The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue and Deference

Rosalind Dixon
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, CHARTER DIALOGUE, AND DEFERENCE

Rosalind Dixon

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

November 2009

This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.
For those concerned about the democratic legitimacy of Charter review by Canadian courts, the idea of dialogue offers a promising midway path between the extremes of judicial and legislative supremacy. Current dialogue theory, however, largely fails to live up to this promise of compromise. Instead of distinguishing democratic worries associated with US style, strong-form judicial review, it largely endorses the legitimacy of such review. For dialogue to live up to its original promise, a new theory that more clearly distinguishes Canada from the United States is required. In this article, which offers a new theory of dialogue, the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to defer to reasonable legislative sequels will be the key to success. As a result, section 33 of the Charter will play a valuable but largely background role in promoting dialogue. The advantage of this approach, compared to rival approaches that would weaken judicial review, is that it is more realistic and more in line with existing SCC practice. Moreover, it is normatively desirable when judged from the perspective of the courts’ capacity to counter blockages in the legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charter rights.

For some, more than enough has been said about the idea of dialogue as a metaphor for the relationship between courts and legislatures under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.¹ There have been more than ten years of debate about dialogue in Canada,²

---


but little progress in persuading skeptics that the practice of judicial review by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) can be reconciled with a commitment to self-government in a democracy, as the original literature on dialogue promised.\(^3\)

For skeptics, the primary democratic worry about judicial review under the *Charter* is that, when it comes to open-ended *Charter* guarantees, Canadian courts may adopt an interpretation that is directly counter-majoritarian in nature.\(^4\) While the *Charter* is not intended to be a purely majoritarian instrument, from a democratic point of view, the constitutional understandings of a majority of Canadians still have an important role to play in the interpretation of the *Charter*. Rights guarantees are open-ended and permit multiple reasonable interpretations—there is no objectively ascertainable, “correct” interpretation.\(^5\) This applies to the text and history of the *Charter*, to Supreme Court precedent, and as a matter of *Charter* values,—because at an abstract philosophical level, there will be just as much (if not more) room for reasonable disagreement about the scope and priority to be given to particular, individual rights.\(^6\)

If Canada is committed to principles of democracy, as section 1 of the *Charter* suggests, the only principled way of interpreting such guarantees will be by reference to the actual understandings of Canadians about specific *Charter* guarantees, or about the more general requirements of section 1 itself. If equality matters in the process of self-government, the understandings of every Canadian should also count in a roughly equal way in this context. A problem arises when the SCC prefers its own understanding of the *Charter* to that of a clear majority of Canadians.

In the United States, this problem has spawned a large literature on the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” associated with judicial review by the United States Supreme Court (USSC).\(^7\) The sense of difficulty is particularly acute, most American scholars agree, because it is almost impossible to modify the effect of Supreme Court decisions by

---


\(^6\) *ibid*.

amending the Constitution under the terms of Article V.\textsuperscript{8} It is also compounded by the insistence of the USSC, in recent years, upon its broad and exclusive authority to determine the meaning of constitutional rights—even in the face of legislative “dialogue” by Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—and by its rigid, categorical approach to assessing the constitutionality of particular legislative provisions.\textsuperscript{9}

In Canada, dialogue scholars, such as Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, have argued that certain structural features of the Charter, together with the actual record of legislative response to SCC decisions, mean that these same concerns about democratic legitimacy “cannot be sustained” or, at the very least, are “greatly diminished.”\textsuperscript{10} They argue that because, in reliance on these features, Parliament or the legislature has almost always been able to reverse, modify, or avoid the effect of SCC Charter decisions with which they disagree, “it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court and the competent legislative body as a dialogue.”\textsuperscript{11} Together with Wade Wright, Hogg and Bushell further suggest that this dialogue indicates that, under the Charter, a balance is achieved between the extremes of judicial supremacy and legislative supremacy, known as “strong-form” and “weak-form” judicial review, respectively.\textsuperscript{12} More specifically, they suggest that, since the Charter, Canada has adopted something of “a halfway house between the strong form of judicial review typified by the United States and the statutory bill of rights typified by the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960.”\textsuperscript{13}

The idea of dialogue also clearly supports this understanding.\textsuperscript{14} By describing the possibility of an ongoing exchange between courts and legislatures in their interpretations of the Charter, dialogue as a metaphor clearly points to a potential midway path between the extremes of both legislative and judicial finality. It suggests that, rather than courts or legislatures being wholly final in their interpretation of the Charter, both court decisions and legislative responses to those decisions—“legislative sequels”—could be understood to have a much more provisional, penultimate legal force.\textsuperscript{15}

---


\textsuperscript{9} For a critique of the Supreme Court’s approach in this context from a perspective sympathetic to, though not synonymous with, new dialogue theory, See, e.g., Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, “Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power” (2003) 78 Ind. L.J. 1 at 25, 28.

\textsuperscript{10} Hogg and Bushell, \textit{supra} note 2 at 80, 105.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.} at 79.


\textsuperscript{13} Hogg, Bushell Thornton and Wright, \textit{supra} note 2 at 29.


Dialogue, \textit{n.}: 1. a. A conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk together; b. Verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons, conversation; c. In \textit{Politics} … valuable or constructive discussion or communication.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Cf.} Dan T. Coenen, “A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue” (2000-2001) 42 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1575 at 1582-83 (arguing that dialogue involves court decisions being provisional or revisable in character); Michael J. Perry, “Protecting
On closer inspection, however, current dialogue theory’s interpretation of provisions such as sections 1 and 33 of the Charter provides little basis for distinguishing Canada’s version of review from US style, strong-form (i.e., strongly final) judicial review.16 By interpreting section 33 as a more or less exhaustive vehicle for interpretive dialogue under the Charter—when section 33 has almost never been used for that purpose—dialogue scholars effectively validate, rather than challenge, the obstacles to Congress or state legislatures in the U.S. overriding USSC decisions via Article V. Similarly, by arguing that the SCC is not required to show any deference (under section 1 or internal limitation clauses) to legislative attempts to engage in dialogue, these scholars also affirm, rather than criticize, the approach of the USSC towards provisions such as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

For dialogue theory to live up to its original promise of persuading skeptics about the democratic legitimacy of rights-based review in Canada, a new theory of Charter dialogue is therefore required.17 The purpose of this article is to develop such a theory.

In the new theory of dialogue offered, the key to “weakening” judicial review in Canada, relative to that in the United States, will be to insist that the SCC defer to Parliament or the legislature’s interpretation of the Charter in “second look cases,” provided that such a deference is reasonable when judged by reference to certain minimal criteria.18 As a complement to this, dialogue will also require that in second look cases the SCC stand ready, in cases where it has previously reasoned broadly under the Charter, to narrow the force of that reasoning ex post, so as to reconcile ex post deference with its prior precedents. There are several reasons, outlined below, for adopting such a deference-based approach.

First, it is unrealistic to regard section 33 as a routine vehicle for dialogue, given both its history and structure. Rather, section 33 should be understood as a valuable incentive for (and a textual confirmation of the desirability of) the SCC engaging in ex post deference or narrow statement of this kind. It serves this function by providing Parliament and the legislature with a residual power to override the SCC, in the event the SCC fails to show such deference.

Second, a deference-based approach gives the SCC maximum flexibility to counter blockages in the legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of
Charter rights. By preserving scope for the SCC to reason “deeply” in first look cases, ex post—or “second look”—deference enhances the SCC’s ability to persuade Parliament, the legislature, and even the public, to give greater attention or accommodation to Charter rights. By insisting that first look decisions are binding, this approach also gives the SCC greater ability, than pure weak-form theories of review, to counter the most persistent forms of legislative inattention to Charter rights claims. The proposed theory also has the advantage of having a greater degree of fit with existing Charter history and SCC practice than rival theories.

It may look as though the SCC is being asked to practice two different forms of review, but as the article explains, this approach to second look decision making should not be rejected out of a concern for judicial independence. Provided courts are mindful of its preconditions and rationale, such an approach will be fully compatible with the maintenance of judicial independence. The article also explains that, given the inevitability of some interpretive uncertainty under the Charter, and the stability created by a presumption of constitutionality at the second look stage, this theory of ex post deference and judicial narrow statement does not meaningfully threaten interpretive consistency or predictability under the Charter. Provided courts are mindful of its preconditions and rationale, such an approach will be fully compatible with the maintenance of judicial independence.

This new understanding reveals that the history of dialogue under the Charter to date has tended both to be more real than skeptics fear and more contingent than dialogue scholars assure. (That is to say, there has been a higher rate of dialogue than skeptics admit, but fewer instances and less endorsement of dialogue than advocates claim.)

The most important test of dialogue in new dialogue theory will be whether the SCC or lower courts are willing in second look cases to actually defer to legislative sequels evidencing interpretive disagreement with the courts. On this measure, there has already been a high rate of dialogic success. Another important test will be whether legislative sequels of this kind enjoy meaningful de facto success. On this criterion, there have been an even greater number of instances of dialogic success.

---

19. The distinction between first and second look cases will, of course, be somewhat fluid, given that first look cases may involve indirect consideration of prior precedents, and second look cases may involve consideration of new circumstances in addition to prior precedents: See, e.g., JTI-Macdonald, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. The distinction, however, is one which both the SCC and commentators have endorsed as helping to distinguish between circumstances in which the SCC lacks reliable information about the considered Charter views of Parliament or the legislature on a particular question, from those in which such information is directly available from recent legislative debate and action. In a scholarly context, see Hogg and Bushell supra note 2.

20. On the concept of deep reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 16-19 (defining “depth” in terms of the degree to which a judge’s reasons are overtly theoretical or normative).

21. At most, concerns about judicial independence may imply that some form of delay in the consideration of second look cases is an additional requirement of successful dialogue, not that the theory of new dialogue itself should be abandoned: see further note 156-57, infra.
At the same time, there have been relatively few cases—no more than four at the SCC level—in which dialogue has truly been tested. This means that it is still premature to draw firm conclusions about the relative strength or weakness of Charter review by Canadian courts. Even more important, while generally acting consistently with the requirements of new dialogue theory, the SCC has not endorsed its premises, such that the future of dialogue still hangs in the balance.

This article is divided into five parts. Part I outlines the broad contours of current dialogue theory and explains how it tends largely to endorse, rather than distinguish, US style, strong-form judicial review. Part II develops the core elements of a new, alternative theory of dialogue, its prescriptions for section 33 of the Charter as a vehicle for dialogue, its advantages over rival theories, and its answers to potential criticisms. Part III reassesses the record of dialogue under the Charter to date, in light of the understandings of what constitutes new dialogue, set out the preceding parts. Part IV concludes by considering the preconditions for, and therefore the contingency of, new dialogue under the Charter in the future.

I. DIALOGUE, DEMOCRACY AND THE UNITED STATES AS A COMPARATOR

In comparative constitutional scholarship on judicial review, the United States is generally understood as the archetypical model of strong-form—or final—judicial review.22 This is not because Congress or state legislatures consistently defer to the USSC’s interpretations of the Constitution or decline to re-enact legislation struck down for inconsistency with the Constitution.23 Like their Canadian counterparts, it is common practice for Congress and the state legislatures to respond to USSC decisions that invalidate their legislation for inconsistency.24 For example, Justice Mitchell Pickerill has shown that between 1954 and 1997, Congress responded to USSC decisions at a rate of sixty-two per cent.25 In only a small minority of those instances did Congress repeal the prior legislation, with the result that in almost fifty per cent of cases, it chose to reenact its statutory policy.26 Notwithstanding this practice on the part of American legislatures, the reason the U.S. is considered to embody a system of strong-form judicial review is that Congress and state legislatures in the U.S. face a number of obstacles to success, when they seek to engage in “dialogue” of this kind.27

24 Ibid. [both]
26 Ibid.
Substantial formal legal barriers under Article V of the US Constitution deter Congress or state legislatures from formally overriding a decision of the Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments require the support of a two-thirds majority of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and ratification by three-fourths of the states. As the size of the House, Senate, and number of states in the United States have increased, this requirement has become increasingly onerous. In recent decades, even proposed amendments enjoying a high degree of popular support—such as the Equal Rights Amendment (which would have inserted an express guarantee of equal protection on the grounds of gender into the Fourteenth Amendment)—have failed. In only one instance during the twentieth century, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mitchell (A.G.), has Congress succeeded in initiating a constitutional amendment in order to modify the effect of a Supreme Court decision. Mitchell also involved a question of federalism, or Congress’s power to prescribe the minimum voting age for state elections, rather than (at least most directly) an issue of constitutional rights parallel to those involving interpretation of the Charter.

Another, more contingent reason for the strong degree of finality enjoyed by the USSC in its interpretation of the Constitution is that the Court itself has consistently insisted upon broad and exclusive authority to determine the meaning of constitutional rights, even in the face of dialogue by Congress. For example, in United States v. Eichman, the Court considered the Flag Protection Act, enacted following the Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson, which struck down an earlier flag burning prohibition. The Court rejected the argument that there was a clear “‘national consensus’ favoring a prohibition on flag-burning” because “any suggestion that the Government’s interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment.”

In (City of) Boerne v. Flores, the Court again held that only the USSC had the authority to interpret, rather than enforce, the meaning of the Constitution. The issue

---

28 U.S. Const. art V.
30 400 U.S. 112 (1970) [Oregon].
32 496 U.S. 310 (1990) [Eichman].
34 491 U.S. 397 (1989) [Texas].
35 Eichman, supra note 29 at 318.
36 521 U.S. 507 (1997) [Boerne].
there conceived the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,\textsuperscript{37} which was a response to Employment Division v. Smith.\textsuperscript{38} It ruled:

Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”\textsuperscript{39}

More recently, in Dickerson v. United States,\textsuperscript{40} the USSC invalidated an attempt by Congress to modify the effect of the \textit{per se} exclusionary rule, established by its earlier decision in Miranda v. Arizona.\textsuperscript{41}

When it comes to attempts by state officials to engage in dialogue, the USSC has been even more insistent on its exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution. In Cooper v. Aaron,\textsuperscript{42} in the context of violent disputes about the implementation of a school desegregation order in Arkansas, the Court insisted on the importance of executive compliance with court orders as an important dimension to the rule of law. Furthermore, it also insisted on the general supremacy of the Court’s interpretation of the constitution over competing legislative and executive interpretations. Specifically, Chief Justice Warren declared that, since Marbury v. Madison,\textsuperscript{43} judicial supremacy had been “a permanent and indispensable feature of [the US] constitutional system” and that “[n]o state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the [Court’s interpretation of the] Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”\textsuperscript{44}

Equally famous is Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey\textsuperscript{45} and the question of whether or to what extent to overrule Roe v. Wade.\textsuperscript{46} There, a plurality of the USSC held that legislative attempts to narrow the scope of Roe pointed against, rather than in favour of, the Court revisiting its abortion decisions.\textsuperscript{47} As deference could be interpreted by the public as “surrendering to political pressure,” the Court should be less,

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{37} 42 USC. §2000bb (1993).
\textsuperscript{38} 494 U.S. 872 (1990) [\textit{Smith}].
\textsuperscript{39} Boerne, supra note 33 at 519.
\textsuperscript{40} 530 U.S. 428 (2000) [\textit{Dickerson}].
\textsuperscript{41} 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at 444 (per Chief Justice Warren) [\textit{Miranda}]. (ruling that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant,” unless it could demonstrate that a person had been “warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed”).
\textsuperscript{42} 358 U.S. 1 (1958) [\textit{Cooper}].
\textsuperscript{43} 5 U.S. 137 (1803) [\textit{Marbury}].
\textsuperscript{44} Cooper, supra note 45 at 18
\textsuperscript{45} 505 U.S. 833 (1992) [\textit{Casey}].
\textsuperscript{46} 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [\textit{Roe}].
\textsuperscript{47} Casey, supra note 48 at 867-869
\end{flushright}
not more, willing in such a watershed case to revisit its interpretation of the Constitution.48

The USSC’s rigid, three-tiered approach to the standard of review also reinforces the system of strong-form judicial review in the United States. Where laws violate fundamental rights or fundamental interests under the equal protection clause, or are based on a suspect classification (such as a classification based on race), the Court applies strict scrutiny—or asks whether a law is substantially narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.49 Where a law imposes a time, manner, or place restriction, or another content-neutral restriction on the enjoyment of a fundamental right, or where a law is based on a quasi-suspect classification (such as gender), the Court applies intermediate scrutiny—or asks whether a law is substantially narrowly tailored to advance an important government objective.50 In all other cases, the Court applies a rational basis review, which asks whether a law has some rational connection to a legitimate government purpose.51

The consequence of this three-tiered approach is that the USSC must apply the same approach to any legislative sequel—or second look case—as it did in its first look. While individual justices can always “gloss” over the requirements of strict scrutiny, such scrutiny clearly requires that legislation not unduly infringe the enjoyment of constitutional rights previously recognized by the Court in order to be valid.52 This, in turn, makes it more difficult for individual justices simultaneously to follow the Court’s own precedents and show deference to legislative Constitutional judgments, even if they favor doing so to uphold a congressional sequel.

Canadian scholars suggest that, by reason of the Charter’s distinctive features, judicial review in Canada is “weaker” than in the United States.53 Compared to Article V of the US Constitution, section 33 of the Charter provides a relatively undemanding mechanism by which Parliament or the legislature may override the effect of an SCC decision interpreting the Charter. At any given time, reliance by Parliament or the provincial legislatures on section 33 simply requires an express declaration and the support of a legislative majority.54 After five years, Parliament or the provincial

---

48 Ibid at 867
54 Charter, supra note 1, s. 33(1). (providing that Parliament or the legislature may provide that legislation shall operate notwithstanding s. 2, or ss. 7-15).
legislatures must re-enact the legislation to re-engage the override.\textsuperscript{55} Section 33 of the \textit{Charter}, dialogue scholars therefore argue, creates a “big difference between Canada and the United States.”\textsuperscript{56} Compared to the various provisions of the US \textit{Bill of Rights},\textsuperscript{57} which make no express provision for the limitation of rights, section 1 of the \textit{Charter} also alters the way in which the SCC approaches the assessment of the proportionality or justifiability of limitations on rights.\textsuperscript{58}

On closer inspection, however, the way in which dialogue scholars interpret the significance of provisions such as sections 33 and 1 means that, in the vast majority of cases, their theory actually provides little basis for distinguishing the legitimacy of US style, strong-form judicial review. When it comes to section 33 of the \textit{Charter}, dialogue scholars generally argue that it should be understood to exhaust, not confirm, the scope for true interpretive dialogue between courts and legislatures under the \textit{Charter}.\textsuperscript{59} Thus, in the context of section 1 of the \textit{Charter} (or an equivalent clause-specific limitation), dialogue scholars claim that legislatures are not free to engage in dialogue about the meaning of the \textit{Charter} itself, but only about the way in which the \textit{Charter} relates to particular policy objectives.

In this context it is for the courts, Hogg and Bushell argue in their 1997 article \textit{Charter Dialogue}, to interpret the meaning of \textit{Charter} rights and for legislatures to respect “the \textit{Charter} values … identified by the [c]ourt[s],” while continuing to pursue their prior policy objectives.\textsuperscript{60} In \textit{Charter Dialogue Revisited}, Hogg, Bushell, and Wright make even more explicit this division of responsibility between courts and legislatures. Under their view, while legislatures remain responsible for determining how to achieve social and economic policy objectives, they “may not act on an interpretation of the \textit{Charter} which conflicts with an interpretation provided by the courts.”\textsuperscript{61} Other dialogue scholars, such as Kent Roach, also see dialogue as “an interchange … between judges and legislators in which the former focus on rights and the latter are allowed to explain why they believe it is necessary to limit rights in the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{62}

The difficulty for dialogue scholars, given this view of section 33, is that in the thirty-seven years in which the \textit{Charter} has been in operation, there has only been one case in which the notwithstanding clause has been used to override a decision by the SCC.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[55] \textit{Charter}, supra note 1, s. 33(3).
\item[57] U.S. Const. amend. I-X.
\item[59] See, e.g., Hogg, Bushell Thornton and Wright, supra note 2 at 36; Roach, “Common Law,” supra note 2 at 487.
\item[60] Hogg and Bushell, supra note 2 at 79.
\item[61] Hogg, Bushell and Wright, supra note 2 at 3, 33.
\end{footnotes}
under the Charter. That instance involved the SCC’s decision in Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), and the decision by the Quebec legislature to reinstate a preference for French-only, as opposed to bilingual, signs in the province. Parliament has never invoked section 33 of the Charter, and provincial legislatures have used it only fifteen times in addition to its usage in connection with Ford. Twelve of those further instances also involved Quebec. Peter Hogg suggests that this is because “public opinion outside Quebec has not been deeply disturbed by decisions of the Court,” at least when compared to the US public’s reaction to decisions such as Lochner v. New York, or Roe. The difficulty with this view, however, is that it tends to imply only the narrowest of differences between judicial review in Canada and the United States.

Concerns about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in the United States are far from confined to decisions such as Lochner or Roe, where the USSC adopted a sweeping view of the due process clause in direct tension with the constitutional understandings of a large number of Americans. Those concerns extend to a much larger number of decisions in which the USSC has frustrated a national majority in its interpretation of the constitution.

Nor is it true that the SCC’s Charter decisions have been met with universal popular approval. Take, for example, the decisions of the SCC in R. v. Seaboyer and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), which struck down as incompatible with the Charter certain respective “rape-shield” and tobacco advertising provisions. In both cases, the SCC’s decision met strong opposition from women’s groups and public health organizations, not to mention the public at large. This opposition was not limited to the result, but extended to the Court’s approach to Charter interpretation. In Seaboyer, women’s groups argued that by failing to recognize the relevance of the complainant’s equality rights to the justifiability of the provisions under challenge, the SCC took too narrow a view of the scope of the constitutional value-ordering created by section 15(1)

---

63 Compare Jamie Cameron, “The Charter’s Legislative Override: Feat or Figment of the Constitutional Imagination?” in Huscroft and Brodie, supra note 17 at 135.
65 See An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54, s. 10 (“Bill 178”). Thereafter, the Quebec legislature repealed its own attempt at dialogue by passing legislation designed to give much broader effect to the decision of the SCC in Ford, suggesting that a more narrowly tailored alternative to French-only signage laws would be laws requiring French to be “present and predominant” on all signs. See An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 40, s. 18 (Bill 86).
67 198 U.S. 45 (1905) [Lochner].
of the Charter. In MacDonald, public health advocates argued that the SCC should not have treated tobacco advertising as speech or granted tobacco companies the standing to assert Charter rights. In these and other cases, it is difficult to accept, as Hogg suggests, that the threshold of disagreement was not sufficient to engage section 33.

When it comes to section 1 of the Charter, dialogue scholars have tended to approach this provision in a way that creates little relevant difference between Canada and the United States. For the most part, they suggest that the significance of section 1 (and guarantees with internal limitations) is that it discourages an absolutist approach to the definition of rights. If rights are subject to reasonable limits, there is great scope for dialogue between courts and legislatures about the ways in which rights and policy objectives should be balanced.

One difficulty with this approach is that it misconceives its American counterpart. In fact, there are few areas in which the USSC has adopted anything like an absolutist approach to the protection of constitutional rights. Even in the context of the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the USSC—with the notable exception of Justices Black and Douglas—has consistently adopted a non-abolutist approach to the scope of the guarantee of speech.

A more promising path emphasizes the degree to which section 1 creates greater “flexibility for legislative sequels than … the American Bill of Rights without a limitation clause.” The Court has also subsequently indicated that these requirements are to be applied in a context-sensitive way, with proper regard, among other things, to whether the government is seeking (via particular legislation) to protect vulnerable groups or otherwise promote Charter values. At least as it has been interpreted over the years, the SCC’s Oakes test represents a significantly more generalized, “floating” approach to assessing the proportionality of limitations on rights than a US style test of strict (or even intermediate) scrutiny. The second, minimal impairment limb of the Oakes proportionality requirement is also, in the way it is applied, generally a less

---

74 For arguments to this effect, See, e.g., Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra note 77 at 80-82.
75 See Roach, “Canadian Experience,” supra note 2 at 541.
76 Compare Hogg and Bushell, supra note 2 at 82; Roach, ibid.
80 Ibid.
demanding requirement than the equivalent requirement of narrow tailoring (or substantial narrow tailoring) applied in the United States. This means that when it comes to assessing the compatibility of a legislative sequel with the Charter, Canadian justices enjoy greater flexibility than their US counterparts to uphold such sequels, consistent with their own court’s prior precedents.

It is curious that dialogue theorists do not ultimately permit Canadian justices to use this flexibility to promote a more dialogic approach to review. Notably, they argue that courts “should not approach second look cases any differently than they approach first look cases” but are always required to “decide cases according to their view of the law.” Any other approach, Hogg claims, “would be offensive to the judicial function.”

According to this view, legislative sequels that challenge the SCC’s interpretation of the Charter will be rendered invalid, unless there is a change in the composition of the Court, or broader social changes persuade justices to revisit their own prior decisions. This, in turn, is exactly what happens in the United States—though there is mandatory retirement for SCC judges, but not for members of the USSC, which tends somewhat to increase relative turnover on the SCC.

II. DIALOGUE AS COMPROMISE: THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFERENCE

For dialogue theory to live up to its promise of distinguishing US style concerns about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, a new account of sections 1 and 33—and of dialogue—is required.

A. New Dialogue and Deference ( )

In the new account of dialogue, the key to distinguishing Canadian from US style review will be the understanding that in second look cases, such as those equivalent to Eichman, Boerne or Dickerson, the SCC should show some degree of deference under section 1 to the measures adopted by legislators. It also requires that, in order reconcile a showing of ex post deference with the less deferential approach taken in an earlier case, the SCC should be willing either to overrule that earlier case or to engaging in a form of narrow restatement (or narrow statement ex post).

The idea of a narrow judicial statement ex ante is familiar to common law lawyers in both Canada and the United States as a means by which courts may increase the scope

---

81 Hogg, Bushell Thornton and Wright, supra note 2 at 47-48.
83 See Peter W. Hogg, “Discovering Dialogue” in Huscroft and Brodie, supra note 17, at 5.
for legislators to revise the ongoing, practical effect of their decisions. The key benefit to a narrow statement *ex ante*, in this context, is that it signals clearly to Parliament and the provincial legislatures that there is space to adopt a different interpretation of the *Charter* in future cases.

The idea of narrow statement *ex post* builds on this idea by asking members of the SCC to apply that concept to a second look case. In other words, they would uphold a legislative sequel under a narrow statement of the first look decision as both reasonable and also consistent that decision. But if the legislative sequel could not be saved by a narrow statement of the earlier decision, the first look decision would prevail. Narrow restatement of this kind will also have a central role to play, in new dialogue theory, because overruling a decision will generally be unnecessary (and therefore undesirable), given that the SCC’s interpretation of the *Charter* was itself premised—at least implicitly—on the understanding that a legislative sequel might take the form of a disagreement with the SCC decision.85

The main reason, in new dialogue theory, for insisting on such *ex post* deference under section 1 is that section 33 does not provide a realistic alternative avenue for ordinary, as opposed to extraordinary, interpretive dialogue.86

One reason for this is the historic link between the use of section 33 and Quebec’s demands for recognition as a “distinct society.” Not only did the first remedial use of section 33 occur in this context,87 but, as many other commentators have noted, in both instances the Quebec legislature relied on section 33 in a way which was both widely noticed and deeply unpopular in the rest of Canada.88 Quebec’s use of the override was an important factor in the Meech Lake Accord, which recognized Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada.89 Subsequent use of the power has also, for most Canadians, simply confirmed the link between section 33 and Quebec’s demands to be treated as a distinct society, exempt from broader Canadian constitutional commitments, thereby making it extremely costly for Parliament and anglophone legislatures to contemplate using section 33 as a means of engaging in dialogue.90

---

85 Contrast Cameron, *supra* note 66, at 164 (arguing that at the very least considerations of transparency favor the Court explicitly overruling its prior precedent in such cases).
86 Section 1 provides a natural textual basis, or hook, for such an approach in Canada. It is not necessary, however, for such a hook to exist in order for judicial *ex post* deference or narrow statement to be desirable, according to new dialogue theory. In principle, the lessons of new dialogue theory also apply to the U.S., which lacks any textual hook or confirmation of such an approach.
87 See Kahana, *supra* note X
90 Ibid. [both]
91 Kahana, *S. 33 Practice, supra* note 95, at 257-59 (on the sixteen instances in which s. 33 has been used).
Even if this history did not exist, section 33 would still be an unlikely vehicle for routine legislative dialogue under new dialogue theory. By creating a broad power to override *Charter* rights, section 33 provides legislators with a natural vehicle for setting limits on the extent to which rights apply to particular cases or circumstances—or for expressing what Jeremy Waldron has called “misgivings” about the application of rights.\(^91\) It provides a much less natural vehicle by which Parliament or the legislature can express disagreement with the SCC about the content or priority of *Charter* rights in particular, concrete circumstances (“rights disagreements”).\(^92\) In such cases, if Parliament or the legislature is to invoke section 33 in aid of dialogue, it will be required to some degree to *misrepresent* the nature and scope of its disagreement with the SCC. By making legislators seem less trustworthy, misrepresentation of this kind will also tend to make it far more difficult for legislators to persuade the public that in seeking to engage in dialogue it is motivated by principled disagreement with the SCC, and not just pure political expediency. This, in turn, can mean that the political price of dialogue for Parliament or the legislature exceeds the benefits it perceives to achieving a more democratic and responsive *Charter* outcome.

For this reason, new dialogue theory holds that, while section 33 of the *Charter* will be important to dialogue, its role will tend to be largely background in nature. The most important function of section 33 will be to give the SCC greater incentive to adhere to *ex post* deference.

Given the simple mechanism for applying section 33, if the SCC declines to defer to Parliament or the legislature in second look cases, there is at least some prospect that Parliament or the legislature will decide wholly to override the Court’s interpretation of the *Charter* in favour of its own preferred interpretation.\(^93\) If members of the SCC are in any way “constitutional maximizers,” they will have much greater incentive than justices in the United States to defer to legislative sequels which take some account of their preferred constitutional vision.\(^94\) If they show such deference, they can be fairly confident that their preferred *Charter* interpretation will have some influence. If they strike down Parliament’s or the legislature’s attempt at dialogue, they run a risk, not only of losing influence in a particular area of *Charter* interpretation, but also of losing influence more generally, in the eyes of the public. If members of the Court are at all risk averse about constitutional outcomes, they will have a clear incentive to defer to reasonable legislative outcomes.

---


\(^93\) This assumes, of course, that while the use of s. 33 has been rare, there is no established convention against its use. Contrast Howard Leeson, “Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?” 6 *CHOICES* 3, 20 (2000), online: [http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol6no4.pdf](http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol6no4.pdf)

sequels. By contrast, members of the USSC have every incentive in second look cases to insist upon their own uniquely preferred interpretation of the constitution because the chances of reversal are smaller.

A second important function of section 33 in new dialogue theory will be to provide valuable textual confirmation to the SCC of the desirability of adopting a commitment to ex post deference under the Charter. In this sense, section 33 will serve much the same function vis à vis section 1 (and other internal limitation clauses) as section 15(2) of the Charter does in respect of section 15(1)—i.e., provide a helpful cue to the SCC to prefer one interpretation of the nature and structure of particular Charter provisions over another.\(^95\) Admittedly, it will not provide a perfect textual cue to the SCC in this context, given its connection to the idea of rights misgivings as opposed to rights disagreements and its potential to be read as either confirming or exhausting the proper scope for dialogue under the Charter. However, section 33 will again have much in common with parallel provisions, such as section 15(2), which have also been interpreted by the SCC to involve some potential ambiguity.\(^96\) Therefore, while the notwithstanding clause cannot ensure that a justice will adopt a particular, preferred dialogic approach to the process of justification under section 1, it can, like section 15(2), provide valuable textual support for a justice adopting such an approach if she or he deems it desirable.

A related function section 33 serves, in this context, is to confirm to the SCC that the deference required of it in second look cases is not unlimited. The precise limits which apply to ex post deference many not exactly mirror the limits to section 33, but they will tend to be closely parallel. By itself, the existence of some limits in the latter context will also tend to provide valuable additional confirmation, to the SCC, that there should also be some limits in the former.

One such limit, for example, will be the requirement a legislative sequel is within the outer bounds of reasonable interpretations of the Charter (or, is not patently unreasonable). This reflects the fact that strong-form judicial review is problematic to the extent that there is scope for reasonable disagreement among Canadians about what the text, history, and normative values underpinning the Charter entail in particular cases. The moment such disagreement ceases to be reasonable according to any plausible interpretive theory, democratic objections to the SCC having final authority to interpret the Charter according to that theory also disappear.

A second limit stems from the understanding that, ideally, norms of interpretive deference should be reciprocated between the courts and the legislatures. This helps to ensure that, where the public favours some form of compromise between competing Charter values (or public rights and policy concerns), the path to achieving such a

\(^95\) See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 905 at paras. 105-11 [Lovelace]. (Holding, in dictum, that s. 15(2) confirms the substantive, rather than formal nature, of the equality guarantee found in s. 15(1) of the Charter, rather than establishes a special or exhaustive provision governing the constitutionality of affirmative action measures).

\(^96\) Ibid.
compromise is as smooth as possible. Absent a norm of mutual deference between judges and legislators, the path to long-term constitutional stability will tend to involve sharp swings between differing judicial and legislative constitutional interpretations, pending the ultimate “resolution” of such disagreement by Canadians via electoral or other means. The legislative branch could consistently pass the most extreme, “in your face” legislative sequels, which have effect for some period of time, and the SCC could consistently strike-down those statutes, thereby restoring the legal status quo, pending passage of another sequel.97 This type of behaviour undermines legal stability and predictability in a way which is neither necessary nor desirable from a dialogic perspective. As a result, dialogue theory favours a more controlled process of interpretive exchange under the Charter, whereby both judges and legislators commit to modify wherever possible, rather than wholly disregard, the interpretations of the other branch.98

B. New Dialogue, Judicial Minimalism, and Charter Conversation Compared

By emphasizing the importance of judicial deference and narrow statement ex post under section 1 of the Charter, new dialogue theory gives Canadian courts maximum flexibility ex ante to counter blockages in the legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charter rights.99

I have suggested elsewhere that reasonable disagreement about the meaning of constitutional rights means that, in most cases, a court such as the SCC cannot legitimately seek to enforce a wholly freestanding historical or moral conception of Charter rights. This does not mean, however, that the Court’s role under the Charter is necessarily insignificant, given the range of potential blockages in the legislative process surrounding the protection of Charter rights.100 Because legislative processes in Canada

---

97 For the idea of “in your face” replies, see Roach, “Common Law,” supra note 2.
99 As a result, some critics may, of course, regard new dialogue as supporting an unduly activist approach to judicial review ex ante. See, e.g., Christopher P. Manfredi and James B. Kelly, “Misrepresenting the Supreme Court’s Record? A Comment on Sujit Choudry and Claire E. Hunter, ‘Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada’” (2003-2004) 49 McGill L.J. 741.
100 See Rosalind Dixon, “Creating Dialogue About Socio-economic Rights: Strong-form Versus Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 I.CON. 391 [Dixon, “Socio-economic”]. In this sense, new dialogue theory is to some degree an inheritor to “representation-reinforcing” approaches to judicial review. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). At the same time, by emphasizing the pervasive existence of reasonable disagreement and rejecting any strict process/substantive distinction, whereby procedural values are understood to be free of such disagreement, new dialogue theory frees itself from some of the analytic failings of pure procedural theories. (For criticisms of the theory on this ground, see Laurence H. Tribe, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories” (1979-1980) 89 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1063-65, 1067-79). In doing so, it aligns itself more closely with the idea that judicial review is (alternatively change the “that” to “of” and keep the “as” (?)providing a valuable additional veto/initiation point for the protection of rights. Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
are frequently subject to blockages, such as those caused by “blind spots” and “burdens of inertia,” Canadians will often be prevented from enjoying even those Charter rights that a majority of citizens would be willing to grant them, if asked.\textsuperscript{101}

Legislative blind spots alone can take at least three distinct forms. They can relate to the application of laws to particular cases in a way that limits rights (blind spots of application), to certain perspectives not directly represented in the legislature (blind spots of perspective), and to opportunities for low-cost accommodation of rights claims (blind spots of accommodation). Each form of blind spot will arise for somewhat different reasons, having to do with constraints on the time, expertise, diversity, and focus of legislators.

Blind spots of application will often arise simply as a result of time constraints on legislators. When legislators are required to consider hundreds of bills in any given session, as well as perform constituency-related functions, they will often lack time to study individual pieces of legislation in detail. In other cases, blind spots of application can arise even where legislators do turn their minds to a particular issue, because legislators, like all of us, are subject to forms of bounded rationality and will therefore have limited foresight about the full range of circumstances in which a law may impair rights in the future.

Blind spots of perspective will arise in Canadian legislatures wherever a group lacks “descriptive” representation in the legislature and legislators lack the appropriate incentive or mechanism for reaching out to these excluded voices.\textsuperscript{102} In some cases, limits of this kind will be the product of deliberate, formal restrictions on the franchise (such as those that exist in the case of non-citizens and which used to exist for prisoners.)\textsuperscript{103} In other cases, they will be the product of electoral dynamics. As a result, political parties will have little incentive to select a diverse range of candidates with perspectives very different to those of the median voter. In each case, legislators will often have limited incentive to engage with the arguments and experiences of such groups, and, in any event, will find that they have few institutional opportunities for such engagement.

Blind spots of accommodation, in turn, can arise in legislative processes as a consequence of limits on both the time and expertise of legislators. Such limitations often lead legislators to delegate the task of identifying appropriate rights protections to the minister responsible for particular legislation, or to a legislative sub-committee, even when these legislators themselves often lack the experience necessary to craft appropriate rights protections. They also tend to have a disproportionate interest in achieving the

\textsuperscript{101} For the introduction of these concepts, see Dixon, \textit{supra} note 109.

\textsuperscript{102} On the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, \textit{The Concept of Representation} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

\textsuperscript{103} See notes 196-97, \textit{infra}. 

---

\textsuperscript{101} For the introduction of these concepts, see Dixon, \textit{supra} note 109.

\textsuperscript{102} On the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, \textit{The Concept of Representation} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

\textsuperscript{103} See notes 196-97, \textit{infra}. 

---

\textsuperscript{Review"} (2007-2008) 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (emphasizing the idea of courts as an additional veto point only).
relevant legislative objective in a way that can lead them to overlook opportunities for the accommodation of rights, even if such accommodations represent only a minimal cost on the legislature’s policy aims.\footnote{There are, of course, attempts to change this by introducing new legislative committee structures with specific responsibility for human rights issues. See, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, “New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?” (2003-2004) 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1963 at 1978.}

In many cases, legislative blind spots can also intersect with subsequent legislative inertia in a way that prevents the ongoing correction of earlier oversights. Inertia of this kind can take at least three distinct forms and impede legislative responsiveness to broader changes in constitutional understandings. Legislative burdens of inertia can be the product of competing legislative priorities (priority-driven inertia), competing factions within political parties in the legislature (coalition-driven inertia), and bureaucratic delay on the part of the executive, combined with poor oversight by legislatures (compound inertia). Priority-driven inertia can arise because capacity constraints on legislatures, at both levels of government, cause legislators to prioritize demands for action that benefit a large number of citizens and to neglect the demands of minorities, even where those demands find tacit support from a much larger majority.

Coalition-driven forms of inertia can arise in a different set of circumstances, where legislative behaviour is dominated by partisan political considerations. Against such a background, divisions within political parties over a Charter issue (may cause) legislators to avoid addressing that issue, even where there is fairly clear majority support for legislative change in the broader constitutional culture. In Canada, as in most constitutional democracies, affiliation with a major political party is extremely important to legislators’ chances of election; legislators, therefore, have a strong interest in promoting both the actual and apparent coherence of their party. That coherence can also be threatened where a Charter issue divides a party internally. In these circumstances, party leaders face two broad options: either allow a free vote among party members on the basis of their conscience, or impose party discipline on members in the minority. Both options can have costs for the coherence of the party. Allowing a conscience vote can undermine the public perception of solidarity, but imposing party discipline can erode the internal cohesion of a party; if such discipline is imposed frequently enough, members of a minority faction may no longer feel it is in their interest to remain part of the broad, party-based coalition.\footnote{See Tushnet, “New Forms,” supra note 22 at 834.} Faced with this catch-22, legislators may therefore decide to keep an issue off the agenda—even in the face of demands for legal change from the broader constitutional culture.\footnote{See Mark A. Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary” (1993) 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35 at 40; F.L. Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue?” in Paul Howe and Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 111. The strategic question is whether the short-term}
electoral gains of greater legislative responsiveness outweigh the damage to party coherence.

Alternatively, compound forms of inertia have the potential to arise wherever the realization of a Charter right requires some form of positive action from the executive. Where this is the case, time constraints, competing priorities, and defiance on the part of executive officials can mean that changes that advance rights are substantially delayed.\(^{107}\) Legislatures, with their own competing priorities, can fail to counter or punish such bureaucratic inertia where it arises. However, none of these blockages need be insurmountable, in a constitutional system such as Canada’s, which provides for broad judicial review.

All Canadian courts, not merely the SCC, will be well placed to identify blockages, such as those caused by blind spots of application. The fact that Canadian courts generally hear cases on a concrete, case-by-case basis means that they have ample opportunity to consider the application of laws to particular circumstances. Judges at higher levels of appeal will also, by virtue of prior experience in practice or in lower courts, be highly skilled at identifying the kinds of procedural protection or narrow substantive exceptions to laws which could be adopted at low cost to a particular legislative objective, thereby overcoming existing blind spots of accommodation. When it comes to burdens of inertia, appellate judges in particular will also have a range of sources available to them—domestic and foreign—which can help them identify the degree of popular support for a particular Charter claim.\(^{108}\) Given their powers under the Charter, Canadian courts will also have a broad range of tools available to them with which to counter such blockages, once identified.

The coercive remedial powers Canadian courts enjoy by virtue of section 24(1) of the Charter gives them the direct ability to counter almost all forms of legislative blind spot, simply by striking down or modifying the effect of legislation in a particular case.\(^{109}\) These powers also mean that, compared to purely political interventions made by social movements or human rights commissions, judicial interventions in the name of the Charter provide legislators with a greater incentive to address a previously neglected issue. (If they do not, it is likely that courts themselves will address the issue in a way legislators find less appealing.) The communicative aspect of courts’ reasoning also gives courts an extremely valuable additional tool with which to counter both legislative blind spots and burdens of inertia: appellate courts, and particularly the SCC, generally allow

---


\(^{109}\) By “coercive” I do not mean to suggest that courts literally have the power to enforce their judgments via coercive means. I mean simply to suggest that they have power to issue mandatory legal commands or directives that, in a system in which court orders are generally obeyed, will be given coercive effect by the executive in due course.
provide much readier access to national media attention for rights claimants, than do direct, popular attempts at constitutional change. In doing so, they provide a powerful tool for countering both blind spots of perspective and coalition-driven forms of inertia.

Different approaches to weakening the finality of the SCC’s interpretations of the Charter, however, imply varying degrees of constraint on the capacity of the SCC to use these tools with a view to countering such blockages. As a logical matter, there are two predominant ways, other than via ex post deference, by which the Court could weaken the finality of its decisions without Parliament or the legislature resorting to the application of section 33. One option would be for the SCC to adopt a much narrower approach to the scope of judicial review ex ante. Another option would be for it to accept that Parliament and the provincial legislatures may disregard its decision, or treat it as lacking binding force. The first option is generally associated with theories of “judicial minimalism,” proposed by scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Patrick Monahan in the United States and Canada, respectively. In the United States, the second option is associated with the idea of departmentalism, while in the United Kingdom it is connected to the idea of judicial review as “conversation.”

Theoretically, all three approaches are capable of responding to the possibility that, in seeking to counter perceived legislative blockages, Canadian courts may sometimes misjudge the degree of democratic support for, or practical effect of, recognizing a Charter right. Especially when compared to the predominant understanding of judicial review in the United States, each approach ensures that decisions of the SCC are at least fairly open to revision by Parliament or the legislature. The advantages of new dialogue theory are that it preserves the maximum scope possible for review ex ante, thereby countering blockages in the legislative process, and adopts a more deferential position ex post.


111 Another option would be to make judicial review even narrower and more deferential ex ante, and limited to cases in which the approach adopted by Parliament or provincial legislatures was patently unreasonable, or “clearly in error.” See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 4. Such an approach would, however, be both strongly contrary to existing SCC practice and far from a true compromise between full-scale judicial and legislative responsibility for interpreting the Charter.

112 See Sunstein, supra note 20.


Compared to judicial minimalism, new dialogue theory gives Canadian courts much greater flexibility in first look cases to determine whether to engage in broad versus narrow (and therefore also shallow versus deep) forms of reasoning *ex ante*. By doing so, it gives courts greater ability to use persuasion as a tool for promoting the enjoyment of rights. In many cases, persuasion of this kind will allow courts to address legislative blockages, such as those caused by blind spots of perspective and accommodation, or priority-driven burdens of inertia. Blockages of this kind will often arise in a consistent, closely-related pattern across different settings. Court decisions that seek to counter such blockages via case-specific, coercive means will tend to leave undisturbed a large number of other statutes embodying parallel blockages. In contrast, those that persuade legislators to give increased attention to a particular rights argument, concern, or issue—in more systemic terms—are likely to have a much broader impact on overall blind spots or inertia of this kind.

In comparison to conversational and departmental theories, new dialogue theory gives Canadian courts greater capacity to address legislative blockages, particularly those caused by the most persistent coalition-driven and compound inertia. Unlike conversational theories that limit the courts’ review choices, new dialogue theory gives courts broad power—through remedies—to directly counter such inertia. In the face of such inertia, it allows them to create a new, more democratically responsive legal equilibrium with the expectation that, unless the Court clearly misjudges democratic constitutional understandings, this new equilibrium will endure for some period of time.

---

115 If courts are to reason narrowly, they must also reason in a “shallow” way. See Sunstein, *supra* note 20 at 16–19 (noting that there are few decided cases which even attempt to combine narrow and deep reasoning, given the tension between the two demands). In Canada, see also e.g., *R v Morgentaler* [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at para 258 (seeking expressly to leave scope for Parliament to respond to the decision of the Court striking down 251 of the Criminal Code, by holding that “the precise point in the development of the foetus at which the state's interest in its protection becomes ‘compelling’ I leave to the informed judgment of the legislature”), pars 226–27, 240 (emphasizing women’s dignity and equality as the ultimate basis for recognizing a right to personal liberty and freedom of conscience in respect of abortion, under s. 2(a) and s. 7 of the Charter).

116 Consider *M. v. H.*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 147 [*M. v. H.*]. The Court in that case used a clear combination of both coercive and persuasive tools: see *M v. H ibid* at paras. 72–73 (using overtly normative language with an apparent view to countering such blockages when considering the range of contextual factors relevant to analysis under s. 15(1)), para.147 (issuing a suspended declaration of invalidity). The decision also had a powerful effect, not just in Ontario, but on the inertia in many other federal and provincial statutes. See Bill 5, *An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M. v. H., 1st Sess., 37th Leg., Ontario, 1999* (with its changes to sixty-seven laws which refer to spouses 1999); Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, C.23, 2003 (Bill C-23); Jason Murphy, “Dialogic Responses to *M v. H*: From Compliance to Defiance” (2001) 59 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 299.

117 In a conversational understanding, since the Court’s role is simply “to deliberate and not to decide,” countering legislative inertia is, according to Robert Bennett, “of no particular moment.” Bennett, *supra* note 123 at 892 In new dialogue theory, by contrast, Canadian courts’ capacity to counter such inertia will be extremely important to its ability to promote a more expansive interpretation of *Charter* rights, consistent with respecting reasonable disagreement among Canadians about the meaning of the *Charter*. 
Unlike departmental theory, new dialogue theory also gives Canadian courts much broader capacity to indirectly counter such inertia by further insisting that whatever remedial orders courts do issue, such orders should be treated as (at least narrowly) binding against both legislators and executive officials. It ensures that, whether courts issue a suspended declaration of invalidity or a mandatory injunction setting a time frame for legislative or executive action, the court’s intervention necessarily alters the incentives facing legislators when deciding whether to address a particularly controversial or complex Charter issue. Without a binding time frame for addressing such an issue, legislators with competing priorities or strong internal disagreements will have little reason to give increased attention to a particular issue. But when such a timeframe is backed by the threat of legislative invalidation or contempt of court, judicial intervention will create strong incentives for at least some legislators with a particular interest in or responsibility for an issue.

Another argument for new dialogue theory over rival minimalist, conversational, or departmental approaches is that this approach fits more easily within the structure of the Charter, as well as the actual history of Charter review in Canada. In the United States, there is some historical support for departmental understandings, given that it is far from clear that the framers of the Constitution intended to establish judicial supremacy, at least at the expense of Congress. Furthermore, as Larry Kramer has shown, there was also a long period in the nineteenth century during which the president, Congress and state officials actively exercised their “departmental” authority to interpret the Constitution.

In the United Kingdom, where conversational theories have gained the most attention, defining the Court’s role in purely communicative terms also makes some sense at the level of fit, given the constraints of the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 3 of the HRA provides that British courts have an obligation “so far as it is possible to do so” to “read and giv[e] effect” to legislation “in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” Section 4 provides that where a compatible reading is impossible, courts may make a “declaration of incompatibility.” Such a declaration does not, in turn, “affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given, and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.” As a result, a section 4 declaration may plausibly be considered conversational, rather than legally binding.

By contrast, due to Canada’s history and the structure of the Charter, it is less appropriate to treat Canadian courts’ decisions as lacking binding legal force. By the time

---

121 HRA, ibid., s. 4(6).
the Charter was adopted in 1982, it was accepted that court decisions are legally binding against other branches of government, at least in the narrow sense that other branches must respect courts’ decisions as the final word on the rights and liabilities of individual parties before them, rather than the more general legal issues raised by a case.\textsuperscript{122} Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, empowers Canadian courts to invalidate unconstitutional legislation. Therefore, it also makes less sense to treat Canadian courts’ role as primarily persuasive or communicative, rather than coercive.\textsuperscript{123}

If one considers the SCC’s approach to Charter review since 1982, it is clear that members of the Court have frequently departed from a strictly minimalist, narrow, and shallow approach to judicial reasoning \textit{ex ante}. Take the approach of the SCC in cases in which it invalidates a law for inconsistency with section 1 of the Charter. Truly narrow reasoning in such cases would involve an exclusive focus by the SCC on the minimal impairment limb of the Oakes test (\textit{i.e.}, the question of whether a law limited a protected right as little as possible). Unlike a finding that a law lacked an appropriately important objective or failed the rational basis test, such a finding would not in any way suggest that Parliament or the legislature was precluded from re-enacting closely the measure. Similarly, unlike a finding about ultimate proportionality, such a finding would also avoid comment on what would be required for legislation to pass muster in a second look situation.

The SCC, however, has rarely chosen to rely exclusively on this limb of the Oakes test. While the minimal impairment test has been critical, the Court has also emphasized multiple bases of potential invalidity when striking down legislation. Between 1986 and 1997, Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton, and Sean Gatien found that in nine per cent and sixteen per cent of cases, respectively, the SCC found that the legislation not only failed minimal impairment, but also the requirements of rational connection and proportionality.\textsuperscript{124} At a more qualitative level, the SCC’s section 1 reasoning is at times overtly normative and, to that degree, somewhat broad, even when ostensibly connected to the idea of minimal impairment itself.\textsuperscript{125}


\textsuperscript{125} See, e.g., \textit{M. v. H., supra} note 125 at paras. 72-73.
From this perspective, an approach that emphasizes the desirability of giving the SCC flexibility to determine when and how much to engage in narrow statement ex post, as opposed to ex ante, will therefore also have clear advantages when it comes to considerations of fit.

III. OBJECTIONS TO JUDICIAL DEFERENCE EX POST

Two main objections may be raised to the idea of judicial deference, or narrow statement, ex post: one is that an approach of this kind on the part of the SCC has the potential to undermine interpretive stability—or consistency—at a lower court level, when the constitutional status of a legislative sequel is in issue. Another objection is that deference of this kind is contrary to the independence of the judiciary, which is an unwritten constitutional principle. However, while both point to valid concerns, neither provides a persuasive basis for rejecting, at least out of hand, the desirability of new dialogue theory as a preferred account of the balance between the SCC and Parliament or the legislature under the Charter.

When it comes to concerns about interpretive stability, it is important to recognize that whatever approach the SCC adopts, some degree of interpretive inconsistency is inevitable. It is predictable that lower courts will apply the SCC jurisprudence in different ways and arrive at different outcomes. In the case of legislative sequels, lower courts are also likely to apply a strong presumption of constitutionality—which in effect mirrors the consequences of the SCC applying ex post deference—in a way that creates little difference between these and other cases.

Take the pattern exhibited in lower court decisions in the period between the SCC’s decision in Seaboyer and its subsequent decision in R. v. Darrach, which considered whether Parliament’s new rape-shield law violated the Charter. In a number of cases during this period, the defendant wished to present evidence not addressed by the SCC in Seaboyer—evidence of a complainant’s prior, nonconsensual sexual activity. In determining the admissibility of such evidence, especially prior to the SCC’s decision in R. v. Crosby, the lower courts were guided by the SCC’s interpretation of the purpose of the rape-shield regime discussed in Seaboyer. According to the Court, its obligation was to prevent juries from being distracted by evidence that suggested that a complainant was either more likely to consent to sexual intercourse, or less likely to be credible, by
reason of her prior sexual activity (the “twin myths”).

For the most part, the lower courts had difficulty with this issue and were inconsistent in the approach they took in this area.

In cases more directly parallel to Seaboyer, where applying the legislative sequel required consideration of whether the SCC was likely to defer to (and uphold) such legislation, lower courts arguably adopted a more consistent approach. Unless asked to do so, they did not question the validity of the relevant amended legislation, but instead applied a presumption in favour of validity. By carefully considering the SCC’s guidance in Seaboyer about the twin myths—to which such legislation responded—the lower courts consistently identified certain categories of cases (such as those involving children’s evidence) where the rape-shield regime was inapplicable. They also managed, when applying the Criminal Code, to balance the probative value versus the prejudice of particular evidence in a fairly consistent way. If the SCC had made it even clearer at the first look stage, in Seaboyer, that it favoured a commitment to ex post deference and narrow statement, lower courts would also very likely have approached these cases in an even more consistent way.

The SCC has itself made clear, in the context of section 1, that there will often be a need to “nuance” the application of the Oakes test and give what amounts to deference to the legislature in an attempt to balance competing Charter values. Post 11 September 2001, in the national security context in particular, the SCC held that it is appropriate for courts to show heightened deference to Parliament, and by extension the executive, in assessing whether a violation of Charter rights can be justified. Other courts, including the USSC and House of Lords, have endorsed similar principles of deference, or a similar “margin of discretionary judgment,” in the context of cases involving questions of foreign affairs, immigration, and national security. It therefore

---

131 Seaboyer at para 41.


134 Criminal Code, R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 276, as am. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), S.C. 1992, c 38, s. 2.


136 See Hiebert, Limiting, supra note 84 at 61-71.

137 See, e.g., Suresh v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 30, 120 (noting the importance of deference to Parliament, and by extension the Minister, in assessing the Constitutionality of the deportation of non-citizens deemed a threat to security).

138 In the United Kingdom, See, e.g., A. and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 at para. 29 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill (noting the importance of deference to Parliament in assessing the compatibility of a system of control orders with Art 5 of the European
cannot be that any form of deference by courts to legislative constitutional judgments is antithetical to principles of judicial independence. The question must be one of degree, rather than kind. As a matter of degree, narrow judicial restatement will require deference by Canadian courts of only a limited kind.

Under this principle, in determining whether to defer to a reasonable legislative sequel, Canadian courts will still be required to make a number of important substantive findings. First, they must decide whether a legislative sequel is reasonable in light of the basic constitutional commitment to freedom and democracy in section 1 of the Charter; and, second, they must determine whether it is reasonable in light of their own prior judgments. In either instance, rather than suspending its own judgment, the Court will be required to make complex evaluative judgments about the nature of both prior judicial and prior legislative reasoning.

On this point, the history of Darrach is instructive. In Seaboyer, (the first look case) a majority held that the rape-shield regime in section 276 of the Criminal Code imposed an unjustifiable limitation on an accused’s rights under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. One reason was that the scheme was both unduly rigid and substantially overbroad in its approach, and failed to exclude only irrelevant evidence (i.e., evidence going to the advancement of the twin myths). Parliament responded in a way partially compliant with this reasoning—i.e., it enacted a new regime, giving discretion to judges to admit evidence of the kind considered in Seaboyer, that is, “relevant, specific in nature, and [which has] significant probative value which is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the administration of justice.” However, Parliament also sought to narrow the extent to which the Seaboyer would lead to the admission of such evidence (even if was plausibly, but minimally, relevant), by introducing additional requirements of specificity and significance.

In Darrach, the SCC upheld this new law by, in effect, engaging in a form of narrow restatement. Rather than insisting on a broad reasoning of its prior decision in Seaboyer, it emphasized two of its specific concerns in Seaboyer. First was the way the legislative sequel addressed the blanket nature of the prohibition and its pigeon-hole approach to relevance in the earlier, problematic provision. Second was Darrach’s decision to downplay Seaboyer’s broader reasoning about the irrelevance of particular legislative objectives (such as increasing the willingness of complainants to report sexual assault) and the need to prioritize the accused’s right of full answer and defence by admitting all potentially relevant and probative evidence that did not have the potential to...
cause substantial prejudice. Furthermore, the complainant’s privacy played a different role in the analyses; in *Darrach*, the Court held that excluding evidence of a complainant’s sexual history could legitimately be considered to further the “proper administration of justice.” In upholding the legislation as consistent with the requirements of fundamental justice, *Darrach* also held that it was legitimate for Parliament to “direct judges to the serious ramifications of the use of evidence of prior sexual activity for all parties to these cases.”

Therefore, in *Darrach*, the Court engaged in its own independent, evaluative judgment about the reasonableness of the legislation. Before deciding to uphold the sequel, it gave careful consideration to the degree to which Parliament had avoided an overly rigid, pigeon-hole approach to admissibility, and also applied a balancing approach to determine the admissibility of evidence, as endorsed by *Seaboyer*. The SCC specifically held that by requiring evidence to have significant probative value in order to be admissible, Parliament had not raised the “threshold for admissibility to the point that it [was] unfair to the accused.” The Court also considered the reasonableness, in a more independent sense, of Parliament seeking to exclude evidence of prior sexual history adduced to support inferences other than those based on the twin myths.

In fact, the main relevance of concerns about judicial independence in such a case was at the level of perception, rather than reality. This also helps explain why it was important, if one looks at *Darrach* in broader perspective, that there was an eight year delay between the hearing of the first and second look cases. While ex post deference by the SCC in a case such as *Darrach* and similar cases will not, according to my argument, involve any actual sacrifice in judicial independence which is problematic, there is always some danger that the public will see them in this way—i.e., mistake a decision to engage in dialogue as simply a decision to bow to political pressure. Where this occurs, there could be a cost to the standing of the judiciary. One way for the SCC to avoid this will be to try and ensure some delay in the hearing of sensitive second look cases.

Delay between the enactment of a legislative sequel and its consideration by the Court increases both the actual and perceived insulation of the justices from the particular political pressures leading to the sequel itself. It therefore has an important capacity to reduce the risk that Canadians will mistake judicial dialogue for capitulation. In some cases, delay will occur in the hearing of second look cases without any deliberate action

---

142 *Darrach*, supra note 138 at para 41.
144 *Ibid.* at paras. 34, 36, 38.
147 Compare *Casey*, supra note 48 (noting the costs to public confidence in the USSC of being perceived to “over-rule under fire”).
on the part of the SCC, but in others it will require the Court to make strategic use of jurisdictional control devices, such as the doctrines of mootness and ripeness.\textsuperscript{148}

Compared to a commitment to narrow restatement, use of such devices will do less to distinguish judicial review in Canada from that in the United States, where the USSC controls its docket with a view to some forms of constitutional avoidance.\textsuperscript{149} However, if one considers the time frame of second look cases, such as \textit{Eichman} and \textit{Boerne}, in which there was a one- and four-year delay, respectively, between the relevant first and second look decisions of the USSC, it still remains an important potential basis for distinguishing judicial review in Canada from that in the United States.\textsuperscript{150}

IV. \textbf{REVISITING THE RECORD OF DIALOGUE THUS FAR}

One question which arises is how the record of dialogue to date should be assessed under new dialogue theory. In current theories of dialogue, the test is whether decisions which invalidate legislation are followed by a sequel. Dialogue does not depend on the nature of the response: whether the legislature agrees or disagrees with the Court’s interpretation of the Charter is irrelevant because the focus is on the legislatures decision to respond. In new dialogue theory, by contrast, successful dialogue requires both that: (i) the legislature modify a judicial decision in a manner that evidences some form of interpretive disagreements, and (ii) that the SCC either uphold the legislative sequel by applying an appropriate degree of ex post deference under section 1 or avoid rapid reconsideration of their validity.

Despite these differences in approach, there is a striking similarity between the findings of current dialogue theory and those of new dialogue theory about the rate of dialogue under the \textit{Charter} to date.

In \textit{Charter Dialogue}, Hogg and Bushell suggest that dialogue has occurred in approximately eighty per cent of cases involving a SCC or “significant” lower court invalidating decision.\textsuperscript{151} After updating their study in 2007, in conjunction with Wade Wright, they again claim that dialogue had occurred in substantially more than half, or approximately sixty-one per cent of cases.\textsuperscript{152} Skeptics of judicial review, by contrast, suggest that dialogue has occurred at a much lower rate, and certainly at a rate of less than fifty per cent.\textsuperscript{153} Some departmental scholars, who emphasize the importance of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} See notes 33-39, \textit{supra}.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Hogg and Bushell, \textit{supra} note 2 at 96-98.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Hogg, Bushell Thornton and Wright, \textit{supra} note 2 at 51-52.
\end{itemize}
section 33 to Parliament and the legislature’s ability to contribute to the interpretation of the Charter, argue that true dialogue—if there is such a thing—has occurred in as few as two per cent (or one out of fifty-four cases). 154 Others, who are willing to grant the possibility of dialogue under section 1, suggest that dialogue has occurred at a somewhat higher, but still troublingly low, rate of thirty per cent. 155

New dialogue theory suggests that current dialogue scholars are largely right—even if one puts aside the Quebec’s use of section 33 to re-enact French-only signage laws in response to the SCC’s decision in Ford—legislative sequels have tended to enjoy an overwhelming degree of either formal or de facto success.

Of the twelve instances between 1982 and 2005 in which Parliament or a legislature sought to narrow the SCC’s interpretation of the Charter, four of those instances of legislative dialogue met with a clear dialogic response on the part of the SCC. One such instance, discussed above, was Darrach and the sequel to Seaboyer. The other three involved the Court’s decisions in R. v. Swain, 156 R. v. Morales, 157 and RJR-MacDonald. 158 In all four of these instances, the SCC used communicative and coercive remedies in the first look cases to counter perceived legislative blockages. In second look cases, when shown to have misjudged the degree of democratic support for a particular expansive reading of Charter rights, the Court showed a willingness to engage in ex post deference and narrow statement. The Court’s approach to first and second look cases is a model of new dialogue theory.

In Swain, the SCC implicitly rested its decision on the existence of blind spots of accommodation in the provisions of the Criminal Code that provided for the indefinite committal of persons acquitted of a crime on grounds of insanity. 159 The Court held that such provisions burdened individuals’ rights to bodily freedom and security in a way that was much broader than necessary, particularly given the unfettered power of the prosecution to put the question of insanity at issue, but also because of potential alternative civil models for commitment. Parliament responded by giving narrow effect to the Court’s decision: it preserved the system of indefinite committal, but limited the right of the prosecution to put the question of insanity at issue, and introduced a separate system for administrative committal for persons found unfit to stand trial or not guilty on

155 See Manfredi and Kelly, “Six Degrees,” supra note 162 at 521 (identifying the percentage of cases in which Parliament or the legislature has enacted a sequel evidencing some form of substantive interpretive disagreement). While this approach has advantages over that taken by Hogg and Bushell, it is problematic to the extent that it cannot control for the percentage of cases in which legislative attempts at dialogue ought to have, but, in fact, did not occur. Because of this, beyond ascertaining that some legislative attempts at dialogue have in fact occurred, new dialogue theory focuses on the success rate of actual (rather than hypothetically possible) dialogic legislative sequels.
158 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 76.
159 Swain, supra note 154.
grounds of mental illness. In a series of two subsequent cases, *Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)* and *Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (A.G.)*, the SCC upheld this new legislation as consistent with section 7 almost in its entirety. In doing so, it showed implicit deference to parliamentary judgments about the best way to combine protection of the accused with protection of the community. It also downplayed Swain’s emphasis on the dangers of indefinite detention, in favour of a narrower focus on the dangers of Parliament providing for indefinite detention without a treatment component. This shift in focus in the judicial sequel can be seen as a form of ex post narrow statement.

In *Morales*, the SCC again identified the existence of a blind spot of accommodation, holding that the denial of bail “in the public interest” constituted a denial of the right to a fair trial provided by section 11(e) of the *Charter*, in part because other, more specific grounds for the denial of bail made such a provision unnecessary. Parliament responded in a way that sought to give the decision narrow effect: it repealed the particular ground for denying bail struck down in *Morales*, but simultaneously introduced a new, related ground for denying bail, based on the need “to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.” When this sequel came before the SCC in *R. v. Hall*, the SCC once again showed a willingness to defer to Parliament’s attempt to redefine the balance struck between competing rights, this time even referring explicitly to the idea of dialogue. In doing so, it also showed a clear willingness to narrow its prior reasoning about the two exhaustive bases on which Parliament could limit access to bail. The majority opinion recognized that it was open to Parliament to advance the administration of justice, not only by preventing direct interferences with the trial process by an accused, but also by ensuring that the presence of an accused in the community did not “call into question the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.”

Likewise in *RJR-MacDonald*, the SCC initially identified a blind spot of accommodation in the 1988 *Tobacco Products Control Act*, which prohibited tobacco-advertising in Canadian media and required mandatory, unattributed package warnings on tobacco products. Parliament responded by expressing disagreement with the Court

---

161 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 [*Winko*].
162 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498 [*Penetanguishene*].
163 *Winko*, supra note 170 at paras. 92-93. In 2004, in *R. v. Demers*, ([2004] 2 S.C.R. 489), the Court also retreated from this position slightly, by holding that the new scheme was inconsistent with s. 7 as applied to persons permanently unfit and who do not pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.
164 *Morales*, supra note 166 at 40-41...
166 [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 [*Hall*].
167 Ibid. at para. 43.
168 Ibid. at paras. 40-41.
169 The Court held that the 1988 Act unjustifiably infringed s. 2(c) of the *Charter*, considering that it could almost as effectively have achieved its objectives of protecting children, while still allowing
about the likely costs of giving greater accommodation to interests of freedom of expression in this area. In *Canada (A.G.) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp*., the SCC deferred to this dialogic legislative sequel, this time on the stated basis that changes since *MacDonald* in attitudes towards, and understandings of, the harms caused by smoking justified the greater regulation imposed by the relevant legislative sequel. In doing so, at a more implicit level it also engaged in an ex post narrowing, or softening, of its prior reasoning about the distinct nature of lifestyle advertising on the one hand, and brand and informational advertising on the other. In *JTI-Macdonald*, the Court recognized both that “information can be packaged in many ways,” and that the “sophistication and subtly of tobacco advertising practices” meant that, at least in the case of young persons, such advertising could be capable of increasing smoking.

Consistent with the approach counseled by new dialogue theory, there was some delay in each case between the hearing of the relevant first and second look cases. In *Swain* and *Seaboyer*, a full eight years elapsed between the legislative sequel and the Court’s decisions in *Winko* and *Darrach*. Similarly, there was a six year delay between the sequel to *Morales* and the Court’s decision in *Hall*.

In other cases, the absence of any judicial sequel has meant that a number of dialogic legislative sequels have enjoyed de facto effectiveness or success. While the degree of legislative disagreement with the SCC has varied from one case to another, six SCC cases have, for example, arguably fallen into this category of initiating a process of de facto dialogic success: namely, *Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada*, *R. v. Bain*, *R. v. Daviault*, *Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney information and brand-preference advertising, and a government, rather than unattributed, health-warning.

170 Tobacco Act, S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 22. (allowing informational and brand-advertising only in “adult-only” places and in printed matter, delivered by direct mail, having an 85% or higher adult readership place).

171 [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 [*JTI-Macdonald*].

172 Ibid. at para. 93.

173 [1991] 1 S.C.R 139 [*Committee* (holding that provisions of the Government Airport Concession Operations Regulations, SOR/79-373 prohibiting advertising and solicitation in airports an unjustified limitation of s. 2(b) of the *Charter*, given both degree of impairment of political expression and relative unimportance of objective in general). The provincial minister responded by promulgating S.O.R/95-228, which re-enacted the original ban, but only in respect of commercial solicitation.

174 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 [*Bain*] (holding that provisions of s. 563(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 allowing the Crown to standby 48 potential jurors and to make 4 peremptory challenges, and the defense to make 12 peremptory challenges an unjustified limitation of s. 11(b) of the *Charter*, given the extent to which the provisions at least appear to create an advantage to the prosecution, and therefore unfairness). Parliament responded by enacting *An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (jury)*, S.C. 1992, c. 41, s. 2 which repealed the provision for stand-by jurors, but simultaneously increased the number of peremptory challenges available to the prosecution, to equal the number available to the defense, to 12 or 20 according to the offense.

175 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 [*Daviault*] (holding that provisions of the *Criminal Code*, R.S.C 1985, c. C-46 incorporating the common law rule that intoxication not a defense to crimes of general intent not in accordance with the requirements of fundamental justice in s. 7, and an unjustified limitation of s. 11(d) of the *Charter*, given the possibility of creating a defense of non-insane automatism, to be proven by defense
In one additional case, a dialogic legislative sequel has also enjoyed *de facto* success by reason of a SCC decision to delay consideration of a challenge. In *R. v. Zundel*, the SCC held that a provision of the *Criminal Code* prohibiting the willful publication of false news constituted an overbroad and unnecessary limitation on freedom of expression, given the lack of any intent requirement for such an offense and the availability of alternative criminal sanctions for the willful incitement of racial hatred (upheld in *R. v. Keegstra*). Parliament did not re-legislate under the *Criminal Code*, but introduced a provision for the award of civil penalties in relation to the transmission of “hate messages” (defined so as not to require a showing of intent). In doing so it engaged in dialogue with the SCC about the proper balance between Charter commitments to freedom of expression on the one hand, and dignity and equality on the other. Perception, balance of probabilities). Parliament responded by enacting *An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Self-Induced Intoxication)*, S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1, making a defense of non-insane automatism available, but only where intoxication is not self-induced, or offense does not involve assault or violation of physical integrity.

176 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 [*Thomson*] (holding that the provision in s. 322.1 of the *Canada Elections Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2 prohibiting the publication of “new poll” information within 3 days of election an unjustified limitation of s. 2(b) of the Charter, given the lack of narrow tailoring or proportionality of such a prohibition). Parliament responded by enacting the *Canada Elections Act*, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 326-328, which both complied with the SCC’s decision by restricting the prohibition on publication of polls to election day, but also narrowed the effect of SCC’s emphasis on freedom of expression, by requiring that those publishing earlier polls provide details of their statistical methods on request, or publish a disclaimer where such polls are not based on recognized statistical methods.

177 [1999] 2 S.C.R 203 [*Corbiere*] (holding that the provisions of s. 77(1) of the *Indian Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5 requiring voters in band council elections to be “ordinarily resident” on the reserve an unjustified limitation of s. 15(1) of the Charter, given that such a provision did not minimally impair the equality rights of band members directly affected by council decisions). The Minister responded by enacting new *Indian Band Election Regulations*, C.R.C., c. 952, s. 3, SOR/2000-391, s. 2, which provided that persons could continue to adopt a reserve as their place of ordinary residence, even in the event of a “temporary” absence from the reserve.

178 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [*Sharpe*] (holding that that importance of freedom of expression, combined with the low risk of harm caused by the possession of certain explicit material, warranted reading-in exceptions to the *Criminal Code* prohibition against the possession of child pornography for entirely self-created expression and private recordings of lawful sexual activity). Parliament responded by enacting the *Criminal Law Amendment Act*, S.C. 2003, c. 13, s. 5(4), which replaced previous specific defenses with a more general, yet also narrow, defense based on the fact that material does not pose “an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years”.

179 [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 [*Figueroa*] (holding that the provisions in s. 24 and s. 18 of the *Canada Elections Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 requiring that parties must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts in order to obtain registered status (and thus tax deductibility, transfer of funds and ballot-listing benefits) an unjustified limitation of s. 3, given more narrowly tailored means of achieving cost-savings in public funding of elections, and doubts as to importance of this objective). Parliament responded by enacting *An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act*, R.S.C 2004, c. 24, which allowed require parties to field a single candidate, but simultaneously increased the requirements of voter-support and ongoing membership for the registration of parties.

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act, R.S.C 2004, c. 24, which allowed require parties to field a single candidate, but simultaneously increased the requirements of voter-support and ongoing membership for the registration of parties.


181 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [*Keegstra*].

182 See *Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 at 924 [*Taylor*].
other. In Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, the SCC was asked to consider the validity of this dialogic sequel, but declined to do so by focusing on the jurisdiction of the federal court to make certain orders under this new remedial scheme. The constitutional challenge was moot as a result.

In only one instance in the more than twenty years of litigation under the Charter—in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)—has the SCC actively refused to uphold a legislative sequel in its entirety. In Sauvé I, the SCC struck down provisions of the Canada Election Act 1985 that disqualified prison inmates from voting in federal election as an unjustified limitation on the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter. Parliament responded by introducing legislation which limited the disqualification of prisoners to those serving a sentence of two years or more, but in Sauvé II, the SCC again struck down the relevant limitation.

While the better view is probably that Sauvé II was a failure of dialogue on the part of the SCC, it is also arguable that Sauvé II was exactly the kind of case in which ex post deference was not required under new dialogue theory: namely, a case in which the relevant legislative response by Parliament was not even arguably reasonable in light of the text of section 3 of the Charter and section 1’s commitment to a democratic society. While many constitutional democracies have disenfranchised convicted offenders, it is difficult, at a principled level, to reconcile such practices with democratic commitments to equal access to the franchise and treatment of the right to vote as a fundamental right.

From one view, legislatures in Canada have therefore actually enjoyed a complete success rate when passing reasonable legislative sequels in response to SCC decisions, and at the very least have enjoyed a success rate of eleven out of twelve, (or twelve out of thirteen if one includes the sequel to Ford—a rate of ninety-two per cent). At a lower court level, dialogic legislative sequels have also enjoyed a somewhat lower, but still high, rate of formal or de facto success.

Assessing the pattern of dialogue at this level will, of course, be more complicated than at a SCC level. One reason is that any decision by a provincial attorney general or the federal attorney not to appeal to the SCC may imply that the legislative majority does not wholly disagree with a court’s decision, and, therefore, that the first stage of dialogue (namely a dialogic legislative sequel) is less likely than at an SCC level.

---

183 See Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S. 1985, c. H-6, ss. 13, 53, 54 (as amended by ____ 1998, c. 9, ss. 27, 28.
184 Liberty Net, supra note 157.
185 Ibid. at para. 50 (noting the mootness of the relevant Charter question).
188 Of course, the fact that four members of the SCC would have upheld the relevant sequel under s. 1 points strongly in the other direction. See Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Day Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauvé v. Canada, The Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later: Commentary” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105.
The second complicating factor is the difficulty, from a practical perspective, of ensuring a non-biased sample of lower court decisions. Thus, Hogg and Bushell were criticized in their initial study for deciding to include “significant” provincial court judgments drawn from Hogg’s treatise, *Constitutional Law*, because such an approach could be under-inclusive and might reflect the ingoing assumptions or biases of the authors.\(^\text{189}\) The difficulty can be overcome by analyzing the more than one thousand *Charter* cases reported in the *Canadian Digest*, prepared by the Department of Justice, as those cases are selected by department officials for their significance on a stand-alone basis, rather than for dialogic relevance. An analysis of that data identifies forty-seven cases between 1982 and 2005 in which provincial courts of appeal struck down statutory provisions but the matter never reached the SCC; seven of these met with a legislative response evidencing clear legislative disagreement.\(^\text{190}\)

Among those eight instances of legislative dialogue, in three instances—namely, *R. v. Pugsley*,\(^\text{191}\) *R. v. Bryant*,\(^\text{192}\) and *Stoney Creek (City) v. Ad Vantage Signs Ltd.*\(^\text{193}\)—Canadian courts provided a dialogic response to sequels which narrowed the effect of prior judicial rulings. In each of these cases, there was also some willingness on the part of the courts to engage in a form of narrow statement or deference ex post.

In *Pugsley*, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that provisions of the *Criminal Code* requiring that a person arrested for murder “show cause” justifying their release on bail constituted an unjustified limitation on the right to a fair trial.\(^\text{194}\) Parliament sharply disagreed and re-enacted provisions providing for a presumption in favor of the ongoing detention of a person charged with murder, unless an accused, after being given a reasonable opportunity, could “show cause” justifying release.\(^\text{195}\) In response to this, other provincial courts then showed a willingness to give effect to this new regime, and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld this sequel as consistent with the *Charter* by explicitly narrowing the scope of its prior ruling in *Pugsley*\(^\text{196}\).

\(^{189}\) See Manfredi and Kelly, “Six Degrees,” *supra* note 162. at 516

\(^{190}\) See Department of Justice, Canadian Charter of Rights Decisions Digest—available at http://canlii.org/en/ca/charter_digest/tab-cas.html (last accessed August, 2004). For treatment of the remaining thirty-nine cases, see Appendix (on file with Osgoode Hall L.J.).


\(^{192}\) (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 732. (1984) 48 O.R. (2d) 732 (striking down provision in the *Criminal Code* R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 that where an accused who was subject to an arrest warrant or interim release order failed to appear, they were to be tried by judge alone unless they could establish to the satisfaction of the judge a legitimate excuse for their failure to appear).

\(^{193}\) (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 65. 34 O.R. (3d) 65 (1997) (striking-down by-law prohibiting the erection of signs in the municipality except as authorized by the council, or where erected by a service-station or builder).


In *Bryant*, the Ontario Court of Appeal invalidated a provision requiring an accused who failed to appear to be tried by judge alone, in the absence of a legitimate excuse for not appearing. 197 Parliament disagreed and re-enacted the provision in precisely the same terms; two years later the Court of Appeal upheld this legislative sequel, finding that it was justified on the basis of the emerging doctrine of waiver (which was not before the Court in *Bryant*).198

In *Stoney Creek*, the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down, as an unjustified restriction on freedom of expression, a municipal by-law prohibiting the erection of signs in the municipality, except as authorized by the council, or where erected by a service-station or builder. The municipality’s response narrowed the effect of the court’s decision by restricting signs to commercial property, limiting their dimensions (twenty square metres or seven metres per face) and regulating their distance from the road. 199 The SCC subsequently upheld an almost identical by-law as (implicitly) a reasonable legislative sequel.200

Consistent with the understanding of new dialogue theory, at least in the cases of *Pugsley* and *Stoney Creek*, there was also a delay between the hearing of the first and second look cases.201 Three additional instances of legislative dialogue, involving legislation enacted in response to the decisions of lower courts in *MacLean v. Nova Scotia (A.G.)*,202 *R. v. Chief*,203 and *R. v. Music Explosion Ltd.*,204 have also met with de facto dialogic success. In only two cases—those involving the sequels to *Minister of National Revenue v. Kruger Inc.*205 and *Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (A.G.)*206—have lower courts insisted on a broad reading of their own prior rulings and struck down a legislative sequel designed to narrow a court decision.207 *Kruger* also involved an area of narrow disagreement between the court and the legislature about the need for residual discretion on the part of courts to refuse a warrant.

Overall, from a quantitative point of view, there has therefore been a dialogic success rate at a lower court level of approximately seventy-five per cent.208 At a more

---

197 Criminal Code, R.S.C 1970, c. C-34, s. 526.1 (as amended by Criminal Law Amendment Act 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 65).
198 *R. v. McNabb* (1986), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 266 (B.C.C.A.). Note that leave to appeal from this decision to the SCC was granted ([1987] 1 S.C.R. x), but the appeal was discontinued ([1987] 2 S.C.R. viii).
199 Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek s. 5(g), as ins. by By-Law No.4529-97, ss. 3, 13 –March 25, 1997). [from the Stoney Creek corporation…]
200 *Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville (Town)*, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 158 [*Vann*].
201 See *Sanchez*, supra note 207 (17 year delay); *Vann Niagara* (6 year delay).
202 (1987), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 296 (__)[Maclelan].
203 (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265 (__)[Chief].
204 (1990), 68 Man. R. (2d) 203 [*Music*].
205 [1984] 2 F.C. 535 [*Kruger*].
208 That is, six out of eight instances.
qualitative level, the record of dialogue to date in these cases also provides additional support for the position, under both new and current dialogue theory, that section 33 remains relevant to dialogue in Canada, even when the override is passive or dormant.

At the SCC level, all four instances in which the Court was actively willing to engage in dialogue occurred in the context of provisions—such as sections 2(c), 7, and 11—which are squarely within the purview of section 33. Likewise, at a lower court level, there has also been a clear link between successful instances of legislative dialogue and the availability of section 33. All three instances in which the SCC or provincial courts have been actively willing to defer to legislative sequels to provincial court decisions have involved questions about the scope or meaning of provisions such as the fair trial guarantee in section 1, or freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

By contrast, with only one exception, the instances in which the SCC or provincial courts have been unwilling to engage in dialogue—namely Sauvé II and Reform Party of Canada—have occurred in the context of challenges under section 3 of the Charter, and closely related freedom of expression guarantees, where section 33 does not apply, either in whole or in part.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE RECORD THUS FAR

In confirming the existence of Charter dialogue in this way, new dialogue theory does not suggest that the original proponents of dialogue in Canada got it wholly right about the relationship between judicial review under the Charter and concerns about democracy—or about the inevitable or stable nature of dialogue under the Charter.

In current dialogue theory, because the SCC handed down fifty-four distinct invalidating decisions between 1982 and 2005, by the end of that period there had been fifty-four opportunities to test the presence of dialogue under the Charter and concerns about democracy—or about the inevitable or stable nature of dialogue under the Charter.

According to the requirements of new dialogue theory, there were, by contrast, only twenty-one instances in which Parliament or the legislature sought actively to narrow the effect of Charter interpretation, and thus where it was possible to consider the potential success of legislative dialogue. Even more important, less than half of those instances (i.e., ten or

209 See notes _____, supra. (notes 144-57 in original update).
210 See notes _____, supra. (notes 177-80).
212 Some of these instances involve delegated legislation, and are thus more marginal cases of legislative dialogue. See notes 182, 203, supra.
eleven cases) required the SCC or a lower court to actively articulate its approach to dialogue. At the SCC level, there were only five cases actively tested the Court’s commitment to new dialogue: namely, the four second look sequels to Seaboyer, Swain, Morales, and RJR-MacDonald, plus Vann Niagara. In new dialogue theory it is therefore premature to conclude, as current dialogue theory does, that there is a well-established pattern of dialogue between the courts and legislatures.

A second reason for doubting whether dialogue is in fact as stable as current dialogue scholars suggest is that the SCC itself has not expressly endorsed the requirements of (new) dialogue—i.e., the idea of ex post deference and narrow statement. On the contrary, even when referring to the idea of dialogue, the SCC has tended to focus on the importance of legislative deference to the SCC’s own reasoning, not on the need for reciprocal deference by the Court itself.

Especially first look cases, the SCC has in fact appeared to suggest that the possibility of parliamentary dialogue implies that it should show less deference to legislative constitutional judgments, whether ex ante and ex post.

In Vriend v. Alberta, the Court considered whether Alberta’s human rights code’s failure to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination violated section 15(1) of the Charter. Justice Iacobucci not only cited the concept of dialogue to support the legitimacy of judicial review, he also suggested that the Court could protect gay and lesbian rights in the name of dialogue and regardless of the public’s conception of equality.

Likewise in M. v. H., when considering whether Ontario’s 1990 Family Law Act infringed section 15(1) for failure to include same-sex couples in the system of spousal support applicable to opposite-sex de facto couples, Justice Iacobucci suggested that while principles of dialogue favored the Court showing more deference to legislative policy judgments than others, they favored Courts showing less deference to interpretive judgments, such as those involving “[t]he simple or general claim that the infringement of a right is justified under section 1.”

To some degree, new dialogue theory supports the approach taken by the SCC in these cases, because when judicial review is understood against a backdrop of commitments to ex post deference and narrow statement, courts will have greater freedom than otherwise, ex ante, to use all available means in order to counter perceived legislative inertia. There was also strong evidence, circa 1998-99, that legislative inertia

---

215 Ibid. at paras. 136-40.
216 Ibid.
of some kind existed in Canada surrounding the recognition of gay and lesbian rights, even if the scope of such inertia was uncertain.

New dialogue theory does not suggest, however, that popular constitutional understandings will be irrelevant to the legitimacy of judicial review in cases such as *Egan v. Canada*,218 *Vriend, M. v. H*, or *Reference re Same-Sex Marriage*,219 or that Canadian courts should feel free in such cases, in the face of reasonable disagreement about the meaning of *Charter* rights, to enforce their own preferred constitutional interpretation in preference to that of a majority of Canadians, if such a majority position in fact exists.

On the contrary, it suggests that the democratic legitimacy of *Charter* review will depend in large part on the willingness of Canadian courts to adopt a more restrained approach than the USSC to assessing the constitutionality of dialogic legislative sequels, such as those which very nearly arose in Alberta following *Vriend*, and which did in fact occur in Ontario following *M v. H*, albeit at the purely symbolic level of the title given to the relevant legislative sequel.220

The SCC, in various second look cases, has also shown a clear ambivalence, or (at least) division, on the question of deference in second look cases.

Consider second look cases such as *Hall* or *JTI-Macdonald*. While in *Hall* the Court engaged in a form of implicit ex post narrow statement, its reasoning emphasizes legislative deference to the Court, and not the idea of reciprocal deference between the Court and Parliament. Even by referring to the idea of dialogue itself, it suggested that the key to dialogue was deference on the part of Parliament, noting:

> Since the introduction of the *Charter*, courts have engaged in a constitutional dialogue with Parliament. This case is an excellent example of such dialogue. Parliament enacted legislation … [which the Court determined] was unconstitutional. … After considering this Court’s reasons … Parliament replaced the “public interest” ground with new language.221

In *JTI-Macdonald*, the Court also showed a willingness to narrow the scope of its prior reasoning in *RJR-MacDonald*, but it rejected outright the idea that the legislation represented some form of dialogue, or legislative sequel, which should “militate for or against deference” by the Court.222 Rather, it emphasized the degree to which Parliament,

---

220 This is why I do not classify *M v. H* as one of the thirteen core instances of dialogue. Contrast Hogg, Bushell and Wright *supra* note 2 at 9-10; Roach, “Canadian Experience,” *supra* note 2 at 537, footnote 1 It should be noted, however, that to the extent that the Ontario legislature’s response was somewhat dialogic, the SCC helped ensure the success of that sequel by avoiding deciding on its merits an early challenge to that sequel under the *Charter*. See Murphy, *supra* note 125.
221 *Supra* note 175 at para. 43.
222 *JTI-Macdonald* supra note 180at para. 11.
in enacting the second set of advertising restrictions, had itself shown deference to the “concerns expressed by the majority of [the] Court in RJR-MacDonald.”

In instances where the SCC has directly addressed the idea of ex post deference, the justices have also tended to be sharply divided on the issue. In *R. v. Mills* and *Darrach*, for example, a majority of the SCC endorsed the idea of ex post deference, whereas in *Sauvé II*, a differently constituted majority expressly rejected the exact same principle, suggesting that:

> The fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial rejection of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the Court should defer to Parliament as part of a “dialogue.” Parliament must ensure that whatever law it passes, at whatever stage of the process, conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and important promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not be debased to a rule of “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.”

From this perspective, it may be that it is not only the history of dialogue in Canada which is more contingent than current dialogue scholars suggest. It may also be that the future of dialogue depends increasingly not so much on the embrace by the SCC of the current version of dialogue theory as a normative ideal, but rather on its rejection.

It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical, given the original concerns of dialogue theorists, but it is also what all the “to-do” about metaphors and their meaning is all about.

---

Readers with comments may address them to:

Professor Rosalind Dixon  
University of Chicago Law School  
1111 East 60th Street  
Chicago, IL 60637  
dixon@uchicago.edu

---

224 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 para. 34.  
225 *Supra* note 195 at paras. 8-9  
The University of Chicago Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series

For a listing of papers 1–250 please go to http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/1–199.html

255. David Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate Change, by the Numbers (January 2009)
257. Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche (January 2009)
258. Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, (February 2009)
259. Adam Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective (February 2009)
260. Lior Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon (February 2009)
261. Lee Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (February 2009)
262. Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law (March 2009)
263. Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the Workplace (April 2009)
265. John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness (June 2009)
266. Mary Anne Case, No Male or Female, but All Are One (June 2009)
268. Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penalty: A Brief Genealogy (June 2009)
269. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy (June 2009)
270. Brian Leiter, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Action, July 2009
272. Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, July 2009
273. Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, July 2009
276. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Tyrannophobia, September 2009
278. Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond Property Lines, August 2009
280. Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior, and Anup Malani, Ambiguity about Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, October 2009
281. Anup Malani, Oliver Bemborn and Mark van der Laan, Accounting for Differences among Patients in the FDA Approval Process, October 2009
282. Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, November 2009
283. Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A Reexamination, November 2009