which is so clearly portrayed. The author and those who have made possible the comple-
tion of this laborious task deserve the highest commendation of the American public.

H. DOUGLAS SINGER*


Students of criminal law are too well acquainted with Dean Mikell's casebook to
make any general description or comment necessary. For this reason the present re-
view will be confined, to a large extent, to a comparison of the present edition with its
immediate predecessor.

Dean Mikell's book has long stood for the orthodox arrangement of the case ma-
terial. So far as possible it was previously grouped under general headings illustra-
tive of the corresponding general principles supposed to run alike through all the specific
crimes. Then followed a number of chapters devoted to specific offenses, to bring out
the individual problems applicable only to the offense then under examination. Yet in
actual fact there are very few such general principles everywhere equally and alike
true, regardless of the nature of the offense raising the problem. Instead any such
general treatment is almost certain to run against the inquiry, In what offense are you
trying to apply the principle? And its meaning varies accordingly. Mr. Mikell has
now yielded some slight ground to this viewpoint. Thus the subsection on consent has
been broken up and its thirteen cases distributed among the particular offenses to
which they belong. Likewise the section on negligence disappears and the cases are
moved over to the manslaughter section, where they clearly belong, as the conclusions
worked out from them are obviously valid only for that crime and have no general
bearing, as, e.g., for battery or for rape. Besides the above, a number of chapters on
general topics are lifted bodily from the beginning of the casebook and are placed at its
end, so as to follow, instead of precede, the chapters on specific offenses. Such shifting
of entire chapters seems, however, of less moment, as it will be the rare teacher who
will not in any event rearrange the order of topics to suit himself. Beyond this there
are no structural changes of any

2 With so few real changes a descriptive review then necessarily becomes a chronicle
of more or less subordinate changes. About thirty-six cases have been dropped and
about thirty new ones added—almost always to the definite improvement of the teach-
ing material. The footnotes accompanying these new cases are in the main new. Be-
sides that there are two new footnotes in the book, and forty-six lines (approximately)

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1 So chapter II (except sections 1 and 2 (I)) becomes chapter 19; chapter IV becomes chap-
ter 18; chapter V, section 2 (II) becomes chapter 16; chapter V, section 2 (III) becomes chapter
17; chapter V, section 3, becomes chapter 20; chapter VI becomes chapter 21.

2 Five cases in chapter III are moved into the chapters dealing with their respective particu-
lar offenses. Some of the section headings in this chapter are, wisely, suppressed. Chapters
VIII and IX on False Imprisonment and Kidnaping, and Abortion, respectively, are gone.
As these chapters had a total of only four pages, the change is not an important one. It may be
queried, however, whether kidnaping does not call for increased, rather than lessened, space.

3 Many will probably regret the disappearance of Reg. v. Pembleton, which gave a fine illus-
tration of the complete indefiniteness of meaning of the word "maliciously."
have been added to old notes, and about seven lines removed. Numerous sections, and
some whole chapters even, appear without the slightest change. Sometimes this is
unfortunate. Thus the nearly obsolete subject of larceny by breaking bulk surely calls
for a more recent case than 1835 as the latest word. Insanity gets but one change, viz.,
the addition of five lines to a footnote; many will feel this to be far from adequate
growth. Very welcome is the editor's decision to include citations to law review articles.
It is a pity, however, that he has carried it out to so slight a degree, as such references
appear in only ten notes and are to only twenty-six articles. The book maintains the
usual high standards of its publishers in the matter of freedom from errors of com-
position.

By way of summing up, the new edition will undoubtedly hold fast the many friends
gained by the two preceding editions, while, on the other hand, those who found these
not congenial for one reason or another will probably react in the same way to the in-
stant edition. Considering how slight the changes were that Dean Mikell found it de-
sirable to make there is room for some question as to the wisdom or need of this new
edition at all.

E. W. Puttkammer*

Cases and Readings on Property. Volume II. By Everett Fraser. Chicago: The Foun-

The present volume deals with the usual subject matter of personal property to-
gether with a few topics touching real property such as Adverse Possession, Prescrip-
tion, Emblements, Waste, Fixtures and "Some Legal Relations of a Landowner in
Respect to Land, Air, and Water." The inclusion of these topics in real property logi-
cally brings together a treatment of the law of possession of both real and personal
property with seemingly satisfactory results. Similarities and differences in the two
branches of the property law can be pointed out and time saved by treating possession
of both types of property as a whole.

In the preface Dean Fraser states that "possession is the dominant idea of the first
six chapters." It may be queried whether Dean Fraser has not allowed that one con-
cept to dominate him and his selection of cases just a little too much. The reviewer
would have preferred to see a case with a good plain discussion of the essential elements
of a bailment for the opening case in the chapter on Bailments rather than one in which
the discussion revolves about "possession" with little more than an inference that it is
one of the elements of a bailment. Likewise, for the opening case in the chapter on
Prescription, the writer would have preferred a case involving prescriptive rights in

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4 There are also two citations to books.
5 Such errors as there were in the second edition seem, however, to have survived without
exception. Regina v. W. D. still appears as Rex v. W. D., though the date, 1570, glares at one.
The reference to suicide (p. 308) as an "occasion" (which it no doubt is) instead of an "occi-
sion" (which is what Lord Hale was talking about) remains. The same is true of an error on
p. 681. And in the case on p. 343 there is still the rather serious failure to indicate that the
"foregoing reasons" on account of which the case was reversed were reasons omitted from the
casebook quotation, and were not connected with the lengthy jury charges given (which were
approved, and which, in the casebook, appear as the only matters in review).