The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment

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Today, the mechanism of the spending power helps to drive the gears of the modern federal machine. But early nineteenth-century constitutional debates demonstrate that the spending power is essentially a work-around, and a recent one at that—a tool by which Congress achieves certain political and legal ends while respecting the formal boundaries set by Article I and the Tenth Amendment. The “interbellum” period between 1815 and 1861 was enormously significant for American constitutional law, in particular the constellation of related doctrines concerning congressional power that we now place under the general heading of “federalism”: the spending power, the enumerated powers of Article I, and the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. Political and legal actors in the early nineteenth century believed they lived in a long Founding moment in which the fundamental terms of the federal-state relationship were still open to debate. Constitutional scholars have mistakenly overlooked the constitutional creativity of the period. As a normative matter, I argue for an approach to modern constitutional interpretation that recognizes the ever-changing nature of the landscape of constitutional permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence of the precise contours of that change. Studying the evolution of the spending power over time, especially where the text itself remains constant, demonstrates that ideas about federal structure are not fixed. Therefore, constitutional federalism itself is not fixed—a particularly important insight in an area of constitutional doctrine that is dominated by originalist approaches.

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INTRODUCTION

Time and experience have verified to a demonstration, the public utility of internal improvements. That the poorest and most thinly populated countries would be greatly benefitted by the opening of good roads, and in the clearing of navigable streams within their limits, is what no person will deny. . . . The only objection is to paying for them; and the objection to paying arises from the want of ability to pay.

—Abraham Lincoln, 1832

The constitutional landscape of the early nineteenth century, roughly between the end of the War of 1812 and the beginning of the Civil War, was dramatically different from that of the twenty-first, or even the twentieth, century. Even in the realm of textual provisions that have not changed since the 1790s, such as Article I’s enumeration of Congress’s powers or the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states and the people, the foundational assumptions—and the resulting worries and preoccupations—of what this Article terms the “interbellum” period proceeded from premises that must be understood as distinct and to some degree alien from modern ones. The constitutional text is the same, but the modes of interpretation that contemporaries used were different, as were the basic questions they were asking the text to answer. The words of Article I and the Tenth Amendment have not changed, but the surrounding universe of constitutional possibility has.

Given these differences, why are nineteenth-century constitutional debates relevant to modern constitutional thought? Because the landscape of constitutional possibility is perpetually changing, and the change in each moment in-


forms, and indeed shapes, the contours of the constitutional landscape in subsequent moments. Yet the landscape of each remains distinct, and in some cases appears incompatible, when one attempts to reconcile cases and doctrines across eras. Early nineteenth-century Americans exemplified this point. Their writings routinely expressed both a sense of vigorous participation in the founding of the Republic and a gnawing worry that they had been born too late, and too undistinguished, to wear that mantle comfortably.\(^3\) They viewed themselves as both a special cohort of energetic enactors of their forebears’ plans and a lesser generation of Founders manqués.\(^4\)

This point is a historical one—it attempts to explain the actions and motivations of historical actors. But concerns of historiography and constitutional interpretation also offer important reasons to examine the early nineteenth century. From a historiographical perspective, focusing on the competing narratives that scholars have offered, the period is ripe for reexamination. Many of the dominant accounts are several decades old, or they pay insufficient attention to constitutional thought. Instead, they emphasize political or economic factors: the “age of Jackson”; the “market revolution”; the “rise of American democracy”; the “revolution of communications.”\(^5\) These stories fail to recog-


\(^4\). The youthful utterances of interbellum individuals who later became prominent politicians and jurists display a range of emotions, from resigned nostalgia to frustrated cosmopolitanism. In 1838, Abraham Lincoln told his audience at the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, that “the scenes of the revolution” would soon “fade upon the memory of the world, and grow more and more dim by the lapse of time. . . . At the close of that struggle, nearly every adult male had been a participator in some of its scenes . . . . But those histories are gone.” Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Springfield Young Men’s Lyceum (Jan. 27, 1838), in *THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN*, supra note 1, at 11, 20. More violent emotion can be found in a letter from the eighteen-year-old Joseph Story, whose request for his Harvard College friend Samuel Fay to send his views on Rousseau concluded, “Oh Fay! conceive me in Marblehead, and you must know that I am wretched.” Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel Fay (Sept. 6, 1798), as reprinted in *LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY* 75, 76 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851). On early nineteenth-century Americans’ complex attitudes toward themselves vis-à-vis their forebears, see LaCroix, *supra* note 3, at 254-56 (describing interbellum Americans’ ambivalence toward their Revolutionary predecessors). See generally Joyce Appleby, *INHERITING THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST GENERATION OF AMERICANS* (2000) (discussing the attitudes of the “first generation” of postcolonial Americans). The paradigmatic example of the anxious inheritor, albeit from a few decades later, is Henry Adams. See *HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY* 3-4 (1918).


nize one of the most significant markers of the era: the relentless focus of legal elites, politicians, and ordinary people on the Constitution. This interbellum period witnessed the emergence of the Constitution as the preeminent organizing lens through which Americans viewed political and legal questions. One reason for the period’s relative neglect in legal history is the emphasis of constitutional law scholarship on the Founding period and Reconstruction, which has meant that the period between those watershed events has not received due attention.

But this neglect is misplaced. The early nineteenth century is enormously significant for American constitutional law, and in particular for the constellation of related doctrines concerning congressional power that we now place under the general heading of “federalism”: the spending power and the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. The period between roughly 1817 and 1851 witnessed a series of sustained and contentious public debates about the federal government’s power to fund public works projects—“internal improvements” in the parlance of the day. These projects included roads, canals, harbors, lighthouses, and, later, railroads. The central issue was the proper scope of Congress’s power in relation to the states in the federal sys-


9. For a related point regarding the Civil War, see Arthur Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 327, 328 (1964).


tem. Unlike recent challenges to federal regulation that arguably interfere with state sovereignty, however, the nineteenth-century controversy was not framed in terms of the states’ power to resist encroachments by Congress. Rather, the debate turned on an entirely different conception of state sovereignty from the one employed in modern case law—a conception with equally firm roots in the Founding period.

As I will demonstrate, the principal factors in much of the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence were largely absent from, or irrelevant to, the debates over the practical meaning of federalism in the early nineteenth century. The assumptions of unwaivable, monolithic state sovereignty and perpetual, systemic federal-state tension that have underpinned the majority opinions in many of the Court’s federalism cases since the 1980s are difficult to trace to the Founding period or the early nineteenth century. As the controversy over internal improvements illustrates, crucial interbellum constitutional debates about federalism unfolded in the political branches: Congress, the presidency, and the state legislatures. At issue was the scope of legislative power. Moreover, the debates included the following key themes: state consent; distinctions among Congress’s powers to appropriate funds for internal improvements, to execute the improvements itself, and to transfer the public lands to the states for the purposes of executing the improvements; and the role of the federal government as proprietor of the public lands.

Today, the mechanism of the spending power drives essential gears of the federal machine. The debates over internal improvements offer a nineteenth-century lens on that power that highlights the differences between interbellum and millennial constitutional thought. The internal improvements controversy is thus both analogous and disanalogous to modern debates on the practical implementation of federalism principles. As I will show, interbellum constitutional thought was generally wary of consolidated federal power over public works projects, preferring instead to structure such projects as cooperative federal-state efforts. In contrast, modern constitutional law doctrine and federalism commentary often take the opposite approach: the federal government’s enumerated powers under Article I, where appropriate, are the preferred structural


13. As I have argued elsewhere, federalism also had a distinctly different meaning in the Founding period from the meaning that is often ascribed to it today. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 220 (2010) (“The federal idea . . . is an intellectual artifact, not a transcendent or timeless idea that has always hovered around waiting to be applied to a particular political project.”).

route for such projects, and indirect routes via state cooperation are disfavored.15 As an interpretive matter, to the extent that modern case law relies on a particular substantive concept of federalism that has been consistent since the Founding, the internal improvements example urges us to rethink that notion. Since the earliest days of the Republic, federalism has been an unstable and contested concept, worked out through the meshing of theory and practice.16 By highlighting nineteenth-century understandings of the spending power, the internal improvements debate demonstrates the dynamic nature of federalism in practice.

As the Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions demonstrate, a version of state consent continues to be relevant to conditional spending programs, insofar as the Court is now willing to police the boundary between a conditional and a coercive program.17 With the return of coercion to the center of the spending power analysis, consent is still somewhere in the background of federalism case law. But the current Court’s renewed emphasis on coercion is distinct from early nineteenth-century commentators’ focus on state consent. In short, the post-National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) coercion inquiry is simply not the same as the interbellum consent inquiry. Today, we do not think of consent as having much to do with, or any significant bearing on, Congress’s direct regulatory power under Article I. To the extent that recent federalism doctrine focuses on coercion, the inquiry is confined to conditional spending programs—i.e., bargains with the states, often in situations in which Congress lacks the power to regulate directly under Article I. In the early nineteenth century, by contrast, the issue of state consent was closely

15. See, e.g., Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (upholding a federal statute requiring states to disclose certain accident reports and safety data under the commerce power, without reaching the issue of the spending power, on the theory that the statute “aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce” and thus fit squarely within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); Printz, 521 U.S. at 933; New York, 505 U.S. at 149. Here a distinction must be drawn between the Court’s doctrine and the practical realities of federalism on the ground, as recent important work on cooperative federalism and concurrent power demonstrates. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009) (examining states’ role in defining federalism by resisting federal policy); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 537 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism] (positing that “every branch of state government is squarely in the midst of creating, implementing, and interpreting federal statutory law”); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2002 (2014) (arguing that “Congress [is] our primary source of federalism”). Moreover, the size of the Article I regulatory channel at any given doctrinal moment is a separate issue.


17. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (holding that the Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion” because “[i]n this case the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head” (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 175) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
tied to Congress’s primary powers over commerce, taxing and spending, post offices and post roads, and the public lands. Even though NFIB returned coercion to the center of the conditional spending inquiry, state consent is still not a defense for Congress against an alleged violation of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. Rather, recent case law recognizes the role of consent only by searching for its opposite, coercion. Early nineteenth-century federalism doctrine thus differed from the modern version in two important ways. First, interbellum federalism tied the consent inquiry to direct congressional regulation as well as to conditional spending programs. Second, interbellum federalism did states the courtesy of defining consent capably, instead of focusing obsessively on the potential coercive effects of congressional regulation. In these vital respects, the landscape of federalism looked very different in the early nineteenth century from how it looks today.

But this story is much more than a plea for recognizing contingency or appreciating a path not taken. As a historical matter, I contend that political and legal actors in the early nineteenth century believed themselves to be living in what I refer to as a “long Founding moment,” in which the fundamental terms of the federal-state relationship were still open to debate. As a historiographical matter, I posit that scholars have mistakenly overlooked the constitutional creativity of the period. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, I argue for an approach that recognizes the ever-changing nature of the landscape of constitutional permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence of the precise contours of that change with respect to the spending power.

The spending power, in both its interbellum and millennial versions, is essentially a work-around—a tool by which Congress achieves certain political and legal ends while respecting the formal boundaries set by Article I and the Tenth Amendment. In keeping with the changing nature of those boundaries as limned by the Court, the legislative work-around also changes. Studying the changes to the work-around over time, especially where the text itself remains constant, demonstrates that ideas about federal structure are not fixed. Therefore, constitutional federalism itself is not fixed. Comparing a particular doctrine across time offers insight into the path of constitutional change by re-

18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
20. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
21. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
22. See id. amend. X.
23. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2045-51 (discussing the doctrinal and structural relationships between Article I and the Tenth Amendment).
24. Mark Tushnet describes “[c]onstitutional workarounds” as situations in which “the Constitution is in some sense at war with itself: One part of the text prohibits something, other parts of the text permit it, and the Constitution itself does not appear to give either part priority over the other.” Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1499, 1503-04 (2009) (footnote omitted). Work-arounds can “occur when there is political pressure to accomplish a goal blocked by parts of the Constitution’s text.” Id. at 1504.
vealing what arguments are, and what arguments are not, part of the Constitution at any given moment.

I. THE MODERN SPENDING POWER

Imagine that a majority of representatives in Congress settles on a plan to build a new national highway system. Some states already have adequate roads that can be incorporated into the new system, but others have decrepit highways that must be improved in order to accommodate the most up-to-date cars—electric, perhaps, or self-driving. Those states’ legislatures are dominated by politicians who oppose federal funding for state public works projects and who endorse a narrow view of congressional power. These state politicians also worry that the expansion of the electric or self-driving car industry will harm carmakers in their states. A handful of these states express their intention to resist the federal program. Undeterred, members of Congress insist that the cooperation of all the states is necessary to achieve the goals of the new highway system. But the congressional representatives would prefer not to inflame the resisting states by issuing direct, and preemptive, federal legislation. May Congress threaten to take away all federal highway funding from these states if they do not undertake the necessary improvements—not just new highway funding for the new highway system, but all highway money?

To a degree rarely seen in constitutional law, the answer to this question depends on when the question is asked. Prior to June 2012, the answer would likely have been yes. The governing Supreme Court precedent, South Dakota v. Dole,25 offered a clear answer: “The Constitution empowers Congress to ‘lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.’”26 As part of this spending power, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote, Congress “may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds” in order to “further broad policy objectives.”27 The majority in Dole waved aside concerns about federal coercion of the states that had underpinned analogous cases decades earlier.28

After June 2012, however, the answer to the question of the scope of Congress’s conditional spending power changed. The Court did not overrule Dole, but it dramatically circumscribed the previously vast domain in which the conditional spending power had been understood to operate.29 In NFIB, the Court

25. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding federal legislation requiring states to raise the minimum age for purchase or public possession of alcoholic beverages to twenty-one years or else lose a percentage of otherwise available highway funds).
26. Id. at 206 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
27. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
28. See, e.g., id. at 209-12 (distinguishing prior cases).
invalidated the Medicaid provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the ground that it “penalize[d] States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”30 Reviving an early twentieth-century strand of doctrine,31 as well as invoking the “new federalist” decisions of the 1980s and 1990s, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, “Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”32 In short, the provision amounted to “economic dragooning” insofar as it “threatened [the] loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”33 The Court thus returned an early twentieth-century notion of coercion to the center of the analysis of federal conditional spending programs.

But one might reasonably ask whether a Court comprising several originalist Justices might be interested in the history of the spending power. What was the nature of the power at a time closer to the Founding, perhaps nearly two hundred years ago, in 1822? Imagine asking a citizen of the early Republic how Congress might permissibly go about building a system of roads connecting the Eastern Seaboard with the interior states carved out of the Northwest Territory, such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Would Congress have the power to threaten to withhold funding for roads if, for example, Ohio refused to build its roads using a designated sturdy material, such as the new Scottish macadam technology, which mixed small stones with cement?34 In other words, what textual and structural tools did the federal government possess in 1822 to compel a state to act?

The citizen of 1822 would likely greet these questions with a quizzical expression. Yes, she would respond, Congress certainly may withhold funding for the Ohio road. Then, she would follow with a series of questions: Is the road in question located entirely within the State of Ohio? What were the terms of the State of Ohio’s admission to the Union? What is the source of the federal road funding—a tariff surplus, the general revenues, or some other source? Who owns the lands on which the Ohio road is to be built—the federal government, the state, or private parties? Has Ohio consented to the construction of the road?

32. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590).
33. Id. at 2605.
34. The first macadamized road in the United States was the Boonsboro Turnpike Road in Maryland, completed in 1823. Charles J. Farmer, From Baltimore to Cumberland, Maryland, in A GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ROAD 33, 50 (Karl Raitz ed., 1996).
These questions from the nineteenth-century observer would aim at understanding not just the nature of the condition—the deal that Congress is offering the state—but also the mechanism of the federal spending program itself. A court in 1822 would likely have concluded that Congress could indeed strip road funding from the states because it would have questioned whether Congress could constitutionally grant those monies to the state in the first place. To early nineteenth-century ears, the Ohio road hypothetical would conjure up an entirely different set of constitutional questions from the ones underlying modern spending power doctrine. The fear of economic dragooning, of commandeering the states and rendering them little more than administrative districts, lies at the heart of the spending power as it has developed since the early twentieth century. The question of what Congress can compel the states to do animates much of the Supreme Court’s modern federalism doctrine. Between the Revolution and the Civil War, however, American legal and political thought considered a different, less defensive question: What can Congress do in the name of the states? The modern query asks whether the federal government is impermissibly using the states as administrative entities. The interbellum question, by contrast, asked whether the federal government was permitted to launch public works projects for and within the states.

The spending power derives from the General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides, “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” Although the word “spend” does not appear in the clause, the orthodox understanding of the clause is that it vests Congress with the power to tax, and therefore to spend, for the general welfare of the United States. The taxing and spending powers are thus conceptually and textually linked, but the case law under each has diverged over the past several decades. Since the 1930s, taxing power cases have typically focused on federal taxation of individuals, while

35. Assuming, of course, that the citizen of 1822 did not regard the offer of federal funds as having created a vested right in the state. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 693 (1819) (“As soon as it is in esse, and the franchises and property become vested and executed in it, the grant is just as much an executed contract, as if its prior existence had been established for a century.”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights . . . .”); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 268 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (discussing the protection of vested property rights from state infringement).


37. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-601 (upholding the individual mandate provision of the ACA under the taxing power); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 75 (1936) (invalidating a tax on agricultural commodities under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond the scope of the “taxing and spending power”).
spending power cases have tended to concern Congress’s authority to use federal funds to encourage states to adopt particular programs or policies.38

From the ratification debates of the 1780s to the New Deal controversies of the 1930s, the scope and structural relevance of the General Welfare Clause were the subjects of extensive controversy. At issue was how the clause fit into Article I’s architecture of enumerated powers.39 Was its closest relative the Necessary and Proper Clause, which operates as an auxiliary enumerated power and thus does not give Congress an independent source of power to enact laws based only on the claim that they are necessary and proper?40 This relatively narrow view is generally associated with James Madison, who held that the general welfare power was not a freestanding power and therefore must be attached to an enumerated power.41 Or was it more akin to one of those enumerated powers, such that Congress could regulate based on a finding that a particular policy aided the general welfare of the nation? The broadest view of the general welfare power as a freestanding power was associated with the Pennsylvania Judge Alexander Addison,42 and the prospect that it might become the accepted interpretation worried some observers at the ratification debates.43 An intermediate position, articulated in the Founding period by Alexander Hamilton44 and advocated in the twentieth century by the political scientist Edward S. Corwin, treats the general welfare power as “not an independent grant of power, but a qualification of the taxing power.”45 On this view, the general welfare

38. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601-07 (upholding in part and invalidating in part the ACA’s expansion of state-run Medicaid programs); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588-90 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s scheme of encouraging employers to pay taxes to state unemployment compensation funds).

39. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2082-84 (examining the historical debates concerning the scope of the General Welfare Clause).

40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Nomenclature is important here: the necessary and proper power is an enumerated power, although it has traditionally been treated in the doctrine as auxiliary or secondary to the other enumerated powers. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2056-58.


44. See Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 63, 129 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (“The constitutional test of a right application must always be whether it be for a purpose of general or local nature. If the former, there can be no want of constitutional power. The quality of the object, as how far it will really promote or not the welfare of the union, must be matter of conscientious discretion.”).

power is limited to taxing and spending and does not include broader types of 
regulation.

In United States v. Butler, the Court embraced what commentators have 
termed the “Hamiltonian” view of the general welfare power before ultimately 
rejecting the tax provision in question as impermissibly close to regulation. 
According to the Hamiltonian theory, “the clause confers a power separate and 
distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of 
them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appro- 
riate.” In other words, when Congress can plausibly characterize a particular 
program as taxing or spending, it need not tie that program to some other enu-
merated power.

Following this ostensibly straightforward lineage, many scholars interested 
in the origins of the spending power have looked to the New Deal period, spe-
cifically the 1936 decision in Butler. Others have identified the internal im-
provements debates as the source of the spending power, suggesting a more 
or less direct analogy between the early nineteenth-century conception of the 
General Welfare Clause and that of their own period.

Because it structures the relationship between Congress and the states, the 
spending power is connected to two other important areas of doctrine: on one 
side, congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause; and on the other side, the limits that the Tenth Amendment 
places on congressional power. Article I and the Tenth Amendment, along 
with the Supremacy Clause, constitute the few places in the Constitution’s

46. 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936).
47. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 306 (7th ed. 2013) 
(describing the Court in Butler as “having adopted the Hamiltonian position on the scope 
of the [taxing and] spending power”); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke L.J. 
1, 3 (1994) (describing Butler as the case “that first explicitly endorsed Hamilton’s view”).
according to which the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general wel-
fare, the condition must be unambiguous, the condition must have some relation to the federal 
interest in a particular program, and the condition cannot violate any other constitutional 
provision).
50. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 89, 
91 (2001). But see Engdahl, supra note 47, at 35-37 (noting the irony that the Butler holding 
heeded more closely to the Madisonian, rather than the Hamiltonian, version of the power).
51. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons 
from the Spending Power, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 495, 513-15 (2009); Corwin, supra note 45, at 
559-65; Engdahl, supra note 47, at 26-31.
52. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
53. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2053-57 (discussing the 
structural similarities between the General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause).
54. U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”).
55. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
text where we find even implicit reference to federalism.\textsuperscript{56} The Tenth Amendment is typically viewed as a textual basis for assertions of state sovereignty. As such, it becomes doctrinally relevant in two situations. In the first situation, Congress issues a general statute aimed at individuals pursuant to one of its enumerated powers, and the Court then steps in to strike down the legislation in the name of the states and their reserved powers.\textsuperscript{57} In the second situation, Congress attempts to use its enumerated powers to produce a specific action or policy from a state legislature or executive, and the Court holds that Congress has gone too far—it has “commandeered” the state government.\textsuperscript{58} The Court’s holding in \textit{NFIB} that the Medicaid provision exceeded constitutional limits and amounted to coercion renders the Tenth Amendment a meaningful limit on the spending power for the first time in decades.\textsuperscript{59} The debates over internal improvements in the early nineteenth century combined elements of all these doctrinal areas in ways that are sometimes surprising to modern observers.

\section*{II. The Nineteenth-Century Spending Power: The Case of Internal Improvements}

The debate over the constitutional status of federal internal improvements unfolded in several installments between 1817 and 1851. Each episode centered on a specific public works project for a road, a canal, a river or harbor, or a railroad. Each round of the debate involved different parties, including Presidents James Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson as well as Senators John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Stephen A. Douglas. State legislators, including the young Abraham Lincoln, were also important participants in the discussion.

At stake in each of these debates was a piece of congressional legislation appropriating funds for, or otherwise overseeing, a given improvement project. These projects were “internal” in that they affected travel in the interior of the nation; sometimes, they were also “internal” to a particular state. In a handful

\textsuperscript{56} See LaCroix, \textit{supra} note 2, at 2045-46.


\textsuperscript{58} See, \textit{e.g.}, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that a congressionally imposed “mandatory obligation” to conduct background checks is unconstitutional); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program”).

\textsuperscript{59} See Metzger, \textit{supra} note 14, at 84 (describing \textit{NFIB} as “challeng[ing] th[e] basic constitutional consensus” that “the fight over the federal government’s proper role in the economic sphere” is “largely political, not constitutional”); \textit{see also} South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had not invalidated an act of Congress on the basis of the Spending Clause since 1936).
of prominent cases, the President vetoed the bill in question. Although some commentators have described the process as pitting a series of improvement-friendly Congresses against a succession of dogged White House opponents, in fact the dynamic was more complex. For example, despite Thomas Jefferson’s advocacy of an agrarian Republic based on decentralized power, his signing of the Ohio Enabling Act in 1802 and the treaty concluding the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 caused contemporaries (as well as later scholars) to view him as unmistakably committing federal funds and authority to a national program of development. Other Presidents, such as John Quincy Adams, as well as presidential hopefuls John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, embraced broad federal power to oversee internal improvements.

A simple story of a succession of Congresses motivated by a combination of partisan and economic interests, arrayed against a series of Constitution-embracing Presidents, does not match the reality of crosscutting regional, partisan, and economic coalitions. Indeed, as suggested by the repeated calls for a constitutional amendment permitting internal improvements, many participants in the debate agreed that as a practical matter, Congress ought to have the power to fund such projects. Disputes arose because contemporaries both disagreed as to whether Congress already in fact possessed such a power and embraced widely conflicting views of constitutional text and structure.

The internal improvements debates unfolded across a series of galvanizing moments during the interbellum period. Four of these moments are especially helpful in illuminating the multiple constitutional frameworks at work in the interbellum period: (1) Madison’s veto of the legislation known as the Bonus

60. James Monroe, Message from the President of the United States, with His Objections to the Bill for the Preservation and Repair of the Cumberland Road; Also, a Paper, Containing His Views on the Subject of Internal Improvements (Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1822); Andrew Jackson, Presidential Veto Message (May 27, 1830), in Annual Messages, Veto Messages, Protest, &c. of Andrew Jackson, President of the United States 27, 27-37 (Baltimore, Edward J. Coale & Co. 2d ed. 1835) [hereinafter Annual Messages of Andrew Jackson]; James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, at 584, 584-85 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1896).


63. See Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun 78-83, 414 (1987); Sellers, supra note 6, at 84.

64. See Howe, supra note 8, at 88 (discussing Jefferson’s and Madison’s support for an amendment authorizing internal improvements, for “[o]nly thus could the two presidents reconcile their desire for better transportation with a strict construction of the Constitution”); Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 254.
Bill in 1817; (2) Monroe’s change of opinion on the constitutionality of internal improvements between his inauguration in 1817 and his veto of the Cumberland Road bill in 1822; (3) Jackson’s rejection of internal improvements, culminating in his veto of the Maysville Road bill in 1830; and (4) congressional debates over land grants to states to build railroads, culminating in the passage of the Illinois Central Railroad bill in 1850. Each of these moments provides a snapshot of the interbellum Constitution as it was being contested and defined in the course of political and legal struggle. Taken together, the debates illustrate the terrain on which constitutional interpretation was taking place in the early nineteenth century. As early nineteenth-century Americans battled over the propriety of specific internal improvements programs and distinguished between permissible and impermissible uses of congressional authority, they sharpened their conceptions of Article I enumerated powers and the Tenth Amendment. For modern constitutional scholars, these fiery debates demonstrate the distinctiveness of the early nineteenth-century Constitution. They show us familiar text but render it utterly foreign by upending modern presumptions about what the text meant then, and thus what it might mean now.

A. The Bonus Bill: Madison’s Presidential Finale (1817)

On March 3, 1817, James Madison performed his last official act as President by vetoing a bill supported by a group of prominent congressmen, including John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay. The bill, titled “A Bill to set apart and pledge, as a permanent Fund for Internal Improvements, the Bonus of the National Bank, and the United States’ Share of its Dividends,” proposed to allocate a $1.5 million federal revenue “bonus” and future dividends from the Second Bank of the United States to a fund “for constructing roads and canals, and improving the navigation of watercourses.” Federal funding for internal improvements projects had been debated at least since 1808, when Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin’s Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Subject of Public Roads and Canals had made the case for linking the increasingly important interior of the United States with the coast. The War of 1812, combined with the decline of the Federalist Party, had temporarily halted the drive to enact a federal internal improvements policy. But in the aftermath of the war, with markets booming and the Second Bank freshly chartered in 1816, nation-

65. See Peterson, supra note 63, at 79-80.
66. H.R. 29, 14th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Feb. 27, 1817).
67. Id.; see also Stephen Minicucci, Internal Improvements and the Union, 1790-1860, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 160, 164 (2004) (noting that the contemporary estimate of annual dividends from the Bank was $650,000).
68. See Albert Gallatin, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Subject of Public Roads and Canals; Made in Pursuance of a Resolution of Senate, of March 2, 1807 (Washington, D.C., R.C. Weightman 1808). See generally Goodrich, Government Promotion, supra note 11, at 27-33 (discussing debates surrounding Gallatin’s report); Larson, supra note 11, at 59-63 (same); Goodrich, National Planning, supra note 11, at 18-28 (same).
alist sentiment swelled, and in February 1817 the Bonus Bill passed in the House and Senate, arriving on Madison’s desk four days before his term ended.

Madison, who had recently prosecuted a war despite substantial sectional opposition and signed the charter for the new Bank of the United States, astounded the bill’s supporters by announcing his intention to veto it. Ignoring Clay’s pointed suggestion that he “leave the bill to [his] successor,” Madison took the veto pen in hand. In so doing, he ensured the bill’s status was unambiguous and final, avoiding the mistake President Adams had made sixteen years earlier when issuing last-minute executive commissions. The veto was unequivocal: Madison asserted that the Constitution did not grant Congress the authority to oversee internal improvements.

Madison’s veto message offered a forceful refutation of Congress’s plan to set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvements. In returning the bill to the House, Madison noted “the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution of the United States.” His argument was straightforward: The power to fund internal improvements was not included among Congress’s enumerated powers set forth in Article I, Section 8; nor was it necessary and proper to the execution of any of those powers. Internal improvements did not fall within the compass of the Commerce Clause or the General Welfare Clause, Madison wrote. Moreover, he cautioned against viewing the latter clause—to which he referred as “the clause ‘to provide for common defense and general welfare’”—as a “general power” rather than a “defined and limited” head of authority. Properly understood, Madison insist-
ed, the power to provide for the common defense and general welfare extended only to “the expenditure of money.” This ability to spend was no mean power, he suggested, “money being the ordinary and necessary means” of executing “all the great and most important measures of Government.”79 Furthermore, the fact that a state might agree to the exercise of federal power in the domain of internal improvements, or the suggestion that the act of Congress might itself amount to consent, was irrelevant to the analysis. According to Madison, “[t]he only cases in which the consent and cession of particular States can extend the power of Congress are those specified and provided for in the Constitution.”80 State consent could thus work to supplement textually specified congressional authority. Consent was relevant to determining the scope of Article I power; it was not simply a trump that blocked that power.

This was not to say, however, that Madison believed that a federal internal improvements program could never be enacted. On the contrary, Madison suggested that he would readily support such legislation if it were based upon the proper textual foundation. The veto message described the President as “cherishing the hope” that the “beneficial objects” of the bill would be accomplished through a constitutional amendment explicitly granting Congress the power to oversee internal improvements.81 The funding of public works projects in the states was not necessarily beyond the scope of congressional power; it simply required the people’s genius to express its will that such authority be added to the legislative ambit.

The veto message left obscure the precise nature of the congressional authority at issue in the Bonus Bill. Both before and after Madison issued his veto, however, legislators had dissected and taxonomized the elements of the bill. In the House debates prior to the bill’s passage, Calhoun distinguished between the power to build roads or canals and the power to appropriate money. Congress did not need the power to “cut” a road or canal in order for the bill to survive, Calhoun argued; rather, the bill was simply an application of Congress’s ordinary power to appropriate money.82 The constitutional issue, therefore, was the power to appropriate, not the power to carry out the underlying action for which the appropriation was being made. And, Calhoun continued, the power to appropriate under the General Welfare Clause could not credibly be limited to the enumerated powers absent clear limiting language to that effect. Cannily citing the examples of the Louisiana Purchase and the Cumberland Road (both

79. Madison, supra note 60, at 585.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1817).
the products of the Jefferson Administration), 83 Calhoun sketched the many "instances of money appropriated without any reference to the enumerated powers." 84 Other supporters of the bill argued that it was covered under the commerce power, the power to establish post roads, or the "common defense" portion of the general welfare power. 85

Opponents, meanwhile, anticipated Madison's arguments that the bill was an unwarranted extension of federal power into the domain of the states; some speakers invoked the Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the states. 86 Some critics also distinguished between roads and canals, describing the latter as the appropriate object of Congress because they "unite in commercial connexions remote parts of the nation, and chain them together in bands not to be severed by ambition or faction," in contrast to roads, which "are used more by the inhabitants of their vicinity than by travellers from a distance." 87

Attempts to classify the precise nature of the congressional power that was at stake recurred throughout the internal improvements debates. Commentators typically specified three distinct categories of power: appropriation, execution, and ongoing jurisdiction. Appropriation was the most straightforward: the power to designate federal monies for internal improvement programs. Execution implicated Congress more directly in the programs, for it involved passing legislation to authorize not just spending but also the actual construction of roads and canals. Ongoing jurisdiction tied federal power most visibly to internal improvements because it meant physical presence—for example, federal toll collectors staffing a federally funded and constructed road. If classified as appropriation, was the proposed expenditure a proper use of the general welfare power? If one believed that Congress needed to point to a more substantive enumerated power in order to carry out public works projects, which power (if any) best fit the stated purposes of the program—commerce, post roads, common defense, or something else? 88

Moreover, the related themes of state consent and the possibility of a constitutional amendment continued to sound throughout the period. A proposed amendment introduced on the floor of the Senate nine months after the Bonus Bill veto was both a speech act by a state (here, Virginia) and a formal textual rule that made state authorization necessary for internal improvements pro-

83. See infra text accompanying notes 121-50.
84. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 856 (1817).
85. See, e.g., id. at 869, 886-89 (statements of Reps. Yates and Sheffey).
86. See id. at 895 (statement of Rep. Barbour).
87. See id. at 859-60 (statement of Rep. Root).
88. The debate surrounding the application of the Postal Clause to internal improvements demonstrates the fine-grained textual analysis in which some commentators engaged. After critiquing the argument that the Bonus Bill was justified under the General Welfare Clause, one opponent of the bill went on to insist that Congress's power to "establish post offices and post roads" could not be construed as extending to other roads because the accepted terminology for road construction was "to run or to cut," not "to establish." 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1271 (1818) (statement of Rep. Sawyer).
grams. The draft provision granted Congress the power to appropriate money for roads, canals, and watercourses provided “[t]hat no road or canal, shall be conducted in any State, nor the navigation of its waters improved, without the consent of such State.”89 In the years following Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill, state consent would become a leitmotif of the debates over internal improvements. Commentators focused not only on the ongoing need for agreement by the states with respect to specific public works projects but also on the original terms under which the post-1787 states had joined the Union.90

B. Roads I: Bargains with the States (1817-1822)

On Tuesday, March 4, 1817, the day after Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill, James Monroe took office as President. His inaugural address that day suggested that Clay might have been correct to suspect that the new President would be friendlier to internal improvements. But Monroe’s views on the issue changed several times over the course of his two terms. In December 1817, Monroe announced his opposition to internal improvements. Five years later, a road bill again stood at the center of public debate, and again it met with the veto. Yet again, the President accompanied his veto with a statement explaining his views—but in this case, the statement took the form of a sixty-page pamphlet.

Monroe’s inaugural address contained a paragraph with the potential to mollify both supporters and foes of internal improvements. The speech depicted roads and canals as the connective tissue that would “bind the Union more closely together.”91 These channels of national feeling would also “facilitat[e] the intercourse between the States” and “add much to the convenience and comfort of our fellow-citizens, much to the ornament of the country.”92 Yet Monroe also used language suggesting that his administration might not reject altogether his predecessor’s resistance to a broad congressional power over roads and canals. His first reference to internal improvements came with a caveat: among the “interests of high importance” that would “claim attention” from the new chief magistrate would be “the improvement of our country by roads and canals, proceeding always with a constitutional sanction.”93 Did the new President believe that the Constitution as currently written contained such a sanction, such that this was a descriptive statement, or was he cautioning his listeners to distinguish carefully between permissible and impermissible uses of congressional power? Monroe’s statement left room for different interpret-
tions. Clearly, though, Monroe shared Madison’s view that the internal improvements question was not only a political disagreement but also a debate about the meaning of the Constitution.

Nine months later, in December 1817, Monroe launched an unambiguous salvo against internal improvements. His first annual message to Congress announced his “settled conviction” that Congress “do[es] not possess the right” to “establish such a system of improvement.” Monroe acknowledged that this position represented a shift from the views he had previously articulated, describing himself as “[d]isregarding early impressions.” His objection stemmed from what he now regarded as a lack of the constitutional sanction he had invoked in his inaugural address. The power to establish internal improvements, Monroe maintained, was “not contained in any of the specified powers granted to Congress,” nor could it be viewed as “incidental to or a necessary means, viewed on the most liberal scale, for carrying into effect any of the powers which are specifically granted.” The ability to promote internal improvements simply was not contained in Congress’s array of Article I powers.

Importantly, however, Monroe echoed Madison’s suggestion that the textual landscape needed alteration. Monroe urged Congress to recognize the “propriety of recommending to the States the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution which shall give to Congress the right in question.” Monroe thus assured his audience that he, too, believed in the utility of federal internal improvements. Such a power in Congress would be useful as a practical matter, but a specific textual authorization was needed to add the power to the federal legislative arsenal. Monroe appeared sanguine about such an amendment’s chances of success. Again, like Madison, he suggested that the political entity of the people, whom he referred to as “our constituents,” stood ready to deliberate about potential changes to the constitutional text: “We may confidently rely that if it appears to their satisfaction that the power is necessary, it will always be granted.” The people were no longer “out of doors”; on the contrary, they were somewhere nearby, ready to be gavelled into action and to oblige their representatives with a burst of higher lawmaking. “In cases of doubtful construction,” Monroe maintained, “it comports with the nature and origin of our institutions, and will contribute much to preserve them, to apply to our con-

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
stituents for an explicit grant of the power.” Triggering a constitutional amendment appeared entirely feasible to interbellum commentators, in contrast to the modern view of the Article V process as effectively impossible except in rare circumstances. For some early nineteenth-century commentators, the text of the Constitution virtually invited the people to revise their foundational law on occasion—or, in any event, when invited to do so by their representatives.

Monroe’s newly stringent views galvanized Clay and other congressional supporters of internal improvements into action. In addition to continuing to draft amendments granting Congress the relevant new enumerated power, advocates of internal improvements in the House convened a select committee to respond to Monroe’s annual message. Two days after being convened by Speaker Clay, the committee, chaired by Henry St. George Tucker, son of the venerable Virginia judge and treatise writer, produced a report that forcefully rebutted Monroe’s claims. The Tucker Committee’s report emphasized two themes: first, the consent of the states; and second, the distinction between the power to appropriate funds for internal improvements, the power to construct roads and canals, and the power to maintain ongoing jurisdiction in those improvements.

As a matter of text and precedent, the report argued, if a given state consented to a specific federal internal improvements program, that program was a constitutional exercise of one of the primary enumerated powers (post offices and post roads, common defense, or commerce), or else necessary and proper to the execution of those powers. The report thus offered a cooperative vision of internal improvements federalism. A road, the argument went, was the product of combining a state’s territorial sovereignty with federal funds and, even more important, with the impetus to connect across federal space. Therefore, the report argued that although “the Constitution confers only a right

100. Monroe, supra note 94, at 18.
101. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457, 1458 (2001) (“[T]hrough most of our history, the amendment process has not been an important means of constitutional change.”).
103. See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 21-22 (1817) (proposing an amendment explicitly granting federal power for internal improvements with state consent and distributional limitations).
104. Id. at 452-53 (report by Rep. Tucker).
105. See id. at 455-56.
106. See id. at 456 (“It is not proposed to enter upon the delicate inquiry whether this right can be exercised by the General Government without the assent of the respective States through whose territories a road is constructed in time of peace, with a view to military operations in any future wars.”).
of way, and . . . the rights of soil and jurisdiction remain exclusively with the States respectively, . . . there seems no sound objection to the improvement of roads with their assent.”

Significantly, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states and the people appeared to the committee to present no bar to this focus on state consent. On the contrary, the report pointed to the Tenth Amendment as the source of a state’s right to consent: “For if, by the 10th amendment, this right is reserved to the States, it is within the power of the State to grant it, unless the United States are incapable of receiving such a privilege.” The members of the Tucker Committee thus viewed the Tenth Amendment not as a defensive bulwark to be invoked against invasions of state sovereignty but rather as a fount of the state’s own legal powers, including the power to consent (or not) to the introduction of a federal right-of-way. The state’s ability to grant or withhold its consent to a particular improvement project therefore obviated the need for a general constitutional amendment. On this view, federalism could be preserved by placing the burden on individual states to opt out of congressional regulation, rather than by requiring Congress to point to a particular enumerated power (and to launch a popular movement to add one to the text if none existed). In an inversion of much of the Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence, a robust ability in the states themselves to safeguard their own power under the Tenth Amendment was believed to better protect the states than the alternative of judicial limits on congressional power.

To be sure, the consent-based view articulated in the Tucker Committee’s report was contested during the period. In a letter to Tucker shortly after the report was published, Madison challenged the report’s consent-based theory. Madison wrote that he could not “concur in the latitude of Construction taken in the Report, or in the principle that the Consent of States, even of a single one, can enlarge the jurisdiction of the Gen[era]l Gov[ernmen]t.” Consequently, he did not share the Tucker Committee’s call for the Bonus Bill to be revived absent a constitutional amendment.

In addition to its emphasis on state consent, the Tucker Committee’s report also differentiated among various slices of congressional power over internal

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107. Id. at 455 (emphases added).
108. Id.
109. See Larson, supra note 11, at 112.
111. See Letter from James Madison to Henry St. George Tucker (Dec. 23, 1817), in 8 The Writings of James Madison (1908), supra note 41, at 402, 402-03; see also McCoy, supra note 70, at 96-97 (describing Madison’s disapproval of “Tucker’s opportunistic confounding of utility and constitutionality”).
112. See Letter from James Madison to Henry St. George Tucker, supra note 111, at 403.
113. See 31 Annals of Cong. 460 (1817) (concluding with a proposal to use incorporation fees and dividends from the Second Bank as a “fund for internal improvement”).
improvements, especially the powers of appropriation, execution, and jurisdiction. The report culminated with its strongest claim: that Congress possessed the authority to execute federal internal improvements programs directly. In other words, Congress could itself “construct roads and canals through the several States” (again, with consent). \textsuperscript{114} This power did not extend to “jurisdictional rights,” which remained with the states.\textsuperscript{115} Jurisdictional rights were understood to refer to ongoing operation of the road or canal in question—for example, maintaining tollgates.\textsuperscript{116} As for the appropriations power, the report rejected Monroe’s view that the exercise of such a power amounted to an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to “establish” internal improvements. Unlike an attempt to assert jurisdiction over the road or canal, and thereby to “federalize” it, an appropriation was a limited federal intervention at the beginning of a project. The theory was that Congress would appropriate funds, but the construction would be carried out by the state.\textsuperscript{117} The Tucker Committee’s report pointed to the expansive nature of the “common defense and general welfare” provision of Article I, Section 8 to bolster its claim for a congressional power of appropriation as an absolute constitutional minimum.\textsuperscript{118}

The House’s response to the Tucker Committee’s report accepted the committee’s spectrum of congressional powers but stopped short of echoing its full-throated endorsement of expansive federal authority. The full chamber passed a nonbinding resolution granting Congress the power to appropriate money for the construction of “post roads, military, and other roads, and of canals,” but the committee’s three other resolutions providing for actual federal construction failed.\textsuperscript{119} For many contemporaries, then, the broad contours of the General Welfare Clause provided a sound textual basis for federal funding to the states, which would in turn use the money to build roads and canals. But the other enumerated powers were regarded by many interbellum Americans as insufficient to give Congress the authority to build the roads and canals itself.

Monroe’s second term brought renewed public attention to these questions, with a different focus. In the wake of the Tucker Committee’s report, Secretary of War Calhoun produced his own report setting forth the benefits of a system

\textsuperscript{114} Id.

\textsuperscript{115} Id.

\textsuperscript{116} See infra text accompanying notes 128-50 (discussing Monroe’s Cumberland Road veto message, in which he cautioned that “[a] power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of the tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete system of internal improvement” (quoting MONROE, supra note 60, at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

\textsuperscript{117} 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 458 (1817) (“If, indeed, the power was denied to the General Government of constructing roads and canals themselves, a question might still arise, whether it had not power to appropriate part of the revenue ‘to aid in the construction of roads and canals by the States.’”).

\textsuperscript{118} Id.

\textsuperscript{119} 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1381, 1385-88 (1818).
of roads and canals for military as well as commercial purposes. But the
next major event in the internal improvements drama was Monroe’s veto of the
Cumberland Road bill in 1822.

The origins of the Cumberland Road lay in the negotiations surrounding
Ohio’s organization as a state beginning in 1802 and its admission to the Union
in 1803. Pursuant to its admission compact, Ohio was guaranteed that Congress
would set aside five percent of all future net proceeds from the sale of lands in
the state to build roads. Three percent of the proceeds were to be spent on
roads within Ohio, and two percent were to be spent on roads between Ohio
and the eastern states. The roads connecting the state with the Eastern Sea-
board were of particular concern to Ohioans, who wanted to ensure access to
coastal cities and markets. The Cumberland Road (sometimes known as the Na-
tional Road) was built as part of this program, extending from Cumberland,
Maryland, on the Potomac River, west through Ohio, eventually ending at
Vandalia, Illinois. The road received congressional approval in 1806, and con-
struction began in 1811.

For the first eleven years of its existence, the Cumberland Road was rela-
tively uncontroversial, despite the ongoing disputes about the status of internal
improvements. The road’s origins in Ohio’s admission compact led contempo-
raries to view it as a product of contract, rather than constitutional, law. Con-
sequently, the road routinely received appropriations, even during periods
when Congress or the President was otherwise resistant to funding roads and
canals.

All this changed in 1822, however, when Congress passed a bill to repair
the Cumberland Road. Crucially, the bill also provided for the installation of
“toll houses, gates, and turnpikes” on the road. This provision proved to be

120. J.C. Calhoun, Report on Roads and Canals, Communicated to the House of Representa-
tives (Jan. 14, 1819), in 5 The Works of John C. Calhoun: Reports and Public
1855).


122. See Feller, supra note 62, at 8.

123. See, e.g., Philip D. Jordan, The National Road (1948); Jeremiah Simeon
Young, A Political and Constitutional Study of the Cumberland Road 28-29 (1902);
Joseph S. Wood, The Idea of a National Road, in The National Road 93, 94 (Karl Raitz

124. See Act of Mar. 29, 1806, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 357; Howe, supra note 8, at 212.

125. See Feller, supra note 62, at 8-9. Feller notes that Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
may have intended Ohio’s arrangement to serve as a precedent for other, potentially
more controversial federal internal improvements projects. See id. at 9.

126. See 4 Taylor, supra note 11, at 22 (“Greatest of all the turnpikes was the National
Road. Here was a truly national project, conceived on Roman lines, and—despite sectional
jealousies, a mixture of presidential vetoes and blessings, and constitutional complications
which were never resolved—finally built by the federal government through the heart of the
country.”).

127. 39 Annals of Cong. 1872 (1822). The bill set forth a detailed schedule of tolls
according to the type of vehicle and cargo:
the bill’s undoing. The following day, Monroe vetoed the bill. The President accompanied his veto with a lengthy pamphlet titled *Views of the President of the United States, on the Subject of Internal Improvements.*

Monroe argued that the Cumberland Road bill was a dramatic and unwarranted expansion of congressional power over internal improvements. As in his first annual message of 1817, he insisted that if such a power was to be exercised, it must be grounded in a constitutional amendment. While Monroe agreed with the contemporary consensus that the initial construction of the road was unproblematic insofar as it stemmed from Ohio’s admission compact, he argued that the new bill was an unprecedented expansion of congressional power. In practice, the “preservation and repair” of the road meant that federal officials would be stationed along a road traversing the interior of the nation, with a perpetual brief to demand money from travelers and merchants. “A power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of the tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete system of internal improvement,” Monroe warned. The veto message conjured the specter of presidentially appointed toll collectors as the vanguard of “a complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty, for all the purposes of internal improvement.” The fact that the officials would be appointed by the President, rather than by Congress, did not appear to assuage Monroe’s fears; ra-

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For every space of twenty miles in length of the said road, the following sums of money, and so in proportion for any greater or lesser distance, to wit: For every score of sheep or hogs, six and a quarter cents; for every score of cattle, twelve and a half cents; for every led or drove horse, one cent; for every horse and rider, six and a quarter cents; for every sleigh or sled, for each horse or ox drawing the same, three cents; for every dearborn, sulkey, chair, or chaise, with one horse, twelve and a half cents; for every chariot, coach, coachee, stage wagon, phaeton, chaise, or dearborn, with two horses and four wheels, eighteen and three-quarter cents; for either of the carriages last mentioned, with four horses, twenty-five cents. For every other carriage of pleasure, under whatever name it may go, the like sum, according to the number of wheels and horses drawing the same. For every cart or wagon, whose wheels do not exceed the breadth of four inches, six and one fourth cents for each horse or ox drawing the same. For every cart or wagon, whose wheels shall exceed in breadth four inches, and not exceeding six inches, three cents for every horse or ox drawing the same; and every other cart or wagon, whose wheels shall exceed six inches, shall pass the said gates free and clear of toll.

*Id.* at 1872–73. Exceptions from tolls were specified for “any person passing to or from public worship, or to or from his common business on his farm or woodland, or to or from a funeral, or to or from a mill.” *Id.* at 1873.

128. James Monroe, *Views of the President of the United States, on the Subject of Internal Improvements* (1822), in *MONROE,* supra note 60, at 7.

129. See *id.* at 42 (stating in his veto message that the Cumberland Road “was founded on an article of compact between the United States and the state of Ohio”).

130. *Id.* at 3.

131. *Id.*

132. *Id.*

133. See 39 *ANNALS OF CONG.* 1872 (1822) (“And be it further enacted, That, as soon as the said gates and turnpikes shall be erected, the President of the United States is hereby authorized to appoint, or cause to be appointed, toll-gatherers, to demand and receive, for passing the said turnpikes, the tolls and rates hereinafter mentioned . . . .”).
ther, the bill’s entire toll-gathering structure amounted to an unconstitutional congressional overreach.

Yet Monroe’s attack on the bill also contained a modulation of his earlier views. In contrast to his suggestion in the 1817 annual message that Congress might lack the power even to appropriate funds for internal improvements, the 1822 veto message distinguished between the ongoing “right of jurisdiction and sovereignty” and the power to make occasional appropriations. Appropriations might be justified if the state in question consented, but Monroe contended that the states lacked the power to consent to federal jurisdiction and sovereignty.

The fact that the entire Ohio congressional delegation had voted for the bill seemed not to matter to Monroe’s evaluation of whether the state had consented to the appropriations. Similarly, in Views of the President of the United States, on the Subject of Internal Improvements, Monroe reaffirmed his opposition to the Tucker Committee’s expansive view of state consent. But he also diverged from the narrow theory of appropriations that Madison had articulated in his veto of the Bonus Bill. Whereas Madison had insisted on a narrow reading of the spending power under the General Welfare Clause, Monroe now read the Constitution to grant Congress “the right to appropriate” but not “the right to make internal improvements.” Consistent with this analysis, Monroe proposed that Congress revise the bill to provide appropriations for repairs to the road but omit the tollgate plan.

At the boundary between appropriations and jurisdiction, then, Monroe viewed the Tenth Amendment as shifting from a declaration of states’ rights to a restraint on the states’ power to give up those rights.

With his Views of the President of the United States, on the Subject of Internal Improvements, Monroe moved beyond his constitutional obligation to communicate objections after presentment, taking his views to the coordinate branches of government and indeed to a broader public stage. The President went so far as to send copies of the veto message and the pamphlet to the members of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Marshall replied with a brief and hedging letter of acknowledgment. After noting that he had read the materials “with great attention and interest,” Marshall concluded with a vague

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134. See Monroe, supra note 94, at 18; see also supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
135. See FELLER, supra note 62, at 57 (“Monroe’s new constitutional interpretation left Congress free to subsidize state and private projects and to continue the Cumberland Road, for which it had received explicit permission from the states concerned. The president’s retreat from strict construction opened the way to a vigorous internal improvements policy.”).
136. Monroe, supra note 128, at 3.
137. In addition, five of the six members of Ohio’s delegation in the House voted to override Monroe’s veto. The sixth, Levi Barber, recorded no vote. 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1874-75 (1822).
139. See id. at 3; see also FELLER, supra note 62, at 57.
set of observations on internal improvements. The Chief Justice termed the President’s views “profound” and “most generally just.” He then made the following observation:

A general power over internal improvement, if to be exercised by the Union, would certainly be cumbersome to the government, & of no utility to the people. But, to the extent you recommend, it would be productive of no mischief, and of great good. I despair however of the adoption of such a measure.

Marshall appeared to agree with Monroe’s distinction between appropriations for road and canal construction on one hand (permissible) and ongoing federal management of tolls and traffic on the other hand (impermissible). But these views are surprising from the Chief Justice who, two years later, would read the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses to find that a federal coasting statute preempted a state steamboat monopoly in *Gibbons v. Ogden*.

In contrast to Marshall’s temporizing, the outspoken Justice William Johnson responded to Monroe’s mailing with an overtly nationalist view of internal improvements more in line with what one might have expected from Marshall. Stating that his “Brother Judges” had “instructed” him in his reply, Johnson maintained that the Court’s decision two years earlier in *McCulloch v. Maryland* should also be viewed as the Justices’ opinion on the constitutionality of internal improvements. The Court’s decision to uphold Congress’s establishment of the Second Bank and deny Maryland’s power to tax the Bank, Johnson argued, “completely commits them on the subject of internal improvement, as applied to Postroads and Military Roads.”

Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill capped five years of intense efforts by two Presidents and numerous members of Congress to articulate a theory of internal improvements. Throughout the debates, there was broad agreement that roads and canals were desirable and even necessary to carry passengers, produce, news, and goods throughout the expanding nation. Even in Madison’s and Monroe’s strongest veto messages, each of them took pains to note that the projects themselves would likely bring substantial benefits. “I am not unaware of the great importance of roads and canals and the improved navigation of water courses,” Madison wrote, “and that a power in the

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142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
145. 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 141, at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
147. 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 141, at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See HOWE, supra note 8, at 212-13 (noting the “widespread clamor for better transportation and its manifest tangible benefits”).
National Legislature to provide for them might be exercised with signal advantage to the general prosperity.”  

But both Presidents insisted that any general congressional power to develop substantive internal improvements plans must be grounded in a constitutional amendment; it simply did not exist in their view of the text. Madison and Monroe therefore urged Congress to continue the Founders’ drafting process by using the amendment process to add another enumerated power to the list found in Article I. The prospect of appropriations alone, meanwhile, raised textual and structural questions about how the General Welfare Clause fit into the list of congressional powers and into the system of federalism more broadly. This wide-ranging interrogation of different levels of constitutional proposals to deal with the internal improvements question continued for decades after Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill.

C. Roads II: Money Versus Land (1826-1830)

The internal improvements debate entered a new phase with Andrew Jackson’s election to the presidency in 1828. In 1828, as in the bitter 1824 contest that Jackson ultimately lost to John Quincy Adams, the internal improvements question was intertwined with other highly controversial issues, including the tariff, the retirement of the national debt and the resulting prospect of a federal budget surplus, and the expansion of slavery. Consequently, Jackson viewed internal improvements as a site to demonstrate his commitment to local markets and his belief that the powers of the national government (or, at any rate, Congress) ought to be limited. Jackson ultimately vetoed six internal improvement bills, four of them through the pocket veto. It was the Maysville Road veto, however, that reignited the internal improvements blaze and sent Jackson and his lieutenant Martin Van Buren scrambling to find support for their positions in text and precedent.

The Maysville Road was connected both spatially and conceptually to the vexed Cumberland Road. The bill authorized the federal government to purchase $150,000 worth of stock in a Kentucky corporation, the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, which would in turn build an intra-Kentucky portion of a larger road connecting the Cumber-

149. Madison, supra note 60, at 585; see also Sellers, supra note 6, at 150-51 (hypothesizing that “[d]espite all his Jeffersonian camouflage about the inadequacy of the enumerated powers and the need for a constitutional amendment,” Monroe’s veto message showed that he “supported congressional appropriations for national roads and canals built with the permission and cooperation of the states through which they passed”).

150. See Madison, supra note 60, at 585; Monroe, supra note 128, at 3.

151. See Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights, and the Nullification Crisis 13-14 (1987); Schlesinger, supra note 5, at 57-58; Wilentz, supra note 7, at 301-02.

152. Jackson, supra note 78, at 278. Carlton Jackson notes, however, that President Jackson approved more internal improvements bills than he vetoed. Id. at 261.
land Road at Zanesville, Ohio, with the Tennessee River at Florence, Alabama. Unlike the Cumberland Road bill that Monroe had rejected, the Maysville Road bill contemplated an appropriation rather than ongoing federal control. Shares, not tollgates, were at stake in 1830.

The bill was vigorously debated in the House for three days and ultimately passed by a vote of 102 to 86. But Jackson’s nephew and secretary, Andrew Jackson Donelson, subsequently returned the bill to the House with the news that the President had declined to sign it. After the obligatory claim of support for internal improvements in general, Jackson’s veto message cited two principal problems with the bill: first, its assertion of what Jackson regarded as an unconstitutional extension of the appropriations power; and second, its attempt to extend federal power into what Jackson viewed as the inherently local domain of the states.

For the appropriations point, Jackson focused on Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill and Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill. Despite decades of practice dating back to the Louisiana Purchase that had expanded the appropriations power, Jackson suggested that a proper understanding of the text argued against such an interpretation. Although he noted the necessity of ceding to “a well settled acquiescence of the people and confederated authorities, in particular constructions of the constitution, on doubtful points,” Jackson argued that the expansive tendencies of the appropriations power required strict interpretation. Congress and past Presidents had claimed a broad appropriations power, according to which “the right of appropriation is not limited by the power to carry into effect the measure for which the money is asked.” But Jackson emphasized that Monroe’s adoption of the broad view represented a change from Monroe’s own previously stated belief that Congress could appropriate money from general funds only to carry out its enumerated powers, and not in the service of a broader notion of the general welfare. Indeed, Jackson hinted that a broad appropriations power should be understood as a deviation from the constitutional text and from the Founders’ views. The recent expansion of the appropriations power demonstrated “the difficulty, if not impracticability, of bringing back the operations of the government to the construction of the constitution set up in 1793, assuming that to be its true reading, in rela-

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153. See H.R. 285, 21st Cong. (1830); see also Jackson, supra note 78, at 262.
154. See Goodrich, Government Promotion, supra note 11, at 41-42 (describing the financial structure of the Maysville Road bill).
155. See 6 REG. DEB. 820-22, 827-42 (1830).
156. See Jackson, supra note 60, at 27 (“Sincerely friendly to the improvement of our country by means of roads and canals, I regret that any difference of opinion in the mode of contributing to it should exist between us . . . .”)
157. See id. at 29, 31.
158. Id. at 31.
159. Id. at 30.
160. Id.
tion to the power” of appropriations, Jackson observed.\textsuperscript{161} The history of the appropriations power thus proved “the necessity of guarding the constitution with sleepless vigilance, against the authority of precedents which have not the sanction of its most plainly defined powers.”\textsuperscript{162} Jackson’s veto message thus suggested that he supported a narrow construction of Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause. On this view, Congress could therefore appropriate money from general federal funds only to carry out its primary enumerated powers, and not in the service of a broader notion of the general welfare. The Madisonian conception of the General Welfare Clause, in other words, was still alive.

Of course, one consequence of this distinction between the spending power and the other enumerated powers was to permit supporters of internal improvements to use the appropriations power as a wedge to create an opening for Congress to act. On this point, Jackson cited Madison, pointing to the Bonus Bill veto as evidence of the need to distinguish between the appropriations power and the power to execute improvements projects.\textsuperscript{163} But in correspondence with Van Buren, the seventy-nine-year-old Madison protested that this claim mischaracterized his 1817 veto. On the contrary, Madison insisted,

\begin{quote}
It was an object of the Veto to deny to Congress as well the appropriating power, as the executing and jurisdictional branches of it. And it is believed that this was the general understanding at the time, and has continued to be so, according to the references occasionally made to the document. Whether the language employed duly conveyed the meaning of which J. M. retains the consciousness, is a question on which he does not presume to judge for others.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

According to Madison, then, his 1817 veto had opposed the appropriations power as well as the power to carry out internal improvements.\textsuperscript{165}

Jackson, however, did not press the claim in his veto quite so far. Perhaps because he sought to preserve the appropriations power as applied to other types of improvements, such as lighthouses and military fortifications,\textsuperscript{166} he presented himself as willing to tolerate the acquiesced-in view of the appropria-

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{161.} Id.
\textsuperscript{162.} Id. at 30-31, 34 (“[The country] cannot be benefitted by a legislation which tolerates a scramble for appropriations that have no relation to any general system of improvement, and whose good effects must, of necessity, be very limited. In the best view of these appropriations, the abuses to which they lead, far exceed the good which they are capable of promoting.”).
\textsuperscript{163.} Id. at 28-30 (distinguishing between Congress’s power to assert ongoing jurisdiction over internal improvements, which affects the sovereignty of the states, and its power to appropriate money, which is then spent on projects carried out by the states).
\textsuperscript{164.} Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (June 3, 1830), in 9 \textsc{The Writings of James Madison} (1910), supra note 41, at 375, 376.
\textsuperscript{166.} See Jackson, supra note 78, at 265.
\end{footnotes}
tions power that he believed had emerged in practice since the 1790s. Rather than launching a frontal attack on practice, Jackson introduced a different limiting factor into the analysis. Appropriations for internal improvements were constitutional only to the extent that they adhered to what Jackson termed a “general principle”: “that the works which might be thus aided, should be ‘of a general, not local—national, not state’ character.” The Maysville Road bill failed this test. Collapsing the boundary between general and local, national and state, Jackson argued, “would of necessity lead to the subversion of the federal system.” The Maysville Road simply did not meet the requirement of national character, he wrote, because it had “no connexion with any established system of improvements” and was “exclusively within the limits of a state, starting at a point on the Ohio river, and running out sixty miles to an interior town.” The local-national distinction crystallized much of the past several decades’ debates about internal improvements. The Maysville Road veto was widely popular, in part because the distinction appeared to capture some essential truth about the federal system. Indeed, the local-national approach to internal improvements questions had emerged a few years before it achieved prominence through the Maysville Road veto. Prior to the Maysville controversy—indeed, prior to Jackson’s election—Madison and then-Senator Van Buren exchanged a series of letters on the


169. Id. The underlying concept behind this distinction dated from the colonial period, when British North Americans argued that imperial regulations that encroached on the colonies’ internal affairs violated what they regarded as the constitution of the British Empire. See, e.g., Richard Bland, *The Colonel Dismounted: Or The Rector Vindicated* 22-23 (Williamsburg, Virginia, Joseph Royle 1764) (arguing that for purposes of external government, “we are, and must be, subject to the Authority of the British Parliament,” but that “the Legislature of the Colony have a Right to enact ANY Law they shall think necessary for their INTERNAL Government”); see also LaCroix, *supra* note 13, at 42-44 (discussing the internal-external distinction in eighteenth-century American thought).


171. See Howe, *supra* note 8, at 359 (terming the Maysville veto and message “[p]olitically . . . a masterstroke” because it was “crafted to endorse what we would call the transportation revolution while condemning what we would call big government”).

172. See Feller, *supra* note 62, at 139. Feller continued, “The nebulous distinction between national and local works stung American System men to fury, for it freed Jackson to decide on individual bills precisely as he chose—a freedom he exploited to the utmost.” Id.
subject of internal improvements. Van Buren initiated the correspondence by requesting Madison’s views on a constitutional amendment that Van Buren had proposed. “There is not in my opinion any other matter so threatening to the confederacy as the pretension of the Federal Government upon this subject,” the Senator from New York wrote to the retired President.

At this moment, the assumed power is used by the Government as a most powerful, indeed irresistible [sic] engine, to acquire the favour & secure the allegiance of portions of the union at the expense of those who having made the constitution know what it cost & what it is worth. It is supposed that an extension of the money power beyond that of Jurisdiction is practicable and indispensable to the successful operation of the Government.

Van Buren concluded with a bold petition not only for Madison’s views but also for a draft revision to the Constitution’s text: “If agreeable it would please me to have an amendment worded by yourself; but it does not become me to be more particular.” Van Buren then promptly closed by tendering his regards to Mrs. Madison.

In his correspondence with Madison, Van Buren thus emphasized the appropriations-jurisdiction distinction. Madison replied with a letter in which he outlined a range of possible structural mechanisms to address what he regarded as the constitutional problem of internal improvements. Madison sketched four options: (1) a functional division of power between the general government and the states; (2) a constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to appropriate for internal improvements; (3) a constitutional amendment granting Congress a general power over internal improvements; or (4) a more profound constitutional amendment revising the language of the General Welfare Clause.

Madison began by evaluating a functional separation between federal and state authority: “dividing the power between the General & State Gov[ernmen]ts, by allotting the appropriating branch to the former, & reserving the jurisdiction to the latter.” According to this subject-matter-based division of legislative power, Congress would have the power to appropriate funds for internal improvements, but execution of the programs and jurisdiction over the finished projects would be the state’s domain.

173. In his autobiography, written in the 1850s, Van Buren claimed that he had both advised Jackson to veto the Maysville Road bill and drafted the veto message. See Larson, supra note 11, at 183.


175. Id.

176. Id.

177. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 253.

178. On the efforts of Founding-era theorists to construct a subject-matter-based division of power between levels of government within the Federal Republic, see Lacroix, supra note 13, at 7-9, 103-04.
While this tidy line-drawing had “doubtless a captivating aspect,” Madison rejected the solution based on “the difficult[y] of defining such a division, and maintaining it in practice.” As previous decades’ debates had shown, the line between appropriations and jurisdiction was a fuzzy one. Was the construction of tollgates on the Cumberland Road an exercise of the spending power, or was it an attempt to exert ongoing federal control over traffic and commerce on the road? Moreover, Madison was skeptical that the people of the United States would be willing to fund projects and then give up the ability to monitor and control those projects to “ensure their constant subservience to national purposes.”

Given the lack of clear boundaries, Congress would eventually expand its domain to include jurisdiction, but with no textual or structural basis to rein in such reaching.

Rather than settling for a murky division between types of power, Madison advocated a step that would “obviate the unconstitutional precedent” of past decades while also recognizing the growth in the “constructive authority of Congress” over that period. Madison thus proposed two types of constitutional amendments. One would give Congress a new enumerated power over internal improvements, but only for appropriations. Such an amendment would read, “Congress may make appropriations of moneys for roads and canals, to be applied to such purposes by the Legislatures of the States within their respective limits, the jurisdiction of the States remaining unimpaired.” Congress would thus give funds to state legislatures to be used for roads and canals, and the state legislatures would carry out the projects. But what would happen if a state refused? Madison did not discuss this possibility in the letter to Van Buren. An earlier draft amendment introduced in the Senate in 1817 had granted Congress the power to appropriate money for internal improvements, provided that the state in question consented to the project. The inclusion of a consent provision implied that a state could refuse road or canal funding. Madison’s language, however, contained no such provision, leaving open the question of whether a state could decline the federal money.

In his second suggested amendment, Madison proposed granting to Congress the entire bundle of powers relating to internal improvements. His draft amendment stated, “Congress may make roads & canals, with such jurisdiction as the cases may require.” Unlike the appropriations amendment, this provision contemplated an appropriation by Congress, followed by federal—

180. Id. Indeed, as the facts in McCulloch v. Maryland suggested, the prospect of a single state (e.g., Maryland) having the power to frustrate the national will (e.g., the statute chartering the Second Bank of the United States) was a real possibility to contemporaries. Madison himself had signed the bill chartering the Bank after initially opposing it.
181. Id. at 254.
182. Id. at 255.
183. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 21-22 (1817).
184. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 255.
state—officials and engineers handling the actual construction projects. Again, Madison appeared to be taking a realist view based on what he regarded as the slow creep of congressional power over the past decades. He noted that an amendment granting the full jurisdictional power might be preferable given “the moral certainty, that it will be constructively assumed, with the sanction of the national will, and operate as an injurious precedent.” An amendment would avoid messy line-drawing exercises and would also permit a fresh start on firmer constitutional ground. If Congress was likely to accumulate power anyway, Madison suggested that it was better to cabin the power ex ante with a constitutional amendment. A “recorded precedent” that delineated the precise limits of Congress’s power over internal improvements was preferable to “constructive enlargements” of that power through expansive readings of Article I in its current form.

Madison’s final suggestion to Van Buren was an amendment with a potentially greater reach beyond the realm of internal improvements than either of the previous two. This amendment proposed to revise the language of the General Welfare Clause in such a way as to settle the controversy about its scope that dated back to the Founding. In contrast to the views of Alexander Hamilton and others, Madison had long argued that the clause ought to be understood as an auxiliary to the enumerated powers—an enabling act that granted Congress the power to tax and spend to carry out its commerce, postal, monetary, war, and other enumerated powers. At this point in the letter to Van Buren, Madison’s language took a more forceful tone: “[W]hilst the terms ‘common defence & general welfare,’ remain in the Constitution, unguarded against the construction which has been contended for, a fund of power, inexhaustible & wholly subversive of the equilibrium between the General and the State Gov[ernmen]ts is within the reach of the former,” he argued. To prevent a vast (and, he suggested, unintended) expansion of federal power, Madison suggested two solutions. One was to add a new amendment “expunging the phrase [‘common defence & general welfare’] which is not required for any harmless meaning”; the other was to “mak[e] it harmless” by adding to the end of the General Welfare Clause the limiting phrase “in the cases required by this

185. The key here is the term “jurisdiction.” Madison described this grant of “jurisdiction” as “a constitutional grant of the entire Power,” which he contrasted to a scenario in which the states “obtain[ed] the aid of the federal treasury for internal improvements . . . without interfering with the jurisdiction of the States.” Id. at 254-55. “Jurisdiction” suggested ongoing federal operation of the project, along the lines of the U.S. toll collectors stationed along the Cumberland Road. “Jurisdiction” meant a significantly greater federal presence than did appropriations.

186. Id. at 255.

187. Id. at 254.

188. See MAIER, supra note 43, at 179-81 (discussing the disputes over the scope of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, including the General Welfare Clause, during the state ratification debates).

189. See id.

190. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 255.
Constitution.” Either of these approaches would end the controversy about the scope of the taxing and spending authority. It was thus not an independent power, Madison claimed, but merely an aid to the (other, genuine) enumerated powers.

Madison’s letter containing the proposed amendments crossed in the mail with a letter from Van Buren enclosing a new report from the Senate Committee on Roads and Canals. Aside from a brief, shared speculation as to George Washington’s attitudes toward internal improvements, correspondence between the two trailed off until 1830, when Madison revived it with his letter informing Van Buren that Jackson’s message accompanying the Maysville Road veto had not accurately captured the logic behind Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill.

These discussions of internal improvements between 1826 and 1830 illustrate the struggles of actors as diverse as Jackson and Madison to establish a proper framework for understanding the internal power, and to create an appropriate constitutional box—textual, structural, and practical—in which the power might operate. Notably, each of them, like Monroe, supported a constitutional amendment granting Congress some power over internal improvements. Rather than continue the fight at the level of struggles over particular legislation, they thought in terms of revising and fixing the text, even if it meant enshrining a particular substantive view that was not their preferred approach.

**D. Roads III: Land to the States, Charters to the Corporations (1850)**

For some scholars, Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road bill was the “beginning of the end” of ambitious national programs of internal improvements. Internal improvements bills continued to be debated in Congress, especially regarding public works involving rivers and harbors. While the era of the classic internal improvements bill for a canal or a turnpike had largely passed by the mid-1830s, the 1840s and 1850s brought new transportation technology as well as a distinct set of constitutional concerns and approaches. The growth of railroads raised some new issues and put a different emphasis on some old ones. Examining the debates in this period, in particular over the establishment of the Illinois Central Railroad (ICR) in 1850, illuminates the contemporary constitutional framework because it allows us to see a constitutional work-around in action. That work-around was the mechanism of the federal land grant to a state for the purpose of establishing a railroad.

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191. Id.
192. FELLER, supra note 62, at 141-42.
193. For example, James K. Polk vetoed a major river and harbor improvements bill in 1846. See S. JOURNAL, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 1209 (1846); see also ELLIS, supra note 151, at 25 (discussing expenditures on lighthouses, rivers, and harbors during Jackson’s Administration); PETERSON, supra note 63, at 414 (discussing the Memphis Commercial Convention of 1845, at which internal improvements were debated).
194. See 4 TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 74-84 (describing the shift from roads, canals, and steamboats to railroads).
By the 1840s, politicians who supported internal improvements had begun to shift their focus from direct congressional regulation to land grants from Congress to the states. As the historian Yonatan Eyal puts it, a group of “development-minded Democrats used land grants to skirt the question of the constitutionality of federally sponsored internal improvements.”\footnote{195} The grants operated in the following manner:

Congress would donate public lands so that state governments themselves could use them for improvements. This would obviate endless controversy about the propriety of directly creating a road or lighthouse and would contribute to the same goal of building up the new western states. When desirous of constructing a railroad, for example, Congress would grant alternate sections of public land for the project. The sections of land not donated could then be sold at a much higher price, since the availability of rail transportation nearby would make them suddenly more lucrative.\footnote{196}

As a descriptive matter, the historical account tells us about a change in the legal and political mechanism that interbellum Americans applied to internal improvements questions. Land grants were more appealing than substantive congressional regulation—whether through appropriations or jurisdiction—because they allowed for the construction of railroads while also honoring state sovereignty.

But what was the constitutional framework underlying this change of mechanism? Why did early nineteenth-century Americans find land grants to states for the purpose of building railroads less objectionable than either federal funding for or federal construction of a railroad? Either approach presented opportunities for private profit and, in some cases, graft. To the extent that the land grants came with obligations, placed restrictions on how the states could go about building the railroad, and indeed required significant effort and investment from the state, why did contemporaries view them as preferable to federally directed programs resembling the Cumberland Road or Maysville Road plans, which might have cost some quantum of sovereignty but required less participation by the states?

The debates surrounding the railroad land grants provide a rich case study of the interbellum constitutional landscape. In particular, the congressional deliberations concerning the establishment of the ICR in 1850 throw into relief contemporary conceptions of the commerce power, the spending power, and the Tenth Amendment. The congressional grant of federal public lands to the State of Illinois, which included a related grant to Mississippi and Alabama, on September 20, 1850, was the first of its kind.\footnote{197} Drafted by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, the bill was viewed by Douglas and others as an essential step in the program of building national infrastructure and expanding national

power across the continent.\textsuperscript{198} Within a few years, “a slew of bills proposing to grant public lands and rights-of-way for the building of railroads, canals, and telegraphs filled the dockets of Senate and House.”\textsuperscript{199}

Historians studying the 1840s and 1850s suggest that contemporaries viewed the land grants as a replacement for the less favored mechanism of substantive internal improvements regulation.\textsuperscript{200} The orthodox historiographical story has thus held that the land grants in some sense “solved” the decades-long controversy over internal improvements. Scholars, however, have not probed in depth what it was about the land grants that made them more palatable to contemporaries’ constitutional taste.\textsuperscript{201} The fact that nineteenth-century Americans adopted the land-grants approach suggests that they believed that an approach under which Congress used the states to build the railroads was constitutional—or, at any rate, less constitutionally problematic than the alternative approach. The alternative was for Congress to send federal engineers to build and run the railroads, akin to the proposed Maysville Road toll collectors.

Yet concluding that contemporaries seem to have found the land grants more acceptable than direct regulation tells us little about why they might have held this view. It is not at all obvious that a commitment to robust federalism based on state sovereignty necessarily entails a preference for land grants to the states rather than direct congressional regulation. As the ICR debates illustrate, however, interbellum Americans adopted the land-grants approach because it satisfied key concerns that had plagued the previous three decades’ worth of internal improvements arguments. These concerns centered on the role of state consent, the appropriation-implementation and local-national distinctions, and the need for a constitutional amendment. The ICR debates also brought together the issues of internal improvements and the status of the public lands, including the permissible restrictions and conditions on land grants to the states and the responsibilities of the federal government as a proprietor of land. In short, contemporaries preferred land grants to direct federal regulation because land grants came closer to satisfying crucial interbellum concerns about how federalism and, in particular, concurrent power should operate as a practical matter.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{198} See Eyal, supra note 195, at 47-49.
\textsuperscript{199} Id. at 49.
\textsuperscript{200} See, e.g., id. at 47; Goodrich, Government Promotion, supra note 11, at 170-72; 4 Taylor, supra note 11, at 95-96.
\textsuperscript{201} See generally Eyal, supra note 195, at 47 (describing Democrats as “us[ing] land grants to skirt the question of the constitutionality of federally sponsored internal improvements”); Goodrich, Government Promotion, supra note 11, at 170-72 (describing the ICR Act as “a sharp departure from . . . precedents and from the prevailing attitudes of the thirties and forties”); 4 Taylor, supra note 11, at 95-96 (noting that although the ICR Act was “regarded at the time as a special case, inevitably it set a precedent”).
\textsuperscript{202} On concurrent power, see generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 459 (2012) (arguing that state administration of federal law “counteracts the tendency of statutory ambiguity and broad delegations of authority to enhance federal executive power” (italics omitted)); Bulman-
The land-grants approach relied on a few important background principles, chief among them the surveying and land-sale system established by the Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the fact that new states were typically admitted by compact, and the occasionally controversial fact that the federal government retained ownership of large tracts of public lands within the borders of new states. The Ordinance of 1785 set the basic units of land: the township (six miles by six miles) and the section (one mile by one mile, or 640 acres). In the Ordinance, the Confederation Congress also mandated that several lots in each township be “reserved for the United States.” Two years later, the Northwest Ordinance, one of the initial pieces of legislation passed by the First Congress, provided that the legislatures of new states “shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the Soil by the United States in Congress Assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.” In the Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, according to which Congress granted Ohio permission to seek statehood, the federal government granted the new state certain lands for salt springs and schools. The foundational assumption behind the terms of admission, however, was that “the fee-simple to all the lands within its limits, excepting those previously granted or sold, should vest in the United States.” Consequently, many of the states of the Old Northwest that joined the Union in the early nineteenth century contained large tracts of federal land at the time of their admission. The new sovereign states, in other words, accepted as a term of admission to the Union that the federal government would hold significant portions of their land.

This land provided a hook for Congress to reach into the states and build railroads. In the act establishing the ICR, the sequence of transactions was clear: the statute announced itself as an act “granting the Right of Way, and making a Grant of Land to the States of Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama, in Aid of the Construction of a Railroad from Chicago to Mobile.” Step one

Pozen & Gerken, supra note 15 (discussing the ways in which states can resist federal policy); and Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 15 (analyzing the widespread but overlooked phenomenon of state implementation of federal law).

203. See FELLER, supra note 62, at 8-9.

204. 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 375-76 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).

205. Id. at 378.


208. See Biber, supra note 90, at 121 (describing admission conditions as “a Congressional tool in imposing homogeneity and expanding the scope of federal power”).

209. Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466. In his biography of Douglas, Robert W. Johannsen posits that Douglas included Alabama and Mississippi in the bill in order to win southern support. He notes that during a visit to his wife’s plantation in Mississippi in 1849, Douglas met with officials of the ailing Mobile and Ohio Railroad, who told him that they
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was to grant the right-of-way to the state; step two was to grant land surrounding that right-of-way to the state. Congress was not appropriating funds for internal improvements, nor was it proposing ongoing federal involvement with the management of traffic on the nation’s roads. Instead, the Act invoked one of the most fundamental congressional powers: the power to dispose of public lands.\(^{210}\) This transfer of federal land to the states simply happened to come with a condition attached: it was “in aid of the construction of a Railroad”—or a “road,” as contemporaries typically referred to the projects.\(^{211}\)

As Eyal’s description suggests, the specific provisions of the grant of land to the state, and the reservation of a significant amount of other land to the federal government, were complex. The right-of-way provision was fairly straightforward: from the terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal near present-day Peru, in north-central Illinois, south to Cairo, Illinois, at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, with branches eastward to Chicago and northwestward to Galena, Illinois, and eventually Dubuque, Iowa.\(^{212}\) The alternate-section requirement for the selection of the actual parcels of land was more complicated. It provided “[t]hat there be, and is hereby, granted to the State of Illinois, for the purpose of aiding in making the railroad and branches aforesaid, every alternate section of land designated by even numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road and branches.”\(^{213}\)

The alternate sections would thus run perpendicular from the line of the railroad, each measuring one section (one mile) long and stretching six sections (six miles) outward in either direction from the right-of-way. The result was what was known as a “checkerboard” pattern of land ownership, for as one progressed along the right-of-way, each mile would potentially bring a new owner. In the immediate aftermath of the bill’s passage, and given the remoteness of the land at issue, ownership would for the most part alternate between the State of Illinois and the federal government. Here came the final piece of the congressional scheme: the double-price provision, according to which the land that remained in the hands of the United States could not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the public lands,\(^{214}\) or $2.50 per acre.

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\(^{210}.\) See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”).

\(^{211}.\) See, e.g., Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, § 2, 9 Stat. 466, 466 (“[P]rovided. The construction of said road shall be commenced at its southern terminus, at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, and its northern terminus upon the Illinois and Michigan Canal simultaneously, and continued from each of said points until completed, when said branch roads shall be constructed . . . .” (italics omitted)).

\(^{212}.\) Id. § 1, 9 Stat. at 466.

\(^{213}.\) Id. § 2, 9 Stat. at 466.

\(^{214}.\) Id. § 3, 9 Stat. at 466.
The ICR Act set some penalties for noncompliance by the State of Illinois. The Act began by stating that the lands in question “shall be applied to no other purpose whatsoever.” More pointedly, if the railroad was not completed within ten years, the Act required Illinois to remit to the federal government the proceeds of any of its sales of the land associated with the grant. The same terms were applied to Alabama and Mississippi pursuant to a section of the Act that established the Chicago and Mobile Railroad.

From a structural perspective, the land grants took an unusual form, as contemporaries acknowledged. The federal government possessed lands within the boundaries of some states that it proposed to transfer to the state on condition that the state use the lands for a specific purpose defined by Congress. These lands were located within states that had previously been federal territories, even though many in the newly sovereign states objected to this condition of statehood. In an 1846 debate on a similar plan for a railroad in Michigan, some senators had voiced “old Jacksonian” concerns about the project, arguing that the land grants were merely a cover for federal direction of internal improvements. By 1850, these concerns about federal expansion and encroachment on state power through land grants continued to haunt some legislators. Others, however, had the opposite concern: that the grants were suspect because they allowed a single state to derive undue benefits from the people of the entire United States.

When the bill was debated in the Senate, the discussion focused on the broad issue of the relationship that the Act established among Congress, the State of Illinois, and the railroad company. Some senators objected to the alternate-section and double-price provisions, which they viewed as creating excess-

215. Id. § 2, 9 Stat. at 466.
216. Id. § 5, 9 Stat. at 467.
217. Id. § 7, 9 Stat. at 467.
218. See 4 TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 96 (“Though the grant of 1850 was regarded at the time as a special case, inevitably it set a precedent, and Congress was flooded with bills designed to appropriate tremendous sections of the public domain to aid railroad construction.”).
219. The continuation of westward expansion resulted in a shift in presumptions about the amount of land in new states that would be held by Congress. As post-Founding states grew in number, so did their congressional delegations, many of which were at least initially sympathetic to new states’ claims that statehood was incompatible with a presumption that Congress retained large tracts of land. Sally K. Fairfax, Making New States and Establishing the Public Domain, in OUR AMERICAN LAND: 1987 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 7, 7 (William Whyte ed., 1987).
220. EYAL, supra note 195, at 47.
221. Here again the similarity to Marshall’s concerns in McCulloch v. Maryland about what modern scholars have termed “representation reinforcement” is striking. See supra note 180; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 86 (1980) (discussing McCulloch to illustrate the theory that “at least in some situations judicial intervention becomes appropriate when the existing processes of representation seem inadequately fitted to the representation of minority interests, even minority interests that are not voteless”).
sive restrictions on the State of Illinois. They did not oppose the notion that Congress could grant the lands in the first place, or that the lands could be granted to a state provided that they were used for a specific purpose. Rather, their position was that if such a grant was to take place, the land ought to be given to the state—and its citizens—free from conditions. “The route, it is said, will be about four hundred miles in length, and the grant will be equivalent to a strip of land six miles wide throughout the whole length, or one million five hundred and thirty-six thousand acres of land,” Senator Isaac Walker of Wisconsin noted. Under the terms of the ICR Act, “[o]n an equal amount of land it is proposed to increase the price to double the usual Government price.” Walker condemned this increase in the price of certain federal lands as “a tax upon the actual settlers to that amount, in order to build this road.” Illinoisans would be burdened by the Act’s required price increase, a requirement that prompted Walker to question Congress’s motives. “If Government is going to be generous, let it be generous; but let it not speculate upon its own lands at the expense of those who are to settle upon them,” he argued.

For Walker and others, the Act was problematic not because it promoted internal improvements, or because it gave land to a state to be used for a railroad, but rather because it amounted to a federally imposed tax on settlers in that state who would pay double the pre-Act amount to purchase land within the zone of the railroad grant. As William Dawson of Georgia put it, “[W]here is the power in this Government to make a donation to A in a manner that presses B into paying double price? How is it that A became a beneficiary under the Constitution, whilst you put a penalty upon B?” These critics of the Act were skeptical of arguments offered by Douglas and others that the plan would promote the public interest. They regarded it as an exploitation of the people of Illinois and a potential source of “embarrassment”—in the nineteenth-century sense of financial difficulty—for the state itself.

Other opponents of the ICR bill expressed discomfort with the premise that Congress possessed the power to grant 1.5 million acres of federal land to one state, even if Congress claimed that the benefits of the railroad would redound to the entire nation. The chief concern of these senators was therefore that it represented an improper use of the public domain to enrich a single state, at the expense of the federal government. If Congress was going to do something with the public lands, they suggested, it had to be for the benefit of “We the

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 849 (statement of Sen. Dawson).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 845 (“I cannot but consider it equivalent to an appropriation of the public money for purposes of internal improvement, for the benefit of a State; and hence it is, in my judgment, entering upon an important question . . . .”).
People” of the United States, not simply for Illinois. Unlike the first group of critics, who argued that the ICR Act imposed the federal will on a state, these opponents of the Act suggested that a single state had captured the federal will and was using it selfishly, perhaps even to the detriment of the other states.²³⁰ Their arguments thus sounded in the local-national distinction that Jackson had used to justify his veto of the Maysville Road bill. Instead of a beleaguered state populace suffering at the hands of an overweening federal government, they saw Illinois and its representatives as attempting to profit from Congress’s zeal for railroads. Dawson put the point in terms of the law of trusts:

  Can Congress give to Illinois under the cestui que trust, a million and a half of acres of land, and then turn round and tell the other States in the cestui que trust, we do it in order to benefit the whole of you? The question is, have we any such power? In my judgment, we have it not at all. The public property belongs to the entire people, and when we dispose of it we must dispose of it on that principle.²³¹

The bill’s supporters responded to these criticisms by wrapping themselves in the mantle of state sovereignty, while at the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, dismissing the notion that the Act subjected Illinois to penalties, coercion, or excessive requirements. James Shields of Illinois argued that “if the bill as it is will be any injury to Illinois, that injury will be for the benefit of the United States, and we who represent Illinois are responsible to our people for that injury.”²³² In contrast to Shields’s effort to erect a barrier around the people and State of Illinois, William Dayton of New Jersey took a more pragmatic view. “The State of Illinois is not bound to go on and construct this road,” he stated.²³³ “If you pass this act, she sees what she has before her, and accepts it or does not accept it. There is no obligation incident to the passage of this act that imposes any obligation upon her.”²³⁴ Dayton thus rejected the implicit argument of many of the Act’s opponents that the structure of the land grant had coercive force. The state could simply take it or leave it, he argued.

Proponents of the program also characterized Congress as a beneficent proprietor of the public lands, a trustee with a duty to use the property for the benefit of the people. “I have never entertained the least doubt that the Government, being the large landholder of the country, had the right to dispose of, reserve, or improve the public domain,” commented Henry S. Foote of Mississippi.²³⁵ Other advocates invoked the appropriation-jurisdiction distinction that had so powerfully influenced previous debates. Lewis Cass of Michigan insist-

²³⁰. See id. at 845-46 (statement of Sen. Butler) (characterizing the ICR bill as “a donation of the public lands to the State of Illinois—an open donation, unembarrassed by any restriction,” and endorsing instead “a system looking to the benefit of all parts of the Union, and not of any particular section or sections”).
²³¹. Id. at 849 (statement of Sen. Dawson).
²³². Id. at 848 (statement of Sen. Shields).
²³³. Id. at 854 (statement of Sen. Dayton).
²³⁴. Id.
²³⁵. Id. at 847 (statement of Sen. Foote).
ed that there was “a fundamental difference between the principle of this bill and the Government carrying on a system of internal improvement.”236 Unlike the internal improvements bills of the 1820s and 1830s, “[t]here is no proposition in this bill that the Government should build the road; there is no assumption of authority within the jurisdiction of the States for that purpose whatever.”237 Moreover, echoing Dayton, Cass argued that the states were not even bound by the Act: “The jurisdiction is left entirely to the States to do as they please; to make the road or leave the road unmade.”238 Still others invoked the continental aspirations of the United States, referring to the ICR as “a great national thoroughfare.”239

As the Senate debates demonstrate, the railroad land grants raised many of the same themes as had the controversies over roads and canals a few decades earlier. Throughout the ICR discussions, however, one familiar concept proved particularly significant, even as participants struggled to define it and determine its boundaries: the idea of state consent. It was a particularly powerful idea for opponents of the ICR bill, some who feared that the plan threatened the sovereignty of Illinois,240 and others who found on the part of Illinois a suspicious amount of consent, even eagerness, to take Congress’s bargain.241 As has been noted, nearly the entire Ohio congressional delegation supported the Cumberland Road bill in 1822,242 but that did not amount to the relevant form or quantum of consent for President Monroe. The chief loser (or winner, depending on one’s perspective) from the ICR bill was Illinois, and Douglas’s ardent support both aided and hindered the bill’s passage because contemporaries identified the bill with the Senator.243 But perhaps the clearest, most concrete evidence of consent came in connection with the bill’s proposal to link the ICR with Mobile, Alabama. After Douglas had met with local representatives of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and decided to include Mississippi and Alabama in the draft bill, the legislatures of both states instructed their counterparts in the U.S. House and Senate to support the bill.244 Senator William R. King of Alabama introduced the amendment extending the railroad to Mobile. Was all this evidence of consent by Mississippi and Alabama to a physical invasion by an instrumentality of the federal government? Or was it simply evidence of classic

236. Id. at 846 (statement of Sen. Cass).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 848 (statement of Sen. Shields).
240. See id. at 845 (statement of Sen. Walker).
241. See id. at 845-46 (statement of Sen. Butler) (characterizing the ICR bill as “a donation of the public lands to the State of Illinois—an open donation, unembarrassed by any restriction,” and endorsing instead “a system looking to the benefit of all parts of the Union, and not of any particular section or sections”).
242. See 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1874 (1822) (showing that five of the six members of Ohio’s delegation in the House voted to override Monroe’s veto).
243. See JOHANNSEN, supra note 209, at 312.
244. See id. at 311.
nineteenth-century graft, in which the representatives of the southern states came to view the economic and political benefits of the railroad as outweighing their sovereignty concerns? For critics of the bill, both of these were plausible explanations. Insufficient state consent gave rise to fears of congressional overreach, while a surfeit of consent suggested that the state was funneling away more than its share of benefits from the Union and thus was not adhering to the rules of the Federal Republic.

In the end, the ICR bill passed the House and Senate and was signed into law by President Millard Fillmore on September 20, 1850.\footnote{Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466.} A few months later, in February 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad Company received a charter from the Illinois legislature.\footnote{Act of Feb. 10, 1851, 1851 Ill. Priv. Laws 61.} When construction of the railroad was completed in 1856, the right-of-way crossed—and raised the value of—a section of land along the Chicago lakefront that the railroad had purchased from Douglas.\footnote{See JOHANNSEN, supra note 209, at 317 (noting that Douglas “sold some of his Chicago lakefront property to the Illinois Central for its right-of-way at a considerable profit”).}

III. THE LOST HISTORY OF THE SPENDING POWER?

The debates over internal improvements legislation, from the Bonus Bill in 1817 to the Illinois Central Railroad Act in 1850, suggest two important insights for modern constitutional law.

First, the factors that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have treated as essential to analyzing a particular regulation’s congruence with principles of federalism are not the same factors that early nineteenth-century commentators regarded as relevant. Second, the dramatic difference between interbellum and millennial reasoning about federalism challenges the Court’s reliance on a foundational distinction, unchanged since the Founding, between local and national activities. The history of constitutional thought in the early nineteenth century demonstrates that there is no single correct relationship between the general government and the states, with all deviations to be explained away as political-branch mistakes awaiting judicial correction. The internal improvements debates, despite their untidy tacking from the appropriation-jurisdiction distinction to states’ consent and back, were not simply one view of the Constitution. Between the Revolution and the Civil War, they were the Constitution.

To understand why this is the case, consider the elements of federalism. In interbellum Americans’ analysis of internal improvements, as we have seen, the key factors were the consent of the states; the distinction between Congress’s power to appropriate funds for internal improvements and its power to implement and retain jurisdiction over those projects; and widespread acceptance of the idea that the Constitution could be amended to give Congress additional
enumerated powers. In the Court’s modern federalism analysis, however, these factors are largely irrelevant.

The varying significance of state consent is best illustrated in the Court’s 1992 decision in *New York v. United States.* In that case, a majority of the Court invalidated a federal provision requiring states that could not dispose of their own hazardous waste by a certain date to take title to the waste. The majority’s theory was that by requiring a state to assume ownership of the waste, Congress would in effect be “commandeering” the state treasury because it would be compelling the state to subsidize private parties—here, the producers of hazardous waste, who would be relieved of ownership and liability by the federal provision. **The take title provision offers state governments a ‘choice’ of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of Congress,”** Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the Court. “As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction.”

It was not possible for New York to consent to what the Court regarded as a violation of New York’s sovereignty. “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,” Justice O’Connor wrote. “To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.” It was not possible for New York to consent to what the Court regarded as a violation of New York’s sovereignty. “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,” Justice O’Connor wrote. “To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”

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249. Id. at 175.
250. Id. at 175-76.
251. Id. at 182. But cf. *Hammer v. Dagenhart,* 247 U.S. 251, 278 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The question then is narrowed to whether the exercise of its otherwise constitutional power by Congress can be pronounced unconstitutional because of its possible reaction upon the conduct of the States in a matter upon which I have admitted that they are free from direct control. I should have thought that that matter had been disposed of so fully as to leave no room for doubt. I should have thought that the most conspicuous decisions of this Court had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and other constitutional powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic policy of any State.”).
253. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, *Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case,* in *The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications* 227, 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) (predicting that NFIB will “accelerate the trend toward ‘federalism by waiver,’ in which important questions about the federal-state relationship are resolved by the federal executive branch granting tailored, conditional exemptions from . . . broad, general spending conditions”).
Moreover, in the early nineteenth century, the project of fleshing out precisely what federalism ought to look like in practice took place primarily in the political branches, in contrast to the modern Court’s suggestion that the judiciary is the best judge of what federalism requires. This point is implicit in *New York*, and it became explicit in *NFIB*, with the Roberts Court’s revival of the coercion inquiry in the context of the spending power analysis. Although one might plausibly think that the coercion analysis is simply a modern version of the early nineteenth-century consent inquiry, the Chief Justice’s opinion makes clear that the opposite of coercion is not consent by the state but rather the Court’s assessment that a particular spending program does not amount to “economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce.” We know lack of coercion when the Court sees it, not when we see consent from the state.

To be sure, as *NFIB* demonstrates, modern federalism doctrine does view the states as having the power to consent to the “bargains” offered by congressional conditional spending programs. Indeed, the fact that the Medicaid provision of the ACA threatened to strip states of pre-ACA Medicaid funds proved dispositive to the majority’s determination that the program was not the type of “relatively mild encouragement” typically associated with conditional spending programs but instead represented “a gun to the head.” In the majority’s view, the problem with the Medicaid provision was precisely that it did not offer the states an opportunity to consent to a deal that might have culminated in the loss of their entire allotment of federal Medicaid funding. The focus of the Court’s analysis was a search not for an affirmative act of state consent but rather for the possibility of state coercion.

But to the extent that notions of consent underpinned the Medicaid portion of the *NFIB* decision, we must distinguish between consent in the context of the conditional spending work-around on one hand and consent in the context of direct congressional regulation under Article I on the other hand. As modern federalism cases such as *New York v. United States*, *Printz v. United States*, and even *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*—and, of course, the portion of the *NFIB* decision that rejected the Commerce Clause and Neces-

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255. *NFIB*, 132 S. Ct. at 2574. State sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment might appear to involve similar issues of consent, insofar as a state may in some cases be held to have waived its immunity and therefore to be susceptible to suit in federal court. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002) (holding that the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by removing a case from state to federal court); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Waiver, however, is not the same as consent. Moreover, unlike the Tenth Amendment arena, a state’s acquiescence to judicial process has no direct implications for congressional power.

sary and Proper Clause justifications for the individual mandate—demonstrate, Congress can no longer use state consent as a defense against the charge that its regulation violates the Tenth Amendment. But this was not the case in the early nineteenth century. On the contrary, as the internal improvements debates demonstrate, the presence or absence of state consent was a vital ingredient in the interbellum assessment of congressional regulation under Article I.

Similarly, the early nineteenth-century distinction between appropriations and implementation, and especially the belief that appropriations were constitutionally less problematic, has no real analogue in modern doctrine. Consider Madison’s array of proposed amendments in his correspondence with Van Buren. His second proposal, to grant Congress the power to make appropriations that it would then turn over to the states, which the states in turn would then apply to road and canal projects, would raise red flags today. To the extent that it permitted Congress to order state legislatures to build roads and canals, the proposal would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle. Moreover, the proposal would be difficult to justify as an exercise of the conditional spending power. Although Congress typically has more latitude to affect state policy through a conditional spending program than through direct regulation, the lack of a condition in Madison’s scheme would foreclose that avenue.

A different set of modern objections could be levied against Madison’s third proposal, which suggested granting Congress the power both to appropriate funds for and to implement internal improvements projects. To be sure, such an approach would be less likely to run afoul of the Tenth Amendment insofar as it does not involve Congress using the states to carry out a federal program. On the contrary, state governments would be excluded from internal improvements projects, which would be carried out by federal officials. (Recall the Cumberland Road toll collectors.) But other modern doctrinal concerns about direct congressional regulation would then become relevant. Some internal improvements projects—for instance, a short stretch of road within a single state, such as the Maysville Road—would arguably be purely local in nature, absent any substantial effect on national markets. Such a situation would trigger the intuition underpinning the majority’s holding in NFIB that the individual mandate is beyond the scope of the commerce and necessary and proper powers.  

257. Of course, if any of Madison’s proposals had been enacted as a constitutional amendment, these textual and structural objections would not apply. But the objections are nonetheless useful because they highlight the gulf that separates modern federalism doctrine from that of the early nineteenth century.

258. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992) (stating that “a simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress” is beyond Congress’s power).

As these examples demonstrate, the fundamental constitutional relationship between Congress and the states, which is most clearly observed through the device of the spending power, has undergone profound change since the early nineteenth century. Constitutional interpretations that emerged in the course of conflict between members of Congress, and between Congress and the President, are largely absent from modern doctrine. To be sure, doctrine changes over time, and one cannot reasonably expect the same arguments to be made over the course of two centuries’ worth of case law. But the great silence surrounding the early nineteenth century in modern doctrine is notable given the posture of the Court in recent decades. In the area of the spending power, as in the Tenth Amendment, the Court has frequently taken the position that the basic conditions of the federal-state relation have not changed, and indeed could not have changed, since the Founding era. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB exemplified this approach: “The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding.”

What are modern constitutional lawyers to make of the internal improvements debates? One answer is that the debates tell us that we should listen to James Madison in order to understand that sometimes listening to James Madison would amount to good historical work but bad lawyering. This is so not because Madison was wrong in some fundamental sense about the best way to implement the Constitution’s scheme of federalism, or because lawyers should not pay attention to history, or because old constitutional ideas are inherently suspect. But neither are old constitutional ideas inherently correct, especially when layers of old constitutional ideas must be sifted through and evaluated.

Rather, the point is that the Constitution of the early nineteenth century was not the Constitution of the twenty-first century, even with respect to provisions of the text that remained the same throughout that time.

Indeed, even in the period from 1817 to 1851, the universe of constitutional possibility shifted. As the railroad debates demonstrate, by 1850, discussions of internal improvements were no longer focused on finding the right language for a constitutional amendment that most parties agreed would solve the problem. Instead of ambitious proposals to give Congress additional enumerated powers,

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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (“Undoubtedly the scope of this [commerce] power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852) (“Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some . . . as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.”).

260. 132 S. Ct. at 2589 (third emphasis added).
Douglas and other supporters of land grants to the states framed their arguments in more conservative terms that worked with the constitutional text and practice as it stood. From the 1810s to the 1830s, Presidents and members of Congress believed that they were living in an extension of the original constitutional moment and therefore assumed that the Constitution was still open to relatively easy amendment. By 1850, however, that moment had ended. Consequently, supporters of internal improvements turned to work-arounds that fit with their sense of the constitutionally permissible options. These work-arounds, such as the railroad land grants, in turn became part of the interbellum Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Land grants to railroads did in some sense solve the problem of internal improvements that had dogged American law and politics since the Founding. Applying the modern taxonomy of types of congressional regulation, the land grants look more like a conditional spending program than direct federal regulation under the commerce power or the necessary and proper power. We can therefore say that direct regulation, and with it the growth of congressional power, was more difficult for early nineteenth-century Americans to agree on than were conditional spending programs that relied on the states to carry out specific projects.

The modern concern with Congress’s ability to commandeer the states, and the resulting imperative for the Court to protect the states, thus did not have the resonance in the early nineteenth century that it has today. The interbellum worry about direct congressional implementation of internal improvements did not apply if the regulation was rooted in an enumerated power, and many members of Congress and several Presidents were willing to expand that list of powers through the process of constitutional amendment. Analogies to modern doctrine, then, are tempting but ultimately difficult to make. Yet it is precisely this disanalogy between the early nineteenth-century constitutional landscape and our own that offers valuable lessons for modern constitutional law. Even when modern doctrine can be analogized to arguments and debates from the long Founding period, the reasoning behind those preferences is not the same from that period to ours. Constitutional work-arounds flourish and change over time because the background rules and norms that they work around change over time. Understanding the doctrinal history that created and was created by the work-arounds provides a vital window into the universe of constitutional possibility at a specific time—and a cautionary tale for static or originalist arguments about the nature of American federalism.