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REGULATION FOR THE SAKE OF APPEARANCE

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REGULATION FOR THE SAKE OF APPEARANCE

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Appearance is often given as a justification for decisions, including government decisions, but the logic of appearance arguments is not well theorized. This Article develops a framework for understanding and evaluating appearance-based justifications for government decisions. First, working definitions are offered to distinguish appearance from reality. Next, certain relationships between appearance and reality are singled out for attention. Sometimes reality is insulated from appearance, sometimes appearance helps drive reality over time, and sometimes appearance and reality collapse from the outset. Finally, sets of normative questions are suggested based on the supposed relationship between appearance and reality for a given situation. These normative questions include aesthetics, transparency concerns, and the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy. A final section applies these ideas to prominent debates over campaign finance regulation and broken windows policing. Leading empirical studies are examined and, throughout, the Article draws from scholarship in philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science.

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Attention, comrades! . . . . We have won the battle for production!†
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Appearances matter, and in more ways than one. Countless decisions are explained and justified by the resulting appearance and not, or not only, by the resulting reality. Most people probably do not leave home before considering how their physical appearance will influence the perceptions of others. Cosmetics and cosmetic surgery are multibillion dollar industries, after all,1 to say nothing of commercial advertising and its image focus since before the 1960s.2 In fact, appearances help determine the health and survival of human institutions. If the importance of appearance was not clear much earlier, the economic catastrophes of the Great Depression and the Great Recession underscored the reality. Confidence is a state of mind, and it can influence behavior. Everything from a stable banking system to thriving religious organizations, successful undercover operations, and voter turnout depends on it. It might not be exaggerating to say that the primary goal of human institutions is maintaining various impressions.

Unsurprisingly, then, appearance-based justifications in law and politics are common. Government officials regularly attempt to build public confidence by taking care of appearances. An especially old example is the Bill of Rights. It was promoted partly on the comfort it would give to fair-minded critics of the new government, whose supporters professed no interest in crossing these lines. James Madison said that the amendments were offered “to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual.”3 An especially familiar example arises in codes of judicial conduct. They obligate judges to recuse when their impartiality can be reasonably questioned, not only when rightly questioned.4 And especially controversial examples involve order maintenance policing and campaign finance regulation. For decades, academics and policymakers have debated whether the appearance of neighborhood disorder instigates serious crime, and whether policing strategies directed at otherwise minor crimes can change that appearance and stop that escalation.5 For an equally long time, supporters of campaign finance regulation have defended against court challenges by arguing that the money-politics relationship can be fashioned to minimize both the appearance and the reality of corruption.6

† GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 58 (Signet Classic 1977) (1948).
†† From the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s logo, which is reproduced in decal form at http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/learning/who/runs.html.
3 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (1789); see also id. at 144; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (1977).
5 See infra Part IV.B.
6 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–27, 46–48 (1976) (emphasizing public confidence); infra Part IV.A.
Although the justification is familiar, the special logic of appearance arguments is not well-theorized, particularly for legal institutions.\(^7\) Appearance arguments can be slippery and, often enough, troublesome when asserted by those who claim to be working for the public good. Consider campaign finance litigation. Courts have validated a government interest in appearing non-corrupt without much explanation of how or why it should matter. Are we supposed to think that government is entitled to appear non-corrupt even if it is in fact riddled with corruption? Are defenders of campaign finance laws claiming to know that the government is basically free of corruption? Is there anything more to the argument?

This Article confronts the potential and problematics of appearance justifications. My principal aspiration is to construct a general framework for understanding and evaluating claims that a government decision is justified because it will create a desirable appearance.\(^8\) Decisions within legal institutions are my focus, but the logic of appearance management beyond government will be considered as well. Accordingly, I will offer some conceptual work to distinguish appearance from reality, positive work to identify potential relationships between appearance and reality, and normative work to suggest key evaluative questions that depend on those relationships. To illustrate these ideas, I will apply them to two policies that otherwise have little in common: campaign finance regulation and broken windows policing. Although taking place in different places and on different terms, these debates both involve appearance justifications and both can be renovated using the same general framework.

Part I of the Article discusses the concepts of appearance and reality. These ideas have a tangled heritage of many centuries but a few concise observations should suffice. Part II explores certain relationships between appearance and reality. Often we think that appearance is a superficial version of reality with no causal impact on it. But looks are not always deceiving. Indeed, under certain conditions, an initial appearance will facilitate the emergence of a

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\(^8\) I do not include prophylactic rules, which are norms that reach beyond conduct thought to be threatening in order to help ensure that such conduct does not occur. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 494, 515–17 (2008); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 200, 204–05 (1988). A reason to tolerate this type of crude regulatory overbreadth is that the feared conduct is difficult to detect. Depending on how the rule is fashioned, it might also provide clear guidance. All of this is old news, and my analysis does not pay attention to prophylactic rules per se. Prophylactic rules do tend to target conduct that merely resembles bad conduct, but my interest is decisions that are defended in terms of the appearances that they are supposed to cause, not every decision that takes appearance into account. One could say that prophylactic rules amount to regulation that applies to appearances, while I am interested in regulation for the sake of generating appearances. Prophylactic rules do not raise the same aesthetic, transparency, or causation questions.
corresponding reality over time. These self-fulfilling prophecies can arise in banking, dating, democracy, and elsewhere. And, of course, sometimes there is no important difference between an appearance and the reality of interest. Appearance can be important for its own sake.

Part III uses this assortment of relationships to suggest evaluative frameworks for appearance justifications. The right set of questions depends on the supposed relationship. When there is no relevant reality separate from appearance, normative evaluation is relatively uncomplicated even if observers disagree. In these situations, how things appear is the same as how things really are. The leading example is aesthetic or expressive judgment about an agreed-upon image. When, instead, appearance and reality might diverge, additional questions arise. With respect to government decisions, often the appearance justification involves boosting public confidence. One stock democratic concern about such efforts is transparency: Can officials defend a gap between what they appear to be doing and what they are actually doing? Sometimes they can and sometimes they cannot, and much has been written on that topic already. When a self-fulfilling prophecy is underway, however, the transparency concern is basically eliminated. How things appear will turn into how those things actually are. At this point the key normative question moves from transparency to causation: What is the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy?

Part IV applies these ideas to ongoing debates over campaign finance regulation (especially candidate contribution limits) and broken windows policing (especially for reducing violent crime). The upshot is that the courtroom debate over appearance in campaign finance regulation has been insufficiently concerned about transparency and yet insufficiently curious about self-fulfilling prophecies involving corruption, while the policy debate over broken windows policing suffers from something like the opposite problem. Much scholarly effort on broken windows theories has thus far yielded evidence of modest or zero impact on serious crime, without adequate recognition of resulting transparency issues—and perhaps without remembering the beneficial aesthetic impact of certain forms of order-maintenance policing. Some of these conclusions are debatable, I freely acknowledge, and serious investigation is still underway. To indicate the state of the art in these fields, I include an examination of empirical studies that is somewhat more detailed than typical for law review articles. And throughout, I draw from contributions in other disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science. But whether readers agree with my assessment of specific debates is not so important. The crucial point, in my view, is that formulating sound evaluative questions requires understanding different kinds of appearance-based justifications.

Before going further, a caveat: My normative analysis aims to be indifferent to particular moral commitments but it cannot be entirely agnostic. I do believe that people with left-wing, right-wing, libertarian, statist, and a number of other ideological loyalties can learn from the analytical framework that I will suggest. A variety of people should be able to plug their own values into the general framework before reaching conclusions about specific appearance-based justifications, and without eliminating insight from the framework. It is “neutral” to this extent. That said, the general framework will be less useful to those with especially restrictive commitments regarding official management of appearances. For instance, some might simply oppose intentional official efforts to influence public perception, at least when the influence is misleading. Such commitments might make many cases seem easy and an elaborate analytical framework unnecessary, but via atypical rigidity of the kind that rules out undercover
There is, then, moral moderation in what follows. The Article is less about rattling readers’ core commitments, and more about uncovering the logic of different sorts of appearance justifications so as to facilitate intelligent normative evaluation—so that we can, in a loose sense of the phrase, start seeing appearance arguments for what they really are.

I. DISTINGUISHING APPEARANCE FROM REALITY

For an analysis to be worthwhile, the category of appearance-based justification must be distinctive. We might begin by contrasting appearance and reality, as people commonly do, but is there a meaningful difference between them? Can we specify the difference in accord with typical usage in legal argument—as in the assertion that “[c]orporate participation in candidate elections creates a substantial risk of corruption or the appearance thereof”? These conceptual questions are addressed below. Of course the suggestions here will not end any foundational philosophical debates. No article, let alone a law review article, can do that. My more humble goal is to distinguish appearance from reality in a way that is concise, informed by academic inquiry, consistent with everyday understandings, and useful for the positive and normative analysis that follows.

A. Pedestrians and Philosophers

Considerable doubt can be raised about the practical significance of alleged differences between appearance and reality. Surely it is difficult to prove that the former is less valuable than the latter. Aesthetic design choices have survived the form-follows-function dictates of high modernism, symbols are taken seriously if not violently, and digitized virtual realities allow second lives to be lived in socially meaningful ways. If these count as appearances, they must count for something. One might also think that appearance and reality are points on the same dimension rather than categorically different. References to appearance and reality often arrive together and relate to the same subject, as in the appearance and reality of corruption or safety. Furthermore, many policy debates occur within a fog of uncertainty and error, whether the topic is health, immigration, crime, or terrorism. Being “in touch with reality” might not be very common and it might not be so crucial.

Yet appearance and reality are supposed to be different, and perhaps they are. Getting the gist of the asserted difference may help illuminate what appearance justifications are all
about. Start with ordinary usage. Often the notion of appearance is linked to perception and belief. People regularly discuss the way an event appears to their senses, along with beliefs derived from that appearance. Dictionary definitions of appearance accordingly refer to an external show or to the outward aspect of something based on sense impression, which can be processed into a belief about the world. (“That rusty bridge appears likely to collapse,” for example.) The idea of reality is perhaps more difficult to pin down from pedestrian talk but it is often distinguished from appearance, perception, and belief. Definitions of reality refer to things that are not illusory, that occur in fact, or that have an objective existence. (“In reality, there is a negligible chance that the bridge will collapse,” for example.) People thus tend to use the term appearance to signify superficial impressions, while reality means something like the objective truth. It is roughly the difference between keeping up appearances and keeping it real.

The ability to distinguish appearance and reality is a sign of maturity in more than one way. It is both a marker of cognitive progress in children and the subject of refined intellectual study among adults. Most children grasp simple appearance/reality distinctions by the time they leave kindergarten. When shown an object behind a tinted transparency, for instance, a six-year old typically can recognize a difference between what color the object “looks like” and what color the object “really and truly is.”

Professional philosophical inquiry also includes appearance/reality distinctions, albeit with more precision and lasting disagreement. The relevant discourse has matured over many centuries and across several subdisciplines. It should be enough for present purposes, however, to briefly note a few fault lines within metaphysical and epistemological investigations into objectivity.

On the metaphysical side, several positions can be sorted out. Strong objectivists maintain that there is a truth about the existence and properties of some things in the world that is independent of what people believe, even what we justifiably believe. Indeed, this objective reality might be inaccessible to anyone even under ideal conditions for judgment. Some metaphysically objective things are concededly dependent on the mind, such as the emotions in your head, but strong objectivists can accommodate psychological facts and proceed to argue about other parts of reality, such as the bridges outside of your head. These sorts of positions leave plenty of room for beliefs (perhaps based on something called appearance) that may or

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15 See, e.g., HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1505.
16 E.g., MAXIMILIAN FOSTER, KEEPING UP APPEARANCES (1914) (telling the tale of a couple who move to the big city and live beyond their means); see also AESOP’S FABLES 15 (Jerry Pinkney illus. 2000) (telling the tale of a young mouse who mistakes non-risk for risk based on physical appearances, and stating that appearances can be deceiving).
20 This position was illustrated in Plato’s Republic through the allegory of the cave. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC book VII. Recall that even the sunlit world above could provide only a link to the Forms.
21 See Leiter, supra note 19, at 970–71 (explaining “constitutional independence” from the mind (which cannot include psychological facts), “cognitive independence” (which does), and “causal independence” (which is irrelevant to objectivity)).
may not match objective reality. On another extreme, strong subjectivists maintain that there is no reality or truth other than what is believed by the particular mind or minds in question. This might eliminate any important appearance/reality distinction. There are then intermediate positions in which what counts as metaphysically objective is partly dependent on our minds. One version uses the conclusions reached by some community of observers to identify objective truth, another uses the conclusion that would be reached under appropriate or ideal conditions for judgment. Here the space for appearance-based beliefs separate from reality opens up again.

If there is an objective reality of some dimension, epistemological issues follow. The core question is how we can conclude that knowledge about the real world has been achieved. A committed skeptic might insist that there is a greater than zero probability that you are under the sway of a computer simulation that is manipulating your every sense impression, and so you cannot really “know” anything, except perhaps conceptual truths. Few of us hold to the highest standards of certainty for knowledge in most situations, however. We need not extend those stringent tests beyond “[t]he pastime of epistemology.” Most people would understandably conclude, if pressed, that they know that there was in fact green grass on the ground last summer. Perhaps as a matter of principle they should hold residual doubt about this, but not for any obvious practical purpose. Even on a compromised test for knowledge, though, reasonable disagreement will persist over the best procedures for identifying truth. Given finite resources and limited cognitive capacity, hard choices must be made. There also is debate over which statements are rightly susceptible to testing for truth and falsity in the first place. But wide agreement on the existence of objective reality and human knowledge is notable, as is the persistent need for tests of justifiable belief.

B. Working Definitions

These observations point toward a useful working definition of appearance, as contrasted with reality. Fortunately, evaluating appearance justifications does not require a choice among all of the available metaphysical and epistemological positions. Definitions can be formulated that are informed by those positions but that avoid taking sides on the foundational question whether there is an objective reality in a strong sense. I have in mind the following: For a given

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22 For conflicting interpretations of the dictum, “Man is the measure of all things,” see C.M. Gillespie, The Truth of Protagoras, 19 MIND 470, 482–84, 492 (1910) (understanding it as relativist and subjectivist), and F.C.S. Schiller, Plato or Protagoras? 8–10, 15–18, 21 (1908) (understanding it as pragmatic).


24 Even if nothing were metaphysically objective, there still would be practically important questions about how beliefs should be formed or defended.

25 See, e.g., René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 45, 62–63 (Donald A. Cress trans., 4th ed. 1998) (1641); Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History 5–8, 12–23 (1981) (arguing, however, that the brain-in-a-vat supposition has a self-refuting quality). The strong skeptical position is played out in Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism I, 5–6, 11–12 (1978) (suggesting limits on the classical form of the argument, however). Cf. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Lewis W. Beck ed. 1950) (1783) (arguing that people cannot have knowledge of objects in themselves, but that they can have knowledge of objects as they appear and that this knowledge of phenomena is important).


27 See Leiter, supra note 19, at 975–76 (discussing semantic objectivity).
proposition about the world, (1) appearance can be defined as a source for the perception of information that an observer considers relevant to forming a belief about this proposition—whether or not this is a good source for forming a well-justified belief; and (2) reality can be defined as either the strong objective truth about this proposition or the best justified belief about this proposition that is held by any observer—whether or not this truth or best belief corresponds with a given appearance.

On these understandings, a person forms at least some of her beliefs about the world at least partly based on her perceptions of the world’s appearances, and these appearances need not help people recognize the objective truth or the best available belief about the truth. Appearance involves readily accessible information that might or might not accurately reflect the reality in question. It is like a potentially imperfect proxy for a variable of interest. But with these definitions, it does not matter whether a mind-independent reality exists or can be known with certainty. Reality is defined broadly enough to persist either way and still provide a convenient contrast to appearance. My unorthodox definitions do mix metaphysical and epistemological concepts. Despite the resulting impurity, they are operable, close enough to common understandings, and applicable to debates over law.

Consider Baze v. Reese,28 which upheld a widely used lethal injection protocol. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion concluded that state officials may paralyze a prisoner during the execution to “preserv[e] the dignity of the procedure, especially where convulsions or seizures could be misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress.”29 Perhaps this conclusion is troubling because paralysis conceals relevant information about inmate pain, as Justice Stevens argued.30 But however the normative question is resolved, we can sensibly use the term “appearance” to refer to the basis for observer perceptions and beliefs (i.e., convulsions) regarding some proposition about the world (i.e., inmate pain), and those beliefs might or might not correspond to the best justified or deepest truth of the matter. Whether the reality of pain is truly objective should not affect our ability to distinguish reality from appearance in this setting. A hyper-subjectivist response that “there is no such thing as a ‘reality of pain’” is unproductive, as is the assertion that there is no difference between impressions gleaned by amateurs and the insights of trained experts.

Although the foregoing fits well with propositions about the present or past, an objective reality about the future seems impossible. There would be no such reality with which to contrast appearance regarding an inmate execution that has not occurred. Furthermore, estimated probabilities about the likelihood of pain might not be objective.31 But recall that our inclusive definition of reality reaches some beliefs. A person can have beliefs about the likelihood of future events even if those propositions are not metaphysically objective. Moreover, an amateur’s impression of, say, a health risk usually will be less justified than, say, a physician’s estimate. Our working definitions therefore can be used to analyze efforts at building expectations about the future, as well as shaping perceptions about the present and the past.

29 Id. at 57.
30 See id. at 73 & n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the “esthetic rationale” but concurring on grounds of stare decisis).
31 Alternatively, perhaps “God plays dice” and some aspects of a metaphysically objective reality are irreducibly probabilistic.
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN APPEARANCE AND REALITY

Appearance can be defined so as to distinguish the concept from reality, but noting connections between the two will be crucial to normative evaluation. There are several potential relationships, at least if we take into account the influence of appearance-driven behavior over time. Indeed, the various theoretical possibilities are similar to the possible statistical associations between two variables—correlated and uncorrelated, positive and negative, causal and noncausal, linear and nonlinear. Not every possibility is worth vetting here, however. In this Part, I concentrate on three plausible relationships that are plainly relevant to government decisions: (1) reality insulated from appearance, (2) appearance driving reality over time,\(^{32}\) and (3) reality more or less collapsing into appearance from the outset. Positive causal associations are most intuitive in the following examples, but I do take up potentially negative associations at certain points. The general thought is that relatively accessible appearances sometimes, but only sometimes, make for a reality of interest.

A. Bridges—Reality Insulated from Appearance

Suppose that residents of two towns separated by a river want a bridge to connect them. Recognizing that the bridge will be largely worthless if nobody uses it, and that nobody will use the bridge if it seems unsafe to potential users, officials want a bridge design that is unlikely to collapse and that appears equally safe to the public. So the bridge is built to meet a chosen level of structural integrity and it is decked out to meet common perceptions of sturdiness. The adornments include fresh paint, visible rivets, and no architectural frills. The bridge would be a disaster waiting to happen if it were ready to collapse while appearing perfectly safe, but it would be a waste if the bridge were quite safe without looking that way.

Such appearance-based efforts to influence public opinion are widespread in the private and public sectors. The business of advertising is built on demand for these techniques, for instance, and so is architecture.\(^{33}\) Professional architects understand that casual observers tend to associate the appearance of certain materials with rigidity (e.g., opacity) and others with fragility (e.g., transparency), regardless of expert risk calculations. Architects have been known to include visible elements, such as struts, with no effect on the physical integrity of a structure in hope of producing a calming effect on untrained observers.\(^{34}\) As for governments, illustrations can be found in road safety efforts which often push people’s perceptions toward danger. Recently, Chicago officials ordered transverse lines painted across a stretch of road that includes a particularly dangerous curve on Lake Shore Drive. The lines become closer together as they approach the curve, giving many drivers a sense of speed greater than otherwise.\(^{35}\)

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\(^{32}\) As the discussion should make clear, appearance on its own does not exactly drive reality, even on my definitions. Sometimes people rely on (their perception of) an appearance to form beliefs or attitudes which then influence decisions to behave in some way. Over time, these behaviors may influence the pertinent reality, such as the level of corruption or violence. Occasionally I will use shorthand formulations that I trust will not obscure the sometimes complex causal chains involved.

\(^{33}\) See JONATHAN E. SCHROEDER, VISUAL CONSUMPTION 92 (2002) (“Architecture is a language . . . .”).

\(^{34}\) I thank Chris Thompson, a Chicago architect, for these examples.

\(^{35}\) See Jon Hilkevitch, Drive’s Curve to Get New Stripes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2006, at 3 (metro). In rural China off Highway 215, a smashed car is suspended fifteen feet above the ground along with the inscription, “Four People Died.” PETER HESSLER, COUNTRY DRIVING: A JOURNEY THROUGH CHINA FROM FARM TO FACTORY 121 (2010). As discussed in Part III, one might object to an engineered slippage between appearance and reality; but a thorough normative evaluation requires an appropriate baseline for judging which perception is best. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 37–38, 246–48 (2008).
Many government projects are much like the proverbial bridge, some of them extremely successful. Think about the production of economic data such as the unemployment rate and gross domestic product. These numbers would not be relied on if they were not believed to be reliable.\footnote{Including known controversies over methodological choices, such as excluding discouraged workers from the “unemployed.” For a review of allegations in the 1970s from the out party that the in party was rigging economic statistics, see David Zarefsky, Erwin Chemerinsky & Alan S. Loewinsohn, Government Statistics: The Case for Independent Regulation—A New Legislative Proposal, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1223 (1981).} Judicial judgments are analogous. Wearing standardized robes, sitting on elevated benches, publishing explanations, and sometimes recusing themselves, judges in the United States accumulate sufficient confidence in their work that other officials are willing to enforce their judgments and litigants often abide without enforcement efforts. Like judges, the rest of government has an appearance and reality of quality; and, like the bridge, one might say that a corrupt government that appears virtuous is terrible while a virtuous government that appears corrupt is useless.

These examples share a notable feature: the possibility that appearances diverge, perhaps radically, from reality. Whether the proposition is the shakiness of a bridge or the crookedness of a government, the easily perceived features might not correspond with the truth of the matter. And, at least at the time of those perceptions, appearance will not influence reality. Simply believing that a bridge is safe does not make it safe in fact. A certain kind of optimist might hope that appearance usually conforms to reality, but in these situations there is no obvious reason to think that the former dictates the latter through its effect on beliefs and behavior. As indicated below, there might be nonobvious reasons to believe that appearances will influence reality \textit{over time} in the above examples—positively or perhaps negatively.\footnote{For instance, judges might psychologically internalize the norms that they display, see infra Part II.B (discussing self-fulfilling prophecies), and people might crowd a safe-looking bridge in a way that makes the structure less safe during the next time period, see infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing self-defeating prophecies).} But it will help to keep in mind my simplified version of the bridge model as a stand-in for situations in which reality is insulated from appearance and its ultimate effect on behavior.

\textbf{B. Banks—Appearance Driving Reality}

Now suppose that town residents want a banking system. One type of desired financial institution will accept deposits that remain available on demand, while lending most of the take to entrepreneurs willing to pay interest. As long as some critical mass of depositors does not want their money back at the same time, the banks will have an opportunity to survive and facilitate innovation and economic growth. One of the tricks, then, is to generate the belief among a sufficient number of potential and actual depositors that the banks will not be destabilized by depositors making a run on them. Various techniques are used to achieve this shared confidence. Bank buildings are designed to match cultural cues of stability and an insurance scheme is worked out so that depositors are covered in the event of a bank run, which in turn makes a run less likely.

This simplified story is part of the actual history of U.S. banking.\footnote{See Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of Banking and Financial Institutions 2–32 (4th ed. 2009); Benjamin J. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking: A History 138–238, 241, 243–44 (1990).} Banks became a crucial source of credit and depositor confidence was addressed by reserve requirements, regulatory oversight, discount windows, insurance—even architecture. The First Bank of the United States building in Philadelphia had a marble facade and European styling reminiscent of
the Bank of England; the Second Bank building, like many government buildings of the era, was fashioned after Greek temples. Pivoting away from the Great Depression, many new banks shifted to a fortress model with emphasis on steel and granite. The First National Bank of Chicago evoked “qualities of strength, security, and prodigious assets” partly by the display of granite cladding, “which was structurally unnecessary and added significantly to the expense.” Such design choices signal private information about financial stability or otherwise tap perceptions of reliability. Architecture is hardly the only way to generate confidence, especially in an age of online transactions. Ultimately banks became more heavily scrutinized by regulators for financial soundness, and government-run deposit insurance for many banks was implemented via the Banking Act of 1933. FDIC-insured banks are now required to display the assurance of protection in their branch locations and in certain advertising. Deposit insurance and regulatory oversight seem to sooth many people who choose banks with these features, and they likely help achieve greater bank longevity in the United States.

The bank-run problem and its confidence-based solution represent two forms of self-fulfilling prophecy—a concept now familiar in several intellectual disciplines. The label refers to situations in which a belief is the basis for behavior that pushes reality toward that belief over time. If many bank depositors believe that there is or will be a run on the bank, they will help cause the run as they scramble to save their savings; if they believe otherwise, a run is less likely. Sociologist Robert K. Merton authored the phrase and extended the idea from bank runs to race relations in 1948. African Americans were viewed as undisciplined strikebreakers by union members in the wake of World War I, Merton asserted, partly because the former group were left with little alternative after having been excluded from unions based on that same view. “[M]en respond not only to the objective features of a situation,” he claimed, “but also, and at times primarily, to the meaning this situation has for them. And once they have assigned some meaning to the situation, their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning.” The idea is also cognizable in the game

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40 See id. at 26–28, 250; see also Robert Nisbet, Men and Money: Reflections of a Sociologist, in MONEY MATTERS, supra note 39, at 7, 8 (comparing banks to churches and the importance of faith).
44 See 12 C.F.R. 328.0–.04.
45 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 38, at 47, 309–10.
48 See id. at 196–97.
49 Id. at 194; accord WILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINES THOMAS, THE CHILD IN AMERICA: BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS 572 (1928) (“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”).
theoretic terms of economists. A bank run and bank stability represent multiple equilibria that depend on each participant’s expectations about other participants’ behavior.50 Under certain conditions, shared expectations become the basis for common strategies.51

The notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy is expandable in other ways, as well. Merton concentrated on false beliefs and “the perversities of social logic,”52 yet a similar dynamic applies to beneficial consequences and to beliefs that were not falsifiable at the outset. Widespread depositor confidence in a bank can make the institution justifiably stable, whether or not the expectation against a future bank run can be counted as a false belief. Nor is it necessary that anyone intend to produce the appearance or its consequences; shared beliefs that underwrite reality over time may come about more spontaneously than that. Furthermore, the key behavioral effects might occur in several places: in those who perceive the appearance, in those who are the subject of perception, or both.53

In addition, prophecies can be self-defeating instead of self-fulfilling. The bank run is the classic illustration of the latter, while anticipated crowding is used to illustrate the former.54 If everyone believes that many people will show up at a particular location at a particular time, it could be that no such crowd materializes. Enough people might avoid the (mis)predicted crowd by not showing up. This outcome depends on touchy variables, of course, including how one person anticipates another person responding to pessimistic conventional wisdom about the future. In any event, expectations can have quite different influences on reality over time depending on the details of the social environment.

Two analogous dynamics can now be distinguished. First, positive-feedback loops overlap with but are not the same as self-fulfilling prophecies. These loops encourage path dependence insofar as alternatives become progressively less attractive over time, but they are not necessary to a self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance, bank stability can be a fragile equilibrium in a skittish social environment; and path dependence can occur without the complications of appearance/reality gaps. Also distinct is deterrence through expectation of punishment, along with encouragement through expectation of reward. Incentives do operate through expectations based on perceptions which may be based on appearances, but this chain of causation need not take the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy. People believing that the risk of detection is 50% will not always lead to conduct making it more likely that the risk of detection actually is 50%. And obviously the risk of detection can be 50% without people believing it. Whatever role appearances play in criminal justice, there is no necessary link between the

51 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 39 (1996) (discussing unpredictable outcomes and focal strategies); Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 1009, 1013 & n. 28 (1992) (asserting that bank runs can result from socially costly yet fragile information cascades). In the bank confidence situation, actually, we are faced with a recursive expectations analysis. One person must believe that some number of other persons will not withdraw, which depends on what other persons believe about everyone else’s behavior (and so on). Achieving shared confidence might seem logically complex but it happens in real life.
52 Merton, supra note 47, at 195–96, 208–10. Merton was more successful at illustrating virulent in-group/out-group dynamics, see id. at 197–208, than he was at explaining where the impetus for “deliberate institutional controls” would come from, id. at 210.
53 See Olson et al., supra note 46, at 222.
identified beliefs and the corresponding facts.55

C. Clocks—Reality Collapsing into Appearance

Now suppose that town residents, having become more interconnected, wish to temporally coordinate their activities. They need a social convention for keeping time, which need not track any cosmic reality about the progress of time. So town authorities have an ornate clock tower built in the center of town, a structure that is considered beautiful enough to attract public attention and that represents the time of day by reference to a local sundial. It becomes the time benchmark for town residents. Later, townspeople more frequently interact with nonresidents as transportation and communication technologies improve. This generates demand for coordinating time conventions across more and more jurisdictions, leading to regional standard times and standardized differences between regions.

The foregoing is, once again, a condensed portrayal of two centuries worth of history. Railroads, astronomers, diplomats, and others worked to spread stable conventions regarding time, and their efforts were remarkably successful.56 In the United States today, asking Google, “What time is it?,” yields a link to a website maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Naval Observatory. This website displays “Official U.S. Time” based on a set of atomic clocks.57 The time and time intervals indicated by this system are the reference points for countless information systems, including computer network timekeepers and the Global Positioning System. Standard time is only one of many solutions to coordination problems that depend on salient benchmarks—several of which were authorized by the embarrassingly underappreciated Weights and Measures Clause of the Constitution.58

Clock towers and similar phenomena are reminders that appearance and reality may, roughly speaking, collapse. In the case of standard time used for coordination purposes, the reality in question is constructed from beliefs that follow salient representations of time. There is no deeper truth to be discovered. The widespread belief that it is now 12:00 p.m. basically is the reality of the matter. To complain, as some early critics did,59 that standard time does not accurately reflect God’s version of time is to sidestep the basic point. Standard time does not purport to be anything other than a useful human convention. Of course, standard time is not a matter of individual subjective belief; it is a reality about which a broken clock can give false appearances and about which people can be mistaken. But here the relevant reality is constituted by shared beliefs resting on shared perceptions that are connected to salient appearances.

The idea of appearance/reality collapse has even more force as applied to aesthetics and

55 Again, not-so-straightforward causal links between appearances, perceptions, beliefs, conduct, and reality might exist. For example, widespread belief that law enforcement will quickly apprehend wrongdoers should deter many rational actors from wrongdoing, making it easier for law enforcement to quickly apprehend the remaining contingent of wrongdoers—assuming that this effect is not washed out by potential victims unexpectedly letting down their guard.


58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.

expression. Here appearances can be evaluated without any reference to a related reality. The relevant reality is nothing more than the appearance that attracts attention. Thus a clock tower’s form or a person’s garb can be assessed for beauty without suggesting that there is any truth of the matter beyond individual subjective valuation. As well, objects and conduct may be taken as conveying a painful message of insult or an uplifting message of validation. A Confederate Battle Flag or a civil rights statute, whatever their other functions, can be viewed as symbols of respect or disrespect. Each of these phenomena—architecture, fashion, icons, laws, and so on—may be evaluated for aesthetic or expressive quality without invoking another reality. Making those evaluations can be terribly controversial, to be sure. The thought for now, however, is that people may assess the aesthetic, insulting, and validating qualities of the world on those measures alone.

III. EVALUATING APPEARANCE JUSTIFICATIONS

Although they do not exhaust the possibilities, we now have three useful models for the relationship between appearance and reality as I have defined those concepts. For the clock, appearance and reality are essentially the same from the start. For the bridge, appearance does not influence reality and the two might be dangerously different at any given time. For the bank, an appearance of stability helps pull the institution toward that reality over time. True, decision makers in a given context may have little control over appearance, or how diverse cohorts of observers react thereto, and the applicable model will not always be clear to anyone. Sometimes more than one model will be in play. But with distinct models in mind, we can better understand and assess appearance justifications. These justifications will likely prompt a different set of normative questions depending on the posited relationship between appearance and reality. Without intelligent questions, we will not get intelligent answers.

These questions, by the way, do not seem hitched to any conventional metric of political ideology. Appearance justifications are both embraced and rejected by leftists, rightists, libertarians, statists, and others. Obviously, people sharing one of these ideologies will support appearance justifications under different conditions than others. But none of the familiar ideological groupings indicate systematically greater acceptance of appearance justifications. In Supreme Court decisions, for example, the evaluation of appearance arguments is sometimes unanimous. All participating justices condemned an attempt to dampen white panic selling by banning for-sale signs for houses, while there seems to be an equally wide consensus that judges should appear impartial in the hope of boosting public confidence. Furthermore, so-called conservative and so-called liberal judges each use appearance justifications, albeit to reach different conclusions. The former faction invoked appearances to support the lethal injection
protocol in *Baze v. Reese*, and the latter faction invoked appearances to support limits on contributions to political parties in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*.

The cynical view is that appearance justifications are rhetorical gambits without serious influence on decisions, akin to many claims about federalism, judicial restraint, due process, and other values with fair-weather fan bases. But even if appearance arguments are often tactical, they have logical substance. Conscientious decision makers should grapple with them. And the inquiry is complicated because there is no uniform answer for all occasions. Nobody in their right mind should accept or reject appearance justifications in all situations.

How, then, should an observer react when faced with an appearance justification? In this Part, I will suggest key normative questions with widespread appeal, understanding that they are most sensibly answered with attention to circumstances, observer values, and uncertainty. These suggestions include: (1) efficacy and cost issues are pervasively relevant when officials justify decisions based on hoped-for appearances; (2) under a clock model, the normative analysis is fairly straightforward even if the proper outcome is contested; (3) under a bridge model, transparency issues are likely to emerge insofar as the appearance of government operations might be different from the reality; (4) under a bank model, however, transparency issues will fade as attention shifts to causation issues surrounding self-fulfilling prophecies that can make government actually operate in the same way that it appears to operate. These questions form a general framework for evaluating an array of appearance arguments.

### A. Appearance/Reality Collapse

Begin with the relatively simple case of social constructions, such as standard time, social status, physical beauty, or race (in one sense). They can be used for virtuous or dastardly ends, easing the organization of either deserving liberation movements or dreadful subordination campaigns, and there may be disagreement over which is which. Whether an effort to promote a social construction is justifiable depends on an evaluation of purposes or functions, along with the costs and efficacy of the effort in light of the alternatives. Part of this analysis includes choices across government institutions, private ordering, and public-private partnerships. Many options might be considered and a normative orientation will be required, whether utilitarian, egalitarian, prioritarian, libertarian, or something else. After that, however, the task becomes more straightforward. At least there is no need to worry about successful social constructions failing to match reality. If everyone understands that the construction is meant to be its own mind-dependent reality, questions about deception are inapposite. Coordinated minds are themselves constitutive of the relevant reality. The core issue is whether the project of building the social construction is good or bad in other ways.

Similar thoughts govern aesthetics and expressive impact. Of course observers must interpret the meaning of the appearance in question and apply their values to that perception, and sometimes people disagree on these matters. California’s Proposition 8 was viewed by some as a

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63 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008); see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197, 202-03 (2008) (lead opinion) ("[P]ublic confidence in the integrity of the electoral process . . . encourages citizen participation in the democratic process."); id. at 204–09 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens did write the lead opinion in *Crawford*.

64 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003). Both factions also invoke appearances when raising stare decisis concerns. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (retaining a modified abortion right); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 697 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The unintelligibility of this Court’s precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.").

stigmatizing devaluation of gay relationships and an endorsement of discrimination; others might see the law as democratic confirmation of a traditional and religiously required aspect of marriage. Even with agreement on the message, people might differ over the law’s merit. Still, other challenging issues are sidelined. Observers looking for meaning and making aesthetic judgments need not confront additional complications associated with appearance/reality gaps. A cap or a city or a constitution can be thought ugly or pretty without any reference to any (other) reality with which it might not correspond. Likewise, a speech or a sign or a statute can be insulting or validating regardless of whether the message influences behavior.

So the clock model does not guarantee consensus, and the opportunities for disagreement are reflected in legal disputes. Thus the propriety of paralyzing inmates during their executions was strongly contested, and judges usually will not entertain constitutional challenges to government-hoisted Confederate battle flags even as litigation over government-appropriated religious symbols is commonplace. Nevertheless, pure clock model debates are streamlined in important respects. They take place within a logic and a value set special to aesthetics and expressivism. These debates do share issues with other models—such as whether a given effort at appearance management will be effective with respect to the target audience and what the effort will cost. But the other models prompt additional questions.

**B. Appearance/Reality Separation**

Once appearance might not match a related reality, new sets of normative questions will tend to arise. In the bridge model, the possibility of slippage raises transparency questions about information insiders problematically manipulating appearances to their advantage. In the bank model, by contrast, the prospect of appearance facilitating the emergence of a corresponding reality raises causal questions about the true force of appearance. The bridge model is not entirely separate from the bank model. The bank model represents a subset of all behavioral effects caused by appearances—albeit an especially interesting and pertinent subset that is useful for evaluating government institutions where transparency is often valued. Crudely speaking, however, bridge-type situations present special issues of transparency while bank-type situations present special issues of causation.

**1. Bridge models and transparency**

When appearance can diverge from reality, and when appearance cannot influence reality over time, most people will have reason to be concerned about appearance management efforts. Take the bridge situation. If the structure is unsafe yet designed so that the untrained eye sees safety, then typical bridge users will be at risk without the ability to accept or reject it based on either the objective truth or the best available belief. Depending on additional details, this situation presents a form of misrepresentation, or negligent failure to warn, or other problematic conduct from those responsible for the structure. As such misconduct becomes pervasive, society becomes more hierarchical and dysfunctional. At the extreme, citizens are mired in an Airstrip One dystopia in which information is fabricated by those with power to control those who lack it. This is the downside of institutions learning how to enhance perceptions of fairness.

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67 See, e.g., NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (regarding standing and battle flags).
and levels of sociological legitimacy without otherwise reforming their operations.69

Today’s catchphrase for the problem is lack of transparency. Although the label is shallow,70 the notion of transparency is grounded in common and understandable concerns—concerns about agents failing to serve the interests of their principals and about strangers depriving each other of the power to make informed decisions affecting their well-being. These issues have been explored for generations.71 The point that should be underscored here is that, although transparency worries are less serious for the clock and bank models, they nag the bridge model. The most anxious of all libertarians might fear that government secrecy is a constantly expanding problem, as Max Weber’s bureaucratic “professional insider” seeks to increase advantage over outsiders “through the means of keeping secret its knowledge and intentions,”72 It is, in any event, initially troublesome to even the least enthusiastic democrats when officials may control how their operations appear without simultaneously and similarly influencing their actual conduct.

Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the boundary of appropriate government transparency is contested.73 When people disapprove of information access restrictions, they decry “secrecy,” and, when they approve, they extol “privacy.” Even artifice might play a tragically needed role in an imperfect world.74 Along with self-preservation in the face of unjustified threats to life, there are situations in which deception might be morally acceptable. Examples include covert military operations against wartime enemies and undercover operations against domestic criminal organizations. Much already has been written on the topic and readers will have their own intuitions. Perhaps the safest synopsis is that deception is usually immoral or unethical and sometimes unlawful, but there are exceptions. More important for present purposes is the association of transparency concerns with bridge models of the appearance/reality relationship.

a. Combinations and proposals. The safe-looking bridge hypothetical illustrates a serious transparency problem, but it shows only one way in which appearance and reality diverge. There are four crude combinations, normatively speaking:

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72 MAX WEBER, BUREAUCRACY, in 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956, 992 (Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. 1978) (emphasis omitted).


74 See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 34–49 (1979) (reviewing commonly accepted positions that justify certain lies, excuse certain lies, or define away the objection to lying). For the extreme position, see IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives (1797), in CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346 (Lewis White Beck trans. 1949).
Most comforting is a good appearance paired with a good reality (cell 1), as when a bridge looks and is reasonably safe. The least comforting probably is a good appearance joined with a bad reality (cell 4). Extraordinary situations may call for a false sense of security, and in other cases the appearance/reality gap might be self-correcting, but strong objection to a sturdy looking yet rickety bridge is the standard reaction. Otherwise the combinations are difficult to rank without entering moral and ethical disputes of long-standing. A bad appearance plus a bad reality (cell 3) has the virtue of providing observers an accurate basis on which to demand reform, but bad/bad leaves nothing pleasant to experience and the reality might be impossible to change. In contrast, a bad appearance joined with a good reality (cell 2) is pleasant for anyone with access to the truth and it, too, might be self-correcting. A downside is that observers might demand “corrective action” that is wasteful or dangerous. Public reaction to the perceived risks of terrorism in the 2000s and Communism in the 1950s might be examples. Fear is itself a kind of injury, and it will influence behavior whether or not well-founded.

We can leave deeper debate over these rankings to other work because our present focus is on mainstream policy responses, especially techniques for getting to cell 1. The four cells then come with intuitive, first-cut policy recommendations. Under the bank model: (1) Good appearance/good reality is worth preserving or working toward. The questions involve how. On the simple bridge model, appearance and reality must be maintained separately; the former cannot be used to influence the latter. (2) Bad appearance/good reality ordinarily calls for improvement in the former. Under the bridge model, a bad appearance will not necessarily make the fact of the matter worse but it can have other negative effects, hedonic or behavioral. Sometimes advertising the good news will be sufficient but, often enough, more than cheap talk will be needed. Insiders might engage in signaling, erect strong behavioral safeguards, or otherwise conform to the picture of safety held by outsiders—but without hope that reality will

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75 Cf. Merton, supra note 47, at 204 (“[L]ife in a world of myth must collide with fact in the world of reality.”).

76 This is part of the case for hallucinogenic drugs and experience machines. Although drug-induced experiences are “real” on their own terms, I refer, as usual, to situations in which appearances and reality are related to the same proposition of interest. That is, hallucination is designed to take the place of a “real” life.


79 Institutional responses to such misconceived demands might be best, if the reality cannot be credibly communicated. For indications that prosecution of suspected subversives and minorities during World War I was partly an effort by federal officials to moderate populist demand for persecution, see PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979).

80 Similar logic applies to situations in which appearances are worse than reality, regardless whether appearance or reality should be characterized as “bad.” I use the good/bad dichotomy for clarity in exposition.

81 See ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18 (2000) (discussing costly conduct that may help separate good from bad types). A signal is an appearance as I define the term.
improve as a result. Indeed, if appearance cannot feasibly be improved, degrading reality might be preferable to certain transparency problems. (3) Bad appearance/bad reality situations are far different. Making the bridge appear safer will not make it safer in fact, so the real risk of bridge collapse should be reduced, if not too costly. Perhaps one could defend appearance manipulation aimed at making the risk appear worse, to create pressure for improvements, but that strategy is morally controversial at best. Equally controversial is improving appearance without improving reality, which is possible on the bridge model. 

(4) Good appearance/bad reality also prompts fairly clear recommendations: Reality should be made better and/or appearance should be made worse, depending on costs. Warnings might be sent to potential bridge users and the bridge’s structural integrity might be improved at the same time. But a pleasant appearance, whatever its benefits, will not change the bridge’s structural integrity.

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<td>(4) Bridge Model – improve reality.</td>
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b. Uncertain realities. We can make these crude combinations more nuanced. After thorough consideration, even the most capable decision maker can be left with indeterminacy. He or she might face residual doubt about the relevant facts, the appropriate value set, or the correct application of those values to a given decision problem. Whether or not uncertainty and other forms of indeterminacy are part of an objective reality, they are part of the human experience. When that experience is the “reality,” what should be the appearance? 

Intuitions might loosen here, especially in the abstract. But as a first approximation, when reality is uncertain, appearances probably should display uncertainty as well. If the risk of a bridge collapse this year cannot rationally be pinned down between 10% and 0.01%, no one should believe that the risk is any clearer. This reaction fits the usual desire to align appearance with reality. Reducing appearance/reality gaps empowers people to make judgments based on the closest approximation of truth. Furthermore, intellectuals do not have a standard prescription for dealing with fundamental doubt. There is a longstanding scholarly discussion about how best to manage irreducible uncertainty as opposed to mere risk; the options include maximin, maximax, and randomization. Given the controversy, perhaps protocol choices for decisions under uncertainty should be decentralized to the individual level when possible. If so, it is best for uncertain realities to have uncertain appearances.

Once again, there might be exceptions. Socially beneficial action might be possible only if most people are under the impression that uncertainty has been eliminated. Suppose that

82 Again, reality might be too difficult to move and appearance might be too awful to tolerate. But this “blue pill” situation, we can hope, is an occasional problem.

83 I assume that an appearance cannot be uncertain with respect to any given observer, although there can be disagreement across observers regarding how something appears.

84 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 20, 231–34 (1921).

85 See, e.g., SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY ch 2 (1986); David Kelsey & John Quiggin, Theories of Choice Under Ignorance and Uncertainty, 6 J. Econ. Surv. 133, 133–42 (1992); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 18–21 (2009).
experts on a particular issue rightly identify a residual domain of uncertainty and rightly select a method for decision given this unknown. A morally acceptable course for the experts conceivably could be to convince the rest of us that the uncertainty is unimportant or nonexistent, if such persuasion is necessary to carry out the socially best course of action. One account of the global climate change debate has this complexion. Nor is it far from the Supreme Court’s rationale for allowing states to demand voter identification at polling places. 86 Following this route is itself fraught with risk, of course. The authoritarian dangers are familiar while the likely gains are, by definition, unclear. Opening the possibility might create temptations for elites to overuse appearance-control techniques. Still, the justifications can be analyzed along the lines of deception tactics applicable to the good appearance/bad reality combination. A similar remark applies to efforts at manufacturing uncertainty when the reality is known to be good or bad. 87

c. Necessity and efficacy. Two cautionary notes should be offered now, in addition to a reminder that each of the recommendations above is provisional. First, appearance management is sometimes unnecessary. Appearance/reality gaps can be unstable without anyone trying to close them, as with large-scale conspiracies where secrecy is difficult to maintain. True, strong optimism is hard to maintain in the face of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme or the Johnson administration’s lasting spin on the Vietnam War, not to mention the time it took for people to accept that the earth revolves around the sun. But even modest pessimists will admit that reality often has a gravitational pull on appearance. Second, successfully manipulating appearances can be difficult. Image advertising can do only so much to control the beliefs of people who use the product. 88 Plus different people perceive and interpret events differently, sometimes unpredictably. The causes are numerous. They include differential access to information, differential resources for processing information, and differential sensitivity to influences such as cognitive bias, 89 emotional states, 90 cultural identity, 91 and ideology. 92 Regardless, effective appearance regulation is often challenging.

Consider voter fraud. One theory is that a potential voter’s perception of widespread fraud demoralizes the observer, making her less likely to vote, and that requiring photo identification at polling places will moderate these perceptions. The Supreme Court recently relied on this logic in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. 93 But there are other theories and little evidence. Perhaps perceptions of fraud prompt outraged citizens to vote in greater numbers. Or perhaps a statutory response will be ignored. It is not as if we have a terrific theory of why people vote in the first place. Existing empirical research also leaves doubt. Studying

86 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194–97, 202–03 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J); id. at 204–09 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court upheld Indiana’s identification requirement against a facial challenge based on the interests in preventing an unknown level of fraud, as well as reducing the appearance of fraud to maintain voter confidence.

87 For indications that uncertainty-maintenance is an accepted tactic in law enforcement, consider the confidential protocols for selecting subway stops for bag searches in New York City, see MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006), and tax returns for audits, see INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.19.11.1.5.1.8–.10 (Nov. 9, 2007).

88 See, e.g., GEORGE A. FLANAGAN, MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ADVERTISING 63–69 (1967).


cross-sectional polling data and voting records, Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily found no correlation between beliefs about vote fraud prevalence and turnout, nor between the strength of voter identification requirements and beliefs about vote fraud. 94 The devastating suggestion is that neither causal element of the appearance justification is demonstrable. But the study raises questions, too. Perhaps anti-fraud efforts are more likely in places with concerns about voter fraud, and these measures reduce those concerns—but only enough to washout differences between high and low regulation jurisdictions. The study cannot rule this out, which probably requires time-series data. 95

In addition, law might have a disparate impact across observers. Aside from those who pay no attention, ideological commitments may influence estimations of a law’s effect. Voter identification requirements like Indiana’s (which was supported and opposed along partisan lines in the legislature) could prompt some people to believe that the system is getting better, others to believe that it is getting worse, and still others to perceive a problem that they had not thought about until the legislation. Voter identification might then be akin to airport security efforts that some believe are necessary inconveniences and others criticize as “security theater.” 96 All of this indicates that those evaluating appearance justifications should be attuned to problems regarding necessity and efficacy.

2. Bank models and causation

Although questions of efficacy and cost are inescapable, the possibility of appearance positively influencing reality changes the picture. The normatively plausible options suddenly shift.

First of all, appearance manipulation can now move a situation from the lower right quadrant (cell 3) to the upper left (cell 1). Society could elevate out of the bad appearance/bad reality combination by engineering a better appearance. Similarly, society might retain the good appearance/good reality combination by sustaining the appearance alone. For example, unstable banks might become and remain stable through confidence-building measures such as deposit insurance. This assumes that propping up the bank is a good goal, of course, but the present observation is about techniques. Conversely, attempting to change the underlying reality alone will be ineffective. Unlike a simple bridge model in which reality and appearance must be maintained separately, a bank model shifts attention to appearance by itself.

In addition, the upper right quadrant (cell 2) and the lower left quadrant (cell 4) become unstable under the bank model—for reasons different from any instability under the bridge model. Especially potent appearances will eliminate those combinations, as self-fulfilling prophecies pull reality into alignment in time. Well-functioning banks cannot always survive rumors of insolvency or a more widespread financial panic, while poorly functioning banks can survive for a bit if access to that fact is restricted. Under the bank model, therefore, a good appearance/bad reality situation (cell 4) becomes less urgent compared to a bad appearance/good

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95 Cf. id. at 1755 n. 43 (recognizing that fraud perceptions may drive fraud regulation).
reality situation (cell 2); the former is self-correcting while the latter threatens a downward spiral. Something like the opposite is true under the bridge model, to the extent that reality has any positive causal effect on appearance. For a similar reason, the bank model makes uncertain realities less significant. If a self-fulfilling prophecy is in place, we may rely on appearance as a proxy for unobservable reality.

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<td>REALITY BAD</td>
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<td>Bank Model – unfortunately unstable, improve appearance alone.</td>
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<td>(3) Bridge Model – improve both.</td>
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a. Causation. But these differences depend on the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy—a potentially challenging causation question. Sometimes the suggestion will seem ridiculous, at least to intellectuals. The Secret is a self-help outfit that promotes positive visualization techniques. Among them is daily concentration on statements such as, “I am receiving unexpected checks in the mail.” On par would be a claim that inmate pain depends on the appearance of pain. At other times, a self-fulfilling prophesy will be perfectly plausible. Consider negative expectations and dating. It might not be surprising, given the degree of personal influence, if those who anxiously expect relationships to end are more likely to experience and prompt the quick end of a relationship. And evidence exists for the proposition that pre-existing anxious expectations of rejection lead people to perceive ambiguous cues negatively, and to behave differently during conflicts in ways that decrease the probability of a prolonged relationship.

Seeing a correspondence between belief and result is not the same as understanding the undergirding mechanism. To fully comprehend self-fulfilling prophecies, one must know the environments in which appearance, perception, and belief form in ways that encourage reality to align with them. The underpinnings of the bank confidence example are perhaps most confidently known. FDIC insurance along with greater federal oversight was followed by a period of remarkable stability for covered banks. Many factors contributed to greater stability, to be sure; the country experienced interest-rate spikes and waves of savings-and-loan failures during the 1980s and 1990s. Part of that problem seems to have been troubled thrifts taking riskier gambles with insured money as the government looked on, hoping that these institutions would right themselves. Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that post-1933 insurance and

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99 Accord id. at 557–58; see also William E. Wilkins, The Concept of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 49 SOCIOLOGY OF ED. 175, 180 (1976) (pointing out that self-fulfilling prophecies might be a function of misperceptions, ignorance, values, or the environment).
regulation increased bank stability through depositor confidence.  

In other situations, self-fulfilling prophecies are hard to validate or limited in effect. Among the most studied hypotheses is the impact of teacher expectations on student performance. The classic study is Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobsen’s *Pygmalion in the Classroom.*  

It involved elementary school teachers being told which of their students were likely to show significant intellectual growth based on a new test. But the teachers were misled. Their students had taken a standard IQ test, and the students supposedly marked for an intellectual spurt instead had been marked at random. At the end of the school year, another IQ test was administered. The randomly marked students nevertheless outpaced the IQ score increases of their classmates in a statistically significant way. The control group for all grade levels gained about 8 points between the two tests, while the treatment group gained about 12; the gap for first and second graders was about 25 points and 9 points, respectively. 

Yet it was always unclear precisely which mechanisms drove *Pygmalion*'s impressive results—how exactly teachers might have acted differently toward the marked students, and how marked students experiencing special treatment reacted. The authors themselves warned that their results might be sensitive to the student population and surrounding community. That warning turned out to be sound, if not always heeded in the excitement over the idea. What we can say with some confidence now is that “self-fulfilling prophecies in the classroom do exist, but they are generally small, fragile, and fleeting.”

No simple restatement of how to prompt self-fulfilling prophecies seems possible at this date. Researchers indicate that several factors might be relevant, including the novelty of the situation and the incentives for observers to acquire accurate information. But these are hypotheses. A more powerful message from this literature is that context is important. While we have reason to believe that self-fulfilling prophecies occur in a variety of situations, we do not always have a comfortable grip on when and how they happen.

*b. Valuation.* When a self-fulfilling prophecy is in play, there remains the question

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100 See, e.g., *CARNELL ET AL., supra* note 38, at 47, 309–10; Diamond & Dybvig, *supra* note 50, at 401.


102 See id. at 74–82.

103 See id. at 74–76.

104 See id. at 96 n.4.

105 Lee Jussim & Kent D. Harber, *Teacher Expectations and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Knowns and Unknowns, Resolved and Unresolved Controversies,* 9 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 131, 151 (2005) (observing that, in hundreds of studies, the coefficients are generally on the order of 0.1 or 0.2); see id. at 152 (“[S]ome large self-fulfilling prophecies have been found especially regarding members of some at-risk groups; although self-fulfilling prophecies dissipate, they may endure in diluted form for years.”).

whether to instigate or inhibit the dynamic. Were it possible to increase student intelligence by increasing teacher expectations, that course might be supported by a large majority—setting aside the inconvenient possibility that teachers might have to be systematically deceived. Other efforts to control appearances are more debatable. Deposit insurance plus regulation is one method of reducing bank runs without the inconveniences of bank holidays, but there are downsides, apart from the potentially distorting effects of tax-financed insurance. A deposit insurance program can backfire. If not coupled with accurate risk-based premiums or effective regulation of bank reserves and investment decisions, depositors might monitor their banks less seriously and banks might become too happy to make low-probability/high-return loans. The savings-and-loan crisis has been associated with this moral hazard. There also is evidence that government insurance is not closely correlated with financial sector stability in developing countries.

It is perhaps too easy to adopt a cynical attitude about the corrective potential of regulation in the post-Camelot era. Dark theories should not overwhelm convincing experience, however, and many decades of reliable banking is that kind of evidence. Equally significant, the financial sector is, like others, subject to politics. Popular demand for official action to increase reliability is not a force that can be ignored in the real world. Ultimately, each observer must value the advantages and disadvantages of appearance management. If a self-fulfilling prophecy is possible, the analysis becomes more taxing and more exciting. In addition to the aesthetic and expressive aspects of a decision, one should consider the chance of appearance swaying reality over time, the good accomplished by aligning the two, and the side effects of proceeding in this way. Everything depends on this kind of analysis, however challenging it might be to perform and however unlikely that every observer will agree.

C. Institutional Choice and Design Problems

Finally, issues of institutional choice and design ought to be recognized. The familiar idea is that a decision’s character and quality depend on how the process is structured. Societies face trade-offs when each institution is designed, and more trade-offs when disputes are allocated to one institution instead of others. The standard advice is to compare decision costs along with error costs across different institutional designs and institutional options. Some institutions will be frugal in churning out decisions, others will be expensive; some will be reliably correct, others will be more error-prone. Such differences are partly a function of healthy incentives and relevant expertise, which are all too often inversely related.

107 See generally J.R. Macey & E.H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. REG. 215, 220 (1988). FDIC now attempts to vary the assessments it imposes on banks according to each bank’s risk.


110 Also worth noting are near-substitutes for “banks” not subject to insurance and other requirements, which make the regulatory system more like an option that people may select into. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237, 267–68, 271–73 (1992). There remains the issue of systemic risk from a shadow banking system. See GARY B. Gorton, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).

Furthermore, dynamic effects should be taken into account, to the extent that behavior will change in response to different roles for decision makers. There also is the possibility that a decision is best left uninstitutionalized. Decision costs plus error costs plus problematic dynamic effects could mean that a supposedly social decision should be individualized.

The number of appearance justifications precludes specific advice about the allocation of power. There is too much diversity in the subject matter surrounding the proper basis for aesthetic choices, the importance of public confidence, the magnitude of transparency problems, the mechanics of self-fulfilling prophecies, and so on. However, there are two aspects in which appearance justifications seem special for institutional analysis. They cut in different directions.

On one hand, appearance justifications may come with a high risk of self-serving motivation, facilitated by lack of transparency. Whether the appearance managers are politicians, corporate executives, union leaders, or anyone else, outsiders may worry that false impressions are being generated for the purpose of hording power. These concerns escalate when decision makers control their own images without checks to ensure correspondence with the reality of their performance. True, outsiders suffer from expertise shortages—an inferior ability to evaluate decision-maker performance and justifications. But expertise deficits are pervasive in institutional choice problems, and they do not seem systematically different for appearance justifications. A relatively high risk of officials carrying out selfish designs flows from information asymmetries and it distinguishes many appearance arguments, insofar as outsider incompetence is less troubling than insider motivation problems. This recommends wariness when decision makers defend themselves based on appearance.

On the other hand, only a subset of appearance justifications is susceptible to this risk of bad motives. Aside from occasions when information asymmetries are minor, the risk is tightly related to bridge models and not bank models, let alone clock models, of the appearance/reality relationship. Concern about selfishness peaks when appearance managers create images of their performance that cannot influence the reality of their conduct backstage. When reality will be pulled toward appearance over time, however, the transparency problem fades—and so does the motivation concern. Outsiders need not be so worried whether decision makers are truly motivated by good or ill, as long as the appearance is consistent with a normatively attractive outcome. There is then more ground for deference favoring expert decision makers.

None of this avoids the task of identifying the most likely appearance/reality relationship. Even if bank models indicate less deference to appearance managers while bridge models indicate the opposite, evaluators must choose a model for a given situation. At times this will be uncontroversial, as in the lethal injection case. Situations like those are more suitable to oversight by outsiders, becoming as well-educated as they reasonably can be. But the true relationship among appearance, perception, belief, and behavior is at least occasionally foggy. How these considerations net out will depend on additional detail.

IV. TWO APPLICATIONS

As we have seen, references to appearance and reality often refer to the same proposition. When they do, several relationships are possible. I have emphasized three: reality might be

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113 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 78–79 (2006) (suggesting a few testable hypotheses regarding cross-institutional interaction).

insulated from appearance (the bridge model), appearance might help pull reality into alignment over time (the bank model), or reality might collapse into appearance (the clock model). Each model requires a value set to be normatively useful, and each presents issues of cost and efficacy. That said, each model suggests a different set of evaluative questions for appearance justifications when given by government officials. In simple terms, the bridge model often triggers transparency concerns, the bank model tends to eliminate them, and the clock model is often applicable regardless. In other words, what people call an appearance is usually significant for its own sake, but sometimes we should also worry about officials manipulating appearance away from an associated reality, and at other times those worries should wane amid the aligning force of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

These general impressions are now ready for more concrete application. The possibilities are countless, even restricting our view to contemporary government decisions. In addition to disparate examples referenced above—such as mandatory deposit insurance, voter identification requirements, and lethal injection drug protocols—the list includes ongoing debate over fiscal and monetary stimulus policies to build consumer and investor confidence, religious symbols on government property to reflect a mainstream or desired culture,\(^{115}\) antidiscrimination law as a tool to increase investment in human capital,\(^{116}\) the polarization said to arise from legislative districts that appear to be drawn according to racial lines,\(^{117}\) appearance-based ethics rules for legislators and bureaucrats,\(^{118}\) the proper standard for judicial recusal, and the character of judicial elections.\(^{119}\) This is only a start.

All of these arguments can be compared and contrasted under the models for appearance/reality relationships emphasized above. But each appearance justification is likely to have nuances. Instead of canvassing a large number of applications in speculative fashion, this Part narrows the focus to two modern debates. The discussion can then be fairy in-depth though not fully conclusive. And it can illuminate elements of the more general analytic framework, along with how those elements fit together. For these purposes, I have chosen courtroom debates over campaign finance regulation and policy debates over broken windows policing. Within these debates, moreover, I will concentrate on candidate contribution limits and policing strategies designed to fight violent crime. These two applications make for a constructive discussion. They have lasting prominence in the law literature, they are the subject of recent and intriguing examination by empiricists, and, using the same general framework, we can see

\(^{115}\) See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 60, at 143–44 (discussing possible objections to such practices); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1987) (critiquing the endorsement test); see also McCready County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“Manifesting a purpose to favor one faith over another . . . clashes with the understanding . . . that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\(^{116}\) See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 106, at 1640; Freed & Polsby, supra note 106, at 633–36; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729–30 (1982) (“[The university’s] admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy.”).

\(^{117}\) See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 61, at 506–16; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993) (stating that “reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter”).

\(^{118}\) See, e.g., Peter W. Morgan & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Appearance of Impropriety 2–5 (1997) (criticizing overused charges of apparently unethical behavior); see also United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995) (“Congress reasonably could assume that payments of honoraria to judges or high-ranking officials . . . might generate a similar appearance of improper influence.”).

sharply different gaps in the mainstream discussion of these topics.

A. Campaign Finance Regulation

1. Litigation under the bridge model

The Supreme Court and the advocates before it have treated the appearance justification for campaign finance regulation like the proverbial bridge. Justices have shown varying levels of sympathy to worry about public confidence, but this worry consistently follows a causal path from perceived official misconduct to citizen demoralization and loss of confidence in government. The ultimate dangers are not fully specified but they seem to be much like a bridge made useless by its risk-ridden reputation. Low confidence, low participation levels, and low respect for official decisions obviously undermine effective government.

Courtroom attention to this public relations problem developed between World War II and Watergate. Consider treatment of the Hatch Act. In 1947, the Court rejected an as-applied free speech challenge to the Act asserted by a U.S. Mint employee who wanted to a party ward boss at the same time. The majority opinion relied on a sizable list of factors but it never clearly invoked public perception. By 1973, the arguments shifted. Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers again vindicated the Hatch Act, but this time the Court relied on the appearance problem explicitly: “[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice,” the majority reasoned, “but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”

We cannot be certain why the Court turned to appearances. The government’s lawyers did not press the idea in briefing or oral argument. Worth noting, however, is that Letter Carriers was decided during an era of deep ideological divisions, waves of social unrest, and a crisis of confidence in major institutions—government included. The Watergate break-in had finally escalated into a premier scandal, and the Vietnam War had not done the federal government’s reputation any favors. “[F]rom 1964 to 1970, there was a virtual explosion of anti-government feeling” that was “sustained by the Watergate experience.” True, showcasing official perfidy is awkward for government attorneys defending regulation. It amounts to a claim that your superiors are so corrupt that they require license to restrain themselves and perhaps

120 See, e.g., KURT HOHENSTEIN, CONING CORRUPTION: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM 225–26 (2007) (recounting Senator Howard Baker’s concerns about public trust and confidence during the debates over post-Watergate campaign finance legislation); JOHN MCCAIN WITH MARK SALTER, WORTH THE FIGHTING FOR: A MEMOIR 337 (2002) (“Questions of honor are raised as much by appearances as by reality in politics, and because they incite public distrust, they need to be addressed. . . .”).


122 See id. at 94–104 (citing tradition, deference to Congress, threats to efficiency, threats to government “integrity” when citizens might not receive service without political connections, and support of the law in “informed public opinion”).


124 Id. at 565 (listing other regulatory interests, as well).

125 Haldeman and Ehrlichman were purged after oral argument in Letter Carriers and before the decision issued. See Laurence Stern & Haynes Johnson, 3 Top Nixon Aides, Kleindienst Out, WASH. POST, May 1, 1973.

126 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP 16–17 (1983); see also ROBERT E. Mutch, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 42–43 (1988); John R. Alford, We’re All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958–1996, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 30 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds. 2001) (noting that few people expressed full or no trust in “the government in Washington” and that the shift was mostly from “most of the time” to “some of the time” trust).
innocent parties, too. But the appearance justification goes down easier. A practical problem of corrupt appearance can exist even if corrupt bargains are rare in fact. And this problem must have seemed all too real in 1973.

The landmark Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments followed in 1974,127 and the Supreme Court imported the appearance justification in *Buckley v. Valeo.*128 “Here, as [with the Hatch Act], Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”129 This argument was not enough to preserve every element of the legislation; the Court invalidated caps on independent expenditures. In addition to supposedly greater constitutional value for spending independent of candidate campaigns, the majority thought that uncoordinated expenditures presented less risk of corrupt bargains between spenders and candidates.130 Yet the Court did rely on the appearance of corruption in upholding dollar limits on contributions to candidates.131 Here the risks of actual corruption were considered higher and thus the problem of corrupt appearance seemed worse.

The appearance justification thus played a modest supporting role in *Buckley,* as it has in cases since. Knowing exactly how modest is difficult. But consider this: There seems to be no campaign finance decision holding that the regulatory interest in fighting corruption was insufficient but that the interest in combating corrupt appearance was strong enough.132 Equally notable, the appearance justification always has been theoretically stunted. Judges may worry about public confidence in government but they do not assert that the appearance of corruption also helps cause actual corruption. “Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered,” Justice Souter once wrote, “and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.”133 Government lawyers have argued in similar terms. In *Buckley,* for instance, the Justice Department relied on *Letter Carriers* and its concern about public demoralization,134 not the risk of a downward spiral into widespread corruption in fact. And, on this score, legal scholarship is not more creative. Appearance justifications for campaign finance regulation are not much different in character

129 Id. at 27 (quoting *Letter Carriers,* 413 U.S. at 565).
130 See id. at 19–21, 47.
131 See id. at 27–28 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”). As this quotation suggests, the appearance justification has been intertwined with arguments for prophylactic regulation. Corrupt bargains can be difficult to detect, and broad rules might assure the public that corruption is not widespread. But the argument for prophylaxis, see supra note 8, can stand on its own without making the reduction of corrupt appearance a significant independent goal.
132 The closest counterexample I have seen is *Jacobs v. Alaska,* 338 F.3d 1095, 1112 n. 24 (9th Cir. 2003) (indicating that soft money contributions to political parties create corruption appearances regardless of how the money is actually spent, but also relying on an undue influence rationale).
134 See Brief for the Att’y Gen. & Fed. Election Comm’n 22, *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also id. (indicating that “legislating to restore public confidence in elected government” is important “in times of deep public suspicion and apathy”). Popular demand might be an additional reason for campaign finance regulation but public-pacification arguments still fall under the bridge model.
from courtroom arguments.\footnote{135}

Despite its significance in other respects, \textit{Citizens United} did not mark a major change in the processing of appearance justifications, especially for candidate contribution limits.\footnote{136} The Court took the orthodox approach. The feared consequence was sagging public confidence,\footnote{137} not more actual corruption. And, as usual, the justices did not ask whether the political system might falsely appear less corrupt with regulation in place. Finally, the case is consistent with a judicial tradition of unflinching empirical claims. Ten years earlier, in \textit{Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC}, a majority relied on their sense of plausibility to uphold contribution limits as an effective method of reducing real and perceived corruption.\footnote{138} “The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised,” Justice Souter told us.\footnote{139} The reasoning in \textit{Citizens United} is not so different. Justice Kennedy asserted that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of [quid pro quo] corruption”\footnote{140}—and that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”\footnote{141} Justices supporting and opposing regulation seem equally confident in estimating the effect on public opinion.

Perhaps this is unsurprising. Judges are hardly the most careful empiricists. And they are understandably sympathetic at some level to public relations problems in the rest of government. Aside from the crass observation that the threat is faced by the same system that provided their commissions, judges have for centuries relied on third-party confidence to maintain a role in social life.\footnote{142} This experience must make the bridge model seem natural for campaign finance cases. Judges wearing the same kind of robe or using a broad recusal standard might influence observers’ impressions, but one can scarcely think that those impressions will


\footnotetext[136]{The case addressed independent expenditures. \textit{See} Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 901–03, 908–11 (2010) (relying on \textit{Buckley} for the contribution/expenditure distinction). Perhaps the most important turn of events was the apparent narrowing of “corruption” to quid pro quo deals and the dismissive treatment of “undue influence” as a regulatory interest, \textit{see infra} note 172 and accompanying text, which is more clearly related to political equality commitments. My criticism of the Court’s overall approach to appearance arguments, I should stress, does not depend on a broader understanding of “corruption.”}

\footnotetext[137]{\textit{See} Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 908–11.}

\footnotetext[138]{\textit{See} Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390–95 (pointing to mass media accounts of shady political dealings, public support for contribution limits, and divided scholarship investigating the relationship between contributions and voting behavior).}

\footnotetext[139]{\textit{Id.} at 391; \textit{see also} McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003).}

\footnotetext[140]{\textit{Citizens United}, 130 U.S. at 909. The majority did later observe that the record in \textit{McConnell} had not identified instances of independent expenditure quid for vote quos. \textit{See id.} at 911.}

\footnotetext[141]{\textit{Id.} at 910.}

seriously affect the actual levels of judicial propriety. Believing in dispassionate judges—something Justice Jackson suggested was “mystical”—does not convert the optimistic view into reality. This would have been familiar logic when judges began facing challenges to campaign finance regulation.

2. Unvetted transparency and efficacy problems

The next question is whether this particular logic has been all-too-familiar. In my view, the answer is yes: Judges have been both insufficiently demanding of appearance justifications under the bridge model and insufficiently creative in ignoring the bank model. This subsection takes up the first problem.

a. Transparency. Criticizing courts for permissiveness on the appearance justification might seem counterintuitive. The argument has an uneven track record, at best. But in operating under the bridge model, judges have been disturbingly timid. The objection is not that government’s confidence problem is insignificant. Indeed, it might be more serious than any government lawyer is comfortable claiming. The basic problem is that judges entertain appearance justifications without assuring the rest of us that the actual incidence and likelihood of corruption is at least as low as the appearance that regulators hope to create. Judges have given us little reason to believe that any good appearance attributable to regulation is accompanied by a good reality, or even a solid indication that they are convinced of this.

That is a major problem within the bridge model. Any presumption in favor of transparency has special force in the campaign regulation context. The targets for appearance manipulation are voters or citizens or some other cohort in good standing. They are ordinarily considered principals in democratic theory—something like the opposite of enemies of the state. The mainstream presumption must be that they are entitled to some assurance that the (engineered) appearance of campaign finance regulation roughly aligns with the actual effect. In this situation, moreover, government officials are not communicating their claims to freedom from corruption through talk or simple forms of self-regulation. They are attempting to reprogram the paths of third-party political resources.

From this view, even Justice Kennedy is too soft. Critics in his camp complain that much campaign finance law is ham-handed overkill for legitimate spending on political speech that also protects incumbents or preferred speakers, but this does not show doubt about the law’s ability to minimize quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there seems to be tacit agreement on the Court that contribution caps actually reduce this threat. Certainly the defenders of contribution limits hold that the caps will reduce the frequency of corruption; they do not confess that corruption is widespread and then ask for authority to convince the public otherwise.

True, today’s limits might well reduce corruption in the form of campaign contributions exchanged for official favors from presidents and federal legislators. The attention of these officials is worth substantial sums, one would think, even if they lack any sense of ethics. But no

145 See, e.g., supra note 10. Among other arguments, of course.
146 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1) & 441a(c); Federal Election Comm’n, Contribution Limits (Feb. 2011) (showing inflation adjusted limits for 2011–2012, including a $2,500 cap on individual contributions to federal candidates per election, and a $30,800 cap on individual contributions to national party committees per year). These limits do not account for bundling.
guarantee has been given that public appearance attributable to contribution limits will reflect the actual prevalence of such deals. We should want evidence that corruption will stay least as low as the advertised level. This evidence is obviously difficult to obtain; participants in unlawful bargains prefer to keep their dealings quiet. If, however, the best justified belief is that the real level of corruption is uncertain within wide bounds, then this should form the logical footing for evaluating appearance-based justifications for the caps—not a more optimistic assumption.

Finally, contribution limits risk information losses in the form of candidate signals. Candidate choices about how to finance their campaigns might help voters distinguish good types from bad types. A candidate who refuses large contributions might be more credible when he warrants that his judgment as an official will depend on the best interests of his constituents or on his campaign platform, and will not be sold to the highest bidder. But across-the-board regulation is unlikely to create a separating equilibrium. If competing politicians are all bound by the same rule, they are presumptively indistinguishable within the domain of prohibited conduct. True, politicians do constrain themselves further than the law requires, as when candidates refuse to take political action committee money or return contributions from unpopular donors. But one would expect additional distinguishing behavior in the absence of regulation. Election law could instead authorize candidates to choose their own limits on contributions, if any, advertise those choices, and enforce those promises. This only deepens the transparency problem associated with today’s contribution limits.

b. Efficacy. In addition, an efficacy objection can be made to the appearance justification for contribution limits. If such regulation does not positively influence how any outsider perceives the political system, we will be left with costs and no efficacious response to the supposedly demoralizing perceptions of corruption.

This concern has been investigated by a few scholars, although expert empirical study is still scarce. Most notably, Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie have attacked the claim that corruption perceptions follow campaign finance regulation. They reviewed polls asking respondents, for example, whether they believe that there are many “crooked” people running the government and whether government is run by a few big interests. These numbers have changed but not obviously in response to law. Actually, their data show perceptions improving after Watergate and the 1974 legislation, but the authors emphasize that perceptions deteriorated after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). Several causes might explain the

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147 See generally supra note 81.
148 Recorded votes on campaign finance legislation might provide useful signals, but officials do not seem to support, say, biennial reauthorization of these laws.
149 If there is a signaling justification for statutory contribution limits, it must be institution-wide. Congress, for instance, might be competing with other government institutions and the private sector for the confidence of people concerned with social problems. But that story is more complicated—in part, we would need to know the extent to which the competitor institutions impose campaign-finance-like restrictions on behavior—and it would not recover the value of lost information about individual candidates, anyway.
151 See Persily & Lammie, supra note 135.
152 See id. at 145–46 (drawing on the National Election Study).
153 See id. at 147–49 & fig. 1.
trends. Indeed, Persily and Lammie find statistically significant correlations between answers to the corruption questions and variables such as approval of the president’s job performance, favorable views of the economy, and relatively high levels of trust in general.\footnote{See id. at 150, 156–57, 160, 167 n. 119, 168.}

The study asks an essential question but the answer is, unfortunately, only suggestive. Regulation was not an independent variable in the study.\footnote{See id. at 145.} Although the raw numbers are enough to indicate that past legal change has not dramatically affected public opinion, we should want to know the magnitude of the effect, if any, from various regulatory regimes. We also might wonder whether more radical legal change—such as robust public financing or elimination of contribution limits—could move the numbers further. It also is possible for the sensitivity of public opinion to change. Rising pessimism could help explain improved perceptions after the 1974 amendments yet worsening perceptions after BCRA, without indicating that deregulation would be no threat to the government’s image. Deregulation is a change about which one can be pessimistic, as well. Further, there is an identification problem here: Respondents’ perceptions of corruption might be influencing some of the independent variables, such as presidential approval. Corruption perception during the late Nixon administration surely affected that President’s numbers. To the extent this is true, the importance of forces that influence corruption perceptions, including law, might increase.

Another step forward comes from James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen. Their dependent variable was the corruption perceptions of journalists covering forty-five state legislatures, who were surveyed in 1998 as a clever proxy for actual corruption levels.\footnote{See James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States, 15 J. THEORETICAL POLITICS 341, 350 (2003). Another proxy is corruption prosecutions or convictions, see, e.g., Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis, 97 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1998), which is partly a function of law enforcement priorities. In a hideously dysfunctional regime, there would not be a positive correlation between corruption prosecutions and high corruption levels. A third proxy involves surveys of people’s experience with corruption. See infra Part IV.A.3.} Journalists are, of course, freakishly well-informed. Alt and Lassen were, however, interested in the effects of campaign finance regulation. It turned out that 57% of the variation in journalists’ corruption estimates was explained by statewide education levels (negatively correlated), per capita government revenue (positively correlated), metro population share (positively correlated), and income level (negatively correlated).\footnote{See Alt & Lassen, supra note 156, at 352–53 & tbl. 1.} But this left substantial room for other factors, including law.\footnote{See id. at 354–55 & tbl. 2 (finding that states with direct initiative opportunities without legislative vetoes were associated with lower journalist corruption perceptions). The theory is that initiatives allow citizens to unbundle the package of policies otherwise offered by political agents with slack. See also id. at 356 & tbl. 2 (same for states with higher relative government salaries). The theory is that an otherwise lucrative government job makes engaging in corruption less attractive.} “Campaign expenditures restrictions, by and on behalf of a candidate, are associated significantly with lower corruption,” the authors concluded, speculating that such regulation might counteract the fundraising advantages of incumbents.\footnote{Id. at 354–355 & tbl. 2.} This correlation persisted after a host of control variables were added, including measures of government size and regulatory burden.\footnote{See id. at 357–59 & tbl. 3.} Alt and Lassen did not better specify their campaign finance regulation variable,\footnote{Limits on the total amount spent by candidates would presumably be held unconstitutional, unless as a condition on receiving public financing. Correspondence with the authors indicates that they used 1996 data from the Book of the States on
the significance of their finding is cloudy. Nonetheless, their study offers some support for the
notion that law can affect the appearance of corruption among professional observers.

Using an analogous approach, David Primo and Jeffrey Milyo broke down state-level
campaign finance law into five categories, including candidate contribution limits. The authors
then studied the relationship to perceived political efficacy, such as whether respondents agreed
with the statement “[p]eople like me don’t have any say about what the government does.”162
This measure is not exactly perception of corruption, nor does it target perceptions about state
government.163 And the study tested the influence of any kind of candidate contribution limit,
regardless how high or how loosely enforced.164 In other respects, though, the study is useful.
The timeframe was long; the authors investigated whether regulation tended to lag behind
efficacy perceptions as a way of getting at the reverse causation problem; and several other
plausible influences were controlled for, including partisan affiliation and identification with the
party in power.165 The results were mixed. Public financing was associated with lower levels of
perceived efficacy, while disclosure laws and contribution limits on organizations (corporations,
unions, and political action committees) correlated with marginally higher levels.166
Interestingly, Primo and Milyo found no statistically significant relationship between efficacy
perceptions and contribution limits on both organizations and individuals.167 A cautious
inference is that legal design can modestly influence general public perceptions but that this
effect should not be assumed.

The most provocative study is the most recent. Beth Ann Rosenson found that an index
of campaign finance laws is positively correlated with journalists’ perception of corruption.168
Controlling for several variables, journalists covering state legislatures tend to report somewhat
higher perceived levels of corruption when this index of regulation is higher. As with the Alt
and Lassen study, the use of journalist perceptions is not the best stand-in for the perceptions of a
broader public. Moreover, both studies are cross-sectional snapshots; they do not investigate
variation in legal regimes and perceptions over time, which provides better insight into
causation. It would not be shocking to learn that political systems plagued by widespread
perceptions of corruption respond with formal legal changes that mildly dampen these
perceptions without eliminating them. That said, Rosenson does employ an instrumental
variables technique to help with the reverse causation problem of (reporters’) corruption

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162 See Primo & Milyo, supra note 150, at 23, 29–30 (relying on National Election Studies surveys from 1948 through
2000). On average, 60% disagreed with the statement quoted in text.
163 See id. at 30 n. 16 (recognizing the problem).
164 See id. at 29. Few states imposed any limit on individual contributions to candidates before 1976, but about two
thirds had them by 2000; a majority of states imposed limits on organizational contributions to candidates before 1976, and this
number drifted upward to over forty states by 2000. See id. at 28–29. By 1976 and Buckley, expenditure limits plunge to zero
from about half the states, while disclosure laws then surge from over half the states to all of the states. See id. at 29.
165 See id. at 31–32.
166 See id. at 33–34 (finding a 3% increase over the average in the likelihood of a respondent reporting that they have a
say in government in states with a disclosure law, a 4% increase in states with an organizational contribution limit, and a 5%
decrease in states with a public financing system). These effects were almost nothing compared to having a college degree, or
even a high school diploma. See id.
167 See id.
168 See Beth Ann Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures on Perceptions of Corruption, 8 Election L.J. 31,
34, 40 (2009).
perceptions possibly driving the adoption of campaign finance laws. And her findings are a proper warning that reform efforts in low-confidence environments can backfire.

These studies are not all directly on point, and they are bounded by the variation in state law. Moving from, say, tight contribution limits to none at all is an uncommon experience in the U.S. Nor can we be sure that the relationship of regulation to public perception at the state and federal levels is the same. Different segments of the public might pay more or less attention to system changes depending on their locus. But the limits of empirical study in this field provide grounds for healthy skepticism, not disregard. The power of campaign regulation to greatly influence public perceptions about the political system, perhaps especially in an era of low background confidence levels, is open to serious question. And serious investigation into such questions is, in some respects, only beginning to accelerate. So far, the constitutional debate has been left behind.

3. Potential for the bank model

What is the alternative to the bridge model? Nobody should believe that the appearance and reality of quid pro quo corruption are conceptually the same, nor is Section 441a(a)(1) of Title 2 pretty enough to be defended on aesthetics alone. This leaves a bank model for campaign finance regulation—a model in which appearance influences reality over time. Unlike the bridge model, the bank model reduces transparency concerns because appearance becomes a resource for gauging reality rather than an available tool for deception. In addition, the chance of a beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy reduces concerns about regulatory efficacy. Evaluators still must judge whether appearance regulation can successfully change perceptions, but success has a larger expected benefit if appearance might drive reality toward lower actual corruption levels. And, as I will attempt to explain, a bank model for campaign finance law, including candidate contribution limits, is theoretically appealing even if empirically debatable.

a. Theoretical sketches. The theoretical claim for a self-fulfilling prophecy in this context is fairly straightforward, although the claim partly depends on what kind of prophecy is contemplated. Two possibilities are appearances of undue influence yielding greater likelihood of such influence in fact, and appearances of quid pro quo corruption yielding greater likelihood of such corruption in fact. The first possibility is simpler but probably ruled out as a matter of constitutional doctrine, at least in the short run. The quid pro quo corruption possibility takes a bit more work to explain but it seems perfectly admissible under current doctrine.

Widespread perception of undue political influence (somehow defined) begetting actual undue influence (similarly defined) is a relatively simple idea. Individuals have the choice to participate in the political system, such as by voting, and participation is costly. If many people believe that the system is rigged, in the sense that other people have much more influence on outcomes, the first set might not participate in the first place. Their subjectively expected impact on outcomes would fall without the cost of participation falling in tandem. Granted, a sophisticated understanding of political participation is necessary here; a crude rational actor model might predict zero turnout on election day, regardless. But it is not difficult to believe that those who participate for expressive purposes, self identification, or to comply with social norms can end up disgusted with and disaffected from the political system when subsets of the

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169 See id. at 35–36.
170 There are other forms of corruption and other objectives for campaign finance regulation. I chose the two in the text because they are prevalent in contemporary legal debates.
population appear to be pulling the strings. These self-perceived outsiders might unplug completely. But unplugging may reduce the likelihood that a person’s values will be taken into account, and more people dropping out might make it socially comfortable for still others to do the same.

This form of self-fulfilling prophecy is not free from doubt. Outrage can take many forms, including plugging into a system to change it. Nor is campaign finance reform a surefire mechanism for adjusting perceptions of undue influence; it might be insignificant compared to, for instance, lowering the costs of voting. Similarly, feelings that the system is rigged can be derived from many aspects of a political system, including gerrymandering. Plus different cohorts of people will feel differently about what influence is “due” other cohorts. Each of these concerns begs for empirical testing.\textsuperscript{171} At the same time, the interest in correcting something called “undue influence” has been under assault at the Supreme Court. It has not clearly survived \textit{Citizens United}, and certainly not as to unequal levels of access to public officials prompted by independent expenditures.\textsuperscript{172}

To focus our inquiry, therefore, and to make it more theoretically challenging, we can turn to quid pro quo corruption. A self-fulfilling prophecy for quid pro quo corruption might be counterintuitive and it has not been an aspect of campaign finance litigation. Indeed this particular dynamic does not necessarily have anything to do with citizen demoralization, which is the phenomenon typically singled out in litigation. Yet it has a charming logic.

The idea is that the occasions for quid pro quo corruption will increase, and the political consequences of such corruption may recede, if the public’s general perception is that illicit bargains are commonplace. Imagine that a vast majority is convinced that unlawful quid pro quo deals between citizens and officials is the norm. People believe that such bargains are standard operating procedure, and they expect that the situation will be stable for the foreseeable future. Of course people might have overestimated the incidence of such corruption, but that is not our core concern any longer. The question is how this society—with a bad appearance and an existing reality that is good, bad, or uncertain—might operate over time given these beliefs and expectations. One strong possibility is that corrupt offers and acceptances will increase compared to a situation in which such corruption is thought rare.

First, people often are more likely to adopt than repudiate what seems to be normal behavior.\textsuperscript{173} Acting consistently with a perceived norm of illicit bargaining must be

\textsuperscript{171} One study of state law and its effect on voter turnout finds mixed results. \textit{See} David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, \textit{The Effects of Campaign Finance Laws on Turnout, 1950–2000}, at 2 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (finding no positive impact on turnout from state campaign finance laws post-\textit{Buckley}, finding a negative effect from public financing post-\textit{Buckley}, but finding a positive effect from contribution limits on organizational donors pre-\textit{Buckley}).

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{See} \textit{Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n}, 130 S.Ct. 876, 909–10 (2010) (Kennedy, J.) (“\textit{When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”} ) (citations omitted); \textit{accord} McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 298 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{See}, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, \textit{The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms}, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 380–81 (1997) (discussing shame, esteem, internalization, and guilt). Readers may think of the Minnesota tax compliance experiment at this point, although the results are not as strong as some suggest. \textit{Compare} Stephen Coleman, Minn. Dep’t of Revenue, \textit{The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: State Tax Results 5–6, 17–19 & tbl.2, 25} (1996) (finding increased income reported and taxes paid by randomly selected taxpayers who were told that tax compliance is actually the norm, at least above the $p = 0.10$ confidence level), \textit{with} Marsha Blumenthal \textit{et al.}, \textit{Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota}, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 130–35 (2001) (assessing the same experiment but reporting no statistically significant effect for included tax filers as a whole, with some subgroups reacting favorably and others negatively).
psychologically more comfortable than entering corrupt bargains absent such perceptions. The perceived normalization of “corrupt” bargains might well undo the negative label. Quid pro quo deals contrary to the formal law ultimately might be considered “gift-giving” compatible with necessity, common sense, or tradition. Either way, people can more easily discount the prospect of social sanctions, such as shaming, if they believe that most others are already engaged in the supposedly shameful behavior. More people perceiving the norm can lead to more people following the norm, which can lead to more people perceiving the norm (and so on).

Second, and regardless of social norms, there will be perceived competitive pressure to follow a perceived norm of corrupt bargaining. From the citizen’s perspective, restraining oneself despite the corrupt bargains accepted by others disadvantages abstaining parties. It amounts to unilateral disarmament in a battle for scarce public resources and favors. Even when such resources are in fact abundant, an apparently corrupt system can push otherwise law-abiding citizens toward bribery out of felt necessity. “If officials are generally untrustworthy, ordinary people and businesses may believe that the only way to get what they need is through a payoff,” Susan Rose-Ackerman has observed. The decision to employ this strategy depends on an estimate of its necessity, which is a matter of appearance. Again, more people perceiving the usefulness of such payoffs can lead to an equilibrium in which there are more people offering such payoffs. On this theory, “our expected gain from corruption depends crucially on the number of other people we expect to be corrupt.”

A third corruption-escalating force comes from the officials’ side of the equation. In addition to other forms of psychological comfort, officials might become less fearful of punishment for entering corrupt bargains when most people consider it normal. Part of the reason could be societal shifts in ethical standards that redefine bad behavior away from such deals. But another factor is the difficulty in credibly distinguishing oneself as a law-abiding official. Once the political system is tarnished by a poor reputation for corruption, it is not clear how a participant can escape that reputation. Attestations of ethical behavior, almost by definition, will ring hollow when perceptions of corruption are running high. Most observers of politics tend to be casual observers, and even careful observers have difficulty distinguishing politicians on questions of ethics. That these perceptions are influenced by real levels of corruption is not enough to eliminate the degrading effect of bad appearances.

Additional forces might then lean public officials toward corruption. Insofar as outsiders have only a weak basis for distinguishing among officials, a competitive disadvantage for self-restrained officials will arise. The corrupt quid often makes life easier for the recipient, whether by more easily building an effective campaign or by other personal benefit. Others are that much worse off. This competitive disadvantage folds into adverse selection effects. Otherwise ethical people will tend to opt out of public service, while those most comfortable with corrupt bargains

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174 But cf. Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government 15, 100–01 (2011) (offering evidence that people in highly “corrupt” settings tend not to internalize the norm as good behavior).


177 See id. at 1334.

178 This helps account for contribution limits as institution-wide signals. See supra text accompanying notes 147–149.
are more likely to select in.\textsuperscript{179} If a person wants to act ethically and wants to enjoy a reputation for ethical behavior, why enter an institution where people are likely to be tarred regardless? In an environment like this, political communities “may find themselves stuck in bad equilibria such that high-quality citizens avoid public office because so do other high-quality citizens.”\textsuperscript{180}

This is an admittedly stark picture, perhaps unrealistic for the United States in the short term. Moreover, we might spin out a different theory on which a political community begins to sense that corruption is spreading and responds with pressure for reform.\textsuperscript{181} Anti-corruption regulatory efforts can also backfire: Observers might take regulatory efforts as a sign that the corruption problem is larger than they had thought.\textsuperscript{182} Or the public response might be polarized. The community might be so heterogeneous that there is no useful “average” response to a given regulation. We might see hard-core moralists and crooks unmoved by anti-anticorruption campaigns, confirmed cynics and unswerving optimists holding fast to their outlooks, rigidly ideological camps shifting hard but in different directions—and only a relatively small persuadable group whose willingness to play fair depends on their perceptions of how many others are equally willing. Any of this is conceivable.\textsuperscript{183}

But with little creative effort, we can envision a set of pressures on private parties and public officials that sends a political system spiraling downward, with ever greater levels of perceived quid pro quo corruption and ever greater levels of actual quid pro quo corruption. Catastrophic risks are worth taking into account even if those risks are small. Widespread corruption is no exception. As the World Bank puts it, “Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy to the point where even non-corrupt officials and members of the public see little point in playing by the rules.”\textsuperscript{184}

b. Causation challenges. The foregoing is an image. The next question is whether it fits reality. On this score, the best available information falls short of what we should demand, given the possibility of severe political system degradation already happening in some places around the world. The hopeful note is that serious researchers have turned their attention to the fascinating interrelationships between corrupt appearances, corruption experiences, confidence levels, legal design, and so on. Here I will mention a few leading research efforts, and highlight hindrances to achieving a comfortable level of certainty regarding law’s role in self-fulfilling corruption prophecies.

\textsuperscript{179} I am assuming that ethical people have a realistic alternative to government service, while corruption-oriented people are at least equally drawn to government service. \textit{Cf.} Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, \textit{Bad Politicians}, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 759, 760–62 (2004) (showing multiple equilibria as to the fraction of capable politicians based on selection effects, even when voters have perfect information about candidate types, where less-capable people are at a disadvantage in the private sector).


\textsuperscript{182} Because of the general trend toward increasing anti-corruption regulation in the United States (aside from repeal by judicial review), the effect of deregulation on public perceptions is probably more difficult to study. It is nonetheless possible that regulatory efforts to create formal incentives will suggest to observers that many people share a need for such incentives.

\textsuperscript{183} I thank Dan Kahan for helping me develop these thoughts.

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{World Bank}, \textit{World Development Report: The State in a Changing World} 102–03 (1997); accord Cabelkova & Hanousek, supra note 181, at 203; accord \textit{Rotstein}, supra note 174, at 100, 146 (asserting that corrupt systems are sticky).
The logic of such prophecies indicates causal links that are, in principle, empirically testable. These include: (1) under what conditions a given law, such as a contribution limit of $X, will likely influence perceptions about the frequency of quid pro quo corruption; (2) under what conditions these perceptions increase the likelihood of corrupt offers, their acceptance, and adverse selection effects that increase the frequency of quid pro quo corruption; (3) under what conditions quid pro quo corruption is a net negative for society or otherwise wrongful. The answer to the third question is essentially uncontested in the United States, and, although a productive analysis of the issue as possible, I will leave it aside in favor of live debates.

The challenge of achieving better-than-provisional answers to the first two questions is evident. Numerous forces plausibly influence corruption levels. Among them are urbanization and income levels, government’s scope and salary levels, competition for public office and access to information about government, tradition and path dependence. Furthermore, a number of legal design choices might influence corruption perceptions and corruption frequency, aside from campaign finance regulation. These include term limits, citizen initiatives, redistricting procedures, and civil service protection. And corruption perceptions might usually follow the observer’s general disapproval of those in office, or the unemployment rate, or the even the community’s “kvetch” quotient.

We have already reviewed the emerging empirical evidence on the first question (the effect of law on corruption perceptions). The results were mixed and modest, but sufficiently provisional to leave even minimally curious observers wanting more. Evidence on the second question (the effect of corruption perceptions on corruption levels) is in a similar state. Scholars are beginning to understand the risk of essentially perpetual corruption resulting from the reputation of a political system spiraling downward. But they are only beginning.

Discomfiting illustrations do exist. Take reputationally challenged political jurisdictions in the United States—places where corruption is and has been taken as a fact of life, such as Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Illinois. The familiarity of former Illinois governors with the criminal justice system is plausibly explained in part by adverse selection effects and greater opportunities for corrupt conduct, which are facilitated by expectations that such conduct will

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185 A related question is whose perceptions are likely to be influenced, not just how many people’s.

186 For the possibility that corrupt bargains can rightly circumvent misguided government policy, see Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AMER. BEHAV’L SCIENTIST 8 (1964) (food price controls in Brazil), and Daniel Levy, Price Adjustment Under the Table: Evidence on Efficiency-Enhancing Corruption, 23 EURO. J. POLITICAL ECON. 423 (2007) (black markets in the Republic of Georgia).


188 See, e.g., Alt & Lassen, supra note 156, at 342–44; Treisman, supra note 187, at 399.

189 The direction of influence, if any, from some of these variables is theoretically ambiguous. For instance, civil service protection might professionalize a bureaucracy such that its employees refuse bribes, or it might increase corrupt bargains by providing those employees with an unwarranted sense of security.


191 See supra Part IV.A.2; see also Natalia Melgar, Maximo Rossi & Tom W. Smith, The Perception of Corruption, 22 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 120 (2010) (investigating a variety of factors that might influence corruption perceptions around the world, such as income inequality and education, but not law or law enforcement efforts).
It also seems that local governments that develop serious corruption problems tend to remain trapped in that bad equilibrium. It is not difficult to imagine that the reputation of New Orleans makes it difficult to alter real corruption levels. The same thought applies to political systems beyond our national borders in which appearances, expectations, and the best indicators of actual corruption all drop together. Afghanistan is an inviting example. Reports are that a sizable fraction of public business, ranging from land titles to government jobs, operates with transactions that violate formal law and that the average person expects to persist.

These are case-study suggestions but broader investigations have been conducted. Part of this research involves the propensity to make corrupt offers when corruption perceptions are high rather than low. A pioneering study is Inna Cabelkova and Jan Hanousek’s work on post-Soviet Ukraine. Their basic finding was that people reported greater willingness to engage in bribery of officials when their perceptions of corruption were higher. This is consistent with a self-fulfilling prophecy theory, regardless of why the former attitude tends to come with the latter perception or why the perception arises in the first place. In some ways, the Ukraine of the late 1990s is exceptional. Over 60% of the respondents indicated that they thought government did nothing to fight corruption, and 25% reported a personal experience with corruption. Yet parts of the world today are similar or at risk of becoming so.

There is also ongoing, large-scale empirical investigation into the effects of corruption perceptions. One revealing study uses the 2008 Gallup World Survey to reach 78,000 people in 90 countries. Among several intriguing conclusions, Bianca Clausen and her coauthors find

193 For a suggestion that public tolerance for corruption in New Orleans diminished after Hurricane Katrina, see Mike Tolson, New Orleans Rebuilding. But Katrina Scars Remain, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 29, 2010. Shifts in general public expectations regarding corruption might come from exogenous shocks, including exposure to other systems via the post-Katrina diaspora. I thank Clay Gillette for developing these points.
194 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTIONS PERCEPTION INDEX 2005 & 2009 (reporting aggregations of surveys on corruption perceptions, and showing Afghanistan falling from 117th out of 159 ranked countries in 2005 (2.5/10.0) to 179th out of 180 in 2009 (1.3/10.0)); Dexter Filkins, Afghan Corruption: Everything for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009 (providing anecdotes). For a partial success story about Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission and Anti-Corruption Court, see Simon Butt, “Unlawfulness” and Corruption Under Indonesian Law, 45 BULL. INDONESIAN ECON. STUDIES 179 (2009) (pointing out the advantages of a new, specialized, non-corrupt enforcement regime, along with threats of over-deterrence from vague and overbroad anti-corruption norms).
195 The empirical literature on government corruption is growing, with the recognition that corrupt political regimes pose hurdles to economic development. See, e.g., Toke S. Aidt, Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 271, 271–72 (2009) (finding corruption experiences among business managers and general corruption perceptions negatively correlated with per capita wealth, while only the corruption perception measure correlated with per capita GDP changes). Case studies from abroad can be found in ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988); see also F. Varese, The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Socialist Russia, 45 POLITICAL STUDIES 579 (1997). A leading account of corruption from an economic and political perspective is SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999); see also SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 187, at 11–12, 91–108.
196 See Cabelkova & Hanousek, supra note 181; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Trust and Honesty in Post-Socialist Societies, 54 KYKLOS 415, 420–24 (2001) (reviewing studies on corruption perceptions and attitudes toward government, and noting a result in which respondents’ predicted happiness with achieving success through bribery depended on the perception that others were engaged in similar transactions); see also Alvaro S. González et al., The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4394, Nov. 2007) (concluding that firms’ corruption perceptions adjust slowly to experiences).
197 See Cabelkova & Hanousek, supra note 181, at 390, 396.
198 The authors studied several information sources and their effects on perception, such as media and friends. Unsurprisingly, a respondent’s reported experience with corruption strongly influenced corruption perceptions. See id. at 390.
199 See id. at 384.
200 See Bianca Clausen et al., Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions 2 (World Bank Policy Research
that corruption perceptions have an independent effect on willingness to support violence as a means of change and willingness to exit the political jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{201} This influence of perceptions is not as strong as reported corruption experiences, and the authors are rightly concerned that corruption perceptions are more vulnerable to reverse causation than are reported corruption experiences.\textsuperscript{202} But the relationship between high corruption perceptions and attitudes towards violence and exit seems to hold independent of the effect on confidence in government (corruption perceptions are associated with low confidence, as well). This suggests one of many potentially negative consequences of widespread corruption perceptions.\textsuperscript{203}

Furthermore, scholars are trying to pin down the relationship between corrupt appearances and corruption levels. An important recent attempt by Wonbin Cho and Matthew Kirwin concentrates on seventeen countries in Africa.\textsuperscript{204} The authors spell out a vicious circle involving corruption experiences and perceptions feeding off each other.\textsuperscript{205} And they test the theory with survey data, homing in on particular government services (access to healthcare and education). As we have seen, isolating the various causal pathways is a major challenge, and the authors had only cross-sectional data. But Cho and Kirwin’s results are consistent with a self-fulfilling prophecy role for corruption expectations, albeit a role built on reported corruption experiences. “[T]he experience of corruption decreases popular satisfaction with government service delivery in basic healthcare and education sectors,” the authors conclude, “and perceptions of an unjust government service delivered by corrupt officials motivate citizens to pay a bribe or give a gift to obtain public services.”\textsuperscript{206}

More valuable work in this area can be done—including work on the United States where political campaigns are relatively expensive yet corruption levels seem far lower than in Afghanistan. Appearance of corruption can do only so much damage.\textsuperscript{207} In fact, a lesson we can draw from the Clausen study involves the power of actual corruption experiences. Their data show that public perceptions of corruption tend to vary widely across countries with relatively low rates of reported corruption experiences, but the perception tends to remain high among countries with relatively high rates of reported corruption experiences.\textsuperscript{208} In other words, a country with widespread corruption experiences among its citizenry will probably have a difficult time controlling corruption appearances, whereas a country in which corruption is rarely experienced might end up with a clean reputation, a dirty reputation, or something in between. The United States probably fits in the latter category, however, where several forces might

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See id. at 24. Even controlling for kvetch proxies. See id. at 14–16.
\item A respondent’s reported corruption perceptions might be essentially a function of that person’s disapproval of the policies of the incumbent administration. There is somewhat less reason to think that a respondent is more likely to report actual corruption experiences based on such other variables, although it is possible, especially in ambiguous situations.
\item See also Lavallée et al., supra note 175, at 16 (finding that corruption perceptions and experiences are associated with lower trust in political institutions in the African countries studied, although a negative effect of perceptions weakens as access to services degrades while the negative effect of experiences rises).
\item See id. at 10.
\item Id. at 16.
\item In parts of the political system in the United States, perhaps only well-informed people contemplate campaign contributions. These people, too, make decisions based on imperfect perceptions of the system’s standard operating procedure, but they might be less susceptible to self-fulfilling prophecy dynamics.
\item See Clausen et al., supra note 200, at 30 (fig. 1).
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influence the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, including campaign finance law. Total absence of the bank model in most campaign finance debates is, all told, a troubling omission.

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Among the potentially litigable issues today is whether and to what extent money contributions to political candidates can be restricted by law, consistent with the judiciary’s emerging constitutional commitments. Litigation is pushing in a deregulatory direction while the politics of the post-Watergate era have trended in the opposite direction. The proper role of appearances in the analysis is not yet well understood. Certainly there is no simple clock model for plausibly evaluating regulation in this field. Actual, not just apparent, corruption is a threat of understandable concern in the United States. After this mainstream conclusion, however, confident depictions of the situation fall away. Whether campaign finance laws such as contribution limits are more like bridges or banks is open to serious debate. At the moment, evaluators probably should consider both models. To the extent that a bridge model cannot be ruled out, proponents of regulation should be asked why core democratic transparency norms are not at risk or are overridden by other values. To the extent that a bank model cannot be ruled out, critics of regulation should be asked why the theory and emerging evidence on self-fulfilling corruption prophecies do not adequately support the status quo.

Of course, efficacy questions persist regardless of which model fits best. No appearance-of-corruption justification for contribution limits makes sense unless the regulation affects the perception of at least some observers—and the influence will not likely be exactly the same across all observers who pay attention. Furthermore, effective campaign finance regulation comes with costs. Contribution limits prevent donors who care from facilitating political messages that they support, and willing recipients from more easily fueling their campaigns. Evidence on efficacy is mixed, and observers in the “money is speech” camp will demand large demonstrable benefits before supporting attempted inhibitions on the money trail in politics. True, not everyone holds such extreme constitutional views. Those with more moderate positions will be curious whether, for instance, eliminating contribution limits would not only deepen public cynicism but also increase the likelihood of illicit quid pro quo deals. And those who frown at any system other than public financing will be even more tolerant of such regulation. In all events, efficacy and cost are part of a thorough evaluation of campaign finance law for a large fraction of concerned observers.

However readers answer these questions for themselves, courts have performed poorly on nearly every one. Setting aside judicial disagreement over how to value cash contributions in constitutional terms, judges have waded into other issues of appearance without a sensible navigation system. They make untested yet confident assertions about the effects of regulation. They myopically picture the political system as if it were a bridge in need of public confidence but without pressing core transparency concerns. And they have not explored self-fulfilling corruption prophecies at all. Judicial treatment is simultaneously too permissive, insufficiently creative, and disengaged from serious empirical inquiry. Only by miraculous happenstance could these mistakes cancel out. While the lessons of institutional choice and design might help explain or even justify current court behavior, the argument over appearance in campaign finance litigation is no good for anyone trying to get a serious handle on the strengths,

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209 See supra Part III.C (discussing expertise/bias trade-offs across different institutions); infra Part IV.C (comparing the judicial treatment of campaign finance challenges with the policy debates over broken windows policing).
weaknesses, and uncertainties surrounding the issue.

B. Broken Windows Policing

1. Policy debates and prophetic theories

Debates over broken windows policing have their own shortcomings but they have been remarkably different. Aside from attracting little direct judicial attention, this policing strategy has been tightly connected with a bank model. Policymakers, scholars, and others have struggled with the question whether a concentrated government attack on perceived disorder will pay dividends in terms of reduced crime rates. True, broken windows theories are not always terribly concrete, but many versions do indicate that neighborhood appearance drives the reality of neighborhood safety. A critical question for this field is whether policy makers and scholars have been too devoted to the creative sophistication of a bank model, at the expense of models and arguments that are simpler and more reliable.

To better understand these ideas, we can separate broken windows theories of misconduct from broken windows theories of policing. In general terms, the former assert that the appearance of disorder is causally related to the amount of disorderly behavior. “[I]f a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired,” James Q. Wilson and George Kelling hypothesized, “all the rest of the windows will soon be broken.” There is no simple and stable definition of disorder for purposes of broken windows theorizing, but the notion is invariably connected to neighborhood appearances. Wesley Skogan’s physical and social dimensions of disorder are both immediately observable:

Disorder is evident in the widespread appearance of junk and trash in vacant lots; it is evident, too, in decaying homes, boarded-up buildings, the vandalism of public and private property, graffiti, and stripped and abandoned cars in streets and alleys. It is signaled by bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, by the presence of prostitutes and panhandlers, by public drinking, the verbal harassment of women, and open gambling and drug use.

A broken windows theory of misconduct was popularized before it was specified, and there is more than one conceivable version. Different versions can suggest different hypotheses regarding the rate of misconduct, the seriousness of misconduct, and the mechanism by which either is influenced by the appearance of disorder. Thus one might hypothesize that the appearance of a broken window will soon lead to an outbreak of window-breaking and nothing else, or that much more serious misconduct will follow, as well. Much scholarship concentrates on the implications for serious crimes such as homicide or robbery. Equally significant, more


214 See id. at 29–32 (explaining the idea based on observations, logic, and a few analogous studies).

215 See, e.g., id. at 51, 72–75 (reporting on robbery); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 60–61, 78 (2001) (reporting on robbery, rape, burglary, assault, and also purse-snatching);
than one mechanism might be at work. All versions of the theory suppose that the appearance of a location influences behavior in that location, but the influence might occur through norm internalization, “signals” about the state of the neighborhood, herding behavior among the ill-informed, shifts in the “social meaning” ascribed to what had been considered misconduct, or something else. Not every possible mechanism directly implicates a self-fulfilling prophecy that runs through shared perceptions and expectations. But a theme in broken windows theories of misconduct is that the appearance of disorder suggests to observers that disorder is uncontrolled, and this prompts some people toward even greater disorder that is, in fact, not controlled.

These hypotheses are not just academic curiosities; they now form the rationale for a common policing policy. Broken windows theories of misconduct were matched with broken windows policing strategies, which took hold in several jurisdictions. The most notable example is New York City. Following the arguments of George Kelling, in 1990 the city’s transit police began more aggressive enforcement of misdemeanor offenses such as turnstile jumping. Subway misdemeanor arrests and ejections tripled within a year, with arrestees booked quickly on a mobile “Bust Bus.” In 1994, the strategy moved above ground. The plan was for city police to boost arrests for fairly minor, if quite visible, misdemeanors and ordinance violations—such as graffiti, littering, panhandling, public drunkenness, public urination, and prostitution. The police department announced that such enforcement measures would be “the linchpin” of its efforts “to reduce crime and fear in the city. By working systematically and assertively to reduce the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD will act to undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible.” Between 1994 and 1998, adult misdemeanor arrests increased by at least 40,000 per year. During the 1990s, the violent crime rate plunged. For example, the total number of homicides in New York City dropped more than 70% between 1990 and 1998 (from 2,245 to 633).

New law enforcement strategies and favorable changes in crime rates lent credibility to broken windows theories of misconduct and of policing. It was at least possible that broken windows policing had improved the orderly appearance of affected neighborhoods, that an orderly appearance generated expectations that order would be maintained, and that these expectations influenced human conduct in ways that pulled reality toward those

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216 See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 211, at 19–20 (focusing on signals, albeit not in the technical economic sense of good types and bad types with private information); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 210, at 281–82 (noting the possibility of herding and information cascades); Kahan, supra note 106, at 369 (concentrating on social meaning).

217 See HARCOURT, supra note 215, at 1, 46–51; GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, DO POLICE MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 2 (2001). The overall strategy was referred to as the quality-of-life initiative. This and similar strategies go by many names, including broken-windows and order-maintenance policing.

218 See KELLING & COLES, supra note 211, at 131–33 & figs. 4.1–4.2 (showing ejection and misdemeanor arrest numbers increasing after mid-1990); WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 154–56 (1998) (describing the strategy).


220 Id. at 7.

221 See HARCOURT, supra note 215, at 2 (noting that reported stop-and-frisk activity increased even more).

expectations. Perhaps more law-abiding people became confident that looking out for each other
and collaborating with the police would be effective and acted accordingly; perhaps more law-
breaking people expected this or other inconvenient reactions to the risk of serious crime;
perhaps a combination of the foregoing took place. Regardless, concerned members of a
community might feel that they have reason to attend to the visible remnants of fairly low-level
misconduct. They might do so in the hope of preventing more of the same—or worse. There
was a success story on serious crime in New York City.

2. Causation problems for the bank model

On the other hand, many large cities in the United States experienced significant drops in
their recorded crime rates. Not all of them implemented broken windows policing. Nor was this
policing strategy the only potentially relevant event in New York City.223 Economic news was
good, for instance. And so there were competing hypotheses.224 Perhaps atypically large drops
in crime followed atypically large increases as a matter of simple reversion to the mean, not
because of policing strategies. Perhaps a crime wave in the 1980s and early 1990s was a product
of violence surrounding burgeoning crack cocaine markets, and this storm of violence dissipated
for reasons unrelated to policing.225

No scholarly consensus has emerged on either broken windows theories of misconduct or
their affiliated policing strategies. These ideas still attract vocal support and determined
criticism. The relevant empirical issues have, however, received constructive attention that
provides the beginning for intelligent analysis.

On broken windows theories of misconduct, two leading investigations come from
Wesley Skogan and Bernard Harcourt. In 1996, based on data from thirty neighborhoods,
Skogan found a statistically significant relationship between neighborhood resident perception of
physical/social disorder and robbery victimization.226 Importantly, the association held after he
controlled for racial demographics, poverty indicators, and proxies for neighborhood stability.227
“[D]irect action against disorder could have substantial payoffs,” Skogan wrote.228 In 2001,
however, Harcourt reanalyzed the same data and offered major caveats. He emphasized that
there were missing data on robbery and disorder, and that survey respondents were not
questioned about the location of their victimization.229 This might make readers skeptical about
the statistically demonstrable impact of perceived disorder on any crime rate. In addition,
Harcourt reported that there was no statistically significant relationship between disorder
perceptions and rape, burglary, assault, or purse snatching.230 Even if people rely on the same

223 See, e.g., KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 217, at 5, 11–12 (stating that police initiatives other than broken windows
policing are difficult to track with measurable proxy variables); David L. Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and
programs and their national diffusion).
224 See, e.g., KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 217, at 2–3 (emphasizing a divide between root-cause theories and police-
impact theories); Magdalena Cerdá et al., Misdemeanor Policing, Physical Disorder, and Gun-Related Homicide: A Spatial
225 See, e.g., Cerdá et al., supra note 224, at 533.
226 See Skogan, supra note 213, at 51, 72–75.
227 See id. at 71.
228 Id. at 75.
230 See id. at 60–61, 78. Harcourt also points out that five Newark neighborhoods account for the positive finding on
robbery in the Skogan study, see id. at 72–74—although one might think that this fact is more interesting than discrediting.
visual cues for neighborhood disorder, and even if those cues are reliable and untroubling as a basis for policymaking, the causal impact of such perceived disorder on serious crime is reasonably contested.

Although much more could be said about the persuasiveness of broken windows theories of misconduct, our focus on appearance-justified government decisions suggests that we move to the evidence on broken windows policing strategies. With respect to the causal effect of these strategies on serious crime, we can look to several relatively recent efforts. The optimistic side is represented by the report of George Kelling and William Sousa published by the Manhattan Institute in 2001. The authors investigated police precincts in New York City during the 1990s and they found a statistically significant and large relationship between misdemeanor arrests and violent crime (a combined measure of homicide, rape, robbery, and felony assault). Equally notable, Kelling and Sousa could not find a significant positive relationship between the violent crime rate and proxies for cocaine use, the young male population, or poor economic conditions. These proxy variables are by definition imperfect, as is the correspondence between misdemeanor arrests and what can plausibly be called broken windows policing, and perhaps an omitted variable is driving violent crime rates down. That said, the numbers in this study are striking. The authors claim that precincts “could expect to suffer one less violent crime for approximately every 28 additional misdemeanor arrests,” and that “[o]ver 60,000 violent crimes were prevented from 1989 to 1998 because of ‘broken windows’ policing.”

On the skeptical side, the standout response is a 2006 law review article by Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig. They gathered data to match Kelling and Sousa’s. But Kelling and Sousa examined the average misdemeanor arrest rate per precinct across the entire decade rather than yearly changes in these arrest rates, and they did not control for the possibility of mean reversion in violent crime rates. So Harcourt and Ludwig made two notable adjustments: controlling for the violent crime rate in each precinct leading up to 1989, and shifting from the decade-long average arrest rate in each precinct to yearly per precinct totals for 1989 to 1998.

Perhaps one could find something measurably different about these neighborhoods that would be instructive.

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See also Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 215, at 603, 608, 629–30, 637 (finding that coded levels of disorder in Chicago neighborhoods generally does not mediate the effect of other neighborhood characteristics on homicide, burglary, and robbery, and emphasizing the importance of collective efficacy alone). But cf. Pamela Wilcox et al., Busy Places and Broken Windows? Toward Defining the Role of Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime Models, 45 SOCIOLO. Q. 185, 199–200 (2004) (reporting results from a cross-sectional study that physical disorder does mediate the effect on violence and burglary from business-oriented public spaces, but not from schools or playgrounds)

233 KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 217, at i–ii.

234 See id. at 5, 8–10.

235 See id. at 4–5, 8 (detailing their proxy variables as including data on hospital discharges for cocaine-related treatment at the borough level, young male enrollment in public high schools at the precinct level, and the number of unemployed persons at the borough level). The study found higher unemployment associated with falling violent crime rates. See id. at 9.

236 See id. at 18 (emphasizing quality, not just quantity, of enforcement).

237 Id. at i (executive summary) & 9 (emphasis omitted); see also Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235 (2005) (studying New York City-wide data on monthly misdemeanor arrests and finding an association with declines in car theft and robbery but not other crimes).

238 See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 210, at 289–93.

239 See id. at 290–93, 295 (explaining the mean-reversion control variables as 1989 violent crimes and 1984–1989 change in violent crimes).
With the controls for mean reversion, more than two thirds of the association between misdemeanor arrests and violent crime disappeared. With several more precinct-level control variables, including changes in poverty and vacant housing, the association shrunk further and lost statistical significance. And with a shift to yearly changes in misdemeanor arrests, the association turned around in some model specifications, with misdemeanor arrest increases correlating with violent crime increases. This leaves mean reversion as a plausible alternative explanation for drops in violent crime. “[P]recincts that received the most intensive broken windows policing during the 1990s are the ones that experienced the largest increases in crime during the city’s crack epidemic of the mid-to-late 1980s.”

Harcourt and Ludwig also tried to find out what happens when people are moved from disorderly neighborhoods into more orderly locations. They studied the criminal behavior of current and former residents of public housing projects in high-poverty areas. Applicant families were randomly assigned housing vouchers that could be used only in low-poverty areas, housing vouchers that could be used anywhere, or no additional assistance. This program design could not fully isolate the effect of neighborhood disorder by itself, considering that movers usually experienced changes in neighborhood affluence and they were conceivably subject to more attentive neighbors or police officers; moreover, use of the vouchers did not yield much racial integration as measured by census tract. But the results are suggestive. Based on self-reporting and arrest records, the voucher recipients seemed to have more favorable opinions of their neighborhoods compared to the control group, but they did not show significantly different offending rates. By reassessing the New York City data and by adding a randomized experiment involving people subject to broken windows dynamics, Harcourt and Ludwig’s evaluation made it far more difficult to accept broken windows theories of disorder or of policing—at least in the form of more misdemeanor arrests to drive down violent crime.

Since then, serious empirical work on broken windows policing has become, in some respects, more modest and more targeted. First, several studies report that the effect of broken windows policing is small compared to other measurable variables. This conclusion is

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240 See id. at 294 tbl. 2, 295. According to the table, adding the 1989 variable or both the 1989 and 1984–1989 change variable had this effect; the 1984-change variable had less impact on its own.

241 See id. at 294 tbl. 2, 295–96; see also id. at 318 (explaining that census-tract data was translated into precincts).

242 See id. at 296, 297 tbl. 3; Errata, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407 (2007) (showing that Table 3, Row 1 displays coefficients for misdemeanor arrest changes, and that these coefficients were positive in Models 2–5). In no model for Table 3 is there a negative and statistically significant association between misdemeanor arrest changes and violent crime changes.

243 Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 210, at 276.

244 See id. at 276–77, 300–07.

245 See id. at 304 & 305 tbl. 5 (indicating that voucher users tended to move into higher income and lower crime census tracts, but not racially mixed census tracts); id. at 310 n. 90, 313–14 (explaining the possible difference in police monitoring).

246 See id. at 306–14 (noting that lower arrest rates for female youths were offset by higher rates for other subgroups). The results reported there are based on Jeffrey R. Kling, Jens Ludwig & Lawrence F Katz, Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment, 120 Q.J. ECON. 87 (2005).

247 See Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango & Andres F. Rengifo, The Impact of Order-Maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988–2001, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 369, 377 (2007) (controlling for mean reversion and finding a statistically significant but “modest” effect of misdemeanor arrests on robberies and homicides); Steven F. Messner et al., Policing, Drugs, and the Homicide Decline in New York City in the 1990s, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 385, 401, 405 (2007) (similar for gun-related homicides and for robberies between 1990 and 1999, and also finding a relationship between a proxy for cocaine use (cocaine-related accidental deaths as recorded in hospital records) and lower homicide rates); Cerdá et al., supra note 224, at 539 (characterizing the effect of misdemeanor arrests on gun-related homicides between 1990 and 1999 as “small”); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 163, 177, 184 (2004) (crediting increased imprisonment, increased numbers of police officers, deflated
controversial; it depends on what counts as small when lives are at stake and when people have only so many policy levers to pull. That said, policing strategies are unlikely to account for anything approaching the whole story. Consider the recent contribution from Richard Rosenfeld and his coauthors. Taking seriously the warnings of Harcourt and Ludwig, the Rosenfeld team controlled for mean reversion in New York City by using 1984 and 1988 precinct-level data on robbery and homicide rates. \(^{248}\) They still found a statistically significant association with misdemeanor and ordinance-violation arrests from 1988 to 2001. \(^{249}\) On the other hand—and at least equally important—the authors were able to credit these arrests with only 7–12% of the homicide decline and 1–5% of the robbery decline. \(^{250}\) Perhaps this finding should not have been surprising. Even broken-windows-enthusiast George Kelling estimated, in a less-publicized part of his work with Sousa, that misdemeanor arrests accounted for only 5% of the violent crime decline in the City. \(^{251}\)

Second, broken windows policing probably has hope of influencing the rate of only some serious crimes perpetrated against only some victim classes. To date, misdemeanor arrests have little or no demonstrable effect on homicides without guns. \(^{252}\) One theory is that arrests for minor crimes reduce homicide rates by getting guns off the street during coincidental searches and seizures; this theory does not reach non-gun violence. \(^{253}\) Furthermore, misdemeanor arrests seem to protect only certain segments of the population from homicide, to the extent that homicides decline at all. \(^{254}\) And it is worth noting that the mechanism of influence remains unclear. Misdemeanor policing might not be getting at serious crimes rates through improved physical appearance of neighborhoods, \(^{255}\) but rather, if anything, through ordinary deterrence or incidental police contact with arrestees who commit both minor and serious offenses.

On this recent theme of limited and selective impact, consider an intriguing 2010 study conducted by Magdalena Cerdá and six colleagues. \(^{256}\) This team had given up on broken windows policing affecting non-gun-related homicides and, in an earlier study, they had failed to find evidence that visual disorder was the mechanism by which misdemeanor arrests might influence more serious crime. \(^{257}\) So they decided to break down New York City gun homicides

\(^{248}\) See Rosenfeld et al., supra note 247, at 362, 369, 374 & nn. 13–14.

\(^{249}\) See id. at 360, 374, 377–78.

\(^{250}\) See id. at 377–78.

\(^{251}\) See KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 217, at 10 (using 1989–1998 precinct-level data). Kelling and Sousa also report that about 45% of the variance in violent crime was not explained by the four independent variables in their model. See id. at 24 n. 43.

\(^{252}\) See Messner et al., supra note 247, at 405 (separating gun-related from other homicides, then finding a statistically significant association between misdemeanor arrests and the former but not the latter).


\(^{254}\) See infra text accompanying notes 256–262.

\(^{255}\) See Cerdá et al., supra note 224, at 536, 538–39 (finding a “weak[]” inverse association between misdemeanor arrests and gun homicides over time, but not via a proxy variable for neighborhood disorder based on sidewalk cleanliness data).

\(^{256}\) See Magdalena Cerdá et al., Investigating the Effect of Social Changes on Age-Specific Gun-Related Homicide Rates in New York City During the 1990s, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1107 (2010).

\(^{257}\) See id. at 1108; Cerdá et al., supra note 224, at 536, 538–39.
into three victim age groups at the precinct level. When examined from this angle, higher misdemeanor arrest rates did have a statistically significant negative association with gun homicide between 1990 and 1998—but only for adult victims aged 35 or older. Other variables mattered for this older cohort, too. Lower rates of gun homicide victimization were also associated with lower levels of cocaine use and higher levels of public assistance receipt. Depending on relative costs and feasibility problems, reducing cocaine consumption and spreading the economic safety net might well be superior to vigorous misdemeanor enforcement strategies if a city’s goal is to protect adults from homicide.

Furthermore, if the goal is to protect younger people from homicide, then the Cerdá study offers no statistical support for misdemeanor policing. Instead, the study points to policies that reduce cocaine use, increase public assistance availability, and reduce alcohol consumption. These three variables were linked to falling homicide rates for victims under age 35, not misdemeanor arrests. And recall that the first two of those three variables were also associated with lower homicide rates for adults aged 35 or older. Changes in cocaine use and public assistance seem to do double duty. To take one comparison: An increase of one standard deviation in the misdemeanor arrest rate was associated with a drop of 7.4 homicides for adults per 100,000 people, while an increase of one standard deviation in public assistance receipt was associated with 10.5 fewer homicides for young adults per 100,000 people plus 2.9 fewer homicides among adults. Which policy or combination of policies is optimal cannot be established by a single study, of course. And, unfortunately, it does not seem that this study attempted to control for mean reversion. But creative takes on the available data open wide the possibility that policing strategies are just one modest part of the successful management of one slice of the violent crime problem in the United States.

Finally, to the extent that broken windows theories of misconduct deserve respect, crude versions of broken windows policing are not responsive. The fit between misdemeanor arrests and neighborhood aesthetics is rather poor, after all. A randomized policy experiment in Lowell, Massachusetts speaks to this point. Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond chose thirty-four high-crime areas, divided them into matched pairs, and randomly selected one of each pair for experimental treatment. The experimental areas received a variety of interventions that are not

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258 See Cerdá et al., supra note 256, at 1107–08 (excluding only Central Park from the precincts studied and relying on Medical Examiner records for location of injury and cause of death).

259 See id. at 1110, 1113 tbl. 4. Misdemeanor policing was measured by misdemeanor plus ordinance arrests, see id. at 1108, which is not the same as “broken windows policing” insofar as this set does not capture only and all illegal conduct that contributes to perceptions of disorder. The study does, however, control for citizen complaint rates by precinct as well as the ratio of felony arrests to felony complaints and the number of officers assigned to each precinct. See id.

260 See id. at 1109, 1113 tbl. 4. The proxy for precinct-wide cocaine use was the percentage of accidental deaths with positive toxicology results for cocaine, again according to Medical Examiner records. See id. at 1108.

261 See id. at 1109, 1111 tbl. 2, 1112 tbl. 3 (finding that the homicide rate for youths aged 15–24 fell with declining cocaine consumption, and that the homicide rate for young adults aged 25–34 years fell with declining alcohol consumption and increasing receipt of public assistance); see also id. at 1108 (noting that the proxy for alcohol consumption was similar to the proxy for cocaine use); id. at 1109 (stating that increasing incarceration rates were associated with increasing homicide rates for youths aged 15–24).

262 See id. at 1109–10, 1111–13 tbls 2–4 (stating that a standard deviation increase for misdemeanor arrests was 737 per 10,000 population, and for public assistance was 10.1%).

263 See Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577, 582–85 & n.5 (2008) (explaining that hot spots were identified partly by clustering of emergency calls in 2004 but that the matching was “primarily . . . qualitative”). The study also tested for displacement effects in two-block adjoining areas. See id. at 591–92, 596–97 (finding no statistically significant effect on emergency calls).
easily summarized. These areas experienced some combination of (1) “order maintenance interventions” including increases in misdemeanor arrests, stops-and-frisks, patrols, and dispersal orders for loiterers; (2) “situational strategies” against disorder, such as cleaning and security for vacant lots, more street lighting, more video surveillance, destruction of abandoned buildings, and inspection of problem taverns; and (3) “social service strategies” involving connections with mental health workers, homeless shelters, and youth recreation. This semi-randomized experimental research design helps sidestep the issue of mean reversion.

After a year, the experimental areas had nearly 20% fewer emergency calls than the controls, including greater than 30% advantages in robbery, burglary, and nondomestic assault calls. Situational strategies showed the strongest statistical association with fewer calls; the effect of misdemeanor arrests was less clear yet still plausible; and social service strategies failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, and unsurprisingly, a large majority of the experimental areas were recorded as having a decreased appearance of social and physical disorder—comprising loitering, public drinking, drug selling, homelessness, vacant lots, abandoned buildings, abandoned cars, street trash, and graffiti. Braga and Bond therefore oppose a simplistic “zero tolerance policing model” focused on arrests.

3. Transparency problems and aesthetics

Given the available evidence, a sensible conclusion is that the probability of generating a beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy with broken windows policing is either uncertain, low, or confined in important ways. Even if some observers are more optimistic, the difficulty in proving that a bank model dominates here should lead us to consider other possibilities. One alternative is a bridge model, in which the appearance of order exerts no downward pressure on serious crime rates. And if that is the applicable model, then broken windows policing becomes vulnerable to a transparency objection.

This policing strategy came with an asserted hypothesis when it was initiated. The strategy was advertised as an effective technique for reducing serious and violent crime, not just urinating in public. At the inception of the policy in New York City, for example, officials indicated that aggressive misdemeanor enforcement could reduce the rate of more serious crimes. Police Strategy Number 5, which announced the police department’s broken windows policing effort, was openly concerned with resident “perception” that the City was in decline, based not only on violent crime rates but also “an increase in the signs of disorder.” The document goes on to note the broken windows work of Wilson, Kelling, and Skogan, stating that the latter “has found that disorder is indeed the first step in what he terms ‘the downward spiral of urban decay.’ Fear exacerbated by disorder causes people to abandon [public spaces] . . . ,

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264 See id. at 584–85 (describing the Compstat-like process for captains in treatment areas). The study did not measure the impact of the data-driven oversight process, to the extent it was meaningfully different from the control areas.
265 See id. at 585–86, 594 (calculating the misdemeanor arrest increase in experimental areas as approximately 29% compared to the control areas, and noting that only 12 of 17 experimental areas received social service strategies).
266 See id. at 587–88, 592–93 & tbl. 1 (noting that social disorder was measured by researcher counts during 5 minute periods, and that physical disorder was based on researcher coding of photographs of the blocks in question).
267 See id. at 594–95 & fig. 1 (showing that situational strategies were statistically significant at the .05 level, and misdemeanor arrests at the .10 level).
268 See id. at 586–87, 595 & tbl. 2.
269 Id. at 600.
270 POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 219, at 5.
and even leave the city altogether. . . . NYPD will act to undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible.”

When statistics on serious crime looked more and more favorable during the 1990s, some prominent officials and observers credited broken windows policing. As the mayor put it in 1998, “We didn’t become the City people most want to live in and visit by encouraging an atmosphere of disorder and disrespect for the rights of others. . . . We have made the ‘Broken Windows’ theory an integral part of our law enforcement strategy. . . . The broken windows theory works.”

The former head of the transit police and police department wrote in the same year, “We were proving the Broken Windows theory.” Indeed the Kelling and Sousa study discussed above attracted media attention. Such promotion and credit attribution indicates a transparency problem, to the extent that ordinary people became overly persuaded that serious crime rates were reduced because of broken windows policing.

The extent of the transparency problem is debatable but there are reasons to believe that it is significant. Many New York City residents seem to have held high regard for broken windows policing. An opinion poll conducted for the Citizens Commission of New York City in 2000–2001 is on point. It found over 70% support for a broken windows theory of crime. Similarly, the police department’s overall quality-of-life enforcement strategy garnered a 66% approval rating, with similar levels of support across racial lines. Part of this popular support surely is based on a belief that broken windows policing helped reduce violent crime. According to a 2004 report from the National Research Council, “There is a widespread perception among police, policymakers, and the public that enforcement strategies (primarily arrest) applied broadly against offenders committing minor offenses lead to reductions in serious crime,” even though, the report observed, “[r]esearch does not provide strong support for this proposition.”

More recent empirical research adds nuance to the picture, as discussed above, but a gap remains between broken windows policing as advertised and as tested.

No clean excuse pardons this appearance/reality gap. Like campaign finance regulation,

271 Id. at 6–7.
273 BRATTON, supra note 218, at 156 (discussing transit authority policy); see also id. at 152, 228–29, 294–96 (discussing crime declines and Strategy No. 5 but emphasizing that it was only one of many NYPD strategies).
274 See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 210, at 274–75 (collecting media reports); see also KARMEN, supra note 222, at xii (asserting that “the politically correct answer” to the crime-decline causation question “was ‘All praise belongs to the NYPD’”).
276 See id. at 6; id. appx. B tbl. 1 (showing 50% responding “definitely” and only 8% “not at all”); id. at 8 (indicating support across racial categories). The survey question reads, “Some people feel that if fairly minor street problems are tolerated—such as disorderly teens, boom box radios, small-time drug dealing, buildings not kept fixed and clean—that this leads to more breakdowns since it looks like nobody cares. Would you say such minor breakdowns in the neighborhood contribute to more crime: [] 1-not at all 2-slightly 3-may be 4-probably 5-definitely.” Id. appx. A (question 11).
277 See id. at 6. Respondents were also asked about ten specific quality-of-life matters. Respondents tended to support enforcement efforts against littering, marijuana smoking, squeegees, speeding, loitering, loud radios, bad taxi driving, and graffiti; overall, they opposed enforcement regarding street vendors and also jaywalking, albeit slightly. See id. appx. B tbl. 4.
278 See id. at 8; id. appx. B tbl. 3.
279 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 229 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds. 2004); see also Braga & Bond, supra note 263, at 579.
the situation involves public policy as advertised to ordinary citizens, not just enemies of the state. Justifications for broken windows policing do not include fooling potential lawbreakers into believing that misdemeanor arrests cause lower serious crime rates. To achieve that effect, potential lawbreakers might have to know about the policy of increasing misdemeanor arrests, but they do not need to be aware of any causal claim. The theory behind broken windows policing, however vague, turns on the response to neighborhood appearance and not the response to assertions that those appearances cause changes. So we are left with a situation in which the link between this policing strategy and serious crime has been at least arguably overstated to the general public, which has at least arguably overestimated the strength of that link.

The magnitude of the problem is not great, however. Far uglier transparency gaps exist in the world. In the first place, the problem under consideration is overclaiming on the effects of a policing strategy, rather than false reporting about misdemeanor arrests or fabricating comfortably low violent crime rates. Perhaps no one has been tricked into a false sense of security or a failure to take reasonable precautions as a result of broken windows policing. In addition, the disparity between information insiders and information outsiders is small in some respects. The policy was publicly announced and its effects are subject to testing. Although officials probably have special access to valuable information, professional empiricists have acquired data on which the impact of the policy has been subject to critical evaluation. Ordinary citizens are not expert statisticians but, under these circumstances, perhaps they bear some responsibility for mismatches between popular perception and the demonstrable effects of a high-profile policing strategy.

Resolving this particular transparency issue decisively is less important than identifying it as a relevant normative question. That question becomes pressing as soon as broken windows policing—or any other government decision—moves away from the bank model and toward the bridge model of appearance/reality relationships. The above discussion is meant to illustrate the significance of those relationships to sensible normative evaluation. At the same time, broken windows policing was not promoted only in terms of predicted effects on serious crime, nor was the strategy sold as a one-dimensional plan to maximize misdemeanor arrests. There always was much more to the broken windows debates.

Indeed, doubts about a self-fulfilling prophecy plus an arguable transparency problem should direct attention toward a model that is simpler. Striking out the complications of bank models and bridge models returns us to the aesthetics of clock models, and there is a case for a brand of broken windows policing that is no deeper than this. Part of this policing strategy was meant to improve the appearance of neighborhoods according to the tastes of the mainstream, majority population. To the extent that the strategy does change local visuals in the intended direction, gains in social welfare will be achieved even if the strategy does absolutely nothing to change the rate or seriousness of misconduct. Most people seem to find graffiti ugly, loitering discomfiting, and public urination obnoxious. If it effectively targets these problems, perhaps broken windows policing is worth the cost without any benefit other than aesthetic comfort for mainstream residents.

Changing the atmosphere was always part of the mission for broken windows policing, and that change does not require lower crime rates. From the beginning, Kelling and Wilson were interested in a cure for urban anxiety. They thought police officers walking their beats could reduce “the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers,
drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.”

They did make bolder causal claims regarding crime rates, and some people are not queasy about panhandlers. A notable lack of tolerance unites popular desires to sweep up the trash on account of ugliness and sweep out less-valued people on account of anxiety. But surely large majorities of city residents prefer neighborhoods without litter, graffiti, and broken windows, regardless of the crime rate and the people who frequent those locations. Broken windows theories of misconduct and policing were partly founded on these sensibilities.

The aesthetically focused versions of these theories do not suffer from the same challenges involving efficacy, causation, and transparency. Few of us doubt that law enforcement can have some effect on the rate of window breaking and, if officials also take time to fix the windows that are broken, the aesthetic gain becomes uncontroversial. Equally obvious, a direct response to neighborhood aesthetics is impervious to transparency concerns. The policy and its success are defined by what people perceive. What you see is what you get. And in this case people will perceive essentially the same thing, even if they will disagree at the margin over what counts as beautiful and what counts as ugly. “American conceptions of the appropriate level of public order have changed dramatically over time,” Skogan concedes, but “the evidence suggests that [many forms of disorder] are not experienced differentially . . . and that major economic, social, and lifestyle divisions in urban areas are not reflected in real differences over appropriate levels of order.”

In any event, the capacity of policing strategies to influence the relevant aesthetics is a fairly straightforward proposition to test.

At the same time, simplistic versions of broken windows policing are poorly designed for refurbishing shabby neighborhoods. A zero-tolerance policy for misdemeanor and code violations, even if it were realistic, is not a solution to ugliness or even visible signs of disorder. “[A]rrest strategies do not deal directly with physical conditions,” Braga and Bond observe. Something like a real estate policy might do much better. “[D]ealing with disorderly conditions requires an array of activities, such as securing abandoned buildings, removing trash from the street, and managing homeless populations, which are not captured in one-dimensional misdemeanor arrest measures.” Indeed, arrests can worsen the aesthetic. Arrests themselves tend to be disorderly. While arrests indicate that police officers care, arrests also indicate that there is something troubling for the officers to care about. And, if it appears that members of disadvantaged groups are feeling the brunt of the policing effort, yet another negative aesthetic consequence must be factored in along with complaints of domination and other injustices.

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280 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 212, at 31.
281 Skogan, supra note 213, at 5, 9. For warnings that people convert perceptions of poverty and race minority presence into perceptions of disorder, see Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 231.
282 Braga & Bond, supra note 263, at 600.
283 Id. at 597; see also Ralph B. Taylor, Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and the Nationwide Fight Against Crime, Guns, Fear, and Decline 22 (2001) (distinguishing the effects of different types of neighborhood disorder or incivilities on crime and decline, and indicating different kinds of policy responses); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 210, at 282 (“[T]he broken windows hypothesis [of misconduct] is, in principle, consistent with a variety of potential policy levers, ranging from changes in policing to community organizing.”); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 255, at 638 & n. 36 (“Attacking public disorder through tough police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime . . . .”).
284 See, e.g., Ralph B. Taylor, Incivilities Reduction Policing, Zero Tolerance, and the Retreat from Coproduction, in Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives 98, 107–08 (David L. Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds. 2006); Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219, 1249, 1267 (2000) (“One might infer that minority communities tend to lose confidence in police fairness as...
All of this is a reminder that aesthetic justifications are not uncontroversial justifications. People disagree over the right aesthetic, and some policies are not especially well suited to achieving pure gains toward beauty and comfort. Broken windows policing in practice recalls some of these difficulties. An aesthetic justification for the policy is less convenient than a demonstrable self-fulfilling prophecy in which the appearance of order matches the reality measured by crime rates of all kinds. Under those conditions, we could identify consensus goals and a policy that left little space for transparency problems. Unfortunately, existing empirical evidence is not as comforting as broken windows theories. At this point, probably the best defense of broken windows policing involves a practice and an argument trained on aesthetics.

C. Reflections

The foregoing debates are different in several noteworthy respects. Debates over campaign finance regulation often migrate to the courts in the form of constitutional litigation, while broken windows policing remains a policy debate with little direct judicial review. Furthermore, the former debate proceeds largely on theory as relevant evidence develops, while the latter features a sizeable body of on-point empirical work already. Not only do we think that recorded murder and robbery rates are more reliable than estimates of political corruption (a notoriously private activity, even when precisely defined), but causation empiricists working on U.S. policy have a head start on broken windows policing. And although the analysis of both issues can be improved with attention to appearance/reality relationships, the respective recommendations are quite different. The campaign finance debate has not been pinned down by a bridge model and closed off from a bank model, while the broken windows debate suffers from something like the opposite problem—along with an underappreciated clock model perspective that is not similarly applicable to the campaign finance context.

One might think that these differences intimate a sensible division of labor across institutions. Judiciaries are not well-built to process complex empirical issues, while academics are supposed to do so and policymakers might be expected to do the best they can. On the other hand, the labor is not actually divided so neatly. Judges repeatedly make empirical assertions in campaign finance litigation, including the relationship between regulation and public opinion. Courts are toying with efficacy and causation questions, just not in anything close to expert fashion.285 At the same time, the policymaking process is not doing an especially good job with the contested data on which broken windows theories depend. One might believe that complex empirical questions related to public policy are most legitimately determined by legislative politics or bureaucratic judgment, but those institutions show their own shortcomings. And judicial use (or tampering) with empirical questions is not likely to end soon.

Even if we should generally prefer that academics and officials grapple with statistics while judges perform other tasks, many appearance justifications have a peculiar character. order-maintenance policies become more stringent.”).

When an appearance is proffered for something more than its intrinsic value, officials can be called on to defend themselves without enjoying impermeable deference and without suffering implacable skepticism. The risk that officials will perniciously manipulate the appearance of their operations motivates the creation of significant safeguards, including some outsider oversight. But the questionable competence of outside evaluators along with the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy indicates that oversight should come with a measure of restraint. Whether the authority for oversight is lodged in a judiciary or some other institution, it will often make sense to seriously test appearance justifications, empirical components and all. Obviously the outcome may depend on contested value commitments, such as the constitutional value assigned to campaigns donations and the social value of living in a neighborhood free from constant monitoring for relatively minor criminal infractions. But for those who are not so certain or not extraordinarily wedded to those values, the problems of transparency and the emerging empirical lessons of the best scholarly efforts will become critically important. If one doubts that the broken windows policy debate will improve, it is not difficult to imagine judges becoming curious about self-fulfilling corruption prophecies if not the transparency problem associated with campaign contribution limits.

Whatever is the likely or optimal combination of decision makers, any conscientious observer should have an intelligent set of questions and a few lessons to draw from the discussion above. One plausible lesson is that attention should be smoothed out across the different models for appearance/reality relationships. Anyone interested in a comprehensive judgment on broken windows policing or campaign finance regulation has to consider more than one model. Concentrating on the exciting possibility that graffiti cleanup can result in fewer murders will shunt aside the risks of public misinformation, along with the simple benefits of aesthetic pleasure and a sense of safety. Concentrating on the importance of public confidence to an effective government will miss transparency threats to the most rudimentary versions of democracy, along with the possibility that contribution limits help ameliorate those concerns by preventing a corruption-inducing self-fulfilling prophecy.

Of course, none of this is to argue that all of us should be struggling with all of these questions to the same extent. Nor is it true that everyone engaged in these debates pretends to be offering comprehensive judgments when they examine one part of the overall analysis. But at least someone should be paying serious attention to multiple aspects of these issues. The general analytic framework suggested above is a kind of checklist for determining whether significant aspects are being left out, regardless of the appearance-based justification in question. The prominent campaign finance and broken windows debates reviewed here illustrate differing highs and lows in attention levels.

See supra Part III.C (suggesting that independence from the officials asserting appearance-based justifications cuts in two directions when it comes to calibrating review authority).

Honest judicial concern about this transparency issue is not highly likely, in my judgment. Judges are partly an extension of the political system and not the leading candidates for attacking its legitimacy. Furthermore, charging widespread corruption might reinforce the perceived need for more regulation, which several justices plainly oppose; and the justices who are more tolerant of regulation might not want to effectively concede that law has been ineffective so far. That said, mainstream judges with different ideological commitments might be willing to point out that defenders of campaign finance regulation cannot be sure what the actual corruption level would be if current regulations were invalidated. And, at the same time, those judges might be willing to take into account the risk of a destructive self-fulfilling corruption prophecy before voting to eliminate candidate contribution limits.

For a responsibly limited take on an empirical conclusion, consider Messner et al., supra note 247, at 410 (closing with a caution about resource allocation issues and negative effects associated with order maintenance policing).
At a more micro level, there are lessons to learn about the potential of self-fulfilling prophecies. They are curious phenomena which operate on sometimes hazy and touchy social mechanics. It takes creativity to see possibilities for self-fulfilling prophecies, perhaps running in different directions, and the dynamics can be exciting. A strong self-fulfilling prophecy can cure a transparency concern, as I have emphasized. Indeed, when the feared consequences fall into the catastrophic categories of political corruption or homicides, even small probabilities of self-fulfilling prophecies will substantially boost the expected beneficial consequence of law or law enforcement. No regulatory interest more subtle than fighting a downward spiral into government-for-sale or extreme physical insecurity is necessary. Avoidance of transparency questions, furthermore, can sidestep contentious normative questions, such as the trade-off between ineffective government institutions and accurate public perception, or the aesthetic and other value of vigorous enforcement of quality-of-life laws.

But strongly influential self-fulfilling prophecies are not well understood today. Not many have been confidently confirmed. Indeed, high hopes have been unfulfilled in more than one setting, such as teacher expectations and broken windows policing. In those fields, beneficial effects triggered by physical appearance or widespread belief remain believable yet modest and sensitive to context, as far as we can tell. They are both real and qualified. Perhaps the growing work on self-fulfilling corruption prophecies will have a similar trajectory—ingenuity followed by excitement and then moderation. In any event, one challenge is to remain open-minded about the applicability of bank models without undue enthusiasm. Campaign finance litigation shows poorly on the former virtue, while some broken windows policing advocacy tips over into the latter vice. Another challenge is to preserve the conditions for progress in understanding self-fulfilling prophecies. In the policing context, we have the advantage of local variation, which provides data for quasi-experimental empirical research, not to mention a few randomized policy trials. In the campaign finance situation, however, there is a chance that judges will diminish policy diversity by shrinking the policy space through uniformly deregulatory constitutional doctrine. Thus far, meaningful candidate contribution limits are still acceptable to judges. But there is reason to worry that additional constitutional constraint will be imposed in an information-forfeiting manner.

From this cautionary note, I want to reissue several warnings about the general framework deployed here. First, it does not cover every relationship between appearance and reality over time. Instead I have emphasized select relationships that seem especially relevant to appearance arguments involving government decisions. Second, certain value choices will have to be inserted before yielding conclusive judgments. The analysis above attempted to avoid telling the reader exactly what to value and, no doubt, even readers with shared values will interpret the strength of various appearance arguments differently. Third, the framework draws on different models for appearance/reality relationships but it does not instruct the user how to choose across those models. Often more than one model may be in action. My objective has not been to solve the problem of model selection but rather to promote its importance. Finally, I want to emphasize that no two debates can reveal terribly much about a practice as widespread as appearance justifications for official decisions. Even a complete treatment of campaign finance and broken windows would not say everything worth knowing about appearance arguments. Additional work is warranted. And I encourage inspired readers to start seeing appearance arguments everywhere—and for what they really are.
CONCLUSION

This Article suggests a distinction between the elusive concepts of appearance and reality, along with several ways in which the two can be related. Often we think that reality is insulated from any influence that can be linked to appearance, but sometimes an appearance becomes the basis for conduct that fosters a corresponding reality over time, and sometimes the concepts essentially collapse in the first place. Grasping these relationships is important for reaching sensible normative judgments about appearance-based justifications. The evaluative issues are comparatively simple when appearance and reality are essentially the same. As always, cost and efficacy of appearance management will be relevant, but still other questions arise when appearance and reality might diverge. If reality seems insulated from appearance, the key question involves transparency: whether, for example, attempts to build public confidence can be justified despite the risk of a gap between the apparent and actual conduct of officials. If instead reality might be a function of appearance over time, the transparency issue becomes subordinate to a causal question: whether, for example, the appearance of good behavior will help produce a beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy.

These ideas were illustrated with debates over campaign finance regulation and broken windows policing, but any number of other applications could have been used. The basic point is not so much about which applications are most interesting or the proper conclusion to draw about any particular argument. Answers to those questions will depend on individual ideological commitments that I do not pretend to reconcile. Instead I have presented a general framework for analyzing appearance-based justifications in government decisions that is compatible with a large spectrum of values. This we need. Every day, decisions are made in order to generate good looks, including good-looking government operations. Thoughtful observers ought to have a sensible set of questions to ask about those appearances, any underlying reality, and the connection between the two.

Readers with comments should address them to:

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552. Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, May 2011
553. Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, May 2011
556. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, June 2011
557. Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford, Reversible Rewards, June 2011
561. Joseph Issenbergh, Last Chance, America, July 2011
562. Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, July 2011
564. Louis Kaplow and David Weisbach, Discount Rates, Judgments, Individuals’ Risk Preferences, and Uncertainty, July 2011
566. David A. Weisbach, Carbon Taxation in Europe: Expanding the EU Carbon Price, July 2011
570. Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, August 2011
574. M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, September 2011
575. William H. J. Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, September 2011
576. Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, October 2011