Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics
Publication Date
2012
Publication Title
Law & Economics Working Papers
Abstract
This Article classifies the consumer protection techniques that European contract law employs into four categories: Mandatory arrangements; disclosure; regulation of entry to and exit from contracts; and pro-buyer default rules and contract interpretation. It argues that these techniques are far less likely to succeed than advocates, including the European Commission, believe, and that they may bring about unintended consequences and hurt consumers. The techniques and their limits are illustrated through a study of the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL). The Article argues that the ambitious pursuit of consumer protection goals is also likely to interfere with the other main goals of European contract law: harmonizing the laws of member states, encouraging cross border trade, and improving consumers' access to markets.
Number
598
Recommended Citation
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, "Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 598, 2012).
Additional Information
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