zation of the book, in which two thirds are devoted to a critical review of other men's writings, and only one third to the exposition of the author's own ideas.

However, this last third of the book is packed with extraordinary density, and its fruitful and interesting ideas are a rich reward even for the reader who does not always agree with them. Unfortunately, there is no index to help the reader retrace his steps. This must be held a serious mistake, for a book of this kind cannot be merely read, but must be carefully studied and restudied.

Gerhart Niemeyer†


The theory of law suggested by some passages in this book makes it particularly interesting to lawyers. It is the view that law is simply an expression of physical power, or force. This view has of course been maintained by many thoughtful students. The author seems to attribute it to Thucydides, quoting from him at the outset a statement by an Athenian representative threatening the little island of Melos. Thucydides' history is, however, a systematic criticism of the theory of force. Thucydides was opposed to the small-capitalist democratic imperialist party in Athens, and his history is a cold if not unprejudiced attack on its policy. The Melian episode occurred when the democratic party was probably under the leadership of Alcibiades, and not long before the ultimate disaster to Athenian power which resulted from Alcibiades' expedition to Syracuse. The ironical emphasis and timing of the episode suggest therefore that Thucydides saw in the position of the Athenian leaders a symptom of the fatal illness of his age.

Pareto is a provocative modern exponent of the force theory of order. The reviewer does not agree with this theory and neither in the end does the author. Both agree, nevertheless, that Americans may easily overlook the importance of force in considering the affairs of Europe and Asia. Even today we may need to remind ourselves of the necessity for dealing skilfully with power impulses in the effort to develop some sort of world order.

Mr. Spykman criticises some Americans for supposing that the country was safe without regard to the balance of power in Europe and Asia. However, some of those whom he criticises have pointed out that at least until the invasion of Russia there was an opportunity for the maintenance of a long-time balance which would strengthen our defensive position. Again Mr. Spykman, while giving a full and interesting account of the present strength of our defensive position, emphasizes the danger of invasion from northern outposts in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. His account of the danger assumes the continued cooperation, in the event of their victory, of Germany and Japan. American policy might, however, even under the worst imaginable conditions, derive some benefit from inevitable tensions between these two powers.

The book is primarily an exposition of American interest in maintaining a balance of power in Europe and Asia after victory by the United Nations. The author was born in the Netherlands and lived in Europe during his early years. He has been for

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some time a member of the staff of the Institute of International Studies at Yale. The combination qualifies him to remind us of the vitality of the traditional British theory of power and politics. Neither Germany nor Russia, China nor Japan, should be allowed to develop controlling force. This should be the end of American, as it has been of British, policy. The presentation may seem to some discouraging. It will seem to others a useful corrective of easy assumptions about the peace for which we are fighting. If we hope for more than an uneasy balance, we cannot do with less. If we are to accomplish more, we must combine balance with completely international armed force.

In the end any simple theory of force receives a significant qualification. The word "merit" is introduced, and not in quotation marks. The sentences deserve quotation.

"The founders of the United States were impressed with the value and importance of balanced power. They created for this nation a government of checks and balances in the profound conviction that only in that manner could tyranny be avoided. Our government has been criticized for being slow and cumbersome, and it has irritated many who prefer quick and efficient response to executive command, but it has lived up to the hopes of its founders and preserved the political and civil liberties perhaps better than any other government. A similar merit extends to balanced power in international society."

MALCOLM P. SHARP

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