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1179
Abstract
This Article defends the practice of reasoning by analogy on the basis of its epistemic and institutional advantages. The advantages identified for analogical reasoning include that it produces a wealth of data for decisonmaking; it represents the collaborative effort of a number of judges over time; it tends to correct biases that might lead judges to discount the force of prior decisions; and it exerts a conservative force in law, holding the development of law to a gradual pace. Notably, these advantages do not depend on the rational force of analogical reasoning. Rather, the author contends that, as open-ended reasoning and analogical reasoning alike may sometimes result in incorrect decisions, these qualities of analogical reasoning make it a desirable method of deciding legal disputes.
Recommended Citation
Sherwin, Emily
(1999)
"A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law,"
University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 66:
Iss.
4, Article 3.
Available at:
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol66/iss4/3