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Abstract
This Article explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's longstanding discrimination against corporate political speech. This Article also explores the relevance of state law regulation of corporate political speech to the competition between the states for corporate charters. The underlying aim of this Article is to bring to bear on the relevant policy debates a shift in focus from the shareholder/manager agency relationship to the agency relationship between lawmakers and society. The Article draws on the contractarian view of the firm, the economic theory of regulation, and the study of public choice.
Recommended Citation
Sitkoff, Robert H.
(2002)
"Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters,"
University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 69:
Iss.
3, Article 13.
Available at:
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol69/iss3/13