Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little, Not Too Much, Private Property

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Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective:

Why There Is Too Little, Not Too Much, Private Property

Richard A. Epstein*

Abstract

This Article critiques Michael Heller’s important contribution in the Gridlock Economy. At no point does it take the position that gridlock, or the associated anticommons, is not a serious issue in the design of a legal system. But it does insist that gridlock is not the major source of social dislocation, or that private ownership is the major source of gridlock. More concretely, the articles examines the other important sources of economic distortion that are unrelated to economic gridlock from private action. These include the use of excessive government subsidies (as with health care), misguided government licenses (as with broadcast licenses); the unwise use of government power to create gridlock situations (as with employment law); the excessive role of government permitting (as with real estate development); and the use of creative private techniques to overcome gridlock (as with patent licensing as a way to combat the patent thicket). Thereafter, the Article explains how traditional common law rules did a better job in controlling for gridlock than many current initiatives, by narrowly defining the class of actionable harms to exclude competitive loss, blocked views, and hurt feelings. It closes with an explanation of how broad definitions of harm slow down decisions in the public sector, thereby impeding the use of the eminent domain power that could otherwise respond to gridlock issues.

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The topic of this conference is Michael Heller’s provocative new book on *The Gridlock Economy*. The central thesis of the book is that one critical obstacle to overall social advancement is the fragmentation of property among private owners that prevents its coherent assembly for projects that are desired by all but achievable by none. There is no question that, more than anyone else, Heller has put this topic on the map in its current form, chiefly through two earlier academic articles which have had immense influence on the field. The ability to introduce into the mature field of law and economics even a single new generative term, the anticommons on which *Gridlock* is based, is a major intellectual achievement. What makes this accomplishment so noteworthy is that it now seems obvious—but only after the fact. The question of holdout has long been on the agenda, but the ability to link this problem up with the issue of overconsumption of shared resources—or commons—opens up previously unappreciated avenues for research. We thus know that with any standardized models the losses that come from excessive fragmentation of productive assets, or tragedies of the anticommons, are equal to those which come from the excessive use of common resources over which there are no clear property rights, or tragedies of the commons. Today, no assessment of complex social institutions and practices can be undertaken without thinking about its anticommons implications. *Gridlock* is here to stay; not only in discussions about traffic, but also in those about the economy writ large.

But wherein lies the source of this gridlock? Heller’s subtitle offers us one possible answer: *How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives*. Sometimes the strong protection of private property rights is a source

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4 Heller, supra note XX.
of genuine economic stagnation and dislocation. However, any close examination of
the issues reveals one larger truth that lacks the attention-grabbing character of
Heller’s title. In most settings, the weak and indefinite property rights system is the
source of the gridlock that he rightly deplores. We do not need another indignant
attack on the vulnerable institution of private property. We need a greater
appreciation of how unbridled government power does just what Heller says:
“wrecks markets, stops innovation, and costs lives.”

The purpose of this critique of Heller is to illuminate the true sources of the
gridlock problem. In so doing, I hope to avoid moving to the alternative scheme of
insisting that private property is the “be-all and end-all” of sound legal regulations
of the economy. Quite the contrary, for many years I have taken the position that we
can identify an optimal mix of private and public property, one that is often achieved
by customary practices that arises out of the countless actions of unrelated
individual persons, but which sometimes depends on state action for their reliable
implementation. The fundamental trade-off that has to be made in all cases lies in
balancing the holdout problems that drive the formation of the gridlock economy
and the exclusion problems that arise under any private property arrangement.5
The proper balance cannot be determined in the abstract, but rather requires a close
look at the nature of a particular resource to figure out what system of rights
maximizes the value in using that resource. Stated in this fashion, it becomes clear
that gridlock is only one important piece of the overall puzzle. Gridlock neither
displaces nor subsumes the other institutional or social problems that stand in the
path of efficient resource allocation.

To set the stage for this analysis, it is important to stress at the outset one
assumption that Heller and myself share. We both think that by and large
competitive markets offer the best hope for social prosperity and technological
advancement. That is why his indictment insists that too much ownership “wrecks

5 See Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual
Liberty with the Common Good 251-78 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of
[competitive] markets,” which are by implication a good thing. Indeed, Heller is surely correct in thinking that a need for efficient and responsive markets generates a grim view of the holdout problems that arise when property rights are configured in ways that do not facilitate high rates of transactions relative to transaction costs. It is therefore appropriate to begin this essay with a recapitulation of the reasons to fear gridlock in social relations.

Once the reasons to fear gridlock are presented, however, it is necessary to put them into perspective, for Heller overplays their severity. More concretely, Heller makes at least five interrelated mistakes in The Gridlock Economy. He tends to either downgrade or ignore other sources of distortion in the economy. First he ignores the free-fall economy that arises from unwise government subsidies that produce extensive economic distortions. Second, he tends to misclassify issues as gridlock problems when their genesis lies elsewhere. In this instance, the chief error comes in his account of the evolution of property rights in the broadcast spectrum. Third, he ignores those key situations where government power is used to create gridlock, not end it. Employment relations, in both nonunion and union contexts, are the dominant source of this problem. Fourth, he tends to ignore the dangerous role that excessive government permitting plays in throttling effective economic development. The use of natural resources, such as land and water for example, suffers grievously from such permitting. Lastly, even when gridlock does occur due to some distinctive configuration of private property, Heller underrates the tools that are available to control that risk. Intellectual property law offers some instructive illustrations.

I. Why Gridlock?

Early on in Gridlock, Heller sets out, complete with map, the gridlock that developed with respect to transportation over the Rhine River during the late Middle Ages.6 Rivers were, as a matter of both Roman and common law, common property to

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6 HELLER, supra note XX, at 3.
which all had access and over which no one person could exercise dominion. The logic behind this was that the value of the river lay in its "going concern" as a river in which multiple simultaneous uses were possible, only one of which was private consumption. One of the desired uses was transportation down the river which requires property rights of a sort—"rules of the road"—which allow the traffic to move efficiently in a crowded space. But, in early times, letting anyone use the river maximized its value for transportation, especially when the use levels were sufficiently low that crowding and pollution did not require public expenditures. The elaborate construction of toll stations along the Rhine River was a mortal threat to commerce along the river. But it is critical to note that they were not created by private action, nor validated by any conception of the private or customary law. Rather the proliferation of toll booths laid in the fragmented state of political power in Germany at the time, which was controlled by local princes, not a single national government. Indeed, in medieval times, the distinction between the prince as owner of property and as sovereign was not as clear as it has become today. But it is clear that all gridlock along the Rhine must be chalked up to the high politics of rival sovereigns, not petty disputes of rival owners. The point is evident from the full title of the treaty which identifies the relevant parties in its title: “Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies.” The successful political under the Treaty of Westphalia, moreover, unlocked the use of the Rhine to support an extensive commercial traffic by a resort to the customary law that precede the government interventions on the point, which is evident from its own language that reads as follow: “and the antient Security, Jurisdiction and Custom, such as have been long before these Wars in use,

7 J. INST. 2.1.1–5 (J. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913) (“[A]ll of these things are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, the shores of the sea.”). This persists to the modern day in the doctrine of the navigation servitude. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945)(no compensation owed when construction of dam on a navigable river impairs operation of a mill on a nonnavigable fork).


shall be re-establish’d and inviolably maintain’d in the Provinces, Ports and Rivers.”

A simple game-theoretical evaluation provides some estimation of the undeniable magnitude of the gridlock problem. Each sovereign acts on its own initiative and cares only for its own well-being. Putting a toll booth across the Rhine allows it to raise revenues that it could not collect if it just let the traffic go by. It also cuts down on the volume of the traffic, so that overall use of the river is lower than it was before. The individual duchy or potentate, moreover, does not take into account any impact that the loss in traffic will have on upstream and downstream owners. These parties of course have the same option as the original party; they can each put a toll booth across the river and charge fees. Each party in turn gains from its action but inflicts costs on others of greater magnitude. There were 30 toll bridges or so across the Rhine. Suppose each one would allow an owner a one-time increment to income from his own toll operation of 15 percent, but expose all other castle owners to a 5 percent loss of existing stock so that in the end each party gets $1.15 \times 0.95^{29}$, which measures the loss from a five percent decrement on 29 repeat plays. It is clear without the math that the cumulative loss leaves all owners worse off after the game has run its course than if no tolls had been imposed at all. After all, each blockader would find it impossible to ship its own goods any distance along the river. So we have an n-person prisoner’s dilemma game in which defection triumphs when cooperation is desperately needed.

There is, however, nothing about the basic problem that depends upon the physical configuration of this or that river. Modern markets also have complex distribution chains, and it is more than coincidence that in these settings we speak of upstream and downstream parties. The reasoning is the same as with the Rhine example. If each party holds a monopoly position over its stage of production, the effort to extract sequential monopoly rents leads to a virtual shut down of the entire

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10 The Treaty itself explicitly prohibits tolls in two sections. See Id. art. LXIX, LXXXIX
11 I ignore alternative gains that could have been captured by selling goods and services to the river traffic.
market because of the cumulative impact of success noncooperative behaviors. Technically speaking these conditions generate what is termed a double-marginalization problem. The math is not all that important, but the consequences are. Even just two sequential monopolies result in huge social losses relative to a single monopoly. Additional stages of potential blockade only further compound the problem. However, the economic response is one of vertical integration, whereby the multiple firms become one. At that point both the monopolist and the consumers do better off than they did before. Put another way, whenever the factors of production are arrayed *in series* (like electrical circuits), the risk of blockades requires some kind of collective response. The greater the number of parties, the greater the risk that is faced.

The increase in the number of parties takes on a very different significance when the parties do not operate in series like the castles on the Rhine, but *in parallel*, such that each one becomes a substitute source of production or service to the others. Now the right response is, the more the merrier. To see how this works, assume that the only question is how to get from one side of the Rhine to the other. Assume further that these same castles each control one bridge over the river. Now the closer the proximity of these bridges and the greater their number, the more *efficient* the market operates, because each bridge offers an additional substitute for the others. The only locational advantage that one bridge has over the other is the differential cost of transportation from any given location to any given bridge. It follows that the calculations made above go into reverse. Now the greater the number of bridges, the more competitive the market. There is of course no duty to compete, but with free entry we should expect a realization of all the gains obtainable from expanding the range of market options. Gridlock poses problems that competitive markets solve, but everything depends on how the resources are arrayed.
II. The Free Fall Economy

Gridlock may be one important problem, but it is not the only impediment to the sound operation of competitive markets. A second distortion in markets comes not from paralysis but from *excessive* consumption wrought by unprincipled subsidies doled out by government agencies. This problem is best understood as the inverse of a gridlock problem. Far from being caught in a traffic snarl, the “free-fall economy” runs downhill at ever greater speeds without the benefit of the brake normally supplied by the price system in a well-functioning market. The normal competitive processes are distorted by government intervention reducing the costs of production. The result of this subsidy is excessive production of certain goods, at least until the market collapses when the extra demand is no longer sustainable.

The instances of this mistake are not insignificant. Consider just three here: Medicare and Medicaid, the ethanol fiasco, and the subprime crisis. The most salient feature about Medicare and Medicaid is their inexorable increase in costs, which is hardly a sign of blockade tying up needed health care resources. Rather, the age-old question is how to limit demand for goods that are sold at or near a zero price. Medicare generates this problem in how it prices goods to eligible members, typically over 65. To be sure, there are some modest fees for access to medical services, but these are insufficient to cover the entire cost. In the case of Medicare Part B, the enrollee’s fees for professional services cover about 25 percent of the total bill, which implies a huge subsidy.\(^\text{12}\) Worse still, the program is structured as a lump sum payment, independent of age and risk, so that the marginal cost for additional units of medical services is close to zero. Using non-price techniques to ration care—limiting the choice of physician, blocking access to certain types of treatment—generates a huge public uproar, so that the various short term reform strategies are quickly overwhelmed. Gridlock is not the issue. Free-fall is.

\(^{12}\) “[A] 25-75 [coverage] ratio . . . applies generally to persons who enroll in Medicare Part B to get coverage of doctors’ fees, diagnostic tests, and other outpatient services.” Richard L. Kaplan et al., *Retirees at Risk: The Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits*, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 287, 345 (2009) (citing 2009 *MEDICARE HANDBOOK* § 6.02[C][1], at 6-10 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr. eds., 2009)).
Similarly, the huge booms and busts in the ethanol markets are not a function of gridlock. Their occurrence is a function of the free-fall economy driven by large subsidies for using ethanol as a fuel. These subsidies have distorted international trade markets, as American producers have been largely successful in getting Congress—that paladin of free markets—to impose heavy tariffs on foreign importation in order to preserve a free field to American producers.  

It is unclear whether Heller classifies tariffs as an element in gridlock. Regardless, the resultant malaise is surely not the consequence of “too much ownership.” However classified, tariff protection from foreign competition has led to systematic shortages in the grain supply used for food in the domestic and export markets—before the sector was devastated in the financial meltdown which had its origins in . . . the subprime crisis.

The subprime financial crisis, and its massive aftermath, is yet another illustration of the free-fall economy. The episode did not start with paralysis in any observable market; brokers generally know how to arrange for loans and to sell properties. However, they and their customers respond to incentives, including the large infusion of cheap money that the Federal Reserve pumped into the market, and to the constant insistence by Congress that FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC guarantee loans to high-risk borrowers who lack the resources to repay. Cheap money allows people to bid up the price of housing to unsustainable levels until no greater fool can be found, at which point the market collapses like a house of cards. To be sure, cheap money and imprudent government guarantees do not account for all the failings of the financial system. Indeed, the unprecedented level and complexity of securitization of these subprime mortgages could easily have

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15 See, for an account, JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3-5 (2009), with graphs depicting the reduced housing supply if the “Taylor rule” on money supply had been followed.
added fuel to the fire by creating a crisis in valuation once the bubble burst in the underlying assets. The resulting distress is plausibly linked to mark-to-market (or, to accountants, “fair-value”) valuation techniques, which involve periodic reevaluation of unsold assets to market prices. In all, these techniques may have generated the downward cascades that overwhelmed all the (marginal) protections that the investment banks built into the initial financial models. However, regardless of how one treats the various valuation techniques for these assets, gridlock was not the source of distress. Put otherwise, excessive volatility can be as deadly as excessive stalemate. To talk about the one without the other is to deny the complexity of what really goes on in “the” economy as a whole.

III. Insufficient Property Rights: The Broadcast Spectrum

Aside from ignoring the major issues discussed above, Heller also misclassifies as gridlock problems matters that are better treated under other rubrics. The chief illustration of this problem is his analysis of the broadcast spectrum, which has been subject to inefficient allocation over its entire history. In dealing with this issue, Heller makes the bald claim that “[o]ver 90 percent of [airwaves are] dead air because ownership of broadcast spectrum is so fragmented.” The factual predicate is true (or at least true enough) as is evident from a graph of spectrum utilization, which shows steep peaks of intensive use interspersed with areas of virtually no use at all. The obvious resource loss in this scenario is the underexploited portions of the spectrum which, if put into private hands through auction, are worth billions of dollars. The question for Heller is how to squeeze this manifest resource failure into his gridlock model. Unfortunately,

17 Heller, supra note XX, at xiii.
18 For discussion, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 242, 248 fig.1 & n.28 (2005).
that cannot be credibly done. Far from fragmented ownership, the spectrum has one owner. But it is the wrong owner. It is the United States.

To see how this came about requires some historical account of the rules that govern the acquisition of property rights under a private and public law approach. The common law and Roman law approaches both start with this obvious limitation: there is no state, as such, which can confer to particular individuals title to that which is unowned in the state of nature. I have already indicated that, with respect to mixed commons (like water, with both collective and private uses), the customary legal solutions all placed limitations on the ability, first of riparians, and then of other individuals, to extract water from the river. In those contexts, taking initial possession was the only way to reduce water to private ownership, but there were clear customary limits on the amount of water that could be removed from the river by that technique. With respect to land, animals, and chattel, those limitations were removed so that the acquisition of a res nullius, or an ownerless thing, went to the first possessor who was vested with ownership rights from top to bottom, i.e. from the center of the earth to the heavens, or ad coelum et ad inferos. The key feature of these rights was that they carried not only the right to exclude but also extensive rights of use and of disposition. Use rights confer value and alienation rights allow the asset to move from low to high value uses by a variety of techniques—from outright sales, to partial sales (measured either by space or time), to joint ventures. The initial system of property rights thus built in a dynamic element that allowed for the voluntary reconfiguration of rights in light of new technical possibilities and market opportunities. Much of the common law in these circumstances is to facilitate exchange by the use of deeds and recordation that firmed up the transaction between the parties and gave notice to the rest of the world. It is this system of transfer that can, on some occasions, lead to excessive fragmentation.

19 See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. 1805) (ownership of a wild animal goes to its first possessor); Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Penn. 1895) (recognizing right to exclude subsurface encroachment of only a few inches).

Heller explores this capacity in the context of an inheritance regime that treats the next generation as tenants in common of the whole—a practice which often reflect the limitations of familial or tribal concerns.\textsuperscript{21} It bears noting that in these contexts primogeniture is often an effective strategy that concentrates effective management skills in land in the eldest son. But the true effectiveness of that strategy is measured in part by the ability to impose charges, secured by the property for the benefit of other children who therefore receive financial support even they do not retain a control interest in the property. It is only with the proliferation of multiple interests in land that these sharing arrangements can be achieved without debilitating compromises in control. Other types of arrangements, may be needed to structure complex commercial ventures which are not subject to the equitable constraints that control the distribution of wealth within the family, and these too are only make possible by property regimes that organize divided interests in land.

As applied to the broadcast spectrum, the first question is whether the system of land rights (which extends to the skies) is sufficient to blockade any and all use of the overall system. In practice, everyone who faced this problem before Heller agreed that landowner blockades of spectrum transmission or air travel was a dead social loser.\textsuperscript{22} So the question was how best to avoid that result. The usual rule was to “redefine” the property rights so that they extended only to the level of effective occupation from the ground, and no higher.\textsuperscript{23} That redefinition strategy, however, carries with it real costs in that it paves the way for other arbitrary state redefinitions that might not prove to be so socially beneficial. Therefore, in this potential gridlock area, it is correct to create a distinct set of spectrum rights, but to do sonder test that is more restrictive of government power than simply a

\textsuperscript{21} Heller, supra note XX, at 123-25.

\textsuperscript{22} This idea is illustrated by the early case law on air flight path trespasses. See, e.g., Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (calling it “utterly impracticable” that “the law should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out, or assert claims to indefinite, unused spaces in the air”).

\textsuperscript{23} Hinman, 84 F.2d 755, 758-59; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (ownership extends to “the space above the ground as he can occupy or use [it] in connection with the land”).
(correct) assertion of overall social gains. The key point is to add a distributional inquiry: does the redistribution of rights reduce the net worth to the individuals who are subject to the new legal regime? With respect to air traffic and spectrum use, the overall gains are so massive and so reciprocal, that it is hard to see how any landowner who is denied either a holdout right or a cash compensation right is worse off with those uses than without them. Other forms of property redefinition cannot meet this distributional standard, and for them the case for cash compensation is in general far stronger.

Thus far, the analysis of the spectrum shows that one technique for blocking private gridlock is the judicious use of an eminent domain power, whose just compensation requirement may be satisfied by the in-kind benefits that are given to landowners. However, even where a state taking is justified, there is still the question of how to allocate the spectrum use among various players once that use is freed of ground-owner constraint. The common law private property solution is an imitation of a first possession rule, which allows spectrum rights to be claimed by the first user of that particular (fuzzy) band. There was some nascent movement toward this bottom-up system in the radio frequencies during the early 1920s, including the well known Oak Leaves case that explicitly built on the common law analogies. The virtues of this system cannot be easily dismissed; nor should they be unduly romanticized. The key advantage of this system is that it allows for the creation of a robust set of ownership rights that permit effective deployment and use. The obvious problem is with user interference across signals, resulting in lower transmission quality, to which there are several possible responses. The first is that the frequencies can be effectively spaced, as each new entrant tries to create

25 The in-kind benefit comes in the form of restrictions on the property rights of others, providing parallel and reciprocal benefits. See id. at 49-50.
26 Chicago Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1926.), reprinted in 68 Cong. Rec. 215-19 (1926) (recognizing rights in spectrum acquired by application of the resource to productive use, essentially converting priority in time to priority of right, and drawing on water rights models).
distance between him and his neighbor to minimize that risk. The implicit assumptions behind this model are, first, that the entry levels are gradual enough to establish priority of entry—an assumption that fails when modern technology allows for the instantaneous occupation and utilization of spaces and forces the use of auctions to privatize the spectrum. The second assumption is limitation of the amount of bandwidth that can be taken by each occupier and limitation of the number of frequencies that each can take. The third is technological, namely the use of more efficient transmission devices to pack more and more information into narrower bands, which would reduce interference.

This early system for broadcast licenses did not last in part because of the interference problem, which intensified during the rush to establish priority rights and led to the passage of the 1927 Radio Act. The Act established the Federal Radio Commission, which leveraged the physical interference problem into a comprehensive system of government licenses to all players, even those who had perfected their common law title under the first possession system. This maneuver therefore removed private ownership as a means of allocation for the broadcast spectrum, and led to the adoption of a complex administrative system based on “public convenience, interest, or necessity.” This language was construed in grand style, which led to this colossal miscalculation by Justice Felix Frankfurter, who styled himself as the sophisticated opponent of naïve market solutions:

The Act itself establishes that the Commission’s powers are not limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic. The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among

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the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission.

The Commission was, however, not left at large in performing this duty. The touchstone provided by Congress was the "public interest, convenience, or necessity," a criterion which "is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit."29

The many failures of the FCC in buckling down to the task that Justice Frankfurter assigned it have been well documented.30 No one could have ever expected this so-called “touchstone” to provide serious guidance on frequency allocation within the radio band. The want of ownership rights, and the consequence of inefficiency within the band, cannot be attributed to “too much ownership.” They are attributable to the want of any private ownership system at all. The problem is administrative overreaching, not overlapping and conflicting property rights. Frankfurter’s notorious “touchstone” may be sufficient under current administrative law to permit the delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies.31 Operationally, however, it is too vague to supply any guidance for intelligent decision. Furthermore, the technical conditions attached to license which dictate the kinds of equipment that the licensee has to deploy often strip the allocated frequencies of much of their value. Indeed, one of the problems in this portion of the spectrum is not gridlock, but localized underutilization borne of direct regulation. A bandwidth for radio or television allocated 50 or 60 years ago is now more than ample for its original purpose. A private owner would keep some portion of the band, and license, lease or sell the remainder to some non-

31 Such was the ultimate holding of the case, 319 U.S. at 225-26, though the language in question was by then part of the Communications Act of 1934, PUB. L. NO. 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, into which the surviving parts of the 1927 Act were merged. For a broad delegation, see, for example, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding the Office of Price Administration’s power to “stabilize” prices and to prevent “speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal” price increases).
interfering use in order to squeeze more value out of the frequency. However, that cannot happen when state licenses require the government to authorize multiple uses, which governments will find it difficult to issue in any politically charged environment. The result is waste through government intervention, precisely because there is no private property system to act as a counterweight.

The use of state power explains some of the implicit inefficiencies in the use of the highly-occupied spectrum, but it cannot explain the relative idleness of huge portions of the spectrum today. Gridlock, however, offers no explanation either. The key decisions were all made as early as 1912 when the United States government made its initial spectrum allocation (free of all ground-owner concerns) by administrative fiat, with, at best, a partial appreciation of the future evolution of the system. The Navy therefore came out very well because it was easy to see that it would have extensive ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship uses. Similar allocations were made to other forms of government use, including public health and safety, which are, as Heller notes, both primitive and unreliable precisely because they are government operated. These initial 1912 allocations proved wildly incorrect, and became more anachronistic with each passing generation. It is not that we have gridlock among private property owners. It is that we have nontransferable government rights. The incomplete “propertization” of the spectrum has led to public gridlock.

The same can be said of the FCC efforts to create areas of unlicensed spectrum, where parties rely on self-help devices to prevent the usual kind of interference clutter between adjacent radio signals. There is an extensive technical

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32 The Radio Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302, required that broadcasters have licenses from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The history can be found in Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Regulating Broadcast Programming 5-12 (1994).
33 Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note XX, at 6-7.
34 Heller, supra note XX, at 83.
35 Thomas Hazlett argues that, contrary to the “error theory” advanced to explain the failure of the early allocations, the chosen regulatory approach was actually a self-interested move to maximize rents for influential constituencies. Hazlett, supra note XX, at 134. There is nothing which says that different factors had different weights at different times.
dispute as to whether this system of unlicensed low frequencies allows for more intensive utilization than the alternative system that allocates a portion of the spectrum to a single owner who can then decide whether and, if so, which rights to permit, perhaps at lower rates. \footnote{See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, \textit{Some Economics of Wireless Communications}, 16 HARV. J. L & TECH. 125 (2002) (critiquing a property rights approach and suggesting open networks to optimize capacity). For a comprehensive account of the spectrum management choices, see Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, \textit{Policing the Spectrum Commons}, 74 FORDHAM. L. REV. 663 (2004).} Ultimately, if the unlicensed spectrum is inefficient it is not so much because of gridlock. It is because of interference externalities that could be eliminated by allowing single owners to regulate defined portions of the spectrum at some positive price.

\textit{IV. The Government Creation of Gridlock: Labor Market Regulation}

Heller's third key mistake ignores the positive role that the government has taken in \textit{creating} gridlock in otherwise competitive markets. Competitive markets work well \textit{not} because they are instantly and always in perfect equilibrium. Rather they do so because of the activities of transactors on each side of a market, examining the choices open to them on the other side. It is easy therefore to defend a legal regime that seeks to prevent the combination of parties on either side of the market that would reduce the available choices on the other. This notion is clearly expressed in the antitrust law which regards horizontal efforts to fix prices or to divide territories as \textit{per se} violations of the law, given their adverse social consequences. \footnote{United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (finding horizontal allocation of territories \textit{per se} illegal); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (finding horizontal price-fixing agreements to be, in themselves, unreasonable restraints on trade and therefore illegal).} Alternatively, a single monopolist may raise the price of goods (or services) above the competitive level, which in turn will reduce the total level of social welfare, by blocking transactions for mutual gain that would be completed in a competitive market somewhere between the competitive and the (higher) monopoly price.
This stylized account of the antitrust law is not concerned with gridlock issues. The single monopolist has every interest to reduce transaction costs in order to maximize his gains. The only modest source of difficulty for the monopolist is the choice between a single-price or multiple-part pricing schedule (where the quality of goods remains constant) in order to reach both high- and low-demanders simultaneously.38 This difficulty, however, is not qualitatively greater than similar pricing issues that can arise in competitive markets. One such problem arises whenever differential costs of providing service require differential pricing in order to prevent the cross-subsidies that can drive some desirable customers from the market. And a second arises whenever a seller has to allocate joint costs across its multiple product lines.39

The risks of gridlock are vastly increased by the formation of bilateral monopolies that raise transactional difficulties not found in heavily cartelized markets. One of the great “achievements” from the New Deal on forward has been our unerring ability to convert efficient competitive markets into inefficient regulated markets, where the gridlock issues—here measured by the cost of negotiations, plus the risk of strikes and other breakdowns—became paramount. We can thus identify an important class of cases of government-sponsored gridlock.

These pro-gridlock policies stand in instructive contrast to the common law preference for at-will type contracts, whereby a worker could be fired for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.40 Dismissal could be accompanied by a

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38 For example, consider the movie theater ticket pricing strategy to charge less for seniors and students in order to capture these price-sensitive segments of the market without sacrificing the high prices charged for general admission.
40 For my defense, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984). For the common law example, see Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884) (“[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain employ[e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employ[e] may
severance package, computed by a simple formula. And it was paired with the right—still respected today—of the employee to quit for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all. The rule was only a default provision, subject to contractual adjustments on such matters as severance pay, which were often designed to prevent strategic quitting that could disrupt firm production. Indeed one of the soundest (and most reviled) decisions of common law courts was to allow an employer to bring an action against a union for inducing breach of the yellow dog contract whereby the worker agreed not to join a union so long as he or she remained on the job. The point here was to use tort principles to back up contractual arrangements. Suits against individual workers who quit are likely to prove a transactional nightmare, although they were not unknown. Yet the great advantage of using the tort action of inducement of breach of contract against the union was that it could enjoin activities to recruit workers into hidden membership (a breach of contract) before the strike occurred, nipping the gridlock problem in advance. This tort action offered a powerful method whereby employers could preserve the operation of a competitive market—which is why it was targeted for extinction first in England under the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, and then a generation later in the United States through the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. Both statutes gutted a private tort action that hampered gridlock in the form of strikes.

exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer.”), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).

41 Epstein, supra note XX, at 954, 973-74.

42 See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (“The right of action for persuading an employee to leave his employer is universally recognized . . . .”).

43 See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (upholding suit against a labor union which had, among other things, organized mass withdrawal).


In the United States, Norris-LaGuardia was only the first step to greater gridlock. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 took the issue to the next level, by explicitly displacing competitive labor markets with a bilateral monopoly prone to gridlock. The NLRA imposes elaborate duties on both sides to negotiate in good faith with each other. It therefore makes the refusal to negotiate an unfair labor practice. It further prevents individual workers from bargaining on their own account, so that all negotiations go through the union. The only exit right left to the firm is bargain to impasse. The stakes for these negotiations are always high; the risk of strike remains large. Once the system is put into place, the employer is stripped of the ability to make unilateral changes in labor contracts in response to major changes in conditions. The systematic decline in the automobile, steel, tire, and other industries can be attributed to this built-in rigidity, which means that all downward reduction in wages, benefits, and conditions of employment come too little too late. Despite this experience, the legislative impulse today is not to eliminate senseless friction by scrapping this gridlock-prone system. Rather, it is to move in the opposite direction. Thus the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act, which thus far has not become law, seeks to stop gridlock by forcing binding arbitration on an employer once the parties have bargaining to impasse with the aid of a mediator. At that point, a government arbitration panel appointed by the Department of Labor can impose mandatory two year “contracts” by fiat. These

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47 § 158(d). For example, where a collective-bargaining contract is already in place, the laws imposes complex notification requirements to various agencies and services with potentially very burdensome waiting periods. See id.
48 § 158(a)(5).
49 § 159(a) (designated representatives “shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment”).
50 See Epstein, supra note XX, at 1402.
52 See Sec. 3(h)(3) (modifying Sec. 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, at 29 U.S.C. 158), which reads:

(3) If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the request for mediation is made under paragraph (2), or such additional period as the parties may agree upon, the Service is not able to bring the parties to agreement by conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to an arbitration board established in
contracts cover every aspect of the terms and conditions of traditional labor contracts—wages, work conditions, pensions, benefits, discipline and the like. Ironically, Heller says not a single word about these legislative tendencies to abolish private property rights in ways that aggravate the gridlock economy that he rightly deplores.

V. Government Gridlock: Land Use Regulation

The creation of government gridlock also extends to real estate markets, which are always more difficult to operate than labor markets because of the obvious external effects that occur in land use, both in urban and rural environments. The current system of land use regulation is prone to conspicuous instances of gridlock that surface at every zoning hearing across the United States. The all-pervasive nature of the permit and regulation problem in land use markets shows that this problem is not one of those unobserved gridlock difficulties to which Heller refers from time to time. The huge public tumults over zoning hearings give ample evidence of the paralysis that can descend upon the operation of real estate markets. The current situation is that the government cannot occupy property or initiate any project unless it is prepared to condemn the land. But, under current law, its multiple agencies exercise a virtual per se veto power over every development that does not meet its exacting and often inconsistent standards. This problem is compounded because the multiple veto points found in zoning

accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Service. The arbitration panel shall render a decision settling the dispute and such decision shall be binding upon the parties for a period of 2 years, unless amended during such period by written consent of the parties."

I have inveighed against this system in Richard A. Epstein, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 50-68 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337185. I also criticize the provisions aimed to reduce employer resistance during organization drives, and, more importantly, with the proposed card-check voting arrangement that did away with secret ballots in selecting union leaders. Id. at 18-49.

53 See, e.g. Heller, supra note __, at 2, 67, 187.
54 See, e.g. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (per se liability for physical takings only).
regulations often complicate the task of keeping a project alive, as various agencies, often backed by an indignant public opinion or community board, chip away at its economic viability. It need not be this way; the potential solution is a sensible system of regulation that operates on very different premises. This becomes apparent by comparing the current gridlock apparatus to the earlier common law rules that served to eliminate these costly and corrosive bottlenecks.

Common Law Rules. Any system of land use regulation is necessarily more difficult than the optimal form of regulation for labor markets. In labor markets, the physical externality issues are unimportant; what matters is whether the markets are organized in a competitive or regulated form. Not so with land use. To be sure, everyone agrees that, short of condemnation, landowners enjoy the exclusive rights of use and development for their property. But on no account do they enjoy the unlimited rights of use and development of their property, given the twin torts of trespass to land and nuisance. For example, it is of course clear, and nonproblematic, that the ownership of one parcel of land does not allow for the encroachment upon land owned by another. But the harder cases all involve situations in which the harms involved do not come from actual, physical entry or encroachment, but through invasion by smells, soot, vibration, odors, and the like. Every system of property rights of which I am aware brands these, nontrespassory invasions as nuisances, rather than as trespass. The logic for this is clear enough. As a first approximation, it is better if no one engages in nuisance-like activities of these types than if everyone does. The value of two neighboring parcels of land, on average, will both increase if each owner obeys general nuisance prescriptions.

58 See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689-90 (N.C. 1953) (“[A]ny substantial nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of liability forming conduct is a private nuisance.” In this instance, the liability forming conduct was that the defendant oil refinery emitted “noxious gases and odors” in great quantities.)
Therefore, no one wants to move back to a world in which the baseline entitlement of exclusive use confers unlimited rights of use.

Yet the physical invasion requirement has a clear negative correlative that is consistent with the effort to use tort law to maximize the value of two (or more) adjacent plots of land: various kinds of admitted private harms are not actionable within the system. Modern economic theory calls these “pecuniary externalities.”

The classical law called them instances of *damnum absque injuria*—harm without legal injury. The root conception of both is that, for harms in these classes, there is no longer the positive association between the private right of action and overall social welfare. Rather, the correlation now runs in the opposite direction in that the private harm complained of, on average, is indicative of an improvement in overall social welfare.

These nonactionable harms include, most notably, four kinds of losses. The first is the blocking of views, which usually can only be prevented by stopping all forms of construction. As a joint matter, both sides are better off in the ex ante position if both can build, rather than neither. To let the first one to build gain protections against like construction by others creates a perverse incentive for the premature development of land. The legal rule that tells the landowner that it may act today or tomorrow as it pleases, without loss or compromise of rights, eliminates the need to play such games.

The second kind of nonactionable harms under nuisance law are harms that stem from a lack of access to another landowner’s property. Thus it is not an actionable nuisance to fill in wetlands, even if it denies access to the fish or wildlife that previously have used it. Nor is it a nuisance to destroy the habitat that is desired by some endangered species, although the modern case law moves in that

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60 *See, e.g.*, K & K Constr. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 413, 64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (“The decision to build a restaurant on land, or a request to fill in wetlands, does not constitute a nuisance that the government may abate.”)
direction. The point here is not that these uses are not valuable, but rather it is that they are not well-regulated by coercion when the likely response of a landowner is to destroy or impair a habitat lest it become a liability for his own use. The argument in this context is that while it is not permissible to have one’s cattle graze on the land of another, it is permissible to allow the state to force owners to permit unowned cattle (or birds) to use one’s land, even if it causes harm to the owner’s farm animals or structures. It is, on this view, a nuisance for a landowner to exclude wild animals that want to graze on his land (under traditional views, this grazing would be actionable as a routine case of cattle trespass). The government thus forces entry but disclaims liability by renouncing ownership of the harm-causing animals, disincentivizing landowners from maintaining such purposes. The better strategy, by far, is to allow the state to condemn property for habitat protection, or to allow the owner to enter into voluntary arrangements with environmental groups to preserve the habitat (such as agreements with oil companies that they will take more care in drilling for oil in exchange for paying a smaller royalty). Since there are many outsiders who can try to claim some unique interest in someone else’s land, impositions by the public must be constrained or it can end up freezing development in typical gridlock fashion.

The third example of a nonactionable harm in the land use context is identical to one found in labor markets: indeed many cases involve an amalgam of the two. Competitive harms from new entry—a store moving in next door—are nonactionable, no matter how great the financial losses to the incumbent. The reason for this rule is that any complete social accounting cannot limit itself to reckoning only the gains and losses between the two neighboring parties; it must also look to the position of third persons whom the transaction impacts. The ordinary nuisance that diminishes the effective use and value of all land reduces the opportunities of thirds persons to buy and lease into the system. The introduction of new competitors into the marketplace has positive effects, by expanding

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consumer choices. So, the negative correlation between private harm and social gain justifies calling those competitive harms nonactionable—in a conscious and correct refinement of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which is otherwise necessarily overbroad.\textsuperscript{62}

The fourth set of nonactionable harms includes those in the form of personal offense taken at what others say or do. Basic First Amendment law takes the position that the mere aversion that one has to the views of another individual or his expressive practices, no matter how intense, offers no justification for stopping that individual from speaking or acting as he pleases.\textsuperscript{63} The most dramatic examples of this principle are vituperative speech and flag burning (so long as the complainant does not own the flag).\textsuperscript{64} Here again, we are in general better off with both kinds of speech than with neither, and are careful to make sure that people cannot gain rights to control the actions of others by taking undue umbrage at them. Once again, some emendation of the Millian principle of harm is needed to slow down the train of government regulation. It follows from this principle of offense, therefore, that there is no actionable nuisance for reductions in property value because—fill in the name of your least favorite group of people—has moved into the neighborhood.

This initial step to limit the class of actionable wrongs set of harm-defining maneuvers is key because it limits the scope of nasty personal interactions that can trigger judicial intervention. If this common law approach to nuisance is right on normative grounds, it should also set the stage for getting the correct analysis of the legislative system. It follows therefore that if we adopt this theory, judicial intervention is left for those cases of highest social return. Other objectives, such as

\textsuperscript{63} See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”)
habitat protection and landmark preservation can be realized either through condemnation or contract, most commonly through covenants that run with the land, binding and benefiting both sides. Once therefore the definition of nuisances narrows, the scope for potential remedial action necessarily shrinks as well. At this point, the central issue becomes the type and timing of the remedies for the class of wrongful invasions so defined. In this regard, we have to take due notice that the land is often both permanent and fixed, so that even if one person can sell or lease, his successor in title will have to face the same problems. It is painfully easy to see how the operation of a factory that pollutes one area today can continue to pollute that same area tomorrow. Hence injunctions, as well as damages (always difficult to estimate permanent interests in land) have always been available, at least for those nuisances above a certain low-threshold, where the risks of hold-out are generally regarded as material.

Timing is, however, equally critical to the type of remedy available. The usual common law approach postponed the use of injunctive relief until the expected hazard was both imminent and serious, under the standard equitable tests that stressed “irreparable harm.” It was considered better to wait, so long as the damage remedy remained available for any harms that did occur (these remedies already gave land users and developers one strong incentive to steer clear of trouble). Waiting to seek an injunction reduces the administrative costs of the system by allowing most cases to sort themselves out long before any kind of serious harm occurs. But once the harm becomes imminent, no mercy for the defendant becomes the appropriate response—one which has the added benefit of encouraging defendants to steer clear of the line, or to procure the consent of neighbors for potential injuries before undertaking a project. Thus, the bottom line is that these rules produce very few, if any, cases of gridlock. The definition of

65 These low-level common nuisances are rendered per se legal under the so-called “live and let live” rule on the grounds that the initial presumption is reversed. Both parties are better off suffering some small nuisance in exchange for an increased freedom of action. See Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Ex. 1862); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 cmt. g.
66 For a general discussion, see Robert Ellickson Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 739-742 (1973).
nuisance excludes the three most common types of harm—blocking views, competition, and offense—and uses few, strong, and late remedies to deter those nuisances that remain actionable under the law.

There is, of course, one serious gap in this model that in some instances requires public intervention. Nuisances come in all shapes and sizes. The private law system works best when one neighbor pollutes or threatens to pollute his neighbor. But the system does not work as well when it is unclear which neighbor will be harmed if a nuisance occurs. It is costly for private parties to band together, and it is unlikely that one neighbor will sue for the benefit of all. In these circumstances, the use of public power to enjoin activities is an effective way to overcome this transactional barrier. But there is one huge caveat that defines this shift from private to public enforcement: the identity of the plaintiff may change, but the principles under which either damages or injunctions are issued do not. The sole reason for the shift is transaction cost reduction, not to give the state expanded powers that upset the efficient distribution of remedies that were created under this common law regime.

**Modern Administration.** The modern system of land use regulation has disregarded the above assumption. Instead, it assumes that once the state gets involved in the case, neither the narrow definition of harm, nor the restricted use of injunctions to cases of imminent harm, matters. Each and every one of the four types of harms excluded from the private law of nuisance thus becomes the proper object of permissible public regulation that routinely considers such matters as aesthetics, growth, affordable housing, wetlands protection, endangered species and the like. This hugely expanded definition of harm guarantees that the number of actionable interactions between people will increase, which in turn will put greater pressure on the remedial side of the system. And when the remedies are considered, the requirement of imminent harm disappears in favor of some kind of precautionary principle, whereby the activity in question has to be regarded as wholly safe before anything can be undertaken.
The current system thus starts with the proposition that blocking views, preserving habitat, engaging in economic competition, or engaging in activities that cause offense locally are now all legitimate concerns for regulation for which no compensation is required to the affected landowner. The National Environmental Policy Act,\textsuperscript{67} which deals with information collection on a range of topics that includes how “to assure all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings” or to “attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environmental without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable or unintended consequences.” The clear subtext is that over which you can collect information you can regulate.\textsuperscript{68} Any new structure that is built within any community will therefore be likely to have profound effects on large numbers of nearby persons. The permit process is so cumbersome and time-consuming that it could not possibly be run through the judicial system. So by default, an administrative approach has to take over regulation, which makes land use regulation fertile ground for a system of multiple vetoes that defines the gridlock economy. Typically, this process will be dominated politically by well-connected persons (often with private agendas) who live in the neighborhood that is cheek by jowl with the new development. At this point, the aggregation of preferences is a nightmare because some of the neighbors will get economic, social, or aesthetic gains from the operation, and hence will favor it, while many others will be opposed. If the matter ceases to be an up or down vote on the new project, virtually everyone will have some idea on how to tinker with the enterprise in order to expand their scope of influence. The local bias will exert its influence on the timing question. With harms so numerous, the imminence test yields to the precautionary principle, whether we deal with zoning or environmental protection. Indeed all these issues can easily mix together. One sense of the broad definition of externality is found in \textit{Chinese Staff & Workers Association v. City of New York},\textsuperscript{69} where the question was whether the construction of a new luxury condominium could so alter the ratio of

\textsuperscript{67} See, e.g, The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4331(a)&(b).

\textsuperscript{68} Id. See also id. at 1062-63.

\textsuperscript{69} 502 N.E. 2d 176 (N.Y. 1986).
Chinese to Italians on the edges of Chinatown, as to trigger an immediate environmental survey that at the very least would slow down the redevelopment project for reasons that having nothing to do with either common law nuisances or the social provision of infrastructure. The New York Court of Appeal, under its SEPA (the state analogue to NEPA found that this construction had sufficient an adverse effect on the “physical environment”–defined to cover historical and aesthetic changes as well as population shifts within the community–to trigger a full-scale environmental impact statement. The plaintiffs: Chinese groups (which had themselves moved into what was once Little Italy) that feared their displacement owing to new competitive entry. The decision was a perfect invitation to gridlock that necessarily slighted any gains from the new project that would inure to the new owners, their employees, and customers. The point here is not to lengthened the list of relevant considerations beyond those provided by statute. It is to narrow the list to defeat the unwise territorialism of deliberative processes, which silences all outsiders to ‘the’ community.

The actual response cuts in the opposite direction. Given the large set of relevant interests, no one thinks that litigation offers an initial response. So instead a blizzard of statutes fronts load the permit process under a full participation model of democratic politics that gives every outsider has his or her say. The public officials or boards then have veto power over the project, often in layers. The New York City Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP), for example, requires, after an initial certification, a Community Board Review, a Borough President Review, a City Planning Commission Review, a City Council Review, and a Mayoral Review. So the new standard requires that you prove that you won’t step on any of the broad interests that are relevant in these cases before you are allowed to undertake the new project. The permitting process becomes, by far, the single most important feature of land development. Most new projects must go through multiple layers of

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permit approval before construction can even begin, including dredge and fill permits that are within the province of the Army Corp of Engineers. And where the federal government leaves off, state departments of natural resources can pick up the slack. Gridlock personified.

Once we have objected, moreover, to the common law approach because of external effects, nothing says that the community harms cannot also arise from the inside of a real estate project, which has, of course, no nuisance-like characteristics. It is therefore common today that we have all sorts of other strictures on new construction that become veto or choke points for the process. The amount of affordable (below market) housing that must be built is now subject to extensive multilateral negotiations, which must be concluded before construction can begin.

No one thinks that a higher supply will result in more units at lower prices. Access for the disabled, especially those in wheelchairs, becomes another example of a legitimate state interest, such that any project can be slowed down or stopped if it does not meet stringent requirements, whether or not someone disabled lives there. Labor relations also matter. Since market solutions were already rejected in labor cases, it is now fair game to slow down a permit process if organized labor does not get guaranteed work on the project, for example. And of course there is no particular reason not to also impose various other exactions on local developers, not just to handle the increased traffic that they bring into the neighborhood, but also to subsidize the construction of improvements that benefit existing residents. And from this plethora of permits comes no judicial relief. Speak to various large scale developers and they will speak as one. There is no legal protection. Everything requires a political solution. It is gridlock squared.

The dynamics of this process have one key feature, the systematic separation of power from responsibility. There is no effective remedy against an administrator who says that he needs to see more documents or to review the documents that he

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already has in possession. Nor is there any principle of res judicata that guarantees that the approval that is given one day will stick the next. The basic rules do not treat permits as vested until final approval is obtained, no matter how extensive the predevelopment costs undertaken in reliance on administrative understandings. Litigation, moreover, is not appropriate until the administrative process has been exhausted, which allows officials to string along everything even further. It does not take much imagination to see how costs spiral, which in turn brings in fresh calls for additional subsidies and penalties, which overheat the market still further. Different kinds of permits, moreover, are administered by different kinds of groups with different sorts or expertise so that any change in one dimension could require a redrawing of plans that has to run through the entire cycle yet a second time. Gridlock necessarily follows in a permit culture, not from having too many private property rights, but from having too many systems of oversight in search of too many objectives, which leaves too much unfettered discretion in the hands of public officials who do not have to bear the costs of their own arrogance or mistakes.

The question then arises as to what tactics could be used to overcome this problem in the current legal environment. One possibility for overcoming gridlock is to engage in condemnation of properties that are needed to create some larger assembly of land. This approach appeals to Heller, who is keenly aware of how a single landowner with a strategically held tract can block an entire process. But the eminent domain process is in fact highly complex. On the one hand, Heller is far too sanguine about the operation of the power. He thus defends the Supreme Court’s decision in *Kelo v. City of New London,* which had generated a firestorm of public protest when private land was taken for the purposes of economic development under a very broad reading of the “public use” language in the takings

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74 See HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note __, at 110-15.
75 Id. at xiii, 113.
76 Id. at 117 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
clause, giving the local government complete discretion on what land to take.77 Heller’s argument would make some sense if there were some sort of land assembly process that the Kelo plaintiffs had blocked. But, in fact, this was a classic illustration of eminent domain abuse because the City of New London had no idea what it was to do with the land (which four years later still lays vacant), and at no time needed it in order to complete any of the projects that it had on tap. To say that “the underlying facts may seem troubling”78 understates the point a thousand fold, given that the Supreme Court could have affirmed the ability of the state to take private lands in order to overcome assembly problems without giving it carte blanche to roust individuals from their homes in order to get snazzier buildings in their place. And the situation does not get any better because the compensation provided in these cases always leaves the landowner worse off than before by denying compensation for any of the collateral costs associated with eminent domain, such as litigation costs, appraisal costs, and moving costs. The eminent domain solution is thus capable of real abuse that leads to excessive condemnations for no good social reasons.

There are, of course, many situations in which eminent domain powers are available but cannot be used effectively. And here we see the gridlock problem in yet another guise. On this point, Heller offers one proposed solution that is misplaced. In the first instance, he argues that the way in which to cope with the various approval processes is through the creation of a system of land assembly districts (LADs) which he claims will “fix gridlock by giving neighbors a say in whether their land is assembled for economic development,”79 particularly in blighted areas.80 The point here is to allow “the neighbors” to decide what land assembly projects belong in “their community.” But the program only adds an additional layer of confusion to all that precedes it. Many of the most bitter land use

77 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89; see Heller, The Gridlock Economy, supra note __, at 116-17.
78 Heller, The Gridlock Economy, supra note __, at 117.
80 Id. at 119-21. For the complete discussion, see Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1465 (2008).
disputes take place where the developer has put together land for a new project by voluntary means alone. Yet it should not be thought that “the community” will have no say in whether that project is completed. Unfortunately, when it does have its say, it often responds to powerful pressures to say that a development that is needed citywide should be completed, just “not in my backyard” (NIMBY).

The NIMBY movement gets off to the wrong start when it claims ownership interests in property—“my backyard”—that is owned by others. Just deciding where the district lines should be drawn will create major disputes, as there are sure to be some projects that are located at the edge of one district whose impacts will be felt by individuals next door. Any land assembly districts will just add another layer of gridlock to the cumbrous processes that are already in place. Quite simply, there is no way to fix the gridlock problem unless we narrow the definition of externality to exclude all of the various ills that now count as protectable harm. Once that definition is narrowed, the eminent domain process can kick in. Those people who wish to require a builder to redesign his structure for what they conceive of as aesthetic reasons may do so as long as they pay the freight. But it is amazing how few soft externalities people care to correct when forced to tax their community for the result.

In addition, Heller does not fully understand why the eminent domain process does not work in those cases for which it is needed. For example, no one disputes that airports and runways often require the use of the eminent domain power for land assembly. Nor does anyone question that taking land for airports is taking land for public use. For many years the construction of airports did not generate huge controversy, even when master builders like Robert Moses81 were known to trample small people under foot.82 Yet, while Heller reports that since the deregulation of air traffic in 1975, the volume of traffic has tripled, only one new

82 See Epstein, Supreme Neglect, supra note __, at 78.
airport has been built, in Denver. The explanation, however, is not gridlock from private ownership, which is counteracted by the capacity to condemn land on payment of just compensation. Indeed many jurisdictions have “quick take” statutes that allow the property to be paid for before the total amount of compensation is determined, which in some instances is lowballed. Rather, it comes through the operation of the extensive permit system that gives all sorts of persons, including nonowners of the condemned property, an opportunity to challenge the location and size of the airport. Those powers exist even if the designated land is already located in public hands. In some instances, the objections, which relate to nuisances, such as noise and traffic, may be well conceived. But in other cases, the protests are done because of all sorts of collateral motivations. It is thus hard, in these cases, to defend the proposition that huge public projects should be whisked through the political and administrative process without a close look. But, no matter how the trade-offs between speed and legitimacy are done, one thing is clear: gridlock from private ownership is just not part of this knotty problem.

V. The Patent Thicket

The last of the gridlock situations that calls for some examination is the structure of ownership rights under patent law. The claims for the creation of an anticommmons lie in the assertion that useful pieces of information, particularly about drugs and drug research, are parceled out among so many rights-holders that it is impossible for the diligent researchers to assemble the needed tools and chemicals for further investigation via voluntary cooperation. As in general, there are two ways to test this claim. The first is to ask whether there are any other explanations for the decline in new drug innovation. The second is to ask whether,

83 See Heller, The Gridlock Economy, supra note __, at xiii.
even if those are put aside, there is reason to believe that the anticommons argument makes a key difference in this area. I take these up in order.

As with his studies of gridlock generally, Heller overlooks the many other forces that operate in given fields. Here is not the place to discuss the many woes of the pharmaceutical industry, but it is important to note that every major policy shift in the pharmaceutical area in the last decade has reduced the returns to pharmaceutical investment. I shall just tick them off. First, the pricing end of the business is under stress. Many foreign nations pursue aggressive monopsony buying policies that reduce returns. The various government purchase plans through Medicaid have similar effects in this country, with more to come under any health reform package that is likely to make its way through Congress. These activities can be expected to reduce the return to drug companies and with it the return for drug innovation.85 In addition, the costs and complexity of clinical trials have vastly increased, eroding the protection otherwise available under the Hatch-Waxman Act.86 The cost of bringing new drugs to market includes both the time value of money and the cost of compounds that fail to make the cut. A full cost

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estimate from 2003 places that figure at around $1.3 billion per drug—a value which has to be recouped during the ten or so years of effective patent life.

Exposure to liability has also increased with the recent amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and their judicial interpretation, leaving warnings, however thorough, exposed to the risk of being upended by state tort actions. Any evaluation of overall levels of drug initiatives has to take into account these forces, which cut unambiguously against pharmaceutical innovation.

Yet suppose we now put aside these issues to concentrate solely on the gridlock problem as it pertains to pharmaceutical innovation. As mentioned above, the original version of this claim was made by Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg in their 1998 Science article, which featured their theoretical claim that the anticommons had thwarted innovation. Their article, however, could be challenged on both empirical and theoretical grounds.

Start with the empirical. Heller and Eisenberg did not offer any empirical evidence of either the nature or extent of the anticommons problem. In Gridlock, Heller reports his conversations with an anonymous head of a “Big Pharma” drug maker who told him “that his lab scientists developed the potential cure (call it

88 As a result of increased time delays in both clinical trials and the FDA approval process, “the average useful commercial life today is under ten years, or less than half of the basic patent life of twenty years.” Epstein, Supreme Neglect, supra note __, at 160.
91 Heller & Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, supra note __.
Compound X) [for Alzheimer’s] years ago, but biotech competitors blocked its development.”92

Oh? This statement leaves more questions open than it answers.

First, any (anonymous) claim for a potential cure for Alzheimer’s has to be greeted with a grain of salt. That disease is doubtless a composite condition as complex to understand as cancer, for which there is no still no magic bullet. Compound X may have helped manage some portion of the disease, but hardly all of it. Nor does any statement about one firm address the question of whether other pharmaceutical companies have continued to pursue research in this area.93 Owing to the huge amount of research in this area, it is hard to think that future success or failure were tied to a single compound among many. The prospect of financial gain has surely lured others into the field.

Second, Heller offers no explanation as to how biotech competitors could exert this power under the current law. By definition, the competitors are pursuing alternative approaches to the disease. But what this company needed were the complementary technologies and compounds that are not controlled by competitors. Nor is it clear that, for each stage in the process, there is one and only one compound or tool that will do the trick. There would be no holdout problem for research components that were competitively supplied.

Third, Heller offers an incomplete analysis of the empirical literature, much of which cuts in the opposite direction. In one study published in Science, John Walsh, Ashish Arora, and Wesley Cohen94 surveyed 70 attorneys, scientists, and managers who were active in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. Their

92 HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note __, at 4-5.
93 For some sense of the scope of current research, both basic and applied, see Alzheimer Research Forum, http://www.alzforum.org/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
research goal was to assemble evidence that indicated the magnitude of the anticommons problem in biotechnology. The findings, however, revealed that almost none of the recipients claimed that the current legal patent regime posed serious obstacles to their research. In both industry and university labs, researchers adopted strategies of “licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the development and use of public databases and research tools, court challenges, and simply using the technology without a license (i.e. infringement)” to achieve their particular goals.95 A few years later, the verdict was unchanged, as Walsh and his colleagues reported empirical results that demonstrated that “access to patents on knowledge inputs rarely imposes a significant burden on academic biomedical research.”96 In reaching this conclusion, Walsh observed, as Heller reports, “that 29 percent of recently executed material transfer agreements had reach-through claims, 16 percent provided for royalties, and 26 percent imposed publication restrictions. In areas with intense commercial interest, 30 percent of researchers surveyed did not receive the last biological research materials they requested.”97

Heller takes a less sanguine view of these results than did the authors of the study. He wonders whether it makes sense to move research off-shore to avoid patent claims.98 My own reaction is that it hardly matters provided the ultimate commercial products be brought back. Indeed, in terms of current domestic policy I am more worried about research projects and clinics that relocate elsewhere to escape the very exacting standards that United States regulators impose on animal care and clinical studies. Unlike Heller, I am not particularly concerned that American patent law does not allow any special research exemption for using

95 Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, et al., supra note __, at 1021.
97 HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note XX, at 66-67 (citing Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, supra note __).
98 HELLER, supra note XX, at 67.
patented products.99 There are perfectly good explanations as to why that practice is likely to continue in the future. Typically, medical researchers are not in direct competition with the patent holder insofar as they do not attempt to sell the patented technology or product on the market. Instead, their research has positive spillover effects for the patent holder. If it reveals good information, it allows the patentee to extend sales to new markets. If those studies reveals bad information about the patent substance, it allows the patentee to take steps that could avoid costly liability suits, recall actions and the like. The empirical evidence could never dismiss all instances of gridlock, but in the larger picture, gridlock is not a first order question.

Walsh’s other findings are consistent with a high level of commercial activity, which does not suggest gridlock. The use of “reach-through” licenses that allow the patent holder to collect royalties based on the revenues that a licensee receives from its licenses makes good commercial sense. One of the greatest difficulties with scientific research lies in the value of the licensed technology. The reach-through license avoids the need to make front-end estimates of future revenues and thus allows for the use of subsequent information to determine compensation at a later date. Indeed, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,100 curbing patent-holder control of downstream buyers of products embodying their patents, could easily undercut the flexibility of licensing agreements in ways that could impede growth.101 Finally, the refusal to

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99 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (no experimental use defense to infringement if “act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”). It is instructive that this dispute arose in the atypical context of a researcher switching universities, not in the context of one research unit using the patented materials of a second. It therefore suggests that the standard situations where products by one lab are used in research by another generates no practice obstacles to development.

100 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (holding that Intel's sale to Quanta of products embodying the LGE patents for which Intel had a license “took its products outside the scope of the patent monopoly,” and LGE could “no longer assert its patent rights against Quanta”).

give information for free is no surprise in any commercial context, however common it might, and should, be in connection with basic research. No firm is required to share trade secrets under current law. But the introduction of forced sharing agreements would achieve wider dissemination of information at the cost of making it less likely that private individuals and firms would generate the information in the first place. The empirical evidence thus does not support the view that we have a crisis on our hands which research scientists somehow overlook.102

Fourth, it is critical to note how the expansion of research ties in with stronger patent protection. The story of Compound X takes place against a backdrop in which other firms had already developed the patented technologies that this company wanted. But why were those products developed in the first place? Heller is right to acknowledge that the expansion of ownership rights in patented materials starting with Diamond v. Chakrabarty103 in 1980 led to the infusion of huge amounts of investment into biomedical research.104 This illustrates the positive side of the investment equation; exclusive rights spur innovation. In addition, Heller makes one brief reference to the Bayh-Dole Act,105 which requires universities that receive government grants to pursue, if circumstances warrant it, to patenting opportunities for their products with a view toward their commercialization. In general, putting inventions into the public domain should be expected to increase utilization because no one has to enter into any transactions to utilize that material. There is ample reason why everyone agrees that mathematical formulae and laws of nature always fall in the public domain no matter who

102 HELLER, supra note XX, at 67 (“[S]urveying scientists just isn’t likely to reveal systematic gridlock.”)
103 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that the patentee’s micro-organism was patentable subject matter, despite that it was a “living” thing).
104 HELLER, supra note XX, at 60 fig.3.4.
discovers them. Some ask, why then use Bayh-Dole to enhance privatization when it necessarily increases the likelihood of some patent blockade?

It is hard to give a definitive answer to that question, but here is one possibility. The commercialization of valuable compounds is expensive business. Once a compound falls into the public domain, each company that seeks to commercialize it is likely to keep its research activities secret, which means that other potential participants in this space may be leery about moving into an already crowded space. On the other hand, when a drug is patented, the firm with the patent can eliminate one dimension of uncertainty from its calculation. To be sure, it is only one dimension; no patentee can be sure whether some substitute technology is in development and subject to trade secret law, or how well patentees of other products are doing with their research on substitute products. However, the additional flow of investment dollars into patent research from Bayh-Dole suggests that there must be at least some force in operation to account for the spur.\footnote{Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg note the “unprecedented levels” of investment and significant acceleration of the patenting trend after passage of Bayh-Dole. Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 289, 291-92 (2003). However, they ultimately worry about the progress of science. \textit{Id.}} Indeed, the real concern today in many quarters is not with the anticommons problem that stems from broad patented subject matter, but rather from the distinct risk that the United States Supreme Court could well take steps to cut back on the broadly supported \textit{Chakrabarty} decision, with \textit{In Re Bilski},\footnote{545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), \textit{cert. granted}, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009). I have coauthored, with Scott Kieff, an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Dr. Chakrabarty in support of the broad definitions of patent eligibility in \textit{Bilski}. Brief for Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, 2009 WL 2481328 (Aug. 6, 2009) (No. 08-964). It is worth noting that Mark Lemley has led a team of law professors on the same side of the case, even though he has differed with Kieff and myself on a large number of patent related issues.} which presents the Court with a dispute over the patentability of a risk-hedging method for commodities trading.

There are, moreover, good theoretical reasons to dispute Heller’s claim of major patent gridlock. Bruce Kuhlik and I have argued that Heller and Eisenberg...
fundamentally misconceive the nature of the problem by treating the context of drug innovation as though it involves the same political dynamics that are found in permit cultures.108 More specifically, Heller’s own work refers to the corrupt permit system that keeps storefronts empty in Moscow, Russia.109 After all in Russia its not clear whom to bribe when initial bribe may not do much good if still other permits are required down the road. Drugs don’t work that way. Unlike store fronts, drugs are wasting assets, disappearing relentlessly over time. Either a firm enter into deals quickly or it finds itself without a revenue stream. Under such circumstances, parties work overtime to make sensible alliances dealing with anything from a single product to an entire line of products. A patent pool, whereby patent holders agree to license to one another, is of course one device that can mitigate holdup over a wide range of patented technologies. But all patent pools are not created equal.

The current Department of Justice rules make good sense insofar as they are willing to allow patent pools that contain complements yet are suspicious of pools that contain product substitutes, which could become disguised cartelization subject to the antitrust law.110

The Department of Justice position is a welcome change from earlier government activities, which attacked procompetitive pooling arrangements under the antitrust laws. Consider, again, the different configurations of toll booths on the Rhine River. Those that are in series create problems, while those that are in parallel do not. From the antitrust perspective, merger among different gatekeepers operating in series should be welcomed, while mergers of different gatekeepers operating in parallel should be subject to far greater scrutiny. Failure to recognize that distinction in United Shoe Machinery led to 69 years of nonstop litigation by the

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109 HELLER, supra note XX, at 143-64.

United States against the firm, which had merged 30 different firms who held sequential patents on various stages of the shoe manufacturing process. This vertical merger was an effective device to eliminate a Rhine River problem. Over its lifetime, it delivered great efficiencies to United Shoe’s customers, who never complained about the excellent rates of service and the high levels of innovation, which allowed United Shoe to keep a large market share. The great achievement of the Department of Justice was to break up the firm into unsustainable units just when foreign competition was heating up. The lesson here is that vertical integration may be a sensible response to the patent holdup problem as is free entry of new firms from overseas.

In this regard, moreover, the arrival of new patented technologies should not be regarded as necessarily creating a thicker patent thicket. To revert to the earlier images, the current patent map contains patents that operate both in series and in parallel with each other. So the relevant question is whether the new patent adds a new alternative or simply lengthens an established chain. The latter is odd because, even with the new patent, businesses are free to use the strategies they adopted before. On the other side, the arrival of a new patent could allow for an alternative pathway to production that displaces several patents previously used in series with each other. It is as though the new patent supplies an interstate highway for a single toll, supplanting the maze of surface streets previously used. We know that the rate of patent innovation continues to be strong, which could not be the

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112 Epstein, supra note XX, at 52.
case if the thicket were an obstacle and not an opportunity to production. The Alzheimer’s Compound X story that Heller refers to, with all its infirmities, does not seem to describe the overall state of the industry.

All this is not to say that we do not have instances in which the current patent law has been misapplied in ways that block technical innovation. Let me allude to two cases that raise these issues. The first has to do with the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene mutations dealing with breast-cancer risk, which, as Heller rightly points out, occupy a single patent that has impeded scientific research.113 The particular complaint is that the exclusive use of the patent for the BRCA genes has prevented other companies from using their (patented) “home-brew” tests for detecting the gene in situ. Obviously, the problem here is not gridlock, as he acknowledges. The key point is that patent application should be rejected even under the current law.

The fuller story goes as follows. As a matter of first principle, it looks as though the BRCA genes are natural substances that are not patentable as “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”114 An exception to that general rule was developed as early as 1911 in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., in which a Japanese scientist, Jokichi Takamine, had assigned to Parke-Davis a patent for the isolation and purification of adrenalin.115 No one doubted that the process whereby the isolation and purification had taken place was protected. The novel move in Parke-Davis was that Learned Hand sustained a patent for the composition of matter, saying: “while it is of course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.”116 In effect, this decision meant that this patent could not be circumvented by finding some alternative mode for isolation and purification, which

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113 Heller, supra note XX, at 76.
115 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
116 Id., at 103.
of course increased its value. There is little doubt that the Hand decision paved the way for the development of the highly valuable recombinant DNA technologies.117

The difference between this case and the BRCA genes is that Myriad Genetics has asserted that its patent covers not only the sale of synthetic BRCA genes, but also the use of that genetic site inside individual persons.118 This claim creates a complete blockade against new invention because no one can invent around this patent if the sole objective is to treat the conditions involving that genetic site. The correct rule therefore should limit the Park-Davis decision to the cases involving isolation and purification of a product for further sale, which is not at stake here. The work that is needed to locate a gene is far less than it is to first locate and then synthesize it. The blockade that results from this extended patent coverage is far too broad. For these purposes a return to the traditional rule that it is not possible to patent natural substances seems appropriate.

A second aspect of the full story neglected by Heller is the potential patentability of gene fragments called “express sequence tags” (ESTs), used to identify and map new genes, which some drug companies sought to patent in droves. These claims were eventually rejected, and rightly so.119 To the extent these ESTs are to be used in situ, the same objections derived in the context of the BRCA genes apply. For use in the laboratory, the simple approach is that any identification technique that can work by the boatload should be regarded as an

119 See, e.g. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the ESTs lacked specific and substantial utility). Even the Senior Vice President of Research at Genentech, Dennis Henner, conceded concerns. See Dr. Matthew Rimmer, Genentech and the Stolen Gene: Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 5 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 198, 206-207 (2001-2002) (“If the PTO is doing its job correctly, patents will be granted only in those situations where they are warranted, and the rights under those patents will be limited to the contributions of the inventor. Likewise, a gene patent – properly examined –should not enable its owner to prevent parties from doing research, such as sequencing or studying a portion of the genome of an organism.” Quoting Henner, D. 'Statement of the Genentech Senior Vice President Of Research', United States Judiciary Subcommittee On Courts And Intellectual Property, 13 July 2000).
obvious extension of existing technology that should not be patented. One interesting side note of the case rejecting the EST patents, *In re Fisher*, were the steps taken by Merck, which favored an open access regime to develop its complementary products. As Heller notes, Merck simply put its ESTs in the public domain by the creation of a Gene Index, which took the steam out of the EST movement.\textsuperscript{120} The moral of this tale, however, cuts in favor of strong patent protection. It is easy for one key player to put something into the public domain. It is much harder for any company to take something out of the public domain when the patent laws are weak.

In sum, the legal rules governing the protection of patents are surely imperfect, and always in need of improvement. However, there is no evidence that we are in near-crisis mode or that any radical reformation of the law of patents is required at this time. Furthermore, there is strong reason to believe that the weakening of patent protection, along a variety of dimensions, is in fact a serious mistake.\textsuperscript{121}

**CONCLUSION**

I believe that this lengthy review of *The Gridlock Economy* leads to the following overall evaluation of the work. Gridlock and anticommons are serious issues that need to be addressed in any comprehensive examination of property arrangements. But they must also be kept in perspective in at least 5 ways. First, many of the serious distortions in the current economy have little or nothing to do with gridlock. Just the massive programs of government subsidy in the health, real estate, agricultural and energy markets are in aggregate far greater than the issues here. Next, in many instances, as in labor and real estate markets, the government takes an active, if perverse, role in the creation of economic gridlock, by offering legal protection to monopolies (the labor case) or extensive permit powers to government officials (the real estate case). In labor markets, the second area of

\textsuperscript{120} HELLER, *supra* note XX, at 61.

\textsuperscript{121}For my longer critique, see Epstein, *Disintegration, supra* note XX.
error, a return to competitive structures could be accomplished easily if we had the will to do it—which we don’t. In real estate markets, the third area, the massive simplification of the permit process is possible so long as we are prepared to reduce the class of externalities that we think call for public action and defer the granting of remedies until these harms are imminent. Once again, political rather than intellectual issues are the largest impediments. Fourth, in other markets, most notably markets in the broadcast spectrum, the true culprit is single government ownership that can in no way be described as gridlock. And last, the complex patterns of gridlock that from time to time appear in connection with intellectual property rights, especially with patents, have to be put in perspective. At no point could these be regarded as the sole source of uneasiness in the pharmaceutical industry, given the other movements on pricing, liability, and clinical trials that have impeded drug innovation. Even when the gridlock problem does arise it is often a second order issue that pales in significance to the huge boost to investment that strong property rights create in intellectual property. The bottom line therefore is this: private property creates the occasional gridlock, but government ownership and regulation create far more. Heller should therefore recognize that the second half of his title does not follow from the first. Indeed he gets everything backwards. The correct title is less spectacular but more accurate: The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Government Ownership and Regulation Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives.
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