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Antitrust and Labor Markets: A Reply to Richard Epstein

Eric A. Posner
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Abstract. In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and Now, Richard Epstein argues that rather than urge courts and regulators to apply antitrust law to labor markets, reformers who care about labor market competition should try to constrain unions. In this reply, I argue that Epstein’s assumptions about labor market structure are contradicted by mountains of empirical evidence. The anticompetitive behavior of employers causes significant harm to social welfare—both in terms of economic output and equity. Antitrust law is a valuable tool for addressing America’s ailing labor markets.

In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and Now, Richard Epstein pours cold water on the recent efforts to strengthen antitrust enforcement in labor markets, arguing that reform should focus on curtailing the power of unions rather than enhancing antitrust law. As his fusillade is aimed partly at my recently published book, How Antitrust Failed Workers, I write this response to take issue with several of his empirical and normative claims. I also argue that an invigorated antitrust law, focused on labor markets, is more consistent with the classical liberal tenets that Epstein has famously championed than the pro-big business ideological position implicit in Epstein’s article. It also has much to offer other ideological strains that are ascendant in American politics, including progressivism and populist conservatism.

Epstein’s view of antitrust law reflects the skeptical take associated with the Chicago-school tradition. He believes that antitrust law should be used sparingly, mainly to counter the worst forms of abuse like price-fixing. While he sees a role for antitrust law in blocking mergers that would result in significant market concentration, he believes that markets are generally efficient—they tend to correct themselves because monopoly profits attract entry and technological change disrupts collusion—and that antitrust law is a crude way to correct markets even when they fall short. In Epstein’s view, the real threat to competition comes not from businesses but from workers who organize unions, and politicians who meddle with labor markets. Epstein believes that unions push wages above the competitive level, disrupt commerce, squelch growth, and discourage innovation like charter schools.

This view at one time enjoyed a high degree of influence but it is looking worse for wear these days. Numerous studies suggest that market concentration and accompanying price markups increased substantially over the last forty years of Chicago-school dominance of the

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courts and regulators. Not all economists blame lax antitrust enforcement. But there was never much evidence for the Chicago view, and the recent evidence that it has not improved competition, and may have worsened it, has prompted an overdue reassessment of antitrust law.

But my concern here is not antitrust law in general, but its role in countering labor monopsony, as is Epstein’s as well. In my book, How Antitrust Failed Workers, I argue (1) that labor monopsony, caused by concentration and other frictions, is a real problem for public policy; (2) that antitrust law formally applies to many labor market abuses; (3) that a “litigation gap” prevails, as antitrust law is used in product markets vastly more often, and with vastly more success, than in labor markets; (4) that this litigation gap cannot be justified by differences between labor markets and product markets; and (5) therefore regulators and courts should use antitrust law to address labor monopsony, and Congress should consider reforms.

Epstein does not contest (2) or (3), so I will not repeat the arguments here. Let me then focus on the other claims.

Is labor monopsony a real problem? At one time, many economists believed that labor markets were competitive, or anyway competitive enough that government intervention was rarely warranted. That view has lost favor. Study after study has provided evidence of labor monopsony, including studies that show that employees are not sensitive to wage changes, that minimum wage laws do not usually result in disemployment, that higher levels of concentration are associated with lower wages, that wages are dispersed rather than uniform for workers of equal productivity, and that mergers that concentrate labor markets reduce wages. A recent meta-analysis, published after my book, looks at 1,320 estimates of firm-level labor elasticity in 53 studies, and finds, after controlling for a range of factors including publication bias, that “the literature provides strong evidence for monopsonistic competition and implies sizable markdowns in wages.” While the authors’ estimate of firm-level labor elasticity is higher than

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8 For a discussion with citations, see Posner, How Antitrust Failed Workers at 11-29. See also Kevin Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings, and Inequality, 56 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 219 (2021), for a concise and up-to-date summary; and Alan Manning, Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Review, 74 ILR REV. 3 (2021). See also José Azar et al., Labor market concentration, 1 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 1218 (2020).

that of many of the studies they evaluate, their estimate reflects market-wide conditions, meaning that some markets will exhibit even lower elasticities while others are reasonably competitive.

Not all labor market frictions can be addressed by antitrust law, which is more concerned with concentration than with other frictions like search costs and job differentiation. But here the studies of Azar et al., Benmelech et al., and Rinz, leave little doubt that extremely high levels of concentration are common. Azar et al., for example, estimate that 60% of labor markets are characterized by HHIs higher than 2,500, and a quarter of labor markets have HHIs higher than an eye-watering 7,200. These high levels of HHIs suggest that mergers will often suppress wages, and that is indeed the findings of three recent studies. A nice real-world illustration is a recent hospital merger in Abilene, Texas, involving a hospital with 70.1% of the market of registered nurses and a hospital with 22.4% of the market of registered nurses. The Texas Health and Human Services Commission granted a certificate of public advantage to the merged hospital system even though it would result in single-firm control of 92.6% of the market of registered nurses, as the FTC pointed out in a public comment opposing the merger. Or, in terms of HHI, an already absurdly concentrated market (HHI north of 5,300) was taken to near black-hole level of more than 8,500.

Epstein does not cite academic work that provides evidence that labor markets are competitive. He simply asserts without citation that “[m]ost labor markets operate largely on competitive principles” except where unions exist and laws intervene to protect workers. He repeats the Chicago-school canard that when monopoly rents exist, “savvy entrepreneurs” will enter the market in order to capture a portion of them, ignoring decades of literature that shows how incumbents can block or buy out those potential entrants. The only empirical evidence he cites are turnover rates and the existence of a “labor shortage” in the middle of a pandemic. But turnover rates in isolation do not indicate the presence of labor market competition, moreover,

10 Azar, supra; Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages?, J. HUMAN RESOURCES 0119 (2018); Rinz, supra.
14 He could have; there are some studies that estimate relatively high elasticities. See Sokolova & Sorensen, supra. But Sokolova and Sorenson’s meta-analysis indicates that fairly low elasticities prevail. It is important to keep in mind that from an antitrust standpoint, the relevant issue is not the median or mean elasticity, which offers a general picture of labor markets but masks the distribution. It is clear that in many labor markets, elasticities are quite low, and if labor markets with high elasticities also prevail, that in no way offsets the problem.
15 See also id. at 711, 742-43, 765-66.
16 Epstein, supra at 743.
17 See, e.g., Steven Salop & David Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); and see Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra.
18 Epstein at 740-742.
19 See Venkataraman Bhaskar et al., Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 158 (2002) (“Some economists doubt the importance of labor market imperfections because of high levels of labor turnover, which seems to imply an active and flexible labor market. But, it is not the level of labor turnover that is important; it is the sensitivity to the wage.”). Epstein also acknowledges the existence of wage
while Epstein insists that turnover rates are “high,” he does not provide any basis for thinking that the numbers are high rather than low. As for the current labor shortage, many factors are involved, but it is fully consistent with monopsonistic labor markets. Businesses have faced a spike in demand since the pandemic downturn. In a competitive labor market, they would raise wages to attract additional workers so as to ramp up production. Instead, they have kept wages low or raised them only a small amount, which is the profit-maximizing strategy for labor monopsonists who accept reductions in output relative to the competitive ideal in order to minimize labor costs.

Epstein also argues that the labor monopsony theory is inconsistent with the economic good times that we have supposedly been enjoying until the pandemic brought an end to the party. He points to high stock market returns, but the high stock returns over a handful of years can mean lots of things, and certainly do not refute the labor monopsony hypothesis. Labor monopsony causes a transfer of wealth from labor to capital, and thus should lead to higher stock market returns, which mostly accrue to the wealthy at the expense of workers in monopsonized markets. Epstein also cites household income figures, which have been rising. But taken in isolation, they also tell us nothing. Labor monopsonists choose the wage where marginal revenue product equals marginal cost. Rising worker productivity over time will thus result in higher wages over time even if all employers are monopsonists. Whether household income is rising, falling, or steady, it is lower in a labor market characterized by monopsony or monopsonistic competition than it would be in a competitive labor market. In any event, the consensus view is that over several decades labor’s share of income has dropped steadily, though not necessarily because of a rise in labor monopsony; more likely, the decline of union density is the culprit. Economic growth has also stagnated over the last few decades, consistent again with monopsony (as well as monopoly), which lowers output.

Is the litigation gap justified? While Epstein does not address this question directly, he plainly believes that the litigation gap does not imply antitrust underenforcement in labor markets as I do. Epstein surveys the legal landscape and argues that antitrust litigation aimed at horizontal collusion in labor markets may be justified but he appears to be skeptical that such dispersion, which economists agree is evidence against competitive labor markets. Bhaskar et al., supra at 156 (“The existence of substantial wage dispersion among workers of very similar quality suggests that labor market imperfections are important and inevitably give employers some oligopsony power”).

20 Epstein, p. 748-749.
21 Henry Farber et al., Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data, 136 Q. J. ECON. 1325 (2021) (showing evidence of positive correlation between union density and income equality); see also Anna Stansbury & Larry H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193. On the decline of labor’s share, see Autor et al., supra at 646 (“there is a general consensus that the fall is real and significant”).
22 All that said, in contrast to the evidence on product market monopoly, there is no direct evidence that labor market concentration has increased, although there has been a big jump in the use of covenants not to compete, and other anticompetitive practices may also be on the rise. See, e.g., Rinz, supra; David W. Berger et al., Labor Market Power, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3844532; Alan B. Kreuger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers From Monopsony and Collusion, Hamilton Project (2018). The motivation for the labor-antitrust agenda is the high level of monopsony, which has apparently existed for quite a long time, and not necessarily any increase in labor monopsony in recent years.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3977736
collusion is common; that antitrust litigation aimed at covenants not to compete is unnecessary because common law regulation is sufficient; and that review of mergers for labor market effects may be justified but is usually unnecessary as product-side review will normally catch mergers that produce adverse labor-market effects.23 The overall impression, then, is that the status quo is sufficient.

The frequency with which collusion takes place in labor markets is an open question. Conspirators do not announce their conspiracies; conspiracies must be uncovered through painstaking investigation, often with the help of whistleblowers. For a long time, some economists and lawyers were skeptical that product market collusion took place with any frequency.24 But after investigative resources were ramped up, numerous conspiracies—many of them complex, and international—came to light.25 There is a good theoretical reason to believe that labor market collusion is common: because rational profit-maximizing CEOs know that the government criminally enforces the antitrust laws in product markets while mostly ignoring labor markets, and money is money whether it comes from labor market rents or product market rents, they ought to exploit labor markets rather than product markets on the margin. Since the Justice Department announced that it would begin criminal investigations of labor market collusion in 2016, it has brought three indictments, all just in the last year.26 The Kreuger and Aschenfelter analysis of franchise no-poach agreements shows that they were extremely common, used by 58% of major franchise brands, who collectively employed many millions of workers.27 A number of private actions have also been brought in recent years.28 The evidence thus suggests that labor market collusion is occurring, but we will have to wait before we know the magnitude of the problem.

With respect to covenants not to compete, several studies indicate that they do suppress wages, contrary to Epstein’s claims.29 How is this possible in light of common law regulation? The answer is that common law regulation varies across states, and in some states it is quite light; that common law regulation does not address marketwide impacts as antitrust law does, and so will tolerate noncompetes that cartelize labor markets but that do not cause significant harm to the worker in question; and, most important, that the common law sanction is

23 Epstein at 767-68.
24 Bork, supra. For a discussion, see Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra.
exceedingly weak—nonenforcement, while in some states courts will merely whittle down an overbroad noncompete to an acceptable size. Employers are clearly not intimidated by the law. Statistics showing that a vast number of low-skill workers are subject to noncompetes, which are almost certainly not enforceable, along with evidence that the wages of those workers are suppressed in states with high levels of noncompete enforcement, indicate that the noncompetes operate through an in terrorem effect. Only highly compensated employees can afford lawyers to contest noncompetes in court, and so everyone else doesn’t.

Nor is it correct that blocking mergers that cause excessive product-market concentration will necessarily, or even usually, address concerns about labor market concentration. Product markets and labor markets are different markets. They are rarely coextensive in area: labor markets are almost always local; product markets are frequently national. And even when they are coextensive, merger defenses will rarely be the same for product markets and labor markets. Product market concentration that may be acceptable because the merged firm obtains economies of scale in production may nonetheless be unacceptable because no efficiencies justify labor market concentration.

Epstein is correct that labor markets are generally smaller than product markets, and that therefore review of labor market effects will often be more administratively burdensome than review of product market effects. But the government already reviews mergers for their product market effects in local markets—as it must, if it is to estimate the impact of a merger of national chains that operate drug stores, restaurants, and other venues that serve local markets. The government also reviews many hospital mergers even though they usually impact local product markets. When mergers affect multiple product markets, as they often do, the government analyzes every impact in every product market that is substantially affected; why should it not look at labor markets, where harms and impacts can be greater?

Does antitrust law need reform to address labor monopsony? Epstein says no, and instead that reformers should oppose unions and licensing laws. My view is that antitrust law does not necessarily need legislative reform. The law is capacious enough already to address labor market abuses. Contrary to the views of some, the consumer welfare standard in antitrust law does not block claims by workers. Nor must workers who bring claims to block mergers and other practices prove that a remedy will benefit consumers. While every case produces winners and losers, antitrust applied evenhandedly to labor markets and product markets will, over time, benefit nearly everyone.

But only if regulators and courts take the right steps to enforce the law. I am more optimistic about the regulators than the courts. Regulators have shown a willingness to rethink legal interpretations and regulatory priorities in light of the new wisdom.30 The courts have the unenviable task of using the pinched interpretations of antitrust law by the Supreme Court to

address a new set of practices with which they have little experience. To set them in the right direction, legislative reform may well be necessary.  

Epstein argues that reforms should focus on labor law rather than antitrust law; he argues that labor organization causes grievous harm. My interest is antitrust law, and so I will not attempt to refute him. But his focus on unions seems odd at the present moment. The massive decline of union density in the United States from the 1950s to the present, and the fact that his decline coincides with slowing GDP growth, increasing inequality, and a decline in labor’s share of income, suggests that a further battering of labor organization should not be at the top of the list even for libertarians if they are concerned about the health of the economy and the strength of the social fabric. Moreover, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that the union wage premium results in wages above the competitive rate. Given the prevalence of labor monopsony, the wage premium more likely pushes wages toward but not above the competitive rate, thus enhancing rather than reducing the efficiency of labor markets.

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Labor monopsony is a problem, one that has received little attention from policymakers, legal academics, and even economists until recently. The problem is a difficult one, requiring different forms of legal intervention. Antitrust is not a panacea. But it is part of the solution. And it is an approach—rare in modern times—that should appeal to a broad range of ideological or political persuasions.

Start with the progressives. They are concerned about the political and economic power of big business; inequality; and the exploitation of labor. Labor-side antitrust should appeal to them because it offers a tool against those big businesses that benefit from labor market power; it should push up wages at the expense of capital; and it should therefore reduce inequality, as most people depend on their wages for their income and few people outside the upper middle-class and the wealthy invest in the stock market. While some progressives are skeptical about markets, and thus a bit alarmed that antitrust law helps workers by improving labor markets, they should at least see the law as tactically useful in the larger ideological battle.

Conservatives in the Trump years have exhibited a new concern about big business, which they accuse of imposing liberal values on workers and consumers, and about the plight of working-class and rural workers who have not benefited from economic growth for years. As they are reluctant to endorse an expansion of the social safety net and more progressive taxes, they should at least insist that antitrust law be used to protect workers as well as consumers. That labor-side antitrust enforcement should also increase output and unchain market forces should also please the remnants of the free-market wing of the Republican party.

32 Farber, supra; Summers, supra.
And that brings us to the classical liberals. Adam Smith, the classical liberal par excellence, displayed an attitude toward labor markets that is like night and day compared with Epstein’s:

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters [employers], though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people.  

This remarkable passage illustrates three propositions that modern libertarians have either forgotten or rejected: that employers “naturally” seek to combine in order to suppress wages; that this behavior is common rather than rare; and that no one ever talks about it despite the powerful interests and norms that bind employers.

Smith embraced the free market, but recognized markets that are monopolized or cartelized are not free but are controlled by private actors. After Smith’s time, the antitrust laws were developed to counter private market power in the spirit of Smith’s work. A century later, Smith’s insights were corrupted by conservative economists who insisted that markets self-correct—a view that has curdled into a pro-big business “corporatocratic” view, and that with every passing year becomes harder to sustain.  

Libertarians like Epstein should revive Smithian principles and endorse stronger antitrust laws to protect markets of all kinds, including labor markets. (And even if Epstein is correct that “over-enforcement” of antitrust law occurs in some economic sectors, that cannot possibly be a concern for the application of antitrust law to labor markets, as the history of underenforcement, bordering on non-enforcement, is more than a century old, and has hardly diminished in the last few years of ramped-up activity.)

The idea that labor-side antitrust law could appeal to today’s warring political factions might seem like a fantasy, but developments over the last decade indicate that this agenda may have legs. While Obama-era antitrust policy was restrained and indeed frequently criticized as excessively influenced by Chicago-school thinking, it was the Obama Justice Department that sued the Silicon Valley tech companies and issued the first guidance document warning firms against no-poaching agreements; and it was the Obama White House that first declared that...
labor monopsony was an antitrust problem. One might have expected the populist-conservative Trump administration to curb this agenda, but the Antitrust Division under Trump issued the first criminal indictments of executives for committing labor-side antitrust violations. And now the Biden administration, under the influence of progressives, has announced that labor-side antitrust will be an enforcement priority. Labor-side antitrust law is firmly based on theory and evidence, enough to appeal to policymakers from across the political spectrum. Epstein should join others in supporting it.

40 Malyshev & Boxer, supra.