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American Policing at a Crossroads

Stephen J. Schulhofer,* Tom R. Tyler,** and Aziz Z. Huq***

Abstract:

As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing and its crime control impact has receded. Terrorism has become the new focal point of concern. But satisfaction with ordinary police practices hides deep problems. The time is therefore ripe for rethinking the assumptions that have guided American police for most of the past two decades. This essay proposes an empirically grounded shift to what we call a procedural justice model of policing. When law enforcement moves toward this approach, it can be more effective, at lower cost and without the negative side effects that currently hamper responses to terrorism and conventional crime. This essay describes the procedural justice model, explains its theoretical and empirical foundations, and discusses its policy implications, both for ordinary policing and for efforts to combat international terrorism.

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American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative

As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing and its crime control impact has receded. Terrorism has become the new focal point of public concern. But the apparent satisfaction with ordinary police practices hides deep problems.

Public order successes have been achieved at great cost to politically powerless communities. As the controversy surrounding the recent arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates illustrated, our laws and the way they are enforced have resulted in public attitudes sharply polarized along racial lines, a division that is scarcely surprising in a nation marked by conspicuous racial disparities in its prison populations. And the costs of current strategic choices are no longer confined to minorities and the poor. Through its criminogenic impact, imprisonment has cross-cutting effects for the wider population, promising safety through deterrence at the same time that it increases victimization at the hands of former inmates. And these costs are compounded by fiscal consequences that are

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1 Gates was arrested at his Cambridge home, by police officer who suspected him of house-breaking. Though circumstances were disputed, many whites assumed the officer would not have acted without good reason, while others (especially blacks) found it unlikely that a middle-aged professor, standing on the porch of his own home, would have been viewed with suspicion and then arrested—if he had been white. See MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 16-21 (July 2010) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE] For the officer’s account, see Cambridge Police Dep’t, Incident Report # 9005127, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.samefacts.com/archives/Police%20report%20on%20Gates%20arrest.PDF. For Gates’ view, see Dayo Olopade, Skip Gates Speaks, THE ROOT (July 21, 2009) http://www.theroot.com/views/skip-gates-speaks?page=0,1.


3 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (rev. ed. 2006).

now impossible to ignore. In California, reliance on long-term imprisonment as a crime-control strategy has choked off funds for education and pushed the state to the brink of insolvency. Budget imperatives are forcing the state to reduce its prison population by 6500 inmates, even in the face of a recidivism rate of 70%, the highest in the nation. One prisoner brought home the dilemma and triggered widespread alarm when he was released early but then promptly re-arrested for attempted rape. In other places incarceration policies generate fiscal burdens that, if less dire, are nonetheless patently unsustainable. Highly stretched police forces from New York City to Tulsa, Oakland, Los Angeles and elsewhere are facing cuts in personnel, even in their high priority units.

The pressures have become especially acute because we can no longer subordinate conventional law enforcement to the newer preoccupation with terrorism. That domain was long seen as far removed from everyday policing. But government measures in this once-distant arena increasingly intersect with local efforts to control ordinary crime. And as we discuss below, the local

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7 See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, As States Wrestle with Budget Cuts and Crowded Prisons, Many Reevaluate Their Criminal Justice Codes, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at A20 (discussing states where cost constraints have forced prison releases; Kentucky granted early release to 3000 inmates).


policing practices currently favored in much of America are often in direct conflict with sound responses to the threat of terrorism.

The time is ripe, therefore, for rethinking the assumptions that have guided American police for most of the past two decades. Zero-tolerance policies, the order-maintenance model and their various cousins, for all their apparent success, must be reoriented to make room for different priorities. We see no need for a radical restructuring of the police function, but what we propose is nonetheless a significant shift in emphasis, a shift to what we call a *procedural justice model* of policing.

The procedural justice approach is grounded in empirical research demonstrating that compliance with the law and willingness to cooperate with enforcement efforts are primarily shaped not by the threat of force or the fear of consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’ belief that law enforcement agencies are *legitimate*. And that belief in turn is shaped by the extent to which police behavior displays the attributes of *procedural justice* — practices, described in more detail below, which generate confidence that policies are formulated and applied fairly, so that — regardless of material outcomes — people believe they are treated respectfully and without discrimination. When policing approaches the procedural justice model, law enforcement can be even more effective, at lower cost and without the negative side effects that currently hamper our responses to international terrorism. Indeed, the procedural justice model has direct relevance for the development of successful strategies within that domain itself.

In Part I of this essay, we situate the procedural justice approach by reviewing the principles that inform the police function and the ways they have changed over recent decades. Part II describes the procedural justice model and explains its theoretical and empirical foundations. Part III focuses on concrete policy implications for ordinary policing and for efforts to combat international terrorism. Part IV offers concluding thoughts.

### I. Changing Conceptions of the Police Function
A. Goals and Principles

From its beginnings in the early 1800s and for more than a century thereafter, urban police in America were a highly decentralized, politically attuned branch of municipal government, charged not only with preserving order but also with relaying citizen requests for city services and delivering benefits to constituents at the precinct and ward levels.10 As American cities mushroomed in size and density and as local political machines flourished, the police, deeply engaged in collecting and distributing patronage, occasionally brutal and often corrupt, became an indispensable arm of the ruling establishment.11 The title of one scholarly study summed it up: Police: Streetcorner Politicians.12 The dilemma of “law enforcement in a democratic society”13 – the need not only to endow officials with authority to deploy deadly force but also to preserve democratic control – precipitated what was widely seen as a “crisis of legitimacy.”

The solution that began to emerge in the 1950s, prominently endorsed by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967, was professionalization.14 Henceforth police were to be organized and managed as a highly trained civil service devoted to crime control, “insular, homogeneous, and largely autonomous,” with guarantees of independence from politics, and “purposely distanced” from the communities they were assigned to protect.15 Legitimacy came to be identified with professional norms, a military style of leadership, and a detached, reactive mode in which officers responded

when called for help but deliberately kept their distance from individuals in the local community.

The professional model bolstered one sort of democratic legitimacy (political independence) but undermined another – the authority grounded in the needs and preferences of the polity itself. Just at a time when broad grass-roots authenticity was becoming the hallmark of democracy, police were reaching for an elite mantle of detached expertise. Once again, their legitimacy suffered.

Two adjustments were brought to bear. One was substantive, the due process model through which the Warren and Burger Courts reaffirmed constraints on law enforcement power and insisted that they be enforced not only by the police bureaucracy but also by an independent judiciary.

The other adjustment was strategic. Emphasizing concepts like “community policing” or “problem-oriented policing,” law enforcement priorities were recalibrated. Police effort henceforth would be guided (or would claim to be guided) by the expressed preferences of “the community,” as revealed in listening sessions at the grass-roots and meetings with acknowledged or self-proclaimed community leaders.

Related, but with significantly different emphasis, “order-maintenance policing” made it a priority for police to address local problems, even those that did not rise to the level of grave crimes. Its widely accepted watchword was that

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19 See generally Moore, supra note 17; Jerome Skolnick & David Bayley, Theme and Variation in Community Policing, 10 Crime & Just. 1 (1988).

“‘[b]roken windows’ do need to be repaired quickly.’”

Unlike many versions of community-oriented policing, however, the order-maintenance approach sometimes assigned to the police themselves the responsibility for identifying disorder. One variant of this approach went a step further, from maintaining order to eliminating all forms of disorder. Its message was zero tolerance: even minor misconduct was to be systematically suppressed. Legitimacy would come not from participatory democracy but from effectiveness: police authority would be accepted and respected because it would achieve results.

Thus, for more than half a century, achieving and maintaining “legitimacy” has been a central preoccupation both for those who support law enforcement and for those who want to constrain it. But legitimacy has been understood in sharply different terms, alternatively constitutional (compliance with the rule of law), political (governance in conformity with community preferences) or instrumental (success in reducing crime). The politically charged disagreements have produced profound transformations, but one thing largely missing from the debates has been any effort to define precisely what “legitimacy” means or to measure it empirically. Instead, an apparent consensus about the importance of police legitimacy has masked radically different assumptions about what that is and how it can be achieved.

Conceptual ambiguity and empirical ignorance on issues of broad policing strategy are mirrored in conclusory debates about appropriate tactics for individual officers on the street. The debates, roughly speaking, center around competing preferences for being tough or being fair.

B. Tactical Choices: Toughness versus Fairness

Tough cops aren’t automatically unfair, and civil libertarians aren’t automatically soft, but being tough and being fair are often seen as in tension. And the perceived need to choose between them arises almost everywhere in policing and in criminal law generally: street stops, surveillance, Miranda, and so

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on. In each instance some people feel sure that social protection requires police powers unconstrained by procedural niceties, and others are equally convinced that harsh measures, if insensitive to individual rights, will prove counterproductive.

A similar argument arises in areas far outside of criminal justice. During the Vietnam War, the issue was framed as a debate about whether we should burn down villages sympathetic to the Viet Cong or focus instead on winning hearts and minds. The same dilemma is now one of our military’s biggest preoccupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A commentator who admires former President Bush recently said that we must “project global power and military might [or else our] hegemony will be challenged.” A recent op-ed in the New York Times derided our focus on hearts and minds in Afghanistan; the author argued that it was more important to kill Taliban than to worry about civilian casualties. General Charles Krulak, a former commandant of the Marine Corps, takes exactly the opposite view. He claims that we have to use power sparingly because “the fundamental precept of counterinsurgency” is to “undermine the enemy’s legitimacy while building our own.”

Many Americans have little doubt that in each of these areas the tough approach, whatever its moral drawbacks, at least will make them safer. Another group feels equally sure that being tough can be counterproductive. The impact of toughness on effectiveness may be the most fundamental question in the whole field of social conflict and social control. Though the question is undeniably empirical, it is rarely treated as such; across the political spectrum, nearly everyone assumes that it can be answered on the basis of confident intuitions about the essence of human nature.

For police officers, toughness has not always been preferred. In the early days of modern urban policing, Sir Robert Peel stressed that “[t]he police must


secure the willing cooperation of the public” and that “[p]olice should use physical force . . . only when the exercise of persuasion, advice, and warning is insufficient.”25 Yet in more recent times, a preference for toughness has long held unquestioned sway. Indeed toughness has often been defended as beneficial for everyone. Police scholar William Muir described the mind set of those who believed that “[t]he nastier one’s reputation, the less nasty one has to be.”26 Skolnick and Fyfe concur, adding that “[c]ops and everyone else understand the reality of this paradox. And whether or not they actually articulate it, cops develop styles of policing in response to it.”27 Skolnick and Fyfe are quick to note that the tough style is not always successful.

The instinctive preference of the cop on the beat for the tough approach to policing style was potentially in tension with the notion that police agencies should be “problem-oriented” or “community based.” But that tension dissolved with the emergence of the “order maintenance” approach, with its emphasis on aggressive street stops, along with “proactive enforcement of misdemeanor laws and zero tolerance for minor offenses.”28 Meetings with neighborhood groups evolved from the orientation required in “community based” models – a reciprocal problem-solving conversation – into “a bland, one-sided, impersonal opportunity for city bureaucrats to manufacture consent” for measures they had already decided to implement.29

Although early assessments suggested that the order-maintenance approach was “working” (i.e. reducing crime), more careful analysis made clear


26 Muir, supra note 12, at 126.

27 Jerome K. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force 95 (1993). Skolnick and Fyfe are quick to note, however, that the tough style is not always successful.


that aggressive street-level enforcement did not make cities safer. Similarly, the research does not support the widely held belief that police are always safer if they seek to dominate the situation by force; when police react to perceived threats by displaying force, their actions often escalate the conflict.

How could it be that energetic policing, with a high volume of street stops, searches and arrests was not helping to reduce crime or protect officer safety? One place to look for a possible answer is the tradition that sees the legitimacy of official authority not through the lens of constitutional law, politics or economic efficiency, but rather from the perspective of social psychology.

C. Legitimacy as a Psychological Attribute

The psychological model of legitimacy posits that people obey the law, irrespective of expected rewards and penalties, when they view the government as worthy of trust and respect. The theoretical foundation is in the work of Max Weber, who argued that legitimacy in this psychological sense was the key to the effectiveness of the State. People must believe “that some decision . . . is entitled to be obeyed by virtue of who made the decision or how the decision was made.”

In the context of criminal justice, a large body of research confirms the links between perceived legitimacy and willingness to obey the law. To be sure, potential criminals are sometimes influenced by straightforward material incentives. People who steal cars or rob banks often take into account the chances of getting caught. There is much evidence that they can be influenced to commit

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30 See Harcourt, supra note 28, at 6-11, 59-121. See also Hubert Williams & Anthony M. Pate, Returning to First Principles: Reducing the Fear of Crime in Newark, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 53, 67 (1987) (order-maintenance policies in Newark failed to achieve their goals).


32 MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills eds., 1946).

their crimes at different times or places. And sometimes potential sanctions induce them to commit the offenses less frequently or not at all.\textsuperscript{34}

But research also finds strong support for the psychological legitimacy model. In many situations, people obey the law not because of fear of getting caught but simply because they view the legal authorities as legitimate and believe that legitimate authorities should be obeyed.\textsuperscript{35} Perceived legitimacy is assessed through a “trust and confidence” index, which asks people to express their degree of faith in various public institutions, as measured by their belief that officials are trustworthy, concerned about the welfare of those with whom they deal, able to protect citizens against crime, and otherwise doing their jobs well. People who express a high degree of confidence in public authorities comply with the law either because of social influence (they want to avoid the disapproval of their social group) or because of internalized moral norms (they want to see themselves as decent people who do the right thing).\textsuperscript{36} Legitimacy thus enables authorities to maintain social order almost automatically, without incurring the heavy costs required by instrumental strategies relying on arrest, adjudication and incarceration.\textsuperscript{37}

How can the police build this valuable attribute? The empirical research finds that this sort of legitimacy is sustained not by an aggressive style that subordinates individual rights but rather by something closer to its opposite – practices that can be grouped under the heading of \textit{procedural justice}.

\section*{II. The Procedural Justice Model}


\textsuperscript{36} See \textit{id.} (using survey data to determine influence of different factors upon compliance);\textit{Error! Bookmark not defined.} Paul H. Robinson \\ & John M. Darley, \textit{The Utility of Desert}, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468 (1997) (summarizing this research).

The procedural justice concept captures the perceived fairness of the process used to make and apply rules, and the quality of the personal treatment people receive from authorities. Fairness in decision making involves such matters as whether police are viewed as unbiased and consistent, and whether they give people opportunities to be heard before they take action. Fairness of treatment involves such matters as whether police are courteous and respectful of people and their rights.

Conventional wisdom posits that the primary issue for people dealing with legal authorities is the outcome of the interaction. It is assumed, for example, that when a driver receives a traffic ticket, he is likely to be upset, but that if the encounter ends without issuance of a ticket, the driver is more likely to be happy. But empirical research tells a different story. An extensive body of data demonstrates that while people are happier when they do not receive an unfavorable result (such as a traffic ticket), the principal factor shaping their reactions is whether law enforcement officials exercise authority in ways perceived to be fair. And this is true for both those who do and those who do not receive the unfavorable result. These findings have been replicated using a wide array of methodologies (field research, panel studies, experimental studies) in “dozens of social and organizational contexts.”

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The implications of this research for policing tactics are obvious but seldom appreciated. When police ramp up their arrest rates for low-level offenses like vandalism and vagrancy, the broken windows hypothesis suggests that neighborhood residents should be pleased by these efforts to combat disorder. But opinion surveys often confound that expectation, finding that where arrest rates for these offenses rise or where other “crack-down” tactics are implemented, approval of the police has declined. In light of the research we have canvassed, these results are not mysterious: toughness, if implemented without fairness, is likely to arouse resentment rather than appreciation.

By contrast, toughness with fairness can be productive. In a study that interviewed New Yorkers both prior to and following a personal experience with the police, people who received a negative outcome from an officer who treated them fairly tended to view the police as more legitimate and were significantly more willing to cooperate with the police than they had been before that encounter. As a result, the police can take actions to control crime and build legitimacy at the same time.

The assumption that there is a zero-sum trade-off between individual rights and public safety is therefore far too simple. When perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy decline, people’s willingness to obey also declines, but when authorities build their legitimacy, then people are more willing to comply with the law. And importantly, procedural fairness matters in similar

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42 Brooks, supra note 2, at 1225; WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 15, 118 (1990).


44 See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 555 (2003). Some suggest that this line of argument glosses over a causal ambiguity: Citizens’ perceptions of procedural fairness may be “colored by [their] views about the legitimacy of the police or courts.” David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 29, 32-33 (T. Tyler et al. eds. 2007). If so, perceived legitimacy may shape perceptions of procedural fairness, rather than the other way around. The legitimacy research has used a variety of strategies to exclude this possibility. See, e.g., Tyler & Fagan, supra n. 43, at
ways for White, African-American, and Hispanic respondents, with only minor variations reflecting differences in the issues that are most salient to different ethnic groups.45

Few would argue that compliance can never be achieved in the absence of procedural justice. Obedience can still be obtained, but only through intensive enforcement and harsh punishment. And that route – the one America has largely followed since the 1960s – is not only expensive from the start, but it can trigger a downward spiral. Harsh repression enhances material incentives for compliance, but it weakens perceptions of fairness and thus the willingness to comply voluntarily. And that effect requires yet another increase in the use of aggressive enforcement measures, a step which in turn weakens voluntary compliance even more.

Most of the research testing the legitimacy model has focused on willingness to violate the law. But recent research also examines the links between procedural justice, legitimacy and police capacity to secure cooperation from the general public.46

When police are combating crime and disorder, they need the help of the community.47 People who discover a criminal in hiding have to decide whether to report him. When a crime is occurring, they have to make a similar decision. They may also be asked to attend community meetings to discuss policing strategies or to participate in activities such as neighborhood watch. In all these cases police success in fighting crime depends upon public cooperation. And cooperation is a more fragile commodity than compliance, because it is easy for

251 (using panel data to measure judgments of legitimacy and procedural justice before and after encounters with the police).


people not to cooperate: When does a mere bystander face penalties for not reporting a crime or for not attending a community meeting? People must want to cooperate with the police.

Yet in many low-income African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods, anti-snitching campaigns and other signs of mistrust make clear that even where citizens are law-abiding and desperate to have safe neighborhoods, their cooperation with the police cannot be taken for granted.48

The research on cooperation finds that willingness to assist the police – for example, by reporting suspicious behavior or by participating in crime prevention programs – is strongly linked to people’s belief that police authority is legitimate. And that belief is strong only when officials exercise their authority fairly. Conversely, when perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy decline, willingness to cooperate also declines.49 In one study, procedural fairness was more than twice as important for securing cooperation as judgments about police competence or the fairness of outcomes.50

In short, an emphasis on fairness appears to be central to police success in maintaining social order. Even though tough enforcement measures seem to increase an offender’s probability of apprehension and conviction, the net effect of tough measures can be the opposite, and not only because toughness tends to chill voluntary compliance. Toughness also chills cooperation from the law-abiding community. That reduced cooperation in turn decreases the probabilities of apprehension and conviction, and those effects in turn decrease even the involuntary compliance achieved through the threat of sanctions.

III. Policy Implications of the Procedural Justice Model

49 See Lyons, supra note 29, at 536, 538 (profiling and other tactics resented in minority communities “make it more difficult for citizens in those communities with the information we seek to communicate [it] effectively . . . . Effective partnerships . . . only produce the desired forms of cooperation when they operate as a mechanism to increase understanding, trust and respect among the parties . . . ”)
50 See Tyler, Legitimacy, supra note 37, at 379-80 (comparing influence of perceived legitimacy and police effectiveness on willingness to cooperate).
In this Part, we discuss the implications of the procedural justice research for concrete policy measures in two areas of conventional policing – control of ordinary crime and control of misconduct by the police themselves. We then turn to its implications for domestic counter-terrorism policing.

A. Controlling Ordinary Crime

The zero-tolerance and order-maintenance models of policing, along with other instrumental approaches, emphasize efforts to control crime by increasing the density of police on the street and the frequency of street stops. For example, a Chicago initiative aimed at containing misbehavior by unruly youth and gang members led police over a three-year period to order over 89,000 individuals to disperse and resulted in the arrest of over 42,000 people on charges of “gang loitering.”\(^{51}\) From 2003 to 2007, the number of street stops in New York City rose 500\%, even though the crime rate was stable.\(^{52}\) And these stops were disproportionately concentrated among minority group members.\(^{53}\) Data from other jurisdictions show similar patterns.\(^{54}\)

The procedural justice research described above suggests, however, that these efforts can be counterproductive. To the extent that stop-and-search practices and frequent arrests for low-level public-order offenses are seen as harsh or racially selective, as they apparently are in many urban communities,\(^{55}\) these practices tend to impede compliance and voluntary cooperation with law enforcement. “[I]ntensive frisks and needless arrests can often be a source of


\(^{52}\) Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies, and Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING (S.K. Rice & M.D. White eds. 2009).


\(^{54}\) In Los Angeles, for example, in 2003–2004 there 4,569 stops per 10,000 African American residents, but only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white residents. See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department 5-7 (October 2008), http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47.

\(^{55}\) See text at note --, supra.
friction,” thereby “undermining the very sense of legal legitimacy they were
designed to foster.”\footnote{R. Collins, \textit{Strolling While Poor: How Broken-}
Windows Policing Created a New Crime in Baltimore}, 14 \textit{Geo. J. Poverty L.
& Pol’y} 419, 426 (2007). See also Delgado, \textit{supra} note 48, at 1202; Babe K. Howell,
\textit{Broken Lives from Broken Windows: the Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing}, 33

The damage can be especially great when street sweeps and arrests for
“loitering” bear down on youth who are perceived as threats to a well-ordered
community. The views of children and adolescents about law and the courts are
shaped by many factors, including parents, teachers, gangs, the media, and
interactions with the police.\footnote{Jeffrey Fagan \\& A. R. Piquero, \textit{Rational Choice and Developmental Influences on Recidivism Among
Adolescent Felony Offenders}, 4 \textit{J. Empirical Leg. Stud.} 715 (2007).} Because adult orienta-
tions toward the law are often formed during adolescence, these precursors of adult attitudes are crucial. A
considerable literature inspired by the “broken windows” hypothesis has posited
that norms of law-abiding behavior can be nurtured by a strong law enforcement
presence that exerts control over public spaces, stigmatizes gang membership and
drives disorderly youth off the streets.\footnote{See, e.g., Martin S. Jankowski, \textit{Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society} 193-202
(1991); Debra Livingston, \textit{Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Spaces}, 97 \textit{Colum. L. Rev.}
551, 640-42 (1997).} Yet the empirical research canvassed here suggests the opposite – that intensive law enforcement and a readiness to arrest
for low-level offenses is far more likely to arouse resentment, weaken police
217 (2005). See also Tracy Meares, \textit{The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men}, 92
\textit{Marq. L. Rev.} 651 (2009). To be sure, further research is needed to clarify the links between adolescent
experience and adult attitudes toward authority.}

Tactics that emphasize procedural justice can be equally effective, with
fewer negative side effects. In the procedural justice model, officers are not
oriented toward addressing situations primarily with the threat of force. Instead
officers would be trained to view every citizen contact as an opportunity to build
legitimacy through the tone and quality of the interaction, with force a last resort.

Although police leaders long paid lip service to the importance of gaining
community trust, concrete steps to further this goal were either nonexistent or (as
in the community policing movement) centered on discussion forums largely divorced from the daily activity of the cop on the beat. More recently, police departments across the country have begun to make more tangible efforts, but only in discrete programs of limited scope. An innovative Boston initiative engaged inner-city ministers and other community leaders in an effort to convince at-risk youth to steer clear of firearms.\textsuperscript{60} In High Point, North Carolina, police managed to shut down open-air drug markets by offering dealers a dignified opportunity to avoid arrest in return for a commitment to abandon the drug trade.\textsuperscript{61} A Chicago program has reportedly succeeded in reducing violence and recidivism by organizing discussion forums in which gun offenders on probation or parole meet with police officers, neighborhood residents and social workers for discussions in which their concerns are treated with respect and their needs are addressed with support instead of only threats of punishment.\textsuperscript{62} As many as seventy-five cities reportedly are now implementing legitimacy-inspired initiatives of this kind.\textsuperscript{63} Although the value of such programs is now widely recognized, police departments have yet to fully appreciate their psychological basis and their relevance to the full range of policing activity.

Obviously, forcible street stops should not be withdrawn from the law enforcement arsenal. Stops based on objective indications of a serious offense are almost always warranted, and they need not trigger community mistrust if police pay attention to what happens during such stops. Indeed the available data suggest that although African-Americans resent high levels of arrest for public-order


\textsuperscript{63} See Meares, supra note 59, at 665 & n.95. See also MARK KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS (2009) (discussing strategies to reduce crime with less reliance on arrest and incarceration).
offenses, their approval of the police is “positively correlated with arrest rates for more serious offenses.”

Thus, where stops are carefully initiated, police would not have to reduce their frequency. But even then, the procedural justice approach emphasizes a need for change: police departments must focus on altering the dynamics of police-citizen interaction. Instead of seeking to instill fear or project power, officers would aim to treat citizens courteously, briefly explain the reason for a stop, and (absent exigent circumstances) give the citizen an opportunity to explain herself before significant decisions are made.

These elements of procedurally fair interaction go well beyond constitutional minimums, which typically focus on limiting what the government can do. But many requirements of constitutional law and criminal procedure do limit the way that government power is exercised. Even when officers have probable cause and a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment normally requires them to knock, announce their presence, state the basis of their authority, and give the homeowner an opportunity to admit them peaceably. Officers normally must give the homeowner a copy of the warrant, to provide official confirmation of their authority and the limits on the permitted scope of the search. After the search, they must deliver an inventory of items seized, to establish a record of their actions and a readily understood basis for challenging unauthorized conduct. These requirements, so often celebrated in Fourth Amendment tradition, are not about limiting the tangible burdens government may impose;

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64 Brooks, supra note 2, at 1225-26.
66 The obligation to provide a copy of the warrant is typically grounded in statutes or court rules but generally has not been treated as a Fourth Amendment requirement. See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure §3.4, at 177-78 (3d ed. 2000).
67 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (basing this requirement on Fourteenth Amendment due process rather than the Fourth Amendment).
68 See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 532, 533 (tracing lineage of the knock-and-announce rule back to the 13th Century and finding that it “was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law”).
indeed the traditional abhorrence of clandestine searches\textsuperscript{69} is hard to understand from a purely material perspective. The point of these requirements is essentially the same as that which the procedural justice findings stress – the importance of government’s perceived legitimacy, sustained by actions that build trust and treat citizens with respect. The \textit{Miranda} warnings were designed to serve the identical purpose, communicating to the suspect that officers will treat him with dignity and acknowledge his rights.\textsuperscript{70}

There is no reason, however, for police conceptions of fair treatment to stop with the constitutional minimum. In connection with street stops, operational guidelines within each department could formalize appropriate steps, such as the need for courteous treatment, the obligation to give the citizen a reason for the stop and a chance to explain the circumstances. In this spirit, the review committee established to examine the Gates incident in Cambridge cautioned that “actions that police take to protect their safety and the safety of others can seem cold, insensitive, or overly authoritarian. . . . Whatever police can reasonably do to explain the reasons for the interaction and de-escalate a situation is vital to the peaceful resolution of the encounter.”\textsuperscript{71} Such steps could be made a routine part of every officer’s behavior on the beat. With their low cost and potential for high crime-control payoff, changes like these are a smart use of limited police resources.

As a simple way to put such priorities into practice, officers could easily carry and give to those they stop a card containing a short statement of the rules that govern police stops. The card would enumerate the rights that must be respected (including the right to have the reasons for the stop explained and the

\textsuperscript{69} See, \emph{e.g.}, United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (clandestine search permissible only when secrecy is “essential”); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (when circumstances justify clandestine search, notice to homeowner must nonetheless be given within seven days; extensions of this period permissible only on a “strong showing of necessity”).

\textsuperscript{70} Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 460 (1966) (in the absence of warnings, custodial interrogation “trades on the weaknesses of individuals” and is “destructive of human dignity”; “the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the respect a government – state or federal – must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”).

\textsuperscript{71} See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, \textit{supra} note 1, at 27.
right to tell their side of the story before decisions are made) and the procedures for complaining about unfair treatment. Such efforts help communicate to the public that procedural justice principles are taken seriously.

Because trust in the police varies dramatically across racial lines, policing methods must be especially attuned to racial sensibilities. Of course that point in itself is not new. But we can illustrate the need for a new emphasis by considering the issue of “profiling” and the Gates incident in particular. Traditionally the study of racial profiling has focused upon whether reliance on racial markers actually occurs. We might ask, for example, if Officer Crowley took into account Professor Gates’ African-American appearance or whether the police generally profile minorities. To do so we would collect statistics on street stops, adjust them for actual rates of offending in the target population, and analyze the data to determine if the police stop African-Americans more often than is justified by objectively based concerns about crime.

Following the argument of this paper, however, the Gates case (and other minority experiences with the police) would be approached from a different perspective. People generally view racial profiling as unfair, and when police action leads people to feel they have been profiled, it prompts hostility. This response was evident when Professor Gates reacted to his perception that his treatment was explained simply by the fact that he was a “Black man in America.” The belief that the police are using unfair procedures delegitimates their authority and leads people to resist it.

This finding has two important implications. First, a person can be strongly affected by police contact even if nothing legally significant happens. Even when people are not arrested, they can still feel disrespected, and this will change their views about the police. As a consequence, experiences need to be evaluated in terms of their influence upon the person’s views about the police, not just in terms of whether people were arrested and searched, or why (from the

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72 See p. --, supra.
74 See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1.
officer’s perspective) he decided to act. Even trivial incivilities contribute to a climate of illegitimacy. The Supreme Court, along with countless other observers, has repeatedly missed this point.\textsuperscript{75}

Second, people can have a \textit{positive} experience even when the police take some potentially unwelcome enforcement action (searching their car or giving them a ticket). As a result, police can act to control crime and build legitimacy at the same time. In a study that interviewed New Yorkers both prior to and following a personal experience with the police, people who received a negative outcome from an officer who treated them fairly tended to view the police as \textit{more} legitimate and were significantly \textit{more} willing to cooperate with the police than they had been before that encounter.\textsuperscript{76} In short, police who treat people even-handedly and with respect can reinforce their legitimacy even when they act firmly and aggressively.

Of course, these implications have relevance to much more than just race relations. The research on legitimacy establishes that America’s policing model for dealing with people in all communities and of all ethnicities needs to change.

\textit{B. Police Misconduct}

Attention to legitimacy is important for another sort of compliance – compliance by police officers themselves.

Nearly all existing models of policing posit that an officer seeking to prevent crime and disorder \textit{wants} to exert force (conducting stops, searches and arrests) and that this desire is held in check by an unwelcome, externally imposed constraint – the obligation to remain within constitutional boundaries. Professor Herbert Packer captured this notion and etched it into several generations of

\textsuperscript{75} See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding authority of vice-squad officers to make arrest for failure to signal a turn, whether or not their action was pretextual). Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 563 (1976) (“objective intrusion” held “minimal” because of stops’ “public and relatively routine nature,” even though stops were made “on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry”) \textit{with id.} at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that the “experience [would be] particularly vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively referred, knowing that the officers’ target is the Mexican alien.”).

\textsuperscript{76} Tyler & Fagan, \textit{supra} note --, at 261.
criminal procedure scholarship with his influential paradigm contrasting the “crime control” and “due process” perspectives.\footnote{Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1960).}

In this view, police who disregard search-and-seizure rules may face penalties (suppression of evidence, civil damages or administrative sanctions), and such penalties are assumed to encourage compliance through the instrumental logic of deterrence. The officer considers every stop and every search as potentially beneficial, but she must weigh those benefits against potential sanctions. When the officer can foresee that an exclusionary rule applies, the expected costs will outweigh benefits, misconduct will be deterred and compliance with constitutional norms will be achieved. Conversely, if an officer cannot foresee the prospect of an exclusionary sanction, her behavior supposedly cannot be affected. For the current Supreme Court, this logic has become an analytic obsession, as a majority of the Justices now approach nearly every issue concerning the exclusionary rule by examining the details of presumed deterrence effects under particular circumstances.\footnote{See e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (exclusionary rule applies only when exclusion can “meaningfully deter” police misconduct; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596-97 (2006) (same); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (same). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (exclusionary rule may not be invoked to suppress fruits of an illegal search that did not violate the defendant’s personal rights).}

From a legitimacy perspective, assessments of this sort (whatever their conclusions) are profoundly misguided. The empirical research makes clear that fear of sanctions by itself generates only weak, poorly motivating incentives, which in turn produce at best a sullen, resentful, imperfect form of compliance. And this is exactly what we often observe in the case of police officers asked to comply with the rules of search and seizure. Indeed, the payoff from instrumental deterrence in that context is especially poor, just as we would expect, because those rules and their accompanying sanctions enjoy little legitimacy in the eyes of the police to whom they are addressed. Like the exclusionary rule and for similar
reasons, damage suits and institutional reform litigation have had only mixed success in changing the culture of police organizations.79

The legitimacy perspective makes clear that seeking to compel change through suppression remedies, lawsuits and consent decrees can have only limited effectiveness, because the police then seek ways to avoid detection and accountability. Just as with achieving compliance by the public, so with the police, we need to change what they want to do.

The difference between Fourth and Fifth Amendment requirements is telling here. Police compliance with the rules of search and seizure is always in doubt; evasion and even outright perjury are sometimes the officer’s preferred course.80 In contrast, although police interrogators occasionally flout the Miranda rules or interpret them grudgingly, for the most part they follow Miranda and give the warnings routinely. The reason is simple: police have learned that they benefit from compliance, because the Miranda warnings tend to put suspects at ease, create a (false) sense of security and thereby help officers to get confessions.81

The procedural justice model is promising from this perspective because the changes in police practices it calls for82 are simple to implement and relatively inexpensive. More important, they benefit the police themselves, not just outside citizens and “bad guys.” By projecting sensitivity to procedural justice, officers build their legitimacy and nurture public support. They thereby gain community respect, enhance the safety of their working environment, and create conditions likely elicit greater cooperation in fighting crime. Over time fewer police and prisons are needed, and resources can be redirected to other social priorities. The


80 See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82-83 (1992) (documenting pervasive police perjury used to avoid exclusionary rule in important cases).


82 See p. --, supra.
police are gradually transformed from an occupying force into genuine partners with all components of the community, minorities and the poor included.

We do not doubt the importance of penalties such as the exclusionary rule and will have more to say about them in a moment. But reform of police organizations must start from inside. Articles that make a seemingly similar point – for example, urging reliance on internal police guidelines and administrative sanctions – are too numerous to count, but nearly all proposals of this sort lack an essential feature: positive motivation. The empirical findings make clear that police must want to follow such guidelines, whether or not they will be caught violating them.

Creating positive motivations for compliance is essential not only to insure respect for citizen’s rights but also to achieve adherence to a broad range of internal operational standards and norms. A working environment conducive to those motivations involves several elements. The management literature develops them in detail, and we do not propose to discuss them in depth here. But the key ingredient is worth emphasizing, though it is obvious from what we have already said, because the criminal-procedure and organizational-reform literature almost always assumes that ingredient to be missing and unattainable. The ingredient, of course, is the legitimacy of the rules in question. And by legitimacy here, we do not mean a legal or constitutional legitimacy grounded in a duly enacted text. Rather, as we have stressed throughout, the key concept is social and psychological legitimacy, from the perspective of the target audience whose compliance is sought. Officers must come to understand that the requirements of procedural justice serve their own interest, apart from their constitutional pedigree and even when (as with many of the fair-treatment dimensions of procedural justice) they are by no means constitutionally mandated.

Tone from the top. Attaining this sort of legitimacy begins with the “tone from the top.” Police leaders must emphasize the value of building public support, helping citizens to feel comfortable and safe rather than threatened by the police

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presence. Leaders must communicate that while force will always have a role in policing, that role should be as a last resort, one that should seldom need to be used.

**Recognition and reward.** Police reward structures also need to be reshaped, so that building legitimacy in the community is viewed as a goal of equal importance to issuing traffic tickets and making arrests. If officers believe that their advancement, compensation, and respect in the eyes of their leadership are linked to their ability to create legitimacy and motivate cooperation, they are more likely to follow the principles of procedural fairness in their behavior on the street.

When considering incentive structures, it is important to think beyond material rewards. Studies of work organizations suggest that the impact of material rewards generally flows through their role in signaling management respect for employees and their contributions. Employees want to know that their efforts are valued by their superiors.\(^{84}\) Studies of police organizations indicate that one of the best ways to communicate respect is to follow the principles of procedural justice (fair decision-making and fair interpersonal treatment) in dealing with officers themselves. Officers in the ranks should be afforded a voice in the formulation of the rules that govern their performance, and they must feel fairly treated in connection with internal discipline and civilian review board procedures. Officers who feel respected are more likely to accept departmental policies as legitimate and to comply with them voluntarily.\(^ {85}\)

Correspondingly, officers need to believe that their adherence to these policies will be recognized by their superiors. Being able to reward the police in this way requires new sorts of data. Routine efforts to follow up on police-citizen contact can verify compliance with procedural justice principles and reinforce a procedural justice culture within the police department. Police statisticians must

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move beyond their preoccupation with clearance rates to measure trends in public confidence in the police and in public evaluations of the fairness of police practices, both among those who have had personal experiences with the police and in the community generally. Such data-collection efforts nurture the legitimacy of procedural justice norms in the eyes of the cop on the beat while also signaling to the public that support for these norms is genuine within the police department itself.

The Exclusionary Rule. If the perceived legitimacy of the rules governing police behavior is the key to compliance, and if instrumental incentives have little bite, can we dispense with sanctions like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule? The question is by no means merely academic. A chorus of scholarly voices has argued that changes in urban politics and in the demography and professionalism of the police have made obsolete the judicially enforced criminal procedure restraints developed by the Warren and Burger Courts in response to police oppression of minorities. And the Supreme Court itself seems increasingly ready to gut the exclusionary rule or abandon it completely. There is much to be said on the other side of this debate, but here we focus solely on the research findings concerning procedural justice and legitimacy.

From its inception, the exclusionary rule has reflected two distinct, though complementary concerns. One is the desire “to deter – to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way – by removing the

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86 E.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 41, at 1169-70.

87 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (rejecting the rule that suppression is presumptively mandated for all illegally seized evidence and holding that “police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 596, 597 (2006) (exclusionary rule should be applied only where deterrence benefits outweigh its “massive” social costs, and because “much has changed” since 1961, exclusion is not necessarily justified today simply because that remedy was held necessary “in different contexts and long ago”).

88 The Fourth Amendment at its inception had nothing whatever to do with preventing racial oppression, and to the extent that this concern has greater salience today, it is not plausible to suggest that American policing tactics have rendered it obsolete. In any event, there is no evidence to support (and much evidence to contradict) the Court's assumption in Hudson, 547 U.S., at 597-98, that civil damage liability provides all the deterrence needed. See id., at 609-11 (Breyer, J. dissenting); Herring, 129 S. Ct., at 710 n.6 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“professionalism is a sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy, not its superfluity”); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 579-82 (2008) (same).
incentive to disregard it.”89 But in adopting the exclusionary rule in *Mapp v. Ohio*, the Court also stressed that “there is another consideration, the imperative of judicial integrity.”90

For both Holmes and Brandeis, “judicial integrity” was the decisive point. As Brandeis put it, exclusion of tainted evidence is essential “to maintain respect for law [and] preserve the judicial process from contamination.”91 The objective, he said in one of his best known opinions, is not to tip the balance of an individual officer’s incentives but to protect the foundations of government itself: “Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; . . . it invites anarchy.”92 Justice Brennan urged the same view, emphasizing that suppression of tainted evidence “assur[es] the people . . . that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.”93

In its latest opinions, the Court acknowledged that this perspective dominated at the outset, but declared that “we have long since rejected that approach.”94 Instead, the Court now insists that exclusion is justified solely by potential deterrence of police misconduct, and it gives that rationale a newly constrained form. Two conditions must be met: there must be “appreciable” deterrence and in addition, “to the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighted against [its] substantial social costs.”95 As a result, exclusion now is “our last

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91 *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); *id.* at 469 (Holmes, J. dissenting) (“[I]t is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part”).

92 *Olmstead*, 277 U.S. at 483-85 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).


94 *Hudson*, 547 U.S., at 591 (acknowledging that “[e]xpansive dicta in *Mapp* . . . suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule.”).

95 *Herring*, 129 S. Ct., at 700-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
resort, not our first impulse.” And raising even further this barrier to a suppression remedy, the Court seems to have set aside the long-standing rule of exclusion for the fruits of objectively unreasonable police searches and arrests; instead “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” This new approach gives the police, and is expressly designed to give the police, much greater freedom to secure convictions by using illegally seized evidence.

The present Court’s assumption that suppression inflicts substantial costs, by weakening our ability to impose criminal punishment, is of course the polar opposite of the Brandeis view that it is the failure to suppress that will breed lawlessness. As an a priori matter, neither view is intrinsically implausible. But the empirical research canvassed here has direct relevance for this debate. And those studies provide compelling support for the Brandeis insight on which the exclusionary rule originally rested. Indeed, Justice Brandeis’s reasoning presciently expresses the best current understanding of the connections between legitimacy, procedural justice and the control of crime.

As we have developed in detail throughout this paper, the research regularly finds that people comply with the law not primarily because of fear of sanctions but rather because they believe that authorities who have legitimacy should be obeyed. And such legitimacy flows from people’s confidence that officials are trustworthy, that they abide by the law, and that they treat citizens with respect. Official disregard for the law – made evident when misconduct can be openly exploited to prosecutorial advantage in court – is the kind of behavior that, the research establishes, tends to weaken perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement.

Opponents of the exclusionary rule sometimes suggest that the notion of “judicial integrity” argues against suppression of illegally seized evidence.

96 Hudson 547 U.S., at 591.
97 Herring 129 S. Ct., at 702.
98 See p. xxx, supra.
Contrary to Brandeis, they insist that because suppression can allow obviously guilty defendants to go free, it *undermines* public confidence in the criminal justice system. The legitimacy research has not tested this sort of claim in the specific context of the exclusionary rule. But the general question this argument poses – whether legitimacy is shaped more strongly by police effectiveness than by procedural justice – has been studied in depth across a wide variety of law enforcement situations. And the findings are consistent: in virtually every context studied to date, law enforcement effectiveness has displayed at best only a weak influence on perceived legitimacy, while procedural justice concerns are strongly linked to legitimacy, voluntary compliance and willingness to cooperate.

Against this background, relaxation of the exclusionary rule represents a direct assault on the capacity of police and the law enforcement system to succeed in their mission of maintaining social order. To be sure, a prosecutor’s ability to use illegally seized evidence increases her capacity to secure a conviction and a long sentence, an unequivocal crime control benefit if viewed strictly in the short term. But the strong and consistent finding of the relevant research is that the net effect of law enforcement powers like these is likely to be the opposite, because judicial tolerance for Fourth Amendment violations will generate disrespect for authority, chill voluntary compliance and discourage law-abiding citizens from offering the cooperation that makes it possible to apprehend and convict other offenders in future cases.

Controlling ordinary crime and controlling police misconduct thus are closely connected. And if we are to succeed at both, procedural justice concerns must be placed at the center of attention.

**C. Domestic Counterterrorism**

Terrorism is generally considered a problem to be distinguished from ordinary wrongdoing. Like efforts to combat drug trafficking and some forms of...
organized crime, preventing terrorist attacks requires close attention to international linkages, and federal enforcement agencies take the lead. Yet terrorism differs significantly from other sorts of transnational criminality. Its motivations are usually political rather than financial, its potential for social harm is vastly greater, and its connections to foreign policy and armed conflict are more prominent. Partly for those reasons, the structure of law enforcement is distinctive. Local policing is sometimes relegated to an afterthought; the federal government is expected to play, and does play, an overwhelmingly dominant role.

In light of these contrasts, the applicability of the procedural justice approach to counterterrorism can hardly be taken for granted. Yet criminal justice theory and the dynamics of terrorism both suggest that this model has powerful relevance. And the empirical research specific to this context, though less comprehensive than that in the area of ordinary crime, confirms its importance at all levels, from grand strategy in the federal agencies to the daily behavior of the cop on the beat.

Start at the place that usually gets the least attention – local policing. Despite the widespread assumption of federal primacy, law enforcement officials increasingly recognize that local police must play significant role. Collaboration has even been channeled through formal institutions such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces and “fusion centers.”

In part, the growing involvement of local police flows from perceived changes to the nature of terrorist challenge. In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, the threat was perceived as a largely foreign-source affair. The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate played down threats of domestic origin and identified the growing strength of al Qaeda in western Pakistan as the principal danger to the United States. In late 2009 this perception began to change with a series of allegations concerning terrorism conspiracies developed within the United

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102 National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland 3 (July 2007). The National Intelligence Estimate summarizes “the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues.” Id. at 2.
States. The 2010 National Security Strategy warned that “recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States” demonstrate “the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home.” Of 202 people charged with serious terrorist crimes since September 11, 2001, more than half have been U.S. citizens, and over one-third of those have been American-born.

These new threats give local law enforcement increased prominence, but its importance is now acknowledged even in connection with dangers emanating abroad. A recent RAND Corporation report, drawing from global counterterrorism experiences, notes that terrorism is largely a policing problem, not a military matter, because local police are best able to build relationships with the communities in which terrorists try to hide and recruit members. The report urges police to “actively encourage and cultivate cooperation by building stronger ties with community leaders.” Another RAND report observes that “state and local law enforcement agencies … may be uniquely positioned to augment federal intelligence capabilities by virtue of their presence in nearly every American community [and] their knowledge of local individuals and groups.” These conclusions are consonant with a broader stream of thought that understands global terrorism as a form of “insurgency” most easily defeated by winning the loyalty of the communities in which terrorists may be found. Even in foreign

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104 The President of the United States, National Security Strategy 19 (May 2010).

105 Greenberg, supra note 103, at 6-7.

106 SETH G. JONES & M.C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR COUNTERING AL QA’IDA (2008).

107 K. J ACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR ix (2005); accord Gary LaFree & James Hendrickson, Building a Criminal Justice Policy for Terrorism, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2007) (“In many ways the community-oriented approach favored by successful police departments is the same kind of approach that is most likely to uncover terrorist operations.”).

108 See, e.g., DAVID KILCULLEN, COUNTER-INSURGENCY (2010).
theaters of military operation, heavy firepower, though still favored by some,\textsuperscript{109} is increasingly de-emphasized in favor of at least partial reliance upon measures akin to domestic policing.\textsuperscript{110}

Local police thus play a crucial role, by virtue of their familiarity with neighborhoods and their ability to elicit information held within domestic communities. And with counterterrorism as with policing against conventional crime, community cooperation is essential if the police are to perform this role successfully. Moreover, as with traditional policing, cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, cooperation may be even more fragile in the context of counterterrorism than in ordinary law enforcement: Law-abiding members of the relevant community, though unswervingly loyal to the United States, know that cooperation could mean exposing people with whom they share close ethnic and religious ties to unusually harsh procedures and sanctions. Shaping sound policy to navigate these sensibilities is thus vitally important but exceptionally delicate.

Law enforcement agencies, however, do not follow a unified approach. The decision to opt for policing rather than a military model leaves open important choices. One is whether to focus on intrusive enforcement and intelligence-gathering methods that promise instrumental gains (at possible cost to perceived legitimacy), or whether instead to emphasize long-term efforts to build community trust. Second, where priority is given to the objectives of trust and cooperation, should those goals be pursued primarily by a “top down” approach (building ties to community leaders, as recommended in the RAND report), or should officials emphasize a “bottom up” policy stressing the quality of interaction with individuals in ordinary street-level encounters?

In Dearborn, Michigan, which has an Arab American community of 200,000, law enforcement has made the maintenance of good police-community relations a “major concern.”\textsuperscript{111} In other cities, relations between Muslin-
American communities and local police departments are strained.\textsuperscript{112} At the federal level, community outreach has not been ignored,\textsuperscript{113} but policy has been dominated by measures that relax procedural restraints on investigation and detention, while expanding substantive criminal offenses to reach behavior with only tenuous connections to acts of violence.\textsuperscript{114} From the general public to many of our highest officials, it is often considered self-evident that tougher measures will pay greater dividends.\textsuperscript{115} In Britain, in contrast, those who lead the counterterrorism effort often stress that success depends on building community trust by adhering to traditional conceptions of due process.\textsuperscript{116} In short, no unified approach to counterterrorism policing has emerged. Instead, officials commonly emphasize intrusive or coercive tactics without examining their collateral costs, or focus on generating cooperative relationships with Muslim community leaders while neglecting the character of daily interactions at the grass roots. A central issue is to determine which approaches yield the best results in terms of security.

The available empirical evidence offers stark warnings about the potentially counterproductive effects of harsh measures. A study of British counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland found that of six high-visibility


\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., former Vice President Dick Cheney, quoted in John F. Harris, Mike Allen & Jim Vandehei, \textit{Cheney Warns of New Attacks}, \textit{Politico}, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18390.html (accessed on June 9, 2009) (stating that counterterrorism is “a tough, mean, dirty, nasty business . . . . [W]e’re not going to win this fight by turning the other cheek….The United States needs to be not so much loved as it needs to be respected. Sometimes, that requires us to take actions that generate controversy.”

\textsuperscript{116} See, e.g., Peter Clarke, \textit{The Courts and Terrorism: Transatlantic Observations}, Lecture at NYU Law School, April 15, 2009 (copy on file with the authors) (stating, as former chief of counter-terrorism in London’s Metropolitan Police, that “[f]or deeply pragmatic reasons, . . . it is absolutely essential to adhere to due process. . . People . . . must have confidence and trust in the authorities. . . . They must believe . . . that information . . . will not be used . . . to stigmatize their communities or to justify extrajudicial action.”).
crack-down initiatives, only one had an observable deterrent effect.\textsuperscript{117} Two others had no statistically significant impact, while two intrusive policies were associated with significant \textit{increases} in violence.\textsuperscript{118} The researchers hypothesized that erroneous arrests and the adoption of internment without trial contributed to this backlash by undermining the legitimacy of anti-terrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, several studies have found that perceived injustice on the part of U.S. forces in Iraq is a strong predictor of support for resistance there.\textsuperscript{120}

Turning to counterterrorism tactics in the American domestic context, many thoughtful scholars have suggested that the heightened threat environment post-9/11 justifies wider use of ethnic profiling\textsuperscript{121} and other enhanced police powers, such as greater ability to establish roadblocks and checkpoints.\textsuperscript{122} Yet we have already noted the potential negative impact of such policing activities; in the context of ordinary law enforcement, zero-tolerance measures have often backfired, encouraging crime and discouraging cooperation by creating resentment in minority communities.\textsuperscript{123} A similar problem could well defeat efforts to augment counterterrorism powers. Indeed, because terrorism is a relatively dispersed and infrequent phenomenon, posing a threat to a near-infinite range of symbolic targets and typically using operatives with no prior record of terrorist activity, accurate and timely information to separate genuine threats from background noise has enormous value, and community cooperation therefore


\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.} at 32-34.

\textsuperscript{119} The sixth intervention studied by LaFree, et al. involved a shift from military methods to locally administered criminal justice procedures, treating captured terrorists as ordinary criminal suspects in an effort to delegitimate their cause. The detainees responded with a hunger strike to obtain a return to “prisoner-of-war” status. Further anti-British animosity resulted, and violence subsequently increased. That finding underscores the point that both deterrence and backlash effects can be highly sensitive to context.


\textsuperscript{122} \textit{E.g.}, William J. Stuntz, \textit{Local Policing After the Terror}, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2139-40 (2002).

\textsuperscript{123} See p. xxx, \textit{supra}.
assumes even greater than usual importance. To the extent that terrorist groups
seek either to recruit or hide within co-religionist communities, cooperation can
provide information at lower cost and with fewer negative side effects than
coercive or intrusive forms of intelligence gathering.

That said, we cannot assume that findings from ordinary law enforcement
will apply in a straightforward way to counterterrorism policing. Because
terrorism is motivated by ideology rather than desire for material gain, co-
religionists or members of the same ethnic community may share some
ideological perspectives with those who plan acts of terror; as a result, law-
abiding individuals may be reluctant to put politically radical members of their
communities at risk, even when they themselves oppose violence. In addition,
because al Qaeda invokes religious justifications for its goals and methods, the
religiosity of law-abiding Muslims could conceivably alter the importance of
procedural justice for securing their cooperation. Finally, because links between
procedural justice and willingness to comply or cooperate have not been found in
all societies, recent Muslim immigrants who have lived under repressive
governments could conceivably have different notions of legitimacy or its
importance for cooperation.

To test the links between legitimacy, procedural fairness and cooperation
in communities impacted by counterterrorism enforcement, we conducted
extensive interviews and random polling of Muslim-American residents of New
York City. We found little evidence that religiosity, cultural differences, or
political background play a significant role in determining willingness to
cooperate, nor does strength of identification with the Muslim community,
disagreement with American government policies on Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel,
or instrumental concerns such as a belief that the police are effective. In

strongly as in other cultures to procedural unfairness).

125 [citation blocked for anonymity].

126 *Id.*
contrast, as in the case of conventional law enforcement, we found a strong association between willingness to cooperate with anti-terrorism policing and perceptions of procedural justice. ¹²⁷

One way to test the force of these relationships is to look separately at groups that have particular views about law enforcement or terrorism. For example, people who consider the terror threat very serious presumably will be much more willing to cooperate, and their willingness might not be affected so much by whether they think police actions are intrusive or procedurally irregular. Likewise people who consider the police effective and people who are inclined to defer to authority presumably will be willing to cooperate, and again their willingness might not be affected so much by whether they think police practices are fair.

To look at those possibilities, we divided our sample into people who think that the terror threat is serious (or not), people who think the police are effective (or not), and likewise for the other pairs of attitudes. Table 1 below, drawn from the New York data, shows these relationships.

[TABLE 1 HERE]

¹²⁷ *Id.*
Table 1
Relationships Within Prior-Attitude Subgroups

Police behavior and perceived procedural justice as correlated to Muslim-American willingness to cooperate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Attitudes</th>
<th>Public/clandestine police action</th>
<th>Police targeting of minorities</th>
<th>Procedural justice of the police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror is serious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police help you feel safe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for law enforcement authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for Heirarchy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-.27***</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are subgroup correlations with a combined measure of legitimacy and cooperation.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Part of what Table 1 shows is not surprising. Among people who think the terror threat is not serious, willingness to cooperate is reduced substantially by perceptions that the police use intrusive tactics, target minorities or act unfairly. We see roughly the same effect in the upper row of the other pairs as well. In other words, among people who can be considered law enforcement skeptics (people who prefer liberty to order, don’t accept hierarchies, and think the police are not effective), cooperation drops substantially when police are perceived as intrusive or unfair. These are largely the results we would expect, but they underscore the importance of fairness for cooperation among a substantial segment of the population.

When we look at the lower row of each pair, those who think terrorism is a serious problem and generally favor law enforcement authority, we see in column 1 that cooperation isn’t affected by the use of intrusive tactics, and we see in column 2 that with one exception, cooperation isn’t even affected by targeting. These people seem more focused on instrumental payoffs than on legitimacy. They are generally willing to accept intrusive tactics and even targeting of people in their own community when they accept hierarchical authority and consider the police effective.

But two relationships are less predictable. First, even when these respondents consider the terror threat very serious, cooperation drops substantially if they believe the police are targeting people in their community. And second, in the lower row of all of these pairs (i.e. even among those who broadly support law enforcement), the third column shows that cooperation drops substantially, with very high statistical significance, when police use unfair procedures, such as stopping people without explanation, denying them any opportunity to be heard, and failing to treat them with courtesy. In other words, for all of these subgroups, regardless of prior attitudes about the police, civil liberties, and so on, perceptions of procedural justice have a major impact on willingness to cooperate.

We can illustrate the concrete impact of these relationships by separating the respondents into quartiles based on the extent to which they saw the police as respecting (or not respecting) the requirements of procedural justice. We can then
focus on willingness to cooperate within each group. By highlighting the differences between the groups, Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the consequences of failing to nurture perceptions of procedural fairness.

[TABLES 2 and 3 HERE]
Table 2
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans

(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in policy creation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief that Policy is:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>percent of each quartile willing to:</th>
<th></th>
<th>percent of each quartile willing to:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Work With Police</td>
<td>Alert Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>+9 pts (+11%)</td>
<td>+30 pts (+61%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans
(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in enforcement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief that Policy is:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>percent of each quartile willing to:</th>
<th>percent of each quartile willing to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforced Fairly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Work With Police</td>
<td>Alert Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>+24 pts (+62%)</td>
<td>+17 pts (+41%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These tables show the direct effect of procedural justice on cooperation. Table 2 focuses on perceived fairness in establishing counterterrorism policies. When people believe that overall policies are established fairly, willingness to work with the police rises by 11%, and even more strikingly, willingness to report suspicious activity rises by 61%. That 61% figure is an increase of enormous significance for successful intelligence gathering: Fairness in establishing policies makes it 61% more likely that people in this community will be willing to report suspicious behavior.

Table 3 shifts the focus to perceived fairness in enforcement. When people believe that policies are fairly implemented, willingness to report suspicious activity increases by 41% and willingness to work with the police increases by 62%.

One somewhat unexpected finding is that willingness to work with police in anti-terror initiatives is only modestly affected by fairness in the formation of policy but is extremely sensitive to fairness in enforcement. In contrast, willingness to alert the police is sensitive to both sorts of fairness, but in the reverse order: it is much more sensitive to whether overall policies are established fairly. We suspect that because working with the police is local and personal, willingness to do so is more strongly driven by the trustworthiness of officials nearby than by large questions of policy, such as the decision whether maintain a detention camp at Guantánamo Bay. Conversely, willingness to report suspicious activity seems more likely to be affected by respondents’ perceptions of overall systemic fairness: how such information will be processed by higher officials and how fairly suspects will be treated once they come to law enforcement attention. If so, it makes sense that willingness to report would be very sensitive to perceived fairness of the system as a whole but less affected by respondents’ trust in officials with whom they and their neighbors interact in the neighborhood.

Dynamics of this sort can of course be explored in considerably greater detail. But the existing research is already ample to establish our two central points. First, apart from any civil liberties considerations, tough measures that skirt traditional conceptions of due process take a substantial toll on law
enforcement effectiveness. And second, procedural justice concerns accordingly should be allotted a central place in all efforts to design and implement counterterrorism policy. As in other contexts, sensitivity to procedural justice serves to promote rather than impair the security effort.

IV. Conclusion

This is an ideal moment to reconsider the principles that guide American policing. If we can adopt policing styles that communicate respect and nurture public trust, we can address the central concerns of both minority and majority populations.

Research consistently shows that Whites and minorities want the same thing from the police: fair treatment. Minorities are, however, more apt to say that historically they have been treated unfairly and that they do not receive fair treatment even now. This perceived unfairness leads to lower legitimacy ratings, less deference to the law among minorities and lower levels of cooperation with the police.

Addressing these concerns involves reframing the way we think about the goals of policing, in the context of both counterterrorism and ordinary law enforcement. At all levels, government agencies must pay attention to public judgments about how they exercise their authority, because such judgments shape the behaviors that are of primary importance to the police, in particular the willingness of individuals to obey the law and their willingness to cooperate in efforts to enforce the law against others.