By cleverly presenting his reader with an oblique view of the blind goddess, Mr. Train manages an amusing and sympathetic study of the slightly questionable activities of America's favorite lawyer, Mr. Ephraim Tutt. Mr. Tutt plays the role of an independent arbiter of social justice. Whenever the legal consequences of his client's acts conflict with his decision in the case, he proceeds to relieve his client of these consequences. Since, in attaining his ends, Mr. Tutt is necessarily hampered by the existing mechanisms, he is often forced to make some unusual uses of these devices. In twenty-six "cases" reported, Mr. Tutt reveals an extensive knowledge of obsolete laws and an intensive insight into the foibles of jurors. These, combined with a fortuitously stupid prosecutor or judge, invariably permit him to succeed in releasing the victim enmeshed in the toils of society.

Mr. Tutt's great popularity, derived from the reading public's natural sympathy for the underdog, arose during years in which these stories were published singly in a popular periodical. The compilation into a "casebook" renders more obvious the details of the author's technique and lessens the force of its application. The obliquity of his picture of legal justice is most often accomplished by a careful handling of "human interest" elements. Mr. Train's other device, used in cases in which it is otherwise rather difficult to arouse sympathy for Mr. Tutt's client, consists of presenting the public prosecutor and judge as "hunting in the same leash after the same game." This is objectionable from a practical viewpoint. The consistent portrayal of a law enforcement officer as a bloodhound, a fascist, and a bully must inevitably have a widespread influence upon the attitudes of future juries and laymen as a whole, particularly when the medium is as seemingly innocuous as a semi-serious, apparently humorous story. Emphasis upon extra-legal protection against unavoidable travesties of justice is commendable; but it is both unnecessary and undesirable that the need for this protection should be made to depend upon a prejudice created against a public officer.