed the treaty, even if it does not translate into migration. Since host countries have been more hesitant about signing binding treaties, however, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they believe these agreements are more likely to actually have an effect. Accordingly, we hypothesize that (H₃) migration from source to host increases when countries enter into a BLA.

Again, we use numerous controls to isolate the effect of the treaty. These controls include several that we use for the first two hypotheses: the relative wealth of the countries; the relative degree of democracy; the amount of trade; the existence of a prior BIT; EU membership; a formal alliance. We also include various economic variables likely to affect migration, including unemployment in the host and source; government spending in the host and source; and the population of the host and source.

4. DATA

4.1. Data on Bilateral Labor Agreements

The first step in empirically evaluating why countries sign BLAs, and what effects BLAs have on behavior, is identifying the universe of BLAs. Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward task. There is currently not a comprehensive database of BLAs. Existing academic work is based on disparate sources, including in some cases on BLAs that are apparently not publicly available. Many BLAs do not exist online or from other accessible sources. In a recent survey, the International Labour Office (ILO) was able to identify 358 BLAs but was able to find copies of only 144 of those agreements (Wickramasekara 2015).

For this project, we have tried to identify every BLA that was signed between 1945 and 2015. To do so, we used a five-step process designed to cast a wide net to locate as many BLAs as possible. First, we included all of the BLAs found on the website of the ILO.⁵ Second, we searched the United Nations Treaty Collection using key words and then reviewed the results for relevant agreements.⁶ Third, we searched the World Treaty Index for relevant agreements.⁷ Fourth, we searched the internet for BLAs that were mentioned in different articles, but could not be located in the above databases. Fifth, we searched the foreign ministry databases of countries that prior research suggested had signed a large number of BLAs.

We were able to identify 582 BLAs that were signed between 1945 and 2015.⁸ Of these BLAs, there are 405 unique country-pairs and 555 unique country-years. In other words, there are 177 BLAs where the same country-pair had previously signed a BLA, and 27 examples where the same pair of countries had even signed a BLA in the same year (this is likely because the countries were either renewing or renegotiating a previous agreement). Of these 582 BLAs, we have identified 12 as superseding a pre-existing agreement and 32 as amending a prior agreement. Finally, we were able to identify the Host Country and Source Country for 171 of the agreements—where the BLA itself or some other source identified one country as sending and the other country as receiving migrants—but we were unable to do so in 411 cases because many treaties are written in formally reciprocal terms, we do not have a copy of all agreements we identified, and we have not yet been able to translate all the agreements. This information is summarized in Table 1.

⁵ *Bilateral Labour Arrangements (BLAs) on Labour Migration*, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, <http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/policy-areas/measuring-impact/agreements/lang--en/index.htm> (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).

⁶ We specifically searched for “labor,” “labour,” “working holiday,” “employment,” “employee,” “workers,” “frontier,” “cross-border,” “trainees,” “vocational,” and “mobility.” UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES ONLINE, <https://treaties.un.org> (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).

⁷ WORLD TREATY INDEX, <http://worldtreatyindex.com> (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).

⁸ The appendix provides a complete list of the 582 BLAs we were able to identify.

Table 1: Summary of the BLAs in Our Database

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Total
Totals BLAs	209	61	312	582
BLA Number by Dyad				
Unique Country Pairs	123	56	254	405
Unique Country-Years	190	58	307	555
BLA Number by Dyad				
New	190	58	290	538
Superseding	4	1	7	12
Amendment	15	2	15	32
Host / Source Country				
Identified	48	20	103	171
Unidentified	161	41	209	411

Since we are interested in understanding why countries agree to serve as hosts or sources of workers, and prefer to exploit our entire database rather than only the subset of country-pairs that entered treaties that identify countries as hosts or sources, we used a proxy to identify the host and source countries for the remaining countries. We assumed that for any pair of countries, the host is the country with the higher GDP per capita in the first year in which data on GDP per capita for both countries was available. That country is identified as the host for the pair of countries for all years in the dataset.⁹

To evaluate whether this assumption is reasonable, we examined whether it correctly identifies the source and host country for the 171 BLAs that explicitly identify the source and host country. Our assumption produces an accurate identification for all but 9 cases (in other words, our assumption is 95% accurate). For the 9 BLAs we misidentify the host and source, there appear to be fairly unique sets of facts. For example, we misidentify South Korea as a source country for a number of dyads because of its relatively low GDP Per Capita in the 1950s.

It is important to note a limitation of our dataset. Although our goal was to identify the entire universe of BLAs signed between 1945 and 2015, there is good reason to believe that our list of agreements is underinclusive. This is because countries may not always deposit BLAs in official and unofficial databases of international treaties, and the

⁹ For robustness, we use alternate rules for identifying hosts and source countries in Part 5.3.

signing of a BLA may not be widely reported (or reported at all). Moreover, it is probable that we were more likely to identify the BLAs signed by certain kinds of countries. For instance, it is probably the case that we were more likely to identify BLAs signed by the kind of wealthy countries that deposit their agreements into international databases at higher rates or have their agreements more widely reported. Since the BLAs we were unable to identify are thus unlikely to be random, it is possible that sample selection biases our results.

4.2. Dataset Construction and Independent Variables

To structure our data on BLAs for empirical analysis, we created a dataset with an observation for every pair of countries—which are often referred to as dyads—in each year between 1945 and 2015 (in other words, our unit of observation is the “dyad-year”). Since the number of countries in the international state system has increased over time, the number of observations in our dataset increases over time as well. For instance, in 1945 there were just 65 countries in the international state system.¹⁰ Since this means there are 2,080 pairs of countries, there are correspondingly 2,080 observations in our dataset for 1945. By 2015, there were 196 countries in the international state system, which results in 19,110 pairs of countries that are observations in our dataset. In total, our dataset has 20,217 unique dyads and 831,898 total observations.

¹⁰ We based our list of countries in the international state system in a given year on a dataset of members of the international state system created by the Correlates of War (“COW”) project, available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership/state-codebook-2011>. We made two changes to the COW dataset. First, since Hong Kong has signed BLAs, we included Hong Kong as a country in all years of our dataset. Second, since the COW dataset only provides information through 2011, we added observations for all of the countries in existence in 2011 for 2012–2015. Because The last member to join the UN—South Sudan in 2011—was already included in the dataset, we are unaware of any countries that have entered or exited the international state system between 2012 to 2015 and thus felt comfortable simply extending the countries from 2011 to 2015.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Primary Variables					
GDP Per Capita (ln) (Host)	793,460	9.151	1.109	4.897	12.551
GDP Per Capita (ln) (Source)	791,518	7.990	1.019	4.897	11.971
GDP Per Capita Ratio	785,434	1.157	0.163	0.482	2.333
Polity Score (Host)	719,510	2.690	7.622	-10	10
Polity Score (Source)	745,007	-0.495	6.781	-10	10
Polity Score Difference	645,939	7.694	6.296	0	20
Middle East Host	831,898	0.108	0.311	0	1
Dyadic Controls					
Distance (ln)	768,101	8.753	0.774	4.105	9.901
Contiguous	768,101	0.018	0.134	0	1
Colony	768,101	0.012	0.111	0	1
Common Language	768,101	0.160	0.366	0	1
Trade (ln)	602,864	1.879	2.342	0	13.35
Prior BIT	831,898	0.055	0.229	0	1
EU Free Movement	831,898	0.013	0.114	0	1
Formal Alliance	831,898	0.053	0.225	0	1
Domestic Controls					
Unemployment (Host)	382,079	8.722	5.675	0.1	39.3
Unemployment (Source)	393,079	8.849	6.665	0.1	39.3
Unemploy. Primary (Host)	228,118	34.887	17.440	0.1	91.3
Unemploy. Primary (Source)	118,179	36.249	18.862	0.1	91.3
Gov. Spending (Host)	647,626	16.690	6.354	0	156.53
Gov. Spending (Source)	621,793	15.217	8.234	0	156.53
Ethnic Fractionalization (Host)	802,798	0.395	0.249	0	0.93
Ethnic Fractionalization (Source)	798,016	0.484	0.266	0	0.93
Population (ln) (Host)	793,460	2.100	1.394	0.009	7.223
Population (ln) (Source)	791,518	2.226	1.436	0.009	7.223

In addition to using the data we discussed in the previous section to code whether a dyad was party to a BLA in a given year, we also added independent variables to our dataset that allow us to test the hypotheses outlined in Part 3. First, to capture the relative wealth between the host and source countries, we calculated the *GDP Per Capita Ratio* between dyads in our dataset as the log of the host countries GDP Per Capita divided by the log of source countries GDP Per Capita. For this variable, higher values

mean that the host country has relatively larger GDP Per Capita than the source country.¹¹ Second, to capture how similar countries systems of governments are, we calculated the absolute difference of the host and sources Polity2 score (“*Polity Score Difference*”). Polity Scores are a widely used measure of a countries level of democratization that ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to 10 (complete democracy).¹² Third, we created the variable *Middle East Host* that is a dummy variable coded as 1 in all years for all potentially host countries from the Middle East.¹³

In addition to these variables, we also collected a number of variables that capture both the dyadic relationship between countries and domestic conditions within the country. Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of these variables.

5. THE FORMATION OF BLAS

5.1. Graphical Evidence

Figure 5 presents graphical evidence for the hypotheses we outlined in Part 3. In Panel A, the shaded region graphs the 25th to 75th percentile of the GDP Per Capita Ratio for hosts and sources for all dyad in a given year and the dashed gray line presents the 50th percentile for all the dyads in a given year. The solid black line graphs the average GDP Per Capita Ratio for all new BLAs signed where the host was not from the Middle East, and the dotted red line graphs the average for BLAs signed where the host

¹¹ Our data on GDP per capita is from version 8.1 of the Penn World Tables. When GDP per capita estimates were not available in the Penn World Tables, we supplemented in the “rgdppc” variable from the GDP and Population dataset maintained by Kristian Gleditsch when possible. The Gleditsch dataset is available at <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html> (last visited September 19, 2016). For more information, see Gleditsch (2002). All GDP per capita estimates were converted to 2011 dollars.

¹² The polity2 variable is from the Polity IV dataset, available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (last visited September 19, 2016). For more information, see Marshall & Jaggers (2011).

¹³ We used the “men” option from the kountry package in Stata, which identifies the following countries as being part of the Middle East: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

is from the Middle East. Panel B presents the same information, only the key variable is the Polity Score Difference.

Figure 5: Onset of BLA by GDP Per Capita and Polity Score Difference

A. Average GDP Per Capita Ratio

B. Polity Score Difference

The results indicate that our first two hypotheses are correct for Middle East hosts, but not for other countries. In all years, the average GDP Per Capita Ratio for non-Middle East hosts is below the 50th percentile for all dyads in the dataset. In contrast, for Middle East hosts, the average is above the 50th percentile in all years and above the 75th percentile starting in the early 1980s. Similarly, the Polity Score Difference for non-Middle East hosts is below the 50th percentile for all but a brief stretch in the 1970s, but Middle East hosts are above the 50th percentile in all years.

5.2. Primary Results

Because we seek to understand why countries enter BLAs, our dependent variable is coded as 1 if a pair of countries (or dyad) enters a BLA in a given year. After the first year having entered a BLA, the dyad drops out of the dataset. We are thus assuming that a BLA is permanent, and the cases where a pair of countries enters a second BLA are ignored. In other words, we are modeling the “onset” of BLAs.

A large literature discusses how to correctly model time-series cross-sectional data (Beck et al. 1998). We follow recent scholarship in international law (Chilton 2016; Voeten & Verdier 2014), and use the approach recommended by Carter & Signorino (2010) of modeling the onset of BLAs using logit models with the variables time, time², and time³—with time measured as (Year-1946). This approach has the advantage of producing more familiar and easy to interpret logit coefficients while controlling for the possibility that the observations are temporally dependent. We clustered the standard errors by dyad in order to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.

Table 3 presents our primary results. Models (1) to (3) test the claim that, in general, host countries have signed BLAs with source countries that have similar economic conditions and forms of government. Model (1) begins by including a variable for *GDP Per Capita Ratio*, Model (2) includes *Polity Score Difference*, and Model (3) includes both *GDP Per Capita Ratio* and *Polity Score Difference*. All three include a dummy variable for *Middle East Host*.¹⁴ In all three models, *GDP Per Capita Ratio* and *Polity Score Difference*

¹⁴ The results in Models (1) to (3) are robust to excluding the variable for *Middle East Host*.

have negative signs—e.g. smaller differences make dyads more likely to sign a BLA—and are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Models (4) to (6) repeat Models (1) to (3) while interacting *GDP Per Capita Ratio* and *Polity Score Difference* with *Middle East Host*. The results reveal that the interaction terms consistently have positive signs—e.g. bigger differences make dyads more likely to sign a BLA—and are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 3: Onset of BLAs – Baseline Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP Per Capita Ratio	-1.256*** (0.274)		-0.896*** (0.264)	-2.206*** (0.278)		-1.584*** (0.284)
Polity Score Difference		-0.085*** (0.012)	-0.077*** (0.012)		-0.109*** (0.014)	-0.096*** (0.014)
GDP Per Capita Ratio x Middle East Host				4.416*** (0.580)		3.592*** (0.604)
Polity Score Difference x Middle East Host					0.122*** (0.026)	0.114*** (0.027)
Middle East Host	0.400*** (0.142)	0.258* (0.145)	0.384*** (0.143)	-4.850*** (0.733)	-0.565** (0.255)	-4.735*** (0.838)
Observations	775,181	635,376	605,231	775,181	635,376	605,231

-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year

-- Logit regressions with dependent variable coded as 1 if dyad signs first BLA in given year

-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

-- All regressions include Time, Time², and Time³ (Time is measured as Year-1946)

-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As Table 3 shows, the negative coefficients for *GDP Per Capita Ratio* and *Polity Score Difference* suggest that countries have typically signed BLAs with countries with similar levels of wealth and democratization. For host countries from the Middle East, however, this pattern reverses. The positive coefficients for the interaction terms in Models (4) to (6) suggest that, for Middle East Hosts, larger differences in wealth and levels of democratization are associated with higher probabilities of Middle East Hosts signing a BLAs with a given country. In other words, hosts from the Middle East and the rest of the world have signed BLAs with different kinds of partners.

While the Middle East case conforms with our two hypotheses, the rest of the world does not. Why not? We suspect that in the latter group, BLAs were used for more diverse purposes—for example, to send political signals of good will, to facilitate transfers of migrants in both directions, and to arrange for transfers of relatively small groups of migrants (often high-skill) to perform specific jobs. The European BLAs immediately after World War II were probably designed to facilitate postwar reconstruction, with labor flowing to countries (above all Germany) with the greatest physical destruction. After German unification, Germany entered into numerous BLAs with eastern and central European countries. These BLAs, which often authorized migration of only small groups of workers, were probably intended to signal good will.

5.3. Robustness

The results reported in Table 3 are robust to controlling for a variety of other factors that may influence the likelihood that a dyad would sign a BLA and a range of alternative regression specifications.

First, we estimated a series of regressions that include controls variables that account for the relationship between the pair of countries in each dyad. In Table 4, each model recreates the specification used in Model (6) of Table 3 while also controlling for additional dyad level variables. More specifically, Model (1) includes variables that account for the geographic relationship between countries (their Distance and whether they are Contiguous); Model (2) includes variables that account for the historical relationship between countries (whether they had a colonial relationship or share a common official language); Model (3) includes variables that account for the economic relationship (their total dyad merchandise trade and whether they had previously signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty); Model (4) includes a variable that accounts for the security relationship (the presence of a formal defense alliance); and Model (5) includes all these variables simultaneously. Our primary results are robust to the inclusion of each of these additional variables.

Table 4: Onset of BLAs – Including Dyad Controls

	(1) Geographic	(2) Historical	(3) Economic	(4) Security	(5) All
GDP Per Capita Ratio	-0.767** (0.360)	-1.727*** (0.309)	-1.272*** (0.384)	-1.265*** (0.296)	-0.848* (0.447)
Polity Score Difference	-0.100*** (0.016)	-0.116*** (0.016)	-0.075*** (0.012)	-0.087*** (0.014)	-0.090*** (0.014)
GDP Per Capita Ratio x Middle East Host	3.182*** (0.620)	3.958*** (0.619)	5.195*** (0.650)	3.300*** (0.604)	4.899*** (0.665)
Polity Score Difference x Middle East Host	0.130*** (0.028)	0.126*** (0.028)	0.079*** (0.024)	0.111*** (0.026)	0.105*** (0.024)
Middle East Host	-4.421*** (0.835)	-5.061*** (0.860)	-6.145*** (0.881)	-4.344*** (0.836)	-6.055*** (0.868)
Distance (ln)	-0.759*** (0.071)				-0.574*** (0.070)
Contiguous	0.354 (0.233)				-0.115 (0.248)
Colony		2.254*** (0.219)			0.783*** (0.238)
Common Language		-0.003 (0.159)			-0.219 (0.170)
Trade (ln)			0.433*** (0.019)		0.391*** (0.023)
Prior BIT			0.857*** (0.151)		0.612*** (0.162)
EU Free Movement			-0.855*** (0.329)		-2.118*** (0.405)
Formal Alliance				1.151*** (0.143)	0.066 (0.183)
Observations	562,490	562,490	486,162	605,231	455,862
-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year					
-- Logit regressions with dependent variable coded as 1 if dyad signs first BLA in given year					
-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses					
-- All regressions include Time, Time ² , and Time ³ (Time is measured as Year-1946)					
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					

Table 5: Onset of BLAs – Including Domestic Controls

	(1) Unemploy.	(2) Unemploy. Primary	(3) Gov. Spending	(4) Ethnic Frac.	(5) Pop.	(6) Overall
GDP Per Capita Ratio	-1.486*** (0.313)	-1.730*** (0.641)	-1.629*** (0.332)	-1.229*** (0.325)	-1.545*** (0.277)	-1.113 (0.842)
Polity Score Difference	-0.176*** (0.025)	-0.179*** (0.033)	-0.117*** (0.018)	-0.091*** (0.013)	-0.098*** (0.014)	-0.155*** (0.029)
GDP Per Capita Ratio x Middle East Host	2.744*** (0.675)	5.285** (2.186)	3.378*** (0.762)	4.168*** (0.643)	4.008*** (0.599)	5.995* (3.438)
Polity Score Difference x Middle East Host	0.174*** (0.037)	0.146** (0.066)	0.139*** (0.032)	0.101*** (0.026)	0.120*** (0.027)	0.143** (0.064)
Middle East Host	-3.687*** (0.968)	-6.801** (2.879)	-4.466*** (1.064)	-5.189*** (0.887)	-5.119*** (0.828)	-7.913* (4.459)
Unemployment Host	-0.060*** (0.015)					-0.049** (0.022)
Unemployment Source	0.006 (0.008)					0.029** (0.014)
Unemploy. Prim. Host		-0.005 (0.006)				-0.004 (0.007)
Unemploy. Prim. Source		-0.019*** (0.005)				-0.018*** (0.005)
Gov. Spending Host			0.020*** (0.004)			0.025 (0.019)
Gov. Spending Source			0.004 (0.004)			0.091*** (0.018)
Ethnic. Frac. Host				-1.201*** (0.234)		0.233 (0.450)
Ethnic Frac. Source				-2.249*** (0.208)		-0.965** (0.490)
Population Host					0.252*** (0.034)	0.207*** (0.063)
Population Source					0.297*** (0.027)	0.254*** (0.058)
Observations	291,401	51,511	402,631	574,226	605,231	49,340

-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year

-- Logit regressions with dependent variable coded as 1 if dyad signs first BLA in given year

-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

-- All regressions include Time, Time², and Time³ (Time is measured as Year-1946)

-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Second, we estimated series of regressions that include domestic control variables that account for a number of conditions within both the host and source countries that may influence the likelihood that they would sign a BLA. Model (1) controls for the unemployment rate in the host and source country; Model (2) controls for the unemployment rate of individuals with a primary school education in the host and source country; Model (3) controls for governments spending as a percent of GDP in the host and source country; Model (4) controls for the ethnic fractionalization in the host and source country; Model (5) controls for the log population in the host and source country; and Model (6) controls for all these variables simultaneously. Once again, the results in Table 5 are all consistent with our primary results.

Third, these patterns are largely consistent across the three periods of BIT formation discussed in Part 2.1. In Table (6), Models (1) to (3) estimate Model (6) from Table 3 while sub-setting the years for each of the three periods. Notably, the variables for *Middle East Host* and the interaction terms are omitted from Model (1) because there were not any BLAs signed by a Middle East Host during this period. In Model (2), the signs on the coefficients are in the same direction as our primary results, but the effects are not statistically significant (perhaps due to the smaller number of BLAs signed during this period. In general though, the other results in models (1) to (3) are consistent with our primary results.

Fourth, as we explained in Part 4.2, we identified the potential host and source countries in each dyad based on which country in each dyad had a higher GDP Per Capita in the first year that data was available for both countries. The limitation of this approach, however, is that it may not accurately identify potential host and source countries if one member of the pair has had a dramatic relative change in GDP Per Capita over our time period. To account for this, we re-identified the host and source countries for each dyad based on which had higher GDP Per Capita in 1974 (the start of “Period 2” for BLAs) and in 1990 (the start of “Period 3” for BLAs). These results—reported in Models (4) and (5) of Table 6—are consistent with our primary results.

Finally, our primary results are also robust to a range of alternative model specifications. Specifically, our results are robust to including year fixed effects, including host region and source region fixed effects, using a logit model with dyad random

effects, using a GEE model with AR(1) Correction autocorrelation, and using a OLS model with the count of the total number of BLAs by dyad in a given year as the dependent variable. Taken together, these results all suggest that BLAs have primarily been signed by countries with similar economic and political conditions, but that larger differences in economic and political conditions make Middle East Host countries more likely to sign a BLA with a given country.

Table 6: Onset of BLAs – By Period & Alternative Definition of Host / Source

	(1) Period 1 1945-1973	(2) Period 2 1974-1989	(3) Period 3 1990-2015	(4) 1974 Def. of Host/Source	(5) 1990 Def. of Host/Source
GDP Per Capita Ratio	-2.841*** (0.748)	-1.438 (1.593)	-1.331*** (0.311)	-2.010*** (0.305)	-2.470*** (0.347)
Polity Score Difference	-0.041** (0.021)	-0.025 (0.029)	-0.180*** (0.025)	-0.091*** (0.014)	-0.090*** (0.014)
GDP Per Capita Ratio x Middle East Host		2.083 (1.988)	3.083*** (0.646)	4.453*** (0.568)	4.576*** (0.608)
Polity Score Difference x Middle East Host		0.032 (0.049)	0.191*** (0.038)	0.114*** (0.029)	0.118*** (0.029)
Middle East Host		-1.532 (2.407)	-4.169*** (0.932)	-5.693*** (0.881)	-5.763*** (0.899)
Observations	121,594	157,888	310,237	605,231	605,231
-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year					
-- Logit regressions with dependent variable coded as 1 if dyad signs first BLA in given year					
-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses					
-- All regressions include Time, Time ² , and Time ³ (Time is measured as Year-1946)					
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					

6. THE EFFECT OF BLAS

6.1. Migration Data

We turn to the question of whether BLAs accomplish the goals of states. Our theory was that BLAs enhance protection for the rights of migrant workers while improving screening. We do not have data that allow us to test whether the well-being of migrant workers has improved; nor do we have data that directly measures changes in

the “quality” of the migrant workers who are subject to screening. But it seems plausible that if the treaties work as intended, that legal migration will increase. We thus test whether BLAs increases the stock of migrants from the source country in the host country.

We collected data on the bilateral stock of migrants from four sources, but all of which use the United Nations Global Migration Dataset as their primary source.¹⁵ Although we believe this is the best bilateral migration data available, a limitation of all bilateral migration data that uses the UN database as its primary source is that it relies on data compiled by individual countries. As a result, the definitions used to classify and count migrants—e.g., how long a visitor must stay before he or she is considered a migrant, or whether a non-citizen must have legal status before he or she is counted as a migrant—varies between states. Additionally, the coverage of the data depends on which states have collected detailed data on migration into their country. Although the data exists for at least some dyads starting in 1960, there are only 134,672 observations with data on the stock of migrants in the host state (as a reference, there are a total of 831,898 dyad-years in our dataset). The data is also primarily available at the start of every decade (e.g. 1990, 2000, 2010). These limitations to the data make it impossible for us to make any strong claims about the effect of BLAs on migration, but the results are suggestive.

6.2. Primary Results

For our tests of the effect of BLAs on the stock of migrants from the source state in the host state, our unit of observation is still the dyad-year. For these regressions, the independent variable of interest is whether states have signed a BLA¹⁶ and our dependent variable is the log of the number of migrants from the source state in the host

¹⁵ Those four sources are: the OECD International Migration Database (24% of our observations); Ozden et al. (2011) (42% of our observations); the World Bank’s “Migration and Remittances Factbook” 2011 (10.5% of our observations) and 2016 (11.5% of our observations); and a consolidated database published by the UN Population Division (12% of our observations). The advantage of using these four sources, instead of the UN data directly, is that they have cleaned and processed the data for statistical analysis.

¹⁶ Observations do not drop from the dataset after a BLA is signed for these regressions.

state in a given year. And since the dependent variable is continuous, we use OLS regressions instead of the logit regressions used in the previous section.

Table 7: Effect of BLAs on Stock of Migrants in Host Count

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
BLA	0.642*** (0.121)	0.701*** (0.130)	0.482*** (0.127)	0.511*** (0.122)	0.470*** (0.116)
GDP Per Capita Ratio		1.139*** (0.114)	1.609*** (0.139)	-0.752*** (0.185)	-0.828*** (0.200)
Polity Score Difference		-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)
Trade			0.093*** (0.011)		-0.019 (0.014)
Prior BIT			0.395*** (0.053)		-0.002 (0.051)
EU Free Movement			0.420*** (0.081)		0.547*** (0.080)
Formal Alliance			-0.252*** (0.064)		-0.254*** (0.066)
Unemployment Host				-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Unemployment Source				0.005* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Gov. Spending Host				0.034*** (0.004)	0.045*** (0.005)
Gov. Spending Source				-0.004 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)
Population Host				-3.082*** (0.166)	-3.128*** (0.179)
Population Source				-0.184 (0.136)	0.162 (0.141)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	137,218	100,328	86,718	60,053	55,110
R-squared	0.899	0.893	0.888	0.930	0.927

-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year

-- OLS regressions with dependent variable is log of stock of migrants from source in host

-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7 reports our primary results testing the effect of BLAs on migration. Model (1) includes an indicator for the presence of a BLA as well as year fixed-effects, dyad-fixed effects, and a time linear trend; Model (2) includes these variables while introducing our primary explanatory variables from Part 5.2—*GDP Per Capita Ratio* and *Polity Score Difference*;¹⁷ Model (3) adds the time variant dyad level variables from Part 4.3; Model (4) adds time-variant domestic level variables from Part 4.3; and Model (5) includes all variables simultaneously. It is important to note that, because of limited data availability, as we add control variables we lose roughly 60% of our observations. That said, in all five models, the effect of a BLA on the log of the stock of migrants from the source country in the host country is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results specifically suggest that having signed a BLA is likely to translate into between a 60 (Model 5) to 90 (Model 1) percent increase in the stock of migrants from the source country in the host country.

Although the effect of the *BLA* variable is positive and statistically significant in all five Models in Table 7, this correlation does not necessarily demonstrate that BLA's have a causal effect on migrant from source to host countries. It could instead simply be the case that host countries sign BLAs after they begin to have high levels of migration from the source country. To explore whether this phenomenon is driving our results, we re-estimated Models (1) and (5), but instead of using a dummy variable, we included lag and leads for the 10 years before and after a treaty is signed. Figure 6 plots the coefficients and confidence intervals from the lags and leads from these regressions. Although both panels of Figure 6 suggest there is a positive trend in migration after the signing of a BLA, this trend does appear to start in the few years before a BLA is signed. It is thus possible that the BLA is merely reflective of the increase in migration.

¹⁷ We do not include a term for Middle East Host because it is captured by the dyad fixed effects. Also, we estimated all the Models in Table 7 while including an interaction between *BLA* and *Middle East Host*, but the result was not statistically significant.

Figure 6: Event Study of the Effect of BLA Formation

6.3. Robustness Checks

One explanation for the trends in Figure 6 is that signing a BLA is simply reflective of a country having policies that are friendly to migrants, and that it is a host countries' protections of migrants more generally that drive the observed increases in migration. To test this possibility, in Table 8 we re-estimate Models (1) and (5) from Table 7 while including variables that are proxies for a countries overall level of protection for migrants. First, in Models (1) and (2), our key independent variable is the total number of BLAs signed between a pair of countries in a given year. In Models (3) and (4), our independent variable is a dummy for the presence of a BLA like it was in Table 7, but we also control for the total number of BLAs the host country has signed as a proxy for their openness to migrants. In Models (5) and (6), we use the average of Ruh (2013) measure of a countries protection for migrants (since this data is only available cross-sectional, for these regressions we restrict our data to 2010). All of these specifications continue to find a positive effect of BLAs on the stock of migrants from the source country in the host country.

Table 8: Effect of BLAs – Controlling for Host’s Protections for Migrants

	(1) BLA Totals	(2) BLA Totals	(3) BLA Total - Host	(4) BLA Total - Host	(5) Ruhs Openness	(6) Ruhs Openness
Total BLAs	0.486*** (0.101)	0.456*** (0.099)				
BLA			0.317*** (0.121)	0.255** (0.113)	6.914*** (0.203)	2.194*** (0.196)
BLA Total - Host			0.054*** (0.003)	0.047*** (0.004)		
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	137,218	55,110	18,336	9,734	17,040	9,036
R-squared	0.091	0.575	0.052	0.526	0.080	0.504

-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year

-- OLS regressions with dependent variable is log of stock of migrants from source in host

-- Models 2, 4, and 5 include the control variables used in Table 7 Model 5

-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Effect of BLAs – Between Estimator and Cross Sectional Regressions

	(1) Between Estimator	(2) Between Estimator	(3) 2000 Obs. Only	(4) 2000 Obs. Only	(5) 2010 Obs. Only	(6) 2010 Obs. Only
BLA	8.639*** (0.195)	2.172*** (0.159)	6.663*** (0.192)	1.491*** (0.188)	6.914*** (0.203)	2.194*** (0.196)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	137,218	55,110	18,336	9,734	17,040	9,036
R-squared	0.091	0.575	0.052	0.526	0.080	0.504

-- Unit of observation is the dyad-year

-- OLS regressions with dependent variable is log of stock of migrants from source in host

-- Models 2, 4, and 5 include the control variables used in Table 7 Model 5

-- Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses

-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another issue with our results in Table 7 is that the data for our dependent variable is primarily available in a handful of years (e.g. 2000, 2010). Table 9 presents regressions designed to ensure that this is not driving our results. First, Models (1) and (2) use a between estimator instead of a fixed effects estimator, which relies more on the cross-sectional nature of our data instead of the time-series. Second, Models (3) and (4) restrict our sample to just the year 2000 and Models (5) and (6) restrict our sample to just the year 2010. All six models still find a positive and statistically significant effect of having a BLA on the stock of migrants from the source country in the host country.

7. CONCLUSION

Guest worker systems have received a great deal of criticism from human rights advocates (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2015), who claim that host countries legally permit or informally tolerate abuse committed by employers. Human rights advocates have pressured host countries to enforce significant human rights protections, but to little avail. By contrast, many economists welcome labor migration because, they believe, it generates enormous welfare gains for many of the worst-off people in the world (e.g., Ruhs 2015; Weyl 2016). These economists tend to see restrictions on rights as a price worth paying in order to facilitate migration.

Although our results are tentative, they do offer some grounds for optimism that a third way is available. While migrant workers are frequently poor and vulnerable, many of them do come from countries that are politically powerful; that see gains from persuading host countries to grant rights to their citizens; and that can offer host countries something in return. It is hard to say how substantial these rights turn out to be in practice, but there are advantages to bilateral relationships, which allow countries to tailor legal obligations to their needs. Many of these treaties do very simple things that may nonetheless be effective in improving the well-being of migrants—providing for information-sharing, record-keeping, dispute resolution, screening, and monitoring. And because the treaties offer advantages to the host state as well as to the source state, they may have a better chance of success than moral pressure and multilateral treaties, which typically demand a great deal of host states while offering them little in return.

The BLA is not, of course, a panacea. We have seen evidence in our research that not all countries take them seriously. And we reiterate that we cannot be sure that BLAs actually improve outcomes—rather they may merely reflect good relations between countries or be endogenous to evolving migration pattern. Still, we think we have found enough to justify further empirical research into the causes and effects of BLAs.

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APPENDIX: LIST OF THE BLAS IN OUR DATASET

Year	Host ⁱ	Source	Type	Reference ⁱⁱ
1946	Belgium	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1946	Belgium	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1946	Denmark*	Sweden	N	World Treaty Index
1946	Switzerland*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1946	Switzerland*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1946	Switzerland*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1947	France	United Kingdom	N	World Treaty Index
1947	France*	Italy	N	MAC
1947	Sweden*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1947	United Kingdom	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1947	United Kingdom*	Belgium	N	MAC
1947	United States of America	Mexico	N	World Treaty Index
1947	United States of America	Philippines	N	World Treaty Index
1947	United States of America*	Canada	S	World Treaty Index
1948	Belgium	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1948	France*	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1948	Luxembourg*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1948	Netherlands	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1948	Netherlands*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1948	Switzerland	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1948	Switzerland*	Denmark	N	World Treaty Index
1948	Switzerland*	Sweden	N	World Treaty Index
1949	Belgium*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1949	France*	Ireland	N	World Treaty Index
1949	Luxembourg*	France	N	UN
1949	Sweden*	Netherlands	N	World Treaty Index
1949	Switzerland*	Ireland	N	World Treaty Index
1950	Belgium*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1950	France*	German Federal	N	World Treaty Index
		Republic		
		German Federal		
1950	France*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1950	France*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1950	Luxembourg	Netherlands	N	World Treaty Index
1950	Netherlands*	Belgium	N	World Treaty Index
1950	Sweden*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1950	United Kingdom	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1950	United Kingdom	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1951	Belgium*	Finland	N	World Treaty Index
1951	Belgium*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1951	France*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1951	France*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1951	Netherlands*	Belgium	N	World Treaty Index

Year	Host ⁱ	Source	Type	Reference ⁱⁱ
1951	Netherlands*	Finland	N	World Treaty Index
1951	Norway*	Netherlands	N	World Treaty Index
1951	Sweden*	Belgium	N	World Treaty Index
1951	Switzerland*	Finland	N	World Treaty Index
1951	United States of America	Mexico	N	World Treaty Index
1951	West Germany*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1951	West Germany*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1952	Belgium	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1952	Belgium*	German Federal Republic	N	UN
1952	Belgium*	German Federal Republic	N	UN
1952	Belgium*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1952	France	Haiti	N	MAC
1952	France*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1952	Switzerland*	Netherlands	N	World Treaty Index
1952	West Germany*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1953	Belgium*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1953	Sweden*	German Federal Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1953	West Germany*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1954	Austria*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1954	Belgium*	Italy	N	MAC
1954	Denmark*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1954	France*	German Federal Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1954	France*	Greece	N	World Treaty Index
1954	Netherlands*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1954	Netherlands*	Belgium	N	World Treaty Index
1954	Netherlands*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1954	Spain*	Nigeria	N	World Treaty Index
1955	Finland*	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1955	France*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1955	Sweden*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1955	Switzerland*	German Federal Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1955	United Kingdom	Philippines	N	World Treaty Index
1955	United States of America*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1956	Austria*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1956	Belgium*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1956	Canada*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1956	France	Italy	S	World Treaty Index
1956	France*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1956	France*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1956	Switzerland*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1956	West Germany*	Japan	N	World Treaty Index
1957	Belgium*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1957	Belgium*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1957	Belgium*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1957	Belgium*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1957	France	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1957	France	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
		German Federal		
1957	France*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1957	Italy*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
		German Federal		
1957	Luxembourg*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1957	Luxembourg*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1957	Spain*	Nigeria	N	World Treaty Index
1957	Sweden*	Ireland	N	World Treaty Index
1958	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	World Treaty Index
1958	France*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1958	France*	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1958	Luxembourg*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
		German Federal		
1958	Netherlands*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1958	Switzerland*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1958	United States of America*	Canada	A	UN
1959	Italy*	Spain	A	World Treaty Index
1959	Netherlands*	Ireland	N	World Treaty Index
1959	Switzerland*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1960	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	World Treaty Index
1960	China*	Mongolia	N	World Treaty Index
1960	France*	Italy	A	World Treaty Index
1960	Netherlands	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1960	West Germany*	Greece	N	World Treaty Index
1960	West Germany*	Greece	N	World Treaty Index
1960	West Germany*	Ireland	N	World Treaty Index
1960	West Germany*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
		German Federal		
1961	Denmark*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1961	Finland*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1961	France*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1961	Netherlands	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1961	Switzerland	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1961	West Germany*	Turkey	N	MAC
1962	Austria*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1962	Finland*	Austria	N	World Treaty Index
1962	Italy*	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1962	Italy*	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1963	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	World Treaty Index
1963	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	World Treaty Index
1963	East Germany	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1963	East Germany*	Hungary	N	World Treaty Index
1963	East Germany*	Romania	N	World Treaty Index
1963	Finland*	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1963	France	Morocco	N	MAC
1963	France	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1963	France	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1963	France*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1963	Mauritania*	Mali	N	CARIM-South
1963	Netherlands	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1963	Spain*	Nigeria	N	World Treaty Index
1963	West Germany*	Morocco	N	World Treaty Index
1963	West Germany*	South Korea	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Austria	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Austria*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Belgium*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1964	East Germany*	Ghana	N	World Treaty Index
1964	East Germany*	Guinea	N	World Treaty Index
1964	France*	Algeria	N	World Treaty Index
1964	France*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1964	France*	Tunisia	N	MAC
1964	France*	Turkey	N	MAC
1964	Netherlands	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Netherlands*	Morocco	N	MAC
1964	South Africa*	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Sweden*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1964	Switzerland	Italy	S	World Treaty Index
1964	Switzerland*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1964	West Germany*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1964	West Germany*	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1964	West Germany*	Turkey	A	World Treaty Index
1965	Australia	Malta	N	UN
1965	Austria	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1965	France	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1965	France*	Spain	A	World Treaty Index
1965	France*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1965	France*	United Kingdom	N	World Treaty Index
1965	West Germany*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1965	West Germany*	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1966	Austria	Turkey	A	UN
1966	France*	Algeria	N	UN
1966	Netherlands	Greece	N	World Treaty Index

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1966	Sweden*	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1967	Australia	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1967	Denmark*	Netherlands	N	World Treaty Index
1967	France*	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1967	South Africa*	Malawi	N	World Treaty Index
1967	Sweden*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1967	United Kingdom*	Norway	N	World Treaty Index
1968	France	Algeria	N	World Treaty Index
1968	France*	Spain	N	World Treaty Index
1968	West Germany*	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1968	Yugoslavia*	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1969	Belgium	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1969	Belgium	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1969	Netherlands	Morocco	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Australia	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Belgium	Algeria	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Belgium	Algeria	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Belgium	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1970	France*	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Luxembourg*	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Netherlands	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Switzerland*	German Federal Republic	N	MAC
1970	West Germany*	South Korea	N	World Treaty Index
1970	Yugoslavia*	Romania	N	World Treaty Index
1971	Chile*	Argentina	N	World Treaty Index
1971	France	Portugal	S	UN
1971	Libya	Niger	N	CARIM-South
1971	Netherlands	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1971	West Germany*	South Korea	N	World Treaty Index
1971	West Germany*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1972	Belgium*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1972	Belgium*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1972	East Germany*	Vietnam	N	World Treaty Index
1972	Italy*	Tunisia	N	Other
1972	Senegal*	Mauritania	N	CARIM-South
1972	West Germany*	Tunisia	N	World Treaty Index
1972	West Germany*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1973	Libya*	Tunisia	N	CARIM-South
1973	South Africa*	Botswana	N	World Treaty Index
1973	South Africa*	Lesotho	N	World Treaty Index
1973	Sweden*	Norway	N	World Treaty Index
1973	Switzerland*	Austria	N	MAC
1974	Canada	Mexico	N	World Treaty Index
1974	Finland*	Brazil	N	UN

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1974	Mexico*	Brazil	N	World Treaty Index
1975	Algeria*	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1975	Bulgaria	Cyprus	N	UN
1975	Laos*	China	N	World Treaty Index
		Dominican		
1975	Spain*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1975	Turkey*	Libya	N	MAC
1976	Angola*	Cuba	N	World Treaty Index
1976	Netherlands*	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1976	Norway*	Vietnam	N	World Treaty Index
1976	Sweden*	Mozambique	N	World Treaty Index
		German Federal		
1976	Switzerland*	Republic	N	World Treaty Index
1977	France	Portugal	S	UN
1977	France*	Mali	N	UN
1977	Luxembourg*	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1977	Luxembourg*	Portugal	N	World Treaty Index
1978	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	World Treaty Index
1978	Jordan*	Pakistan	N	Jordan MoL
1979	Canada*	Netherlands	N	UN
1979	Libya	Philippines	N	ILO
1979	Papua New Guinea*	Philippines	N	MAC
1979	West Germany*	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1980	Australia*	Japan	N	MAC
1980	France*	Senegal	N	UN
1980	Libya	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1981	Jordan	Philippines	N	MFA
1981	Qatar	Morocco	N	GLMM
1981	Qatar	Philippines	N	MAC
1981	Qatar	Sudan	N	ILO
1981	Qatar	Tunisia	N	ILO
1982	Finland*	Russia	N	UN
1982	Iraq*	Philippines	N	MAC
1983	East Germany*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1983	Jordan*	Morocco	N	CARIM-South
1983	Libya*	Morocco	N	MPC
1983	New Zealand*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1983	Qatar	Somalia	N	ILO
1983	Turkey*	Jordan	N	MAC
1984	Switzerland*	New Zealand	N	World Treaty Index
1985	New Zealand*	Japan	N	MAC
1985	Qatar	India	N	MFA
1985	Qatar	India	A	MFA
1986	Canada*	Japan	N	MAC
1986	France*	Mauritania	N	UN

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1986	France*	Yugoslavia	N	MAC
1986	Qatar	Turkey	N	MAC
1987	Canada*	France	A	CN govt
1987	France*	Mali	N	World Treaty Index
1987	France*	Morocco	N	UN
1987	Qatar	Pakistan	N	MFA
1987	United States of America*	United Kingdom	N	MAC
1988	France*	Tunisia	N	UN
1988	Jordan	India	N	MFA
1988	Jordan	Philippines	N	MFA
1988	Qatar	Bangladesh	N	MFA
1988	United Kingdom*	Finland	N	MAC
1988	United States of America*	France	N	MAC
1988	West Germany	Yugoslavia	N	World Treaty Index
1989	West Germany	Hungary	N	World Treaty Index
1989	West Germany*	Hungary	N	World Treaty Index
1990	Belgium*	Poland	N	MAC
1990	France*	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1990	Germany	Czechoslovakia	N	World Treaty Index
1990	Germany	Poland	A	MAC
1990	Germany	Poland	N	MAC
1990	Germany	Romania	N	MAC
1990	Germany*	Hungary	N	World Treaty Index
1990	Germany*	Poland	N	MAC
1990	Sweden*	Estonia	N	MAC
1991	Finland*	Estonia	N	MAC
1991	Germany	Bulgaria	N	World Treaty Index
1991	Germany	Czechoslovakia	N	World Treaty Index
1991	Germany	Czechoslovakia	N	World Treaty Index
1991	Germany	Turkey	N	World Treaty Index
1991	Germany*	Albania	N	World Treaty Index
1991	Italy*	Slovenia	N	MAC
1991	Qatar	Iran	N	GLMM
1991	Switzerland*	Italy	N	World Treaty Index
1992	Czech Republic*	Slovakia	N	MAC
1992	Czechoslovakia*	Poland	N	MAC
1992	Finland*	Russia	N	MAC
1992	France	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1992	Germany	Latvia	N	World Treaty Index
1992	Germany*	Bulgaria	N	World Treaty Index
1992	Germany*	Hungary	N	MAC
1992	Germany*	Latvia	N	World Treaty Index
1992	Germany*	Lithuania	N	MAC
1992	Germany*	Romania	N	World Treaty Index
1992	Sweden*	Estonia	N	World Treaty Index

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1992	United Kingdom*	Malta	N	MAC
1992	United States of America*	France	N	MAC
1993	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	N	ILO
1993	Georgia*	Armenia	N	CARIM-East
1993	Germany	Poland	A	MAC
1993	Germany*	Latvia	N	MAC
1993	Germany*	Russia	N	MAC
1993	Kuwait*	Egypt	N	ILO
1993	Russia*	Belarus	N	CARIM-East
1993	Switzerland*	Poland	N	MAC
1994	Czech Republic*	Vietnam	N	MAC
1994	Lebanon*	Syria	N	MPC
1994	Lithuania*	Poland	N	World Treaty Index
1994	Russia*	Armenia	N	CARIM-East
1994	Russia*	Poland	N	MAC
1994	Slovakia*	Vietnam	N	MAC
1994	Sweden*	Lithuania	N	UN
1994	Switzerland*	Germany	A	UN
1994	Ukraine*	Poland	N	MAC
1995	Australia*	South Korea	N	UN
1995	Belarus*	Poland	N	MAC
1995	Belarus*	Ukraine	N	CARIM-East
1995	Canada*	South Korea	N	World Treaty Index
1995	France*	Argentina	N	World Treaty Index
1995	Germany*	Estonia	N	MAC
1995	Germany*	Yugoslavia	N	MAC
1995	Greece*	Bulgaria	N	MAC
1995	Russia*	Slovakia	N	MAC
1995	Switzerland*	Slovakia	N	MAC
1995	Ukraine*	Armenia	N	CARIM-East
1996	Algeria*	Mauritania	N	MPC
1996	Czech Republic*	Ukraine	N	MAC
1996	Germany	Romania	A	ILO
1996	Germany*	Poland	N	MAC
1996	Germany*	Slovakia	N	MAC
1996	Germany*	Slovenia	N	MAC
1996	Luxembourg*	Hungary	N	MAC
1996	Luxembourg*	Poland	N	MAC
1996	Ukraine*	Vietnam	N	CARIM-East
1997	Belarus*	Kazakhstan	N	CARIM-East
1997	Canada*	South Korea	A	UN
1997	Italy*	Albania	N	MAC
1997	Kuwait*	Philippines	N	MFA
1997	Netherlands*	Hungary	N	MAC
1997	Norway*	Germany	N	MAC

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
1997	Portugal*	Cape Verde	N	MAC
1997	Qatar	Philippines	N	MFA
1997	Slovakia*	Ukraine	N	MAC
1997	Switzerland*	Czech Republic	N	MAC
1998	Argentina*	Bolivia	N	ILO
1998	Argentina*	Peru	N	ILO
1998	Austria*	Hungary	N	MAC
1998	Czech Republic*	Russia	N	MAC
1998	Finland*	Slovakia	N	MAC
1998	Japan*	South Korea	N	UN
1998	Luxembourg*	Slovakia	N	MAC
1998	Switzerland*	South Africa	N	UN
1999	Czech Republic*	Bulgaria	N	MAC
1999	Czech Republic*	Hungary	N	MAC
1999	Czech Republic*	Mongolia	N	MAC
1999	France*	Japan	N	MAC
1999	Germany*	Romania	N	MAC
1999	Japan*	South Korea	N	MAC
1999	Luxembourg*	Czech Republic	N	MAC
1999	New Zealand*	France	N	World Treaty Index
1999	New Zealand*	South Korea	N	UN
1999	Slovakia*	Hungary	N	MAC
1999	South Africa*	Tunisia	N	UN
1999	Switzerland*	Germany	A	UN
1999	Ukraine*	Argentina	N	ILO
2000	Australia*	Finland	N	MAC
2000	Australia*	Germany	N	MAC
2000	Australia*	Hong Kong	N	Other
2000	Belarus*	Armenia	N	CARIM-East
2000	Colombia*	Ecuador	N	ILO
2000	Czech Republic*	Lithuania	N	MAC
2000	France*	Hungary	N	MAC
2000	Germany*	New Zealand	N	MAC
2000	Hungary*	Romania	N	MAC
2000	Italy	Tunisia	N	MAC
2000	Japan*	Germany	N	MAC
2000	United Kingdom*	Spain	N	MAC
2001	Australia*	Denmark	N	MAC
2001	Australia*	Norway	N	MAC
2001	Australia*	Sweden	N	MAC
2001	Austria*	Czech Republic	N	MAC
2001	Canada*	France	A	CN govt
2001	Canada*	France	N	UN
2001	France*	Morocco	N	MAC
2001	France*	Poland	N	UN

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
2001	France*	Senegal	N	UN
2001	Germany*	Slovakia	A	ILO
2001	Jordan*	Indonesia	N	MFA
2001	Luxembourg*	Romania	N	MAC
2001	Mexico*	Spain	N	MAC
2001	New Zealand*	Argentina	N	UN
2001	New Zealand*	Denmark	N	UN
2001	New Zealand*	Italy	N	MAC
2001	New Zealand*	Sweden	N	MAC
2001	New Zealand*	Uruguay	N	UN
2001	Portugal	Romania	N	MAC
2001	Spain	Colombia	N	MAC
2001	Spain	Ecuador	N	MAC
2001	Spain	Morocco	N	MAC
		Dominican		
2001	Spain*	Republic	N	ILO
2001	Taiwan*	Philippines	N	MAC
2001	United Kingdom*	Japan	N	MAC
2001	United States of America	South Korea	N	UN
2002	Australia*	Belgium	N	UN
2002	Bolivia*	Peru	N	ILO
2002	Czech Republic*	Poland	N	MAC
2002	France*	Slovakia	N	MAC
2002	Germany*	Bulgaria	N	MAC
2002	Germany*	Croatia	N	MAC
2002	Germany*	Estonia	N	MAC
2002	Luxembourg*	Bulgaria	N	MAC
2002	Mexico*	Spain	N	MAC
2002	Poland*	Spain	N	MAC
2002	Portugal*	Bulgaria	N	MAC
2002	Portugal*	Ukraine	N	MAC
2002	Russia*	Portugal	N	MAC
		Dominican		
2002	Spain*	Republic	N	MAC
2002	Spain*	Romania	N	MAC
2002	Switzerland*	Philippines	N	MAC
2002	Thailand	Laos	N	MFA
2002	United Kingdom	Indonesia	N	UN
2002	United Kingdom*	Philippines	N	MAC
2002	Uruguay*	Brazil	N	ILO
2003	Australia*	France	N	MAC
2003	Australia*	Italy	N	MAC
2003	Canada*	France	S	CN govt
2003	France*	Bulgaria	N	UN
2003	France*	Romania	N	UN

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
2003	France*	Tunisia	N	CARIM-South
2003	Germany	Romania	A	UN
2003	Germany*	Bulgaria	A	UN
2003	Japan	Philippines	N	MFA
2003	Malaysia	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2003	New Zealand*	Belgium	N	UN
2003	Norway*	Philippines	N	MAC
2003	Philippines*	Indonesia	N	MFA
2003	Portugal	Ukraine	N	ILO
2003	Portugal*	Brazil	N	ILO
2003	Qatar	Syria	N	CARIM-South
2003	Spain*	Bulgaria	N	Other
2003	Taiwan	Philippines	N	MFA
2003	Thailand	Cambodia	N	MFA
2003	Thailand	Myanmar	N	MFA
2004	Australia*	Estonia	N	UN
2004	Azerbaijan*	Ukraine	N	CARIM-East
2004	Germany	Romania	A	UN
2004	Malaysia	Indonesia	N	Indonesian Foreign Ministry
2004	New Zealand*	Czech Republic	N	UN
2004	South Africa*	Iran	N	UN
2004	South Korea	Indonesia	N	Indonesian Foreign Ministry
2004	South Korea	Philippines	N	MFA
2004	South Korea	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2004	Spain*	Peru	N	ILO
2004	Sudan*	Egypt	N	CARIM-South
2004	Taiwan	Indonesia	N	MFA
2005	Canada*	Belgium	N	UN
2005	Canada*	Denmark	N	UN
2005	France*	Slovakia	N	UN
2005	Italy	Egypt	N	ILO
2005	New Zealand*	Norway	N	UN
2005	Philippines*	Laos	N	MFA
2005	Qatar	Nepal	N	MFA
2005	South Korea	Philippines	N	MFA
2005	Vietnam*	Cambodia	N	MFA
2006	Canada*	Czech Republic	N	CN govt
2006	Canada*	Latvia	N	CN govt
2006	Ecuador*	Peru	N	ILO
2006	France	Senegal	N	ILO
2006	Japan*	Philippines	N	Other
2006	Jordan	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2006	Libya	Philippines	N	MFA

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
2006	Malaysia	Indonesia	N	MFA
2006	Paraguay*	Bolivia	N	ILO
				Indonesian Foreign
2006	South Korea	Indonesia	S	Ministry
2006	South Korea	Philippines	N	MFA
2006	United Arab Emirates	India	N	MFA
2006	United Arab Emirates	Pakistan	N	MFA
2007	Andorra*	Portugal	N	ILO
2007	Azerbaijan*	Belarus	N	CARIM-East
2007	Bahrain*	Philippines	N	MFA
2007	France	Benin	N	ILO
2007	France*	Congo	N	ILO
2007	France*	Gabon	N	ILO
2007	Jordan	Egypt	N	CARIM-South
2007	Jordan	Syria	N	Jordan MoL
2007	Kuwait	India	N	MFA
2007	Qatar	India	N	MFA
2007	South Korea	Nepal	N	ILO
2007	Spain*	Mauritania	N	Other
2007	United Arab Emirates	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2007	United Arab Emirates	Indonesia	N	MFA
2007	United Arab Emirates	Nepal	N	MFA
2007	United Arab Emirates	Philippines	N	MFA
2007	United Arab Emirates	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2008	Bahrain	Nepal	N	MFA
2008	Bahrain	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2008	Canada*	Poland	N	CN govt
2008	France*	Mauritius	N	ILO
2008	France*	South Korea	N	UN
2008	France*	Tunisia	N	ILO
2008	Ireland*	Argentina	N	UN
2008	Italy	Albania	N	ILO
2008	Kuwait	Syria	N	CARIM-South
2008	Libya	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2008	Libya	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2008	New Zealand*	Brazil	N	UN
2008	New Zealand*	Latvia	N	UN
2008	New Zealand*	Peru	N	UN
2008	New Zealand*	Poland	N	UN
2008	Oman	India	N	MFA
2008	Qatar	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2008	Qatar	China	N	GLMM
2008	Qatar	Indonesia	N	MFA
2008	Qatar	Philippines	N	MFA
2008	Qatar	Sri Lanka	N	MFA

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
2008	Slovenia*	Macedonia	N	ILO Indonesian Foreign
2008	South Korea	Indonesia	S	Ministry
2008	South Korea	Pakistan	N	MFA
2008	Switzerland*	Chile	N	UN
2008	Taiwan	Indonesia	N	MFA
2008	United Arab Emirates	Syria	N	CARIM-South
2009	Bahrain	India	N	MFA
2009	Belarus*	Yugoslavia	N	CARIM-East
2009	Canada*	Estonia	N	CN govt
2009	Canada*	Lithuania	N	CN govt
2009	Canada*	Slovenia	N	CN govt
2009	Canada*	Spain	N	CN govt
2009	France	Burkina Faso	N	ILO
2009	France*	Russia	N	ILO
2009	Italy	Albania	A	ILO
2009	Jordan	Indonesia	N	MFA
2009	Lebanon*	Egypt	N	MPC
2009	Malaysia	India	N	MFA
2009	New Zealand*	Spain	N	UN
2009	Qatar	Turkey	A	GLMM
2009	South Korea	Philippines	S	MFA
2009	Spain*	Ukraine	N	ILO
2009	Switzerland*	Bosnia and Herzegovina	N	ILO
2010	Canada*	France	N	ILO
2010	Canada*	Slovakia	N	CN govt
2010	Denmark*	South Korea	N	UN
2010	Jordan*	Philippines	N	MFA
2010	Libya	Egypt	N	MPC
2010	New Zealand*	Argentina	A	UN
2010	New Zealand*	Turkey	N	UN
2010	Qatar	Gambia	N	GLMM
2010	South Korea	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2010	South Korea	Indonesia	S	MFA
2010	South Korea	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2010	Sweden*	South Korea	N	UN
2010	Switzerland*	Kosovo	N	ILO
2010	Thailand*	Myanmar	N	MFA
2010	Vietnam*	Laos	N	MFA
2011	Canada*	Greece	N	CN govt
2011	Denmark*	Argentina	N	UN
2011	France*	Argentina	N	UN
2011	Italy	Egypt	A	ILO
2011	Italy	Moldova	N	Other

Year	Hostⁱ	Source	Type	Referenceⁱⁱ
2011	New Zealand*	Slovakia	N	UN
2011	South Korea	Philippines	S	MFA
2011	United Arab Emirates	India	N	MFA
2012	Colombia*	Peru	N	ILO
2012	Israel	Moldova	N	Other
2012	Jordan	Bangladesh	N	Jordan MoL
2012	Jordan	Ethiopia	N	Jordan MoL
2012	Lebanon	Philippines	N	MFA
2012	Malaysia	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2012	Oman	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2012	South Korea	Bangladesh	N	MFA
2012	Switzerland*	Tunisia	N	UN
2013	Canada*	France	S	CN govt
2013	Saudi Arabia	Philippines	N	MFA
2014	Belgium*	South Korea	N	UN
2014	Qatar	Macedonia	N	GLMM
2014	Saudi Arabia	India	N	MFA
2014	Saudi Arabia	Indonesia	N	MFA
2014	Saudi Arabia	Sri Lanka	N	MFA
2015	Australia*	China	N	Other

ⁱ An asterisk next to countries' names indicates that the host and source were determined by a GDP difference rather than explicitly stated in any agreement.

ⁱⁱ MAC - Migration at a Crossroads. OECD 2004.
MFA - Migrant Forum in Asia policy brief no. 10 (Winter 2014)
ILO - International Labor Organization database
Washington - Washington database
UN - United Nations Treaty Collection
Other – Other various sources