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Divergent Immigration Attitudes within Emerging North African Refugee

“Host” Countries:

Morocco and Tunisia

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October 2, 2019

International Immersion Program:
North Africa
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The University of Chicago Law School
Spring 2019

Table of Contents

1. ABSTRACT	3
2. INTRODUCTION	4
3. METHODOLOGY & DATA COLLECTION	9
3.1 FIELD OBSERVATIONS.....	9
3.2 ONLINE SURVEY	11
4. FINDINGS.....	12
4.1 PEOPLE TALKING ABOUT (OR NOT TALKING ABOUT) REFUGEES.....	12
4.2 DIVERSITY AS FOUNDATIONAL VERSUS DIVERSITY AS DANGEROUS.....	15
4.3 “BROTHER” VERSUS THE “OTHER”	16
5. SUMMARY	18
6. APPENDIX	20
6.1 ONLINE SURVEY	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	22

Divergent Immigration Attitudes within Emerging North African Refugee “Host” Countries: Morocco and Tunisia

1. Abstract

In response to recent global crises, the European Union has begun to outsource the responsibilities of refugee processing and protection to neighboring countries within North Africa, such as Morocco and Tunisia. With these “externalization agreements,” the European Union seeks to curtail the number of migrants arriving at its border by assuming primarily a financial role in refugee processing and protection, while shifting the remaining responsibilities to Morocco and Tunisia. As a result of these externalization policies, Morocco and Tunisia, historically “transit” countries, are becoming increasingly countries of final destination, or “host” countries, for refugees and irregular migrants. However, Morocco and Tunisia have diverged in their response to this new positioning as an emerging host country within the global refugee regime. This paper posits, through a combination of field observations, secondary literature, and original survey data, that divergent reform policies stem to the countries’ divergent attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, immigration attitudes positively correlate with a citizenry’s (1) awareness of and frequency of engaging with the topic of refugees and migrants; (2) attitude towards the value of population diversity; and, (3) view of the migrant person as familiar rather than as foreign.

2. Introduction

In 2018, an estimated 7,800 refugees settled in Morocco, representing a 23% increase in the Moroccan refugee population within one year.¹ The increase in refugee population within nearby Tunisia was even more significant—nearly doubling with a 42% increase from the year before.² These numbers, although already noteworthy, likely only capture a sliver of the true magnitude of people migrating into Morocco and Tunisia in response to recent global events.³

Literature on migration often divides countries into countries of “origin,” “transit,” or “host.” Origin countries are those countries of emigration, from which refugees and migrants are leaving. These countries are also called “sending countries.” Host countries reflect those destination countries to which these individuals are traveling in the hope of permanently settling, and are also referred to as “receiving countries.” Along the way, individuals migrate through countries, which the literature designates as transit countries. Morocco and Tunisia have long reflected popular transit countries through which asylum-seekers, refugees, migrants, and other displaced people move with a desire to reach and settle in the European Union.⁴ A country’s positioning as either a origin, transit, or host country closely affects the role it plays within the global refugee regime, including the country’s domestic immigration policies and international agreements.

¹ UNHCR. “Global Focus. Operation: Morocco, 2018 Year-End Report.”

² UNHCR. “Global Focus. Operation: Tunisia, 2018 Year-End Report.”

³ Within this paper, the terms “refugee,” “asylum-seeker,” “migrant,” and “irregular migrant” are used collectively to encompass the idea of recent increased migration into and through North African countries in response to global crises and events. “Irregular migration” refers to immigration through non-legal processes. While these terms vary in their legal definitions, these definitions are often ambiguous and overlapping, and the terms are frequently interchanged throughout the literature. For the purpose of this paper, which focuses on the concept of migration patterns broadly and their affect on a country’s immigration attitudes and not on the legal nuisance, the terms are used interchangeably.

⁴ See Berriane, Mohamed. “Introduction: Revisiting Moroccan Migrations.”

Although it continues to be both an origin country, from which migrants emigrate, and a transit country, through which migrants travel temporarily, Morocco has also increasingly become a final destination for many individuals.⁵ Some migrants, largely from Syria or “sub-Saharan Africa,”⁶ remain within Morocco because of financial or physical inability to continue on to Europe.⁷ Others arrive with the specific intention to stay.⁸ And even others are forcefully compelled to stay due to externalization policies between Morocco and Europe. Within these policies, Morocco agrees to intercept and process migrants within its borders with the goal of reducing the numbers arriving into the European Union.⁹ Similarly, Tunisia has also begun to assume more of a receiving country role.¹⁰

Externalization policies are a primary factor spurring the transition of Morocco and Tunisia, historically transit countries, into countries of final destination, or “host” countries, for refugees and irregular migrants. In an effort to curtail the number of individuals arriving at its borders, the European Union in recent years has essentially outsourced the processing and protection of asylum seekers and irregular migrants through policies described as “externalization” asylum policies, a “new asylum paradigm,” or “as a shift from ‘asylum policy’ to ‘refugee policy.’”¹¹ Within these policies, the European Union seeks to take on primarily a

⁵ See Berraine, “Revisiting”; UNHCR, “Morocco 2018 Year-End Report.”

⁶ Because this term is widely used within the literature, including the UNHCR’s publications on Morocco, the paper adopts the term for clarity. However, the author notes the ambiguity and problematic nature of this term, as noted by scholars within the literature.

⁷ UNHCR, “Morocco 2018 Year-End Report.”

⁸ Berraine, “Revisiting,” 514.

⁹ Betts, Alexander and James Milner, “The Externalisation of EU Asylum Policy: The Position of African States,” 1.

¹⁰ See Badalič, “Tunisia’s Role.”

¹¹ Betts, “The Externalisation,” 1.

financial role in refugee processing and protection, while shifting the rest of the responsibilities on to countries to its south, such as Morocco and Tunisia:

European states have based their approach on the assumption that their role in the global refugee regime should be predominantly financial and based on funding first asylum within the South, where the majority of the current refugees are situated. Primary responsibility for physical protection should then rest with states in the region of origin. These states can be compensated or leveraged into playing this role through either incentives or coercion.¹²

In in exchange for taking on these new roles, Morocco and Tunisia receive financial assistance from the European Union and other promises such as reciprocal trade or immigration agreements.

Externalization policies in Morocco stem back to the early 2000s. The European Union and individual European states began to pressure neighboring North African countries to bolster their border security to curtail irregular migration by offering, in exchange, increased trade and the loosening visa entry requirements.¹³ In 2001, Morocco and Spain created an externalization agreement policy in which Morocco would increase its surveillance, border control, and interception of migrants.¹⁴ Morocco has always been a popular transit country, but today it is the main departure point for migrants into Europe, propelling EU-Moroccan externalization agreements even further.¹⁵

¹² Betts, "The Externalisation," 2.

¹³ Norman, Kelsey, "Between Europe and Africa: Morocco as a country of immigration," 427.

¹⁴ Betts, "The Externalisation," 1.

¹⁵ Eljehtimi, Ahmed and Ulf Laessing, "Determined to reach Europe, migrants defy Morocco's crackdown."

Initially, Morocco's response to these externalization agreement policies was one of increased policing and hostility to migrants.¹⁶ However, in 2013, King Mohammed VI announced that Morocco would be reforming its immigration policy to provide a path to regularization for migrants currently residing in Morocco, as well as work towards greater recognition of rights for migrants.¹⁷ Reform efforts include offering migrants the right to societal benefits, such as education and health care.¹⁸ One individual explains the positive effect the reformed immigration policy has had on the migrant lived experiences within Morocco:

Before 2013 it was bad. I live over near the university, and they would come in and demand papers and sometimes they would deport you to the border and you'd have to walk back. But then after 2013, it's calm. The police don't come and do that anymore.¹⁹

Thus, in recent years, Morocco's response to its growing position as a country of settlement has been an increased recognition in the rights of migrants and a decrease in the practices that dominated its policies of the early 2000s, such as "frequent police raids, deportations, and general ambivalence toward the presence of migrants and refugees at the policy level."²⁰

Within Tunisia, externalization agreement policies with European countries to take on the processing and protection of refugees and migrants are fairly recent. The first such agreement came about with the signing of a "Mobility Partnership" between the European Union and Tunisia in 2014.²¹ In agreements on migration between Tunisia and the EU in which migration management controls were outsourced to Tunisia in exchange for financial assistance, Tunisia agreed to prevent irregular migration flows to Italy by intercepting "boat people" attempting to

¹⁶ Berraine, "Revisiting," 515; *see also* Norman, "Between Europe and Africa," 428.

¹⁷ Norman, "Between Europe and Africa," 421.

¹⁸ UNHCR, "Morocco: Operational Environment."

¹⁹ Norman, "Between Europe and Africa," 431.

²⁰ Norman, "Between Europe and Africa," 428.

²¹ International Federation for Human Rights, "Tunisia-EU Mobility Partnership."

land on Italian shores.²² In addition to intercepting these irregular migrants, Tunisia is expected to process their asylum claims on Tunisian territory.²³

Tunisia's response to its changing role as a host country is markedly different than Morocco's. Unlike Morocco, Tunisia has yet to adopt or implement the necessary immigration policies to accommodate its new responsibilities, such as an adoption of an asylum policy, or a recognition of rights for migrants like a path to regularization, the right to work, or access to societal benefits.²⁴ In addition, Tunisia recently enacted legislation criminalizing migration-related activities, such as smuggling.²⁵ This legislation was partly due to Tunisia's relationship with the European Union, which incentivized Tunisia to enact such legislation in efforts to deter those assisting irregular migrants.²⁶ However, policies criminalizing migrants also reflect Tunisia's own historical immigration policy patterns: "[I]n Tunisia, both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary governments used laws criminalizing irregular migration and migration-related activities as one of the key tools for enhancing migration controls."²⁷

Thus, although Morocco and Tunisia have both begun to take on more of a receiving country role within the global refugee regime, their responses, as reflected in their domestic immigration policies, have differed significantly. Why have their approaches diverged? This paper seeks to explore one possible explanation for this divergence, by positing that differences in internal immigration policies reflect differences in the countries' attitudes towards immigration and migrants. Specifically, this paper suggests that such immigration attitudes positively correlate with a citizenry's (1) awareness of and frequency of engaging with the topic

²² Badalič, "Tunisia's Role."

²³ Badalič, "Tunisia's Role."

²⁴ International Federation for Human Rights, "Tunisia-EU Mobility Partnership."

²⁵ Jean-Pierre Cassarino, "Channelled Policy Transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters."

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ Badalič, "Tunisia's Role," 6.

of refugees and migrants; (2) attitude towards the value of population diversity; and, (3) view of the migrant person as familiar rather than as foreign.

3. Methodology & Data Collection

Data for this study were collected using a mixed methods approach drawing from a combination of field observations, secondary literature, and original survey data.

3.1 Field Observations

Field observations were collected over a period of ten days. Five days were spent within two cosmopolitan cities within Morocco—Fez and, the capital city, Rabat—and the remaining five days were spent within Tunis, the capital city of Tunisia.

While in Morocco, I had the opportunity to closely interact with and observe nearly three dozen Moroccans, spanning political leaders, elected public officials, university professors, students within political science and law, and hospitality workers. Additionally, observations occurred within university spaces, government buildings, traditional public spaces (Medinas and markets), modern areas of construction, restaurants, hotels, public spaces spanning bustling tourist sites and markets to more quiet side streets and local cafes, and while traveling inside cars and buses.

Opportunities for observation were similar while in Tunisia. As in Morocco, I had the chance to interact with students, professors, legal and finance experts, and political leaders. However, in Tunisia, the extent of interaction with political leaders and elected public officials was much greater than that in Morocco—the majority of my waking hours, in fact, was spent in the presence of the President of Tunisia, a former President, drafters of the recent Constitution,

public officials and ministers, and political party leaders. Another difference between observation opportunities in Morocco and Tunisia was that I had the additional advantage of sitting with various NGO staff members and leaders while in Tunis. Lastly, the actual spaces, while similar in that I had the chance to speak with market vendors and students, also varied from those in Morocco because I had the unique occasion to visit the Presidential Palace and the Bardo National Museum. The latter was still recovering from the terrible terrorist attack in 2015 in which twenty-two visitors, largely tourists, were killed by two Tunisian gunmen.²⁸

My unit of analysis for observations focused on encounters related to the topic of refugees and irregular migrants, including the lack of these encounters. This included noticing the presence or absence of migrants, and any interaction of migrants with Moroccan or Tunisian citizens. Additionally, observations sought to explore the following questions:

1. *Who* is talking about refugees and migration?;
2. *Where* are they talking about refugees and migration?;
3. *When* are they talking about refugees and migration?; and,
4. *How* are they talking about refugees and migration? What language are they using?

Thus, while in meetings and over lunch with elected officials, professors, party leaders, scholars, and students, and while navigating public spaces and daily life in Morocco and Tunisia, I noted speech and actions related to (or completely devoid of) these themes.

²⁸ BBC News, “Tunisia attacks: Militants jailed over 2015 terror.”

3.2 Online Survey

I drafted an online survey using a free website platform (*see Appendix*). The survey consists of ten questions pertaining to the four questions above and takes roughly five minutes to complete. Questions were written in both English and Arabic for responder comprehension and ease and allowed response in the language preferred by the responder. After returning to Chicago, I followed up with every contact I had secured while in Morocco and Tunisia and shared a link to the survey. Several of those contacts, in turn, offered to share the link with their colleagues on Facebook.

Because the survey was widely disseminated, it is difficult to accurately capture the number of people it reached or the subsequent response rate. However, the response rate is certainly less than 50% and possibly closer to 10%. Of the likely twenty plus individuals reached, only four responses were received—yielding a response rate of merely 20%. Possible reasons for a low response rate may include simply distance; many individuals expressed willingness to answer my questions but did not complete the survey or respond upon further communication, and now that I was in a separate country, it was difficult to make consistent contact and encourage follow-through. Other factors may be that the topic was not interesting to the individual (perhaps further evidence of indifference), or the medium for communication—a survey—was not culturally appropriate, and a one-on-one interview with each individual may have been more fruitful. At any rate, the four responses were rich, and therefore, greatly supplemented the field observations. Of the four responses, three came from Moroccans currently living in Morocco, and the fourth from a Tunisian living in Tunis.

4. Findings

The ten days of field observations taken in compilation with the survey data suggests three major findings. First, the degree of which the topic of refugees was present on people's minds varied drastically between Morocco and Tunisia, despite similar positions as emerging host countries. While both countries must adjust to their recent changing responsibilities, there was a stark contrast in how often people were talking about refugees and migrants within Morocco versus within Tunisia; in fact, people were simply not talking *at all* about refugees and migrants in Tunisia, even when directly questioned!

Second, the ways in which people in Morocco and in Tunisia talked about diversity sharply differed. To the Moroccans I met, diversity was not only positively seen, but also considered a foundational element of their society. In contrast, Tunisians spoke of their perceived country's homogeneity and lack of diversity as instrumental to the country's recent success in becoming the first democracy in the region.

Lastly, in addition to differing attitudes on the topic of diversity, Moroccans and Tunisians also differed in their views of the refugees and irregular migrants wishing to settle within their country. Related to their views of the diverse historical backgrounds of their people, Moroccans tended to view the migrants as ethnically similar and as "brothers," while Tunisians did not tend to hold the same views.

4.1 People Talking About (or Not Talking About) Refugees

On a bustling morning in Fez, my driver, a professor, talked to me and the other people in the car about the next person we would be meeting. As the car paused at a stop sign, I could see young men with dark skin, migrants, dressed in tattered clothes standing at the corners. They

held no signs, but the cars around me rolled down their windows, and out stretched the arms of drivers and passengers. They contained money and food in their hands. Without skipping a beat in the conversation, out stretched the arm of my driver through the open window. As he handed the young man money, the young man said something brief, to which my driver paused from our conversation and replied back warmly. Then the car quickly moved on and the conversation in the car continued. This scene stayed with me and epitomizes the general welcoming attitude I towards migrants that I observed which seem to permeate Morocco. Not only was there an awareness of the presence of these refugees and migrants, but there also tended to be a general compassion and willingness to do more for them.

One individual, a student and researcher, explained to me that Moroccans would generally like to welcome migrants, but they are limited in their ability to do so. If the country can just barely provide jobs and resources for its current population, it is limited in what it can offer to migrants, he explained. To him, it was not an issue of desire, but ability to adequately accommodate refugees and migrants who wish to stay within Morocco. Thus, while Morocco provides a right to education and health care and a path to residency for irregular migrants who choose to stay, many, like these young men I witnessed on the corner, decide to move on for lack of work opportunities, panhandling on the side of the road to subsist and earn enough to continue on to Spain and Europe.

In general, Moroccans believed the people in their country to be talking about the topic of refugees and migrants. They perceived people from all walks of life to be aware of and engaged in these issues—spanning people on the street, the news, scholars, the government, and even the Moroccan King. Refugees and migrants were visible and the topics pertaining to them were salient. This was a country in which people offered the little money they have while paused in

their cars at stop and without a break in conversation. Kindness and charity towards migrants appeared to be habitual.

In contrast, I did not witness—to my knowledge—one refugee or migrant while I explored the markets and side streets of Tunis. This was a sight that befuddles me to this day as Tunisia was a host country to nearly 1,400 registered refugees in 2018 alone.²⁹ Not only were the individuals absent, but also I did not observe any of the many political leaders and public ministers and advisors mention the topics of refugees, migrants, or immigration once in the many meetings I attended about Tunisian domestic and international policies. Upon being asked if these were topics of concern or importance for the government or country, every leader questioned simply answered no and refused to engage anymore on the topic. One Tunisian individual, who worked in the hospitality industry, captured this void succinctly:

People don't talk a lot about [the] refugee problem; they are not aware about that. They are more used to see people leaving Tunisia than the other way around. I also noticed that the media don't talk about refugee[s], not like Europe or the US. . . Regarding this point, maybe I'm not enough objective, but for me, only NGOs talk about [refugees].

In addition, another offered, “I don't know how [the] Government see[s] refugee[s], but I think that [the] government don't care about that question.” Thus, in contrast to Morocco, there was great ambivalence or outright non-engagement regarding the topic of refugees and migrants within Tunisia.

While I was visiting the Bardo National Museum outside Tunis, I was shocked to stumble upon bullet holes in the elevators and walls. Multiple exhibits had not been repaired but were still open to the public; the bullet holes and other relics of the horrific 2015 event left untouched and without additional signage to explain their continued presence or any future plans to address or repair them. There was a general lack of explanation, yet their existence was palpable and had

²⁹ UNHCR, “Tunisia 2018 Year-End Report.”

great emotional affect, unintended or not. This utter oversight or ambivalence towards something so desperately in need of attention—within such an important space as the national museum of Tunisia—was striking and parallels the attitude I observed with regard to the country’s (lack of) discussion regarding refugees and migrants who wish to stay. Maybe there was an element of wishful thinking that if one ignores it, it will go away on its own. Or, at the very least, it may become so routine so as to become invisible.

4.2 Diversity as Foundational versus Diversity as Dangerous

Another difference in immigration attitudes between Morocco and Tunisia was the perception of diversity and its value. The majority of Moroccans I encountered spoke of diversity favorably. “When you are diverse, you are rich,” one individual casually explained to me in a car ride. Another explained, “you don’t have to build up walls; you have to build up bridges.” This positive view of diversity and the subsequent desire to work towards inclusion rather than exclusion likely stems to a commonly held belief that diversity is a fundamental characteristic of Moroccan society:

The people in my country are very diverse[. T]his is due to several historical, geographical, ethnic and linguistic factors[. T]his has made the culture of Morocco a cultural heritage that will strengthen the bonds of cooperation, solidarity and co-existence between the various segments of Moroccan society.

For this individual, diversity is not only a historical feature of Moroccan culture, but it also serves as a pillar, strengthening and facilitating the functioning of Moroccan society. These sentiments were echoed by another respondent:

[How would you describe the cultural and historical diversity of the people in your country?] Thank you for asking this important question. Morocco is characterized by cultural diversity and its geographical and regional specificities. It is distinguished by the linguistic diversity of Arab, Amazigh, Hassania and other dialects. This diversity

created harmony between the various groups that contributed to the preservation of social traditions and customs.

For this individual, and the majority of Moroccans I encountered, diversity was something to cherish and foster, as it is something that “created harmony” and “contributed to the preservation of social traditions and customs.”

While the majority of Moroccans cherished the concept of diversity, for many Tunisians I encountered, there was no parallel sense of Tunisian cultural diversity. In fact, the opposite views of diversity tended to manifest. After being asked what characteristics of Tunisia uniquely primed the country for its most recent transition into democracy, several political leaders and public officials cited Tunisia’s “cohesion,” “lack of factions,” and “homogeneity.” For these individuals, their perceived lack of diversity was instrumental to the country’s recent successes. It is interesting to compare these responses with a Moroccan public minister’s statement that the monarchy “is the main element for stability” within Morocco. Curiously, for some Tunisians, democracy blossomed because of, in part, a lack of diversity, while for many Moroccans, the country’s stability stemmed from the existence of the monarchy and, in part, the diversity of its people, historically and presently. Thus, while many Moroccans tended to view diversity as a characteristic to value and foster, for many Tunisians, in contrast, diversity would be antithetical to the order necessary to maintain the country’s recent democratic prosperity.

4.3 “Brother” versus the “Other”

Additionally, stemming from their understanding of their country as historically ethnically diverse, many of the Moroccans identified as multi-ethnic, including feeling connected to more southern African ancestral influences. This multi-ethnic self-identity was captured by a

Moroccan student who expressed, “The distinctive life of Moroccans [is] to receive and identify various foreign identities.”

Moreover, one Moroccan professor proudly described how the former King did not deliver Moroccan Jews to Hitler as Hitler had requested; “These people are Moroccans,” the King had said. This sentiment was echoed while touring the Jewish quarter in Rabat, where the guide explained, “They [Jewish Moroccans] are Moroccan and welcomed. They are no different than me.” For many Moroccans, the notion of “Moroccan” identity was brilliantly inclusive, not limited to any one religion, skin color, or cultural group.

Likely stemming from the inclusivity of Moroccan culture, many of the Moroccans I encountered described refugees and migrants with terms reflecting empathy and familiarity, such as “brother.” For some Moroccans, the dark skin of the migrants they saw on the corner was not a marker of difference but of similarity; one young man described to me that he felt the he is African, just like the refugees and migrants we were discussing, and they are relatives rather than strangers. This tendency to view the migrants as insiders rather than outsiders created a culture of sympathy, as explained by a Moroccan researcher:

Moroccan citizens are peaceful in terms of values, morals and solidarity among different groups. This is a special advantage. They have provided assistance to immigrants, refugees or others as much as possible.

By relating to them as “brothers,” Moroccans generally were motivated to provide assistance to refugees and migrants.

In sharp contrast, where Tunisians did describe their culture as diverse, they often did so by highlighting French and Italian influences, rather than regional groups that reflected the identities of the majority of the arriving migrants. “[T]he history of Tunisia is very rich and cosmopolitan,” shared one young Tunisian who worked in hospitality, while explaining the

European influence on Tunisian society in answer to my question about Tunisian diversity.

Whereas many Moroccans viewed refugees as “brothers,” for some Tunisians, migrants reflected “the other.” A young Tunisian explained,

I can only say, that with refugees coming from Libya, I didn't noticed[sic] big problem between the local population and Libyan, but I don't know if Tunisian population will accept refugee[s] for a long period.

In his statement, one can see the positioning of the refugee individual as something other than the “local population” and the “Tunisian population,” and as someone to be tolerated, whose acceptance is still being determined. Another individual commented, “I noticed some racism regarding refugee[s] coming from saharan[sic] area.” While the Moroccan identity was inclusive and expansive, allowing for inclusion of peoples from neighboring southern regions, the Tunisian identity tended to be more exclusive, alienating arriving refugees and irregular migrants from society.

5. Summary

In conclusion, despite a similar positioning as a newly emergent host country within the global refugee regime, Morocco and Tunisia have markedly different internal immigration policies and reforms. Morocco has recently adopted immigration reforms that expand the recognition of migrant rights and provide a path to regularization for irregular migrants. In contrast, Tunisia’s immigration policies in response to the increased number of refugees and irregular migrants settling within its borders, has been one of indifference and ambivalence, at best, or punitive and hostile, at worst. There are many possible factors explaining these differences in response. This paper posits, through a combination of field observations, secondary literature, and original survey data, that one explanation for divergent reform policies

stems to the countries' divergent attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, this paper suggests that such immigration attitudes positively correlate with a citizenry's (1) awareness of and frequency of engaging with the topic of refugees and migrants; (2) attitude towards the value of population diversity; and, (3) view of the migrant person as familiar rather than foreign.

6. Appendix

6.1 Online Survey

Tunisia / Morocco

This is an anonymous survey to better help me understand refugee law & policy in Tunisia and Morocco. You may answer in any language you would like. I really appreciate your help!

هذا مسح مجهول لمساعدتي في فهم قانون وسياسة اللاجئين في تونس والمغرب يمكنك الإجابة بأي لغة تريدها. انا فعلا اقدر اشكرا جزيلا Shukraan!مساعدتك

* 1. Which country are you from? من أي بلد أنت؟

* 2. Which country are you currently living in? في اي بلد تعيش حاليا؟

Tunisia

Morocco

* 3. Do you feel there are refugees or undocumented people arriving into this country (the country from question #2)? If yes, **which countries** are these refugees and migrants coming from? هل تشعر أن هناك لاجئين أو أشخاص لا يحملون وثائق يصلون إلى هذا البلد (البلد من السؤال رقم 2)؟ إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم ، ما هي الدول التي يأتي منها هؤلاء اللاجئين والمهاجرون؟

4. How would you describe the **cultural and historical diversity** of the people in your country? For example, "The people in my country are very diverse..." or "My country is not very diverse because..." كيف تصف التنوع الثقافي والتاريخي للناس في بلدك؟ على سبيل المثال ، "الأشخاص في بلدي ..." أو "بلدي ليس متنوعا للغاية بسبب ... متنوعون للغاية ..."

* 5. Do you think your country is talking about the topic of refugees at all? هل تعتقد أن بلدك يتحدث عن موضوع اللاجئين على الإطلاق؟

Yes, there is conversation about the topic of refugees.

No, there is no conversation about the topic of refugees.

Other (please explain)

* 6. Who (if anyone) is talking about refugees and migrants? من (إن وجد) يتحدث عن اللاجئين والمهاجرين؟

- Politicians سياسة
- My family and friends عائلتي وأصدقائي
- The people on the street الناس في الشارع
- The government الحكومة
- The news الاخبار
- My colleagues and coworkers زملائي وزملاء العمل
- Me أنا
- No one is talking about refugees or migrants لا أحد يتحدث عن اللاجئين أو المهاجرين
- Other (please explain)

* 7. Do you think the government of your country views refugees favorably? هل تعتقد أن حكومة بلدك ترى اللاجئين إيجابياً؟

No. The government does not think highly of refugees. The government is indifferent to refugees. Or, I don't know. Yes. The government is sympathetic towards refugees.

* 8. How do the people in your country **view** refugees and undocumented migrants? How would people in your country **describe** refugees and migrants? كيف ينظر الناس في بلدكم إلى اللاجئين والمهاجرين غير المسجلين؟

* 9. Do you think your country is welcoming to refugees and migrants and would wish them to stay within the country? هل يرحب بلدك باللاجئين والمهاجرين ويتمنى لهم البقاء هنا؟

* 10. What **laws** and **policies** does your country have regarding refugees and migrants? ما هي القوانين والسياسات التي لدى بلدك فيما يتعلق باللاجئين والمهاجرين؟

Finished! (Please click here submit your answers)

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