

mately 90 per cent of all our raw film stock. More than 75 per cent of the money paid by the American movie audience goes into the coffers of the Big Five. This concentration of power has given us unexcelled technical achievement in the field of the cinema, but also an inhibiting and unenlightened censorship and an end product intellectually and emotionally substandard.

The foregoing are some of the principal facts which Mr. Ernst forcibly and effectively presents in support of his thesis. He enlists popular support for the "Crusade Magnificent" for freedom from economic restraints on the minds and habits of our people, and appeals to the Congress to initiate this crusade.

Mr. Ernst recommends certain specific remedies. Ownership of radio and press should be divorced. Similarly, movie companies from radio and television. Theatre chains should be kept out of the movie production business, and the production companies forced to sell all their theatres. Networks should be required to make network programs available on equal terms to all stations and should not be permitted to own radio stations. Taxes of a chain-store type should be imposed on multiple ownership of newspapers, radio stations, and movies. Small enterprises in these fields should be encouraged by more favorable tax exemptions and greater mail subsidies in the case of newspapers. Most of these remedies require legislation; some the restoration of the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice to the vigorous state enjoyed by it under Thurman Arnold.

Peculiarly enough, Mr. Ernst makes only a casual, and, on the whole, slighting reference to a much more widely discussed and controversial proposal designed to eliminate monopoly in the communication of ideas, namely a TVA of the air and of the press. The fact that it is a drastic suggestion does not excuse Mr. Ernst's failure to analyze this controversial proposal. It is the one weakness of this otherwise excellent book.

Mr. Ernst throughout many eventful years has made important and valuable contributions toward furthering the first freedom. His book bearing this name is the latest and perhaps the most important one.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*

Toward a Democratic New Order. By David Bryn-Jones. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1945. Pp. viii, 288. \$3.50.

Professor Bryn-Jones's book is in three main divisions. Part I examines the theoretical structure of democracy. Part II reviews four basic concepts: liberty, equality, the rights of man, and fraternity. In Part III the author relates the democratic ideal to current problems of social equality, industry, nationality, world order, and international relations. The magnitude and number of the issues which the author has elected to discuss is somewhat breathtaking; the plan, however, is clear, and the presentation orderly. To the intent and scope of such a book no objection can be raised.

This reviewer, unfortunately, often finds himself unsympathetic to Professor Bryn-Jones' approach to his subject, dissatisfied with the statement of issues, unilluminated by the argument, and irritated by the rhetoric.

In dealing with so large an abstraction as democracy an author will be fortunate if he can give to his reader a coherent statement deriving from a single, well-defined point of view. Eclecticism will yield confusion, or—as with this book—induce apathy of the logical functions. In one place Bryn-Jones offers a moral basis for a judgment: "The

* Member of the Illinois Bar.

principle that might never makes right assumes that the state is a moral entity and that, like every other moral entity, it must find its justification in the end it serves."¹ In another place he advances the psychological axiom that "it has been assumed too readily that with people in general it is reason that decides; it is still more dangerous to assume that with masses of people judgments are always, or even generally, determined in the light of pure reason."² A third manner of approach is through historical analysis. After commenting upon the paradoxical fact that the Roman republic was an oligarchy, he observes that "the answer, at least in part, seems to be that the Roman people had neither the capacity nor the will for self-government."³

The fourth and least satisfactory approach is in a sense mystical; it rests upon the frequent assertion that democracy is fundamentally a faith. An unhappy choice leads to the selection of Wordsworth as the rhapsodist of such a faith; that poet's personal sense of democracy has long ago been discredited, and his exaltation of the private virtues of humble men is generally recognized as part of the canon for the denial of material justice.

Such a variety of approach establishes the author's tolerance, but the failure to take a fixed position is fatal to the emergence of a clear thesis.

The statement of issues is often equally defective. Bryn-Jones obviously belongs to the idealist school of political theorists. Harold Laski, on the contrary, believes that the prime fact about the state is its possession of the supreme coercive power. It is puzzling to find Bryn-Jones quoting Laski on three occasions, with approval, but without any indication of their fundamental disagreement. Throughout the book there are only vague allusions to the sharp oppositions which exist among modern writers on the state.

I have said that the argument is often unilluminating. The failure, in my opinion, lies in the author's tendency to develop his ideas through reiteration. A statement will be repeated time and again within a paragraph or a chapter, in different words but without noticeable progress either by analysis or extension. This critical opinion must of course be tested, and accepted or rejected, by the individual reader.

Professor Bryn-Jones' style is not diffuse but it is heavy with platitude. "In the fires of great trials the purposes of men are fused into a common spirit."⁴ "Political experience comes slowly and its lessons must be learned over long periods and with difficulty."⁵ "But dictators do not resign; they fall!"⁶

Toward a Democratic New Order is permeated by a fine sense of the potential worth of human nature and by an abiding hope that individually good men can create a just and wise government. The author deserves respect both for his tolerant discussion of international differences and for his indignant attack upon economic injustice. If virtuous impulse and a magnanimous spirit were the sole need in a book on democracy, there could be no quarrel with Professor Bryn-Jones. It is regrettable that his dialectic is in large measure naive and unskilled.

G. LOUIS JOUGHIN*

¹ P. 82.

² P. 38.

³ P. 13. Consult Rostovtzeff, *History of the Ancient World* (1927), where a study of the elements which made up "the Roman people" solves the paradox without recourse to such nebulous ideas as "the capacity [or] the will for self-government." See Bryn-Jones, pp. 17, 70, and 125, for other dubious historical judgments on Rome and on the Weimar Republic.

⁴ P. 48.

⁵ P. 272.

⁶ P. 50.

* Assistant Professor of English, University of Texas.